United States Sentencing Commission

United States v. Tabb, 949 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2020). New York second-degree attempted assault is a crime of violence under the force clause of §4B1.2. A conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2 even though the text of the guideline does not include conspiracies. The language in Application Note 1 does not conflict with the text of §4B1.2 and does not expand the definitions in the guideline.

United States v. Nikolla, 950 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2020). Threatening violence in furtherance of an extortion plan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2020). New York first-degree manslaughter is not violent felony under the force clauses of the ACCA and the career offender guideline. The statute can be violated by “an omission despite a duty to act,” which is complete inaction with the intent to cause serious physical injury. In addition, the statute does not match generic murder, manslaughter, or aggravated assault under the enumerated offenses clause of the career offender guideline.

United States v. Thompson, 961 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2020). New York attempted sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree is not a felony drug offense triggering a § 851 enhancement. The state crime is not a categorical match to § 802(44)’s definition of felony drug offense because New York regulates hCG, a pregnancy hormone, which is not included in the federal analog under § 802(44).

Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Johnson, 153 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding that the ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague), did not itself recognize that the residual clause contained in the pre-Booker Guidelines was unconstitutionally vague and thus does not trigger a different (and much later) limitations period for raising this claim in a § 2255 motion.

Gray v. United States, 980 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2020). Assaulting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), is a crime of violence under § 924(c).

United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020). Assault with intent to rob a postal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. A2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. A “controlled substance” means any substance controlled by the jurisdiction of conviction, not substances controlled by federal law.

United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020). Attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The “substantial step” needed to establish attempted Hobbs Act robbery “need not be violent.”

United States v. Runyon, 983 F.3d 716 (4th Cir. 2020). Carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and conspiracy to commit murder for hire where death results in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), are crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

United States v. Al-Muwwakkil, 983 F.3d 748 (4th Cir. 2020). Virginia attempted rape and Virginia burglary are not violent felonies under the ACCA.

Dotson v. United States, 949 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2020). In very limited circumstances, the government may “substitute” an ACCA predicate offense if another predicate was deemed ineligible. The defendant’s ACCA enhancement could stand because the defendant had notice of the substituted prior conviction. It was included in the indictment and presentence report, and the defendant clearly had knowledge and a belief, albeit mistaken, that the offense in question had served as a predicate during trial and appellate proceedings.

United States v. Carter, 961 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2020). Iowa aggravated assault is a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a).

United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020). Illinois possession with intent to deliver cocaine is not a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 851’s sentence enhancement provision. The statute is indivisible and is broader than “felony drug offense” because it includes positional isomers. The offense is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2 because the guideline definition is broad and covers “any category of behavior-altering or addictive drugs. . .”

United States v. Glispie, 978 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2020). Illinois residential burglary is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

United States v. Smith, 981 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2020). Iowa aggravated assault is a crime of violence under §4B1.2. Though the statute is divisible, the defendant was convicted of the section of the statute that required force.

United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020). Assault of a federal officer with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 is a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s force clause. Additionally, Georgia possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a predicate drug offense under both the Armed Career Criminal Act and the career offender guideline.

United States v. Jones, 951 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2020). Colorado second-degree burglary is a “violent felony” under the ACCA because the statute’s definition of “dwelling” satisfies the generic offense of burglary.

United States v. Walker, 953 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2020). California willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant is a violent felony under the ACCA because it requires “a direct application of force on the victim.” (emphasis in original)

United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020). Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is a crime of violence under § 924(c). An attempt to commit a crime of violence, such as Hobbs Act robbery, is also a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is also a crime of violence.

United States v. Baldon, 956 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2020). California carjacking is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a).

United States v. Asuncion, 974 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2020). A felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) excludes offenses punishable by imprisonment for one year or less. A guidelines system is relevant to determining whether an offense is punishable by more than one year if that system “sharply limit[s] the judge’s discretion to impose a sentence above the range.” A guidelines system is not relevant to that determination if that system provides “broad discretion to go above the range.”

United States v. Bautista, 982 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2020). Arizona attempted unlawful transportation of marijuana for sale is not a “controlled substance offense” under §4B1.2(b). The statute is both indivisible and overbroad because it includes hemp in its definition of marijuana.

United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020). Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2020). Texas possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is not a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. The statute prohibits “offers to sell,” which constitute an attempt to commit a controlled substance offense. Inchoate offenses cannot qualify as predicate offenses because the guidelines commentary that includes them “impermissibly ‘add[s] to’ the Guidelines.”

United States v. Armes, 953 F.3d 875 (6th Cir. 2020). In determining the elements of a prior conviction, courts may consider the relevant part of an undisputed PSR that characterizes the contents of an underlying Shepard-approved state court record, such as an indictment or plea agreement.

United States v. Brown, 957 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under § 924(e).

United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio preparing for shipment, shipping, transporting, deliver, preparing for distribution, or distribution of a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale to another person is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Garth, 965 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee possession of marijuana with intent to deliver is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b) because it criminalizes the same conduct as the federal offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.

United States v. Cordero, 973 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2020). Murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2.

United States v. Alston, 976 F.3d 727(6th Cir. 2020). Ohio statute prohibiting selling or offering to sell a controlled dangerous substance is overbroad and indivisible and is not a controlled substance offense under 4B1.2.

United Stated v. Palos, 978 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio cocaine trafficking is not a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. The statute criminalizes attempts to sell, and Sixth Circuit precedent dictates that “controlled substance offense” does not include attempts.

United States v. Wilson, 978 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio aggravated robbery is “twice divisible” and the modified categorical approach is required to determine whether the defendant was convicted of a section of the statute that is a violent felony under the ACCA.

United States v. Jackson, 984 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2021). Kentucky second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2.

United States v. Jackson, 984 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2021). Kentucky marijuana trafficking is a felony drug offense subjecting the defendant to a longer mandatory minimum penalty.

United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 2020). Section 3E1.1(b)’s 1-level reduction for timely notification of the intent to plead guilty requires a government motion, but a government motion is not enough. The court must also determine whether the defendant’s notification of his intention to plead guilty came early enough to permit the government “to avoid preparing for trial” and “to allocate [its] resources efficiently.” A court may not deny this reduction based on a defendant’s filing a suppression motion requiring a hearing, because “preparing for a jury trial involves more work than preparing for a suppression hearing.”

United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020). The court did not err in applying §3B1.1(a)’s four-level adjustment for aggravating role in criminal activity involving five or more participants. The court, “albeit clumsily” articulated, relied on the number of individuals who provided patient referrals (participants), not the number of patients who those individuals referred (victims).

United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020). The court did not err in applying §3C1.1’s two-level adjustment for obstruction. The defendant directed a participant in an illegal kick-back scheme to lie to investigators about the basis for the defendant’s payment to the participant.

United States v. French, 976 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2020). A two-level increase for obstruction of justice under §3C1.1 applied where the defendant made social media posts calling his co-defendant a “rat” and accusing him of “snitching for time cuts.” Even though the government did not intend to call the co-defendant as a witness at the sentencing, the posts were made with the intent to keep the co-defendant from cooperating with law enforcement.

United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2020). The court should not have applied the 2-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight at §3C1.2 in a case where the defendant threw a firearm while fleeing from the police. The government did not prove by a preponderance that dropping the weapon presented a risk that the gun would discharge.

United States v. Hill, 982 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2020). The only Chapter Three adjustments applicable to career offenders is acceptance of responsibility under §3E1.1. The career offender guideline overrides other Chapter Three adjustments such as mitigating role.

United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly in applying §3B1.1(c)’s two-level adjustment for aggravating role. The defendant’s girlfriend testified that the defendant instructed her how to package drugs for sale, directed her to conduct deliveries, ordered her to install a lock on the door where the drugs were stored, had her purchase a firearm and ammunition to protect the drug conspiracy, and managed funds derived from and used in the conspiracy.

United States v. Guidry, 960 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 2020). The time spent in custody on a “probation modification” “in lieu of revocation” is included when determining the length of a prior sentence for purposes of calculating criminal history.

United States v. Jesse, 950 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2020). A prior indeterminate sentence not to exceed two years’ imprisonment counted as a sentence of more than one year and one month yielding three criminal history points, even though a subsequent order showed the defendant’s sentence was discharged after she served 332 days. The subsequent order did not vacate the original indeterminate sentence.

United States v. Doran, 978 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 2020). Retroactive reclassification of a prior offense from a felony to a misdemeanor satisfies §4B1.2’s definition of a felony. If the failure to account for retroactive reclassification results in an overstated criminal history, the Guidelines permit a departure under Application Note 4 to §4B1.1.

United States v. Zerba, 983 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2020). The court properly awarded restitution under the plea agreement, in which the defendant agreed “to pay full restitution to all victims of the offense(s) including relevant conduct victims,” even though the victim was a participant in the underlying criminal conduct and was not directly harmed by the criminal conduct to which the defendant pleaded guilty.

United States v. Razzouk, 976 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2020). “When determining whether the [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act] offense-against-property provision applies to a conviction, courts may consider the facts and circumstances of the crime that was committed to determine if it is an “offense against property” within the meaning of the MVRA.”

United States v. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2020). A supervised release condition requiring sex offender treatment, which allowed probation to select the treatment provider and treatment schedule, was not an impermissible delegation. And, neither the challenge to the condition requiring verification testing (arguing that it unlawfully permitted the use of the unreliable computerized voice stress analyzer) nor the challenge to the standard risk condition (arguing impermissible delegation) were ripe.

United States v. Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2020). A supervised release condition requiring truth verification testing, which permitted probation to select the testing method, was not an impermissible delegation.

United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020). The court erred when it imposed a condition of supervised released prohibiting the defendant from “communicating or interacting with someone . . . who has been convicted of a felony.” Although the standard condition usually requires no explanation, as applied to Bryant, the condition implicated his liberty interest in communicating with a close family member. Therefore, a specific justification was required.

United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020). When classifying a violation under §7B1.1(a), a court may consider a state recidivism enhancement to determine whether the violation conduct constituted an offense punishable by more than twenty years’ imprisonment.

United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020). A court may consider the seriousness of a defendant’s violation conduct when revoking supervised release, but it may do so only to a limited degree. The court did not violate this principle here: “the impact of the defendant’s actions on her victims is no doubt a legitimate component of [the severity of the violation conduct],” and the court articulated “a host of supporting reasons [for its sentence], many of which did not concern the severity of the violation.”

United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2020). The court failed to explain adequately its decision to impose four special conditions related to the defendant’s use of computers. The offense, engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in a foreign country, did not involve computers, and the conditions might limit the defendant’s future job prospects.

United States v. Ellis, 984 F.3d 1092 (4th Cir. 2021). The court abused its discretion when it imposed special conditions of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from accessing the internet and possessing adult pornography. Both conditions were overly broad and not reasonably related the purposes of sentencing.

United States v. Woods, 949 F.3d 934 (6th Cir. 2020). A defendant sentenced for a violation of supervised release was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, because the sentence related to his original drug offense. However, the court was not required to grand a reduction.

United States v. Brown, 947 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2020). The court correctly determined that the defendant had committed Missouri second-degree assault, a grade A supervised release violation under §7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i), rather than simple assault. When the defendant lunged at the deputy and placed his hands on the deputy’s weapon with intent to remove it, the court explained, he took a substantial step toward committing assault with at least the threat of violence.

United States v. Sterling, 959 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2020). A condition of supervised release that required the defendant to disclose “any” financial information requested by the probation office, including unexpected financial gains, was vague and overbroad. There was no evidence that the defendant committed monetary crimes or was at risk of doing so in the future. The condition imposed a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) and it was not necessary to protect the public under §5F1.5(b).

United States v. Porter, 974 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not give undue weight to an impermissible sentencing factor, that is, respect for the law, in revoking the defendant’s supervised release. The court’s respect-for-the-law comment was relevant to the defendant’s breach of trust, and in explaining its decision, the court began with a discussion of the defendant’s history and characteristics.

United States v. Abney, 957 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2020). A defendant has a right to make a statement before being sentenced for violating probation or supervised release. The defendant preserved his objection to the denial of this right by informing the sentencing court that he wanted to “say something.” Even assuming that the error was unpreserved, the failure to permit a defendant to speak before sentencing would be plain error.

United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d 1072 (7th Cir. 2020). USSG 1B1.2(d), which addresses a conspiracy to commit more than one offense, requires a court to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, not the preponderance standard, to find which object offenses the defendant conspired to commit.

United States v. Rodriguez-Pena, 957 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2020). The court erred in applying an 8-level enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(2)(B) (2016) based on a conviction sustained before the defendant was first ordered removed, and that error was obvious. The court, while noting the need for the current sentence to be longer than the prior sentence for the same offense, tethered his decision to the incorrect Guidelines range.

United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2020). A 26-level upward departure in an immigration fraud case was not plain error. The defendant, a rebel commander during the Liberian civil war, repeatedly lied to immigration officials, concealing his crimes and portraying himself as a persecuted victim, and his ruse succeeded for almost twenty years.

United States v. Ballard, 950 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2020). The court failed to explain adequately its reasons for an upward departure from a range of 33-41 months to a sentence of 108 months, during a resentencing in a felon in possession case. The departure was “extreme” and required a “significant justification.”

United States v. Mzembe, 979 F.3d 1169 (7th Cir. 2020). In determining whether a federal sentence should run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to an unrelated, undischarged state sentence under §5G1.3(d), a court may award “at least some deference” to the state judgment.

United States v. Daoud, 980 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2020). A sentence of sixteen years, reduced from a guideline range of life, for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, solicitation of murder, and aggravated assault, is substantively unreasonable. The court gave insufficient weight to the seriousness of the offenses and the need to protect the public and gave excessive weight to the defendant’s pretrial confinement and other mitigating factors.

United States v. Ramirez, 983 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2020). In a felon-in-possession case, an upward variance from a range of 46-57 months to a sentence of 72 months was procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Commission’s recidivism statistics belied the defendant’s aging-out-of-crime argument, and the Guidelines did not adequately capture the risk posed by the defendant’s flight from arrest or the seriousness of his criminal history.

United States v. Begay, 974 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2020). A court may not consider federal/state sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). A sentencing-disparity claim may be relevant to other § 3553(a) factors, but the defendant did not sufficiently brief the argument.

United States v. Lawless, 979 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2020). In an arson case where the defendant built and planted bombs in three public places at night and his conduct resulted in no injuries, an upward variance from 60 months to 144 months was procedurally and substantively reasonable.

United Sates v. Morales-Negron, 974 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2020). Denying the defendant access to the statement of reasons (SOR) was neither grounds for vacating the sentence nor staying the appeal because the court adequately explained its sentence orally. The case was nonetheless remanded for the court to docket the SOR.

United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 2020). Although the defendant was eligible for compassionate release under the First Step Act, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence. Compassionate release is discretionary, and the court sufficiently articulated its reasons for denying the motion.

United States v. Johnson, 956 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2020). The court committed plain error when it relied on the defendant’s prior acts of witness intimidation, which were described in probation’s sealed judicial recommendation, because the parties were not informed of those circumstances and were not given an opportunity to object before sentencing.

United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). A court is not required to “pronounce” a mandatory condition of supervised release, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The court must “pronounce” all other conditions. A condition is “pronounced” when a court conducts an “oral in-court adoption of a written list of proposed conditions,” such as adopting the “special conditions” outlined in the PSR or adopting the “standard conditions” set forth in “courtwide or judge-specific standing orders.” A court must articulate reasons justifying any discretionary conditions it imposes. Plain-error review applies when a defendant fails to raise a pronouncement objection, had notice of the proposed conditions, and had an opportunity to object.

United States v. Angeles, 971 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2020). A court, after reviewing the objections to the PSR, may express concern that a defendant is frivolously denying relevant conduct and state that continuing to do so may result in denial of acceptance under §3E1.1(a).

United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2020). In a case where the defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, counsel’s gross undercalculation of the Guidelines range was not unreasonably deficient. Counsel informed the defendant of the correct statutory penalties and clearly indicated that his estimate was not a promise.

United States v. Taylor, 973 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2020). The court’s sentence was both ineffectual (the sentence was ordered to commence before sentencing) and ambiguous (the sentence did not state which of the four anticipated state sentences the federal sentence should run concurrently with). The court was ordered on remand to consider, and state on the record, whether it would have imposed the same sentence.

United States v. Leontartis, 977 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2020). When calculating the sentencing guidelines the court is not bound by the jury’s finding that the defendant was accountable for 50 grams or less of methamphetamine. It is the sentencing court’s duty to apply and calculate the sentencing guidelines under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

United States v. Garcia, 983 F.3d 820 (5th Cir. 2020). The court properly pronounced the discretionary conditions of supervised release when it referred to “this judgment” (either to an order signed by the defendant setting forth those discretionary conditions or a later entered judgment containing those same conditions) at sentencing and gave the defendant an opportunity to object to those conditions.

United States v. Helding, 948 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2020). The court violated the defendant’s due process rights when, over the defendant’s objection, it relied solely on the out-of-court statements of a confidential informant recounted in the PSR to find the applicable drug quantity. “The sentencing record here did not contain enough to find the CI-provided information sufficiently reliable to influence [the defendant’s] guidelines determination and ultimate sentence.”

Dotson v. United States, 949 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2020). In very limited circumstances, the government may “substitute” an ACCA predicate offense if another predicate was deemed ineligible. The defendant’s ACCA enhancement could stand because he had notice of the substituted prior conviction. It was included in the indictment and presentence report, and the defendant clearly had knowledge and a belief, albeit mistaken, that the offense in question had served as a predicate during trial and appellate proceedings.

United States v. Carnell, 972 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2020). A defendant has neither a confrontation clause nor a due process right to cross-examine analysts and scientists who draft lab reports used at sentencing.

United States v. Wyatt, 982 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2020). The government breached the plea agreement when it failed to mention the defendant’s cooperation, but the appellate court affirmed the defendant’s sentence on plain error review because the trial court accepted the parties’ jointly recommended sentence for a sentence well below the Guidelines range.

United States v. Stamps, 983 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2020). Statutory safety valve requires a defendant to prove by a preponderance that any firearm possessed was unrelated to the drug trafficking conviction. It does not, unlike §2D1.1(b)’s two-level enhancement, require proof that the firearm’s connection to the drug offense was clearly improbable.

United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2020). The court erred in denying a two-level reduction under §3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility where the defendant was convicted at trial of drug possession but acquitted of drug trafficking. A trial conviction does not automatically preclude acceptance, and even before being indicted, the defendant admitted to possessing drugs.

United States v. Grimaldo, 984 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2021). A court does not abuse its discretion when it fails to strike from the presentence report a past arrest that does not result in a conviction.

United States v. Henry, 968 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2020). A sentence adjustment under §5G1.3(b) remains mandatory after Booker. The court must first select the appropriate sentence—whether above, below, or within the Guideline range—and then adjust it for time served in state custody.

United States v. Green, 969 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2020). The court committed procedural error by failing to explain its sentence (adopting the parties’ Guidelines calculation at sentencing and then stating, at a hearing four days after sentencing, that it treated the parties’ agreement as a joint motion for a downward variance) and relying on a clearly erroneous fact (finding that the defendant participated in a murder, despite evidence that it would have been impossible).

United States v. Stinson, 978 F.3d 824 (1st Cir. 2020). Four-level enhancements at §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with another offense and at §2K2.1(b)(5) for trafficking firearms both applied to a case in which the weapons were stolen during the course of a burglary. Application Note 14 to §2K2.1 “addresses the very facts of this case.”

United States v. Reyes-Torres, 979 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). The four-level enhancement at §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a weapon in connection with another offense applied because the “totality of the evidence confirm[ed] that the machine gun and ammunition had the potential to facilitate the offense of drug distribution.

United States Tirado-Nieves, 982 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). The four-level enhancement at §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of firearms in connection with another felony offense applied in a case where the defendant possessed drug paraphernalia in a “quantity that was indicative of drug trafficking.”

United States v. Rodriguez-Leos, 953 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2020). The three-level reduction at §2X1.1 for attempt applied to a defendant convicted of unlawfully exporting ammunition. At the time of his arrest, he had bought the ammunition but did not have possession of it, and there was no showing that completion of the offense was inevitable or imminent.

United States v. Valdez, 973 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2020). In a firearms case where the defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, counsel’s gross undercalculation of the Guidelines range was not unreasonably deficient. Counsel informed the defendant of the correct statutory penalties and clearly indicated that his estimate was not a promise.

United States v. Kendrick, 980 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2020). The court did not err in applying §2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony. The firearms were in close proximity to a cutting agent and a digital scale.

United States v. Ramirez, 983 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2020). In a felon-in-possession case, an upward variance from a range of 46-57 months to a sentence of 72 months was procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Commission’s recidivism statistics belied the defendant’s aging-out-of-crime argument, and the Guidelines did not adequately capture the risk posed by the defendant’s flight from arrest or the seriousness of his criminal history.

United States v. Guidry, 960 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 2020). Section 2D1.1(b)(1)’s 2-level weapon enhancement requires the government to prove a temporal and special relationship between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant; and such an enhancement applies where the gun and drugs were both within the defendant’s reach and where the defendant carried a bullet that had been cycled through the gun’s chamber.

United States v. Leontartis, 977 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2020). When calculating the sentencing guidelines the court is not bound by the jury’s finding that the defendant was accountable for 50 grams or less of methamphetamine. It is the sentencing court’s duty to apply and calculate the sentencing guidelines under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

United States v. Barry, 978 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly err when it converted $14,658 to a drug quantity to determine a base offense level under §2D1.1. The court may consider estimates of drug quantity, and if the government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the money came from drug proceeds, converting money into drug quantity is permitted.

United States v. Pike, 979 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly err in denying a mitigating role adjustment under §3B1.2. While the defendant did not plan or organize the drug-trafficking conspiracy, he pooled his money with others to purchase the drug supply, negotiated sales, chose customers, and used proceeds for his own business. The court did not err in not articulating a factual basis for denying the adjustment because the defendant did not ask for one.

United States v. Galicia, 983 F.3d 842 (5th Cir. 2020). The two-level enhancement at §2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a drug premises applied because the defendant temporarily stored marijuana in his home’s garage on three occasions.

United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly err in applying §2D1.1(b)(12)’s two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises. While the defendant’s name was not on the lease, he directed customers to pick up drugs from the home and stored drugs and drug paraphernalia there.

United States v. Delgado-Lopez, 974 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2020). The court erred in denying a minor role adjustment under §3B1.2(b). The court relied on pure speculation about the economics of the drug-trafficking scheme and considered the defendant’s refusal to cooperate as basis for denying the adjustment.

United States v. Mason, 951 F.3d 567 (D.C. Cir. 2020). A defendant who refused to provide names of people he sold drugs to was ineligible for safety valve relief under §5C1.2(a)(5). Because the names of customers, who were also alleged dealers, constituted “information” concerning “the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct,” he was obligated to provide them.

United States v. Demma, 948 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2020). A sentence of one day of imprisonment for possession of child pornography, a downward variance from a guideline range of 78-97 months, was substantively unreasonable. The court’s policy disagreement with §2G2.2 could not justify the extent of the downward variance because it failed to discuss the retributive purposes of §2G2.2. The court gave excess weight to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) involving the defendant’s individual characteristics but gave little to no weight to other factors, including sentences imposed in similar cases, offense seriousness, and deterrence.

United States v. Hollon, 948 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2020). Engaging in a child exploitation enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) is a “covered sex offense” under the repeat and dangerous sex offender enhancement at §4B1.5(b). The enhancement can apply to first offenders if there is a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct.

United States v. Paauwe, 968 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2020). Section 4B1.5(b)(1)’s five-level enhancement for a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct applies to a defendant whose conduct involves a single victim.

United States v. Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2020). In a plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) resulting in dismissed counts, a court is not bound by the parties’ Guidelines calculation, which in this case excluded the dismissed counts. The defendant waived any argument that dismissed counts did not constitute relevant conduct. Section 2G2.2(b)(5)’s five-level enhancement applied when the defendant pleaded guilty to performing sexual acts on one minor victim and stipulated that he abused a second minor. No impermissible double counting results from applying a §2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement and additional offense levels under §3D1.4. The defendant’s 447-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Barthman, 983 F.3d 318 (8th Cir. 2020). The court clearly erred in finding that the defendant was non-indigent for purposes of imposing a $5,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. The defendant had “a negative net worth of $166,903” and “will be nearly 80 years old, if not older, when he is released from custody.”

United States v. Chan, 981 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2020). In an insider trading case, the court appropriately calculated gain under §2B1.4 as the difference between the value of the shares when the insider sold them while in possession of the non-pubic information, and the market value of such shares after public dissemination of the information.

United States v. Woodson, 960 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2020). A consistent “home base” from which defendants carry out key aspects of their criminal scheme does not preclude a §2B1.1(b)(10) enhancement for relocating a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement.

United States v. Igboba, 964 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2020). The court did not err when it attributed $4.1 million in losses to the defendant in a tax fraud cause even though some losses were linked to the defendant by a single piece of evidence. Also, the sophisticated means enhancement, pursuant to §2B1.1(b)(10), applied based upon the defendant’s acquisition of taxpayer personally identifying information and his use of a virtual private network, the Tor browser, the dark web, multiple bank accounts and email aliases, and corporate shell companies.

United States v. Kozerski, 969 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 2020). In a set-aside procurement-contract fraud case, §2B1.1 loss excludes the value of the services provided to the victim. In this case, which involved the fraudulent procurement of government contracts set aside for service-disabled veterans, the court did not clearly err when it calculated loss by using the aggregate difference between the defendant’s bid and the next lowest bid.

United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020). Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii)’s two-level enhancement for mass-marketing does not apply to word-of-mouth solicitation.

United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020). The court applied the wrong legal standard to determine loss under §2B1.1(b)(1). Relevant conduct “is significantly narrower than the conduct embraced by the law of conspiracy,” and to be held accountable for the acts and omissions of others, those acts must be, among other things, within “the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake.”

United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020). The court did not err in using conspiracy principles to determine restitution, although it did err in applying those same principles to determine §2B1.1(b)(1) loss. The court could have apportioned loss among codefendants, but it was not required to do so.

Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020). The categorical approach applies to determining whether a prior conviction is a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. Rather than compare the prior conviction to a generic offense, the court must compare the elements of the state offense to the conduct specified in ACCA’s controlled substance definition, which includes “the manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance offense.”

United States v. Luna, 968 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 2020). In a case about a recruitment-and-kickback scheme involving car-accident victims, a chiropractic clinic, and automobile insurers, §2B1.1 loss (as well as restitution) does not include the legitimate, compensable services provided by the chiropractic clinic. An offset for legitimate, compensable services, however, does not apply to forfeiture: the focus there shifts from the victim’s losses to the gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.

United States v. Isler, 983 F.3d 335 (8th Cir. 2020). An upward variance from a range of 0-6 months to a sentence 42 months in a case involving theft of trade secrets and false statements was not substantively unreasonable. The court found that the Guidelines range underrepresented the seriousness of the offense because the court could not assign a precise figure to the victim’s significant loss.

United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2020). The court did not abuse its discretion in applying §3B1.1(b)’s three-level adjustment for aggravating role. The defendant played a significant role in planning and operating a lucrative unemployment-fraud scheme; the defendant trained one participant and provided detailed instructions directing his activities; and three other participants stated that the defendant was their contact within the scheme, filed fraudulent claims for them, controlled their mailboxes, and set up meets to disburse payments.

United States v. Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2020). The court abused its discretion when it applied the terrorism enhancement at §3A1.4 in a case involving attempted support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Clear and convincing evidence did not establish that the defendant’s conduct in opening social media accounts for a terrorist organization was calculated to retaliate against government conduct.

United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2020). The court erred in denying a two-level reduction under §3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility where the defendant was convicted at trial of drug possession but acquitted of drug trafficking. A trial conviction does not automatically preclude acceptance, and even before being indicted, the defendant admitted to possessing drugs.

United States v. George, 949 F.3d 1181(9th Cir. 2020). The 6-level enhancement at §2B1.1(b)(2)(C) for offenses that “resulted in substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims” applied where the court determined that the victims suffered losses that were significant in light of the victims’ individual financial circumstances. In addition, the court is not required to identify each specific victim and may reasonably infer a pattern from evidence on “enough” of the victims.

United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2020). The court misstated the number of offense levels resulting from §2B1.1(b)(J) (loss more than $3.5 million) as 18 instead of 16. This misstatement did not constitute plain error because the total number of offense levels awarded reflected the correct number of offense levels for loss.

United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2020). A state government agency is a victim for purposes of §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)’s number-of-victims enhancement if the agency’s losses are included in the actual loss table §2B1.1(b)(1).

United States v. Gainza, 982 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2020). In a fraud offense involving skimmers installed in ATMs, it was clear error to conclude, without proof of the skimmers’ success rate, that defendants obtained account information from all ATM users. The erroneous finding could not support a 12-level loss-amount increase at §2B1.1(b)(1).

United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020). The enhancement at §2K2.2(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense applied where the weapon was found in the defendant’s car near drug paraphernalia and the government proved that the defendant planned to trade the weapon for drugs.

United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020). A base offense level of 20 under §2K2.1(a)(4)(B) was appropriate where the defendant, an “unlawful user” of drugs, possessed a sawed-off shotgun. A defendant is an “unlawful user” so long as his use is “ongoing and contemporaneous with the commission of the offense.”

United States v. Seighman, 966 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of one day in prison, does not violate the Sixth Amendment by requiring mandatory imprisonment without the right to jury trial. Comparing the provision to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in United States v. Haymond, subsection (g) is more akin to ordinary revocation and less like punishment for a new offense.

United States v. Brito, 979 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2020). The court committed plain error when it misstated the defendant’s criminal history and history of deportations. The error went to the core of the defendant’s request for a lenient sentence and not correcting the error would undermine the integrity of the proceeding.

United States v. Perez-Rodriquez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020). A 24-month sentence for illegal reentry, an upward variance from a guideline range of 8-14 months, was substantively unreasonable. The defendant’s conviction was a “mine-run case” and the guideline range already reflected his prior convictions. Citing Commission data, the court of appeals observed that the upward variance created unwarranted sentencing disparities.

United States v. Tabb, 949 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2020). New York second-degree attempted assault is a crime of violence under the force clause of §4B1.2. A conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2 even though the text of the guideline does not include conspiracies. The language in Application Note 1 does not conflict with the text of §4B1.2 and does not expand the definitions in the guideline.

United States v. Nikolla, 950 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2020). Threatening violence in furtherance of an extortion plan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2020). New York first-degree manslaughter is not violent felony under the force clauses of the ACCA and the career offender guideline. The statute can be violated by “an omission despite a duty to act,” which is complete inaction with the intent to cause serious physical injury. In addition, the statute does not match generic murder, manslaughter, or aggravated assault under the enumerated offenses clause of the career offender guideline.

United States v. Thompson, 961 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2020). New York attempted sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree is not a felony drug offense triggering a § 851 enhancement. The state crime is not a categorical match to § 802(44)’s definition of felony drug offense because New York regulates hCG, a pregnancy hormone, which is not included in the federal analog under § 802(44).

Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Johnson, 153 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding that the ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague), did not itself recognize that the residual clause contained in the pre-Booker Guidelines was unconstitutionally vague and thus does not trigger a different (and much later) limitations period for raising this claim in a § 2255 motion.

Gray v. United States, 980 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2020). Assaulting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), is a crime of violence under § 924(c).

United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020). Assault with intent to rob a postal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. A2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. A “controlled substance” means any substance controlled by the jurisdiction of conviction, not substances controlled by federal law.

United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020). Attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The “substantial step” needed to establish attempted Hobbs Act robbery “need not be violent.”

United States v. Runyon, 983 F.3d 716 (4th Cir. 2020). Carjacking in violation of 18 USC § 2119, and conspiracy to commit murder for hire where death results in violation of 18 USC § 1958(a), are crimes of violence under 18 USC § 924(c).

United States v. Al-Muwwakkil, 983 F.3d 748 (4th Cir. 2020). Virginia attempted rape and Virginia burglary are not violent felonies under the ACCA.

United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020). Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2020). Texas possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is not a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. The statute prohibits “offers to sell,” which constitute an attempt to commit a controlled substance offense. Inchoate offenses cannot qualify as predicate offenses because the guidelines commentary that includes them “impermissibly ‘add[s] to’ the Guidelines.”

United States v. Armes, 953 F.3d 875 (6th Cir. 2020). In determining the elements of a prior conviction, courts may consider the relevant part of an undisputed PSR that characterizes the contents of an underlying Shepard-approved state court record, such as an indictment or plea agreement.

United States v. Brown, 957 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under § 924(e).

United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio preparing for shipment, shipping, transporting, deliver, preparing for distribution, or distribution of a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale to another person is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Garth, 965 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee possession of marijuana with intent to deliver is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b) because it criminalizes the same conduct as the federal offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.

United States v. Cordero, 973 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2020). Murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2.

United States v. Alston, 976 F.3d 727(6th Cir. 2020). Ohio statute prohibiting selling or offering to sell a controlled dangerous substance is overbroad and indivisible and is not a controlled substance offense under 4B1.2.

United Stated v. Palos, 978 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio cocaine trafficking is not a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. The statute criminalizes attempts to sell, and Sixth Circuit precedent dictates that “controlled substance offense” does not include attempts.

United States v. Wilson, 978 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio aggravated robbery is “twice divisible” and the modified categorical approach is required to determine whether the defendant was convicted of a section of the statute that is a violent felony under the ACCA.

United States v. Jackson, 984 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2021). Kentucky second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2.

United States v. Jackson, 984 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2021). Kentucky marijuana trafficking is a felony drug offense subjecting the defendant to a longer mandatory minimum penalty.

United States v. Harris, 950 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2020) Arkansas committing a terroristic act is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2. It does not have as an element use of force against a person because it can be committed with intent to injure property.

United States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa and Illinois delivery of a controlled substance are controlled substance offenses under §4B1.2. The guideline’s definition of “distribution” includes delivery and is not limited to commercial drug trafficking crimes. The definition encompasses inchoate offenses through Application Note 1, which “is a reasonable interpretation of the career offender guidelines.”

United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa manufacture, delivery, and possession of counterfeit substances, simulated controlled substances, and imitation controlled substances is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Vanoy, 957 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance, is divisible by the type of substance. Here, applying the modified categorical approach, the defendant’s drug convictions were serious drug offenses under § 924(e).

McCoy v. United States, 960 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2020). Voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

United States v. Ross, 969 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2020). Kidnapping resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), and carjacking (with or without a death) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, are crimes of violence under § 924(c). Under these circumstances, a mandatory life sentence for a kidnapping resulting in death did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and insofar as the consecutive life sentences under § 924(c) had any practical effect, those sentences also did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

United States v. Bennett, 972 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa going armed with intent is not a violent felony under the ACCA. To be convicted, a defendant must have the specific intent to use a dangerous weapon against another and must, while armed, move from one place to another. Because the movement need not be in furtherance of the intent to harm another person, the completed crime does not involve the attempted use of force against the person of another.

United States v. Witherspoon, 974 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant had been convicted of Missouri first-degree robbery. Although the charging document was unavailable, the defendant did not object to the PSR’s recitation of that conviction. Missouri first-degree robbery is a violent felony under ACCA.

United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). Wisconsin possessing with intent to distribute cocaine is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). Attempting to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b). Application Note 1, which includes attempt and other inchoate crimes, is a valid exercise of the Sentencing Commission’s authority.

United States v. Coleman, 977 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2020). Tennessee possession of cocaine for resale is a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the defendant was convicted of possession “with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell” a controlled substance. Missouri delivery or manufacture of an imitation controlled substance is not a serious drug offense because it is punishable by a maximum of four years’ imprisonment, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) requires that an offense be punishable by ten years or more in prison.

United States v. Howard, 977 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not err when it used Shepard documents to determine that the defendant was convicted of Wisconsin armed robbery, which is a violent felony under the ACCA. Additionally, following the holding in Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), North Dakota conspiracy to deliver ecstasy is a serious drug offense under the ACCA because “conspiracy to delivery ecstasy in violation of North Dakota law involves conduct of distributing a controlled substance.”

United States v. Doran, 978 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 2020). California threatening to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury is a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(1).

United States v. Doran, 978 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 2020). Retroactive reclassification of a prior offense from a felony to a misdemeanor satisfies §4B1.2’s definition of a felony. If the failure to account for retroactive reclassification results in an overstated criminal history, the Guidelines permit a departure under Application Note 4 to §4B1.1.

United States v. Oliver, 962 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2020). Georgia terroristic threats is a divisible statute and is a violent felony under § 924(e) when the threat predicating the conviction is “a threat to commit any crime of violence.”

United States v. Green, 969 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2020). RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), is not a crime of violence under § 924(c).

United States v. Kushmaul, 984 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2021). The court did not plainly err in ruling that Florida promoting the sexual performance of a child was a conviction relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, triggering an increase in the statutory mandatory minimum penalty for distributing child pornography.

United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020). The dangerous weapon enhancement at §2B3.1(b)(2)(E) did not apply to a defendant who kept his hand near his waistband to suggest he had a firearm but did not pretend that his hand was firearm. The physical restraint enhancement at §2B3.1(b)(4)(B) did not apply where the defendant herded victims into a defined area but did not physically restrain them there.

United States v. Houtar, 980 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2020). The court did not err in applying §2J1.2(b)(2)’s three-level enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice. The defendant’s flight impaired the family court’s ability to enforce its visitation order, and that conduct was not necessary to sustain the conviction for parental kidnapping.

United States v. Redmond, 965 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2020). The court erred when it applied a four-level enhancement for abduction under §2B3.1(b)(4)(A) because the defendant did not force a victim to “accompany” him to a different location when he directed bank tellers to “walk to an adjacent room, close the door, and count to 100 before coming out.”

United States v. Izaguirre, 973 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2020). When a defendant is convicted of both an underlying offense and the failure to appear for sentencing, §2J1.6 requires that the failure to appear be treated as an obstruction adjustment under §3C1.1, resulting in one guidelines range. The court should then select the total punishment for both offenses and construct the sentence to reflect the requirement that the sentences run consecutively.

United States v. Zamora, 982 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2020). The four-level enhancement at §2C1.1(b)(3) for bribing a public official in a sensitive position applies to a non-supervisory prison guard. The enhancement also applies to a bribe made to influence an unofficial act, that is, an act that would be illegal even without the bribe.

United States v. Houtar, 980 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2020). Section §2L2.2(b)(3)’s four-level enhancement for fraudulent use of a U.S. passport does not require a defendant to present his physical passport when applying for a replacement; use of the passport number and expiration date is sufficient.

United States v. Colon-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). Neither aggravated abuse nor attempted abuse under Puerto Rico law are always crimes of violence that constitute Grade A violations under §7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i) because the abuse statute includes psychological abuse that causes emotional harm. The court committed clear error when it used unsubstantiated allegations in a complaint to find that the defendant had used physical force.

United States v. Garcia-Cartagena, 953 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2020). A hybrid approach is used to classify the grade of a violation under §7B1.1(a). The first step involves classifying the grade of a violation using the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense.” The second step involves using a conduct-based approach to determine if the defendant committed the offense. In the second step, the court can look beyond Shepard documents to any other reliable evidence.

United States v. Benoit, 975 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2020). In a possession/distribution of child pornography case, it was not an abuse of discretion to impose supervised release conditions prohibiting contact with children, including the defendant’s minor son, and prohibiting the defendant from going to places with children. The defendant had sexually abused his sister when she was four, and while an expert opined that the defendant’s risk of recidivism would be low with treatment, the defendant had not started treatment.