PRIMER

CRIMINAL HISTORY

March 2020

Prepared by the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission

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**I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW**

The purpose of this primer is to provide a general overview of the sentencing guidelines and statutes relevant to application of Chapter Four of the *Guidelines Manual*, Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood. Although this primer identifies some of the issues and cases related to the guidelines’ Chapter Four provisions on Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood, it is not intended to be comprehensive or a substitute for independent research, including reading and interpreting the *Guidelines Manual*, statutes, and case law.

The following are some of the main features of Chapter Four—

**The Grid.** The guideline sentencing table is comprised of two components: Offense Level and Criminal History Category. Criminal history forms the horizontal axis and is divided into six categories, from I (lowest) to VI (highest). Chapter Four, Part A provides instruction on how to calculate a defendant’s criminal history score by assigning points for certain prior convictions. The number of points scored for a prior sentence (from one to three) is based primarily on the length of the prior sentence. Two points are added if the defendant commits the instant federal offense while under criminal justice supervision. However, prior sentences for conduct that was part of the instant offense are not counted. Some prior sentences are not counted because of staleness, their minor nature, or other reasons. For offenses committed before the age of 18, some prior convictions are scored differently regarding staleness issues. A defendant’s criminal history category, combined with the total offense level, determines the advisory guideline range.

**Timing.** Because statutory and guideline provisions contain different definitions of prior offenses, the timing requirements of each require careful consideration. For example, §4A1.1, §4B1.1, and the immigration and firearms guidelines impose remoteness constraints on the use of prior convictions, but §4B1.4, §4B1.5, and their corresponding statutes do not.¹

**Certain Repeat Offenders.** The nature of a defendant’s criminal record may affect the calculation of the criminal history score. Statutory enhancements that require mandatory minimum sentences may result in increased statutory maximums and the application of different criminal history guidelines. Certain criminal convictions, generally relating to crimes of violence and drug and sex offenses, may increase the defendant’s guideline offense level. Assessing these prior convictions requires scrutiny to determine whether a prior state or federal conviction fits the specific definition that triggers the enhanced penalty provisions.

¹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
**Departures.** Departures from the otherwise-properly-calculated guideline range for overrepresentation or underrepresentation of a defendant’s criminal history are authorized by the policy statements set forth in §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category [Policy Statement]). An upward departure from the guideline range may be warranted when a defendant’s criminal history does not adequately reflect the seriousness of past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. Likewise, a downward departure may be authorized if a defendant’s criminal history overstates the seriousness of his/her past criminal record or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.

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**II. CRIMINAL HISTORY (CHAPTER FOUR, PART A)**

**A. Computation**

At the outset, and excluding staleness concerns, the calculation of the criminal history category starts with computing how many points each prior conviction carries. Section 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category) provides as follows:

- **(a)** Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.
- **(b)** Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a).
- **(c)** Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this subsection.
- **(d)** Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
- **(e)** Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this subsection.  

Please note there is no limit to the number of points that can be assigned for subsections (a) and (b) type convictions. Under subsection (e), convictions for crimes of violence can override the 4-point limit on subsection (c) type sentences by up to three additional criminal history points.

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B. Definitions and Instructions

Section 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) contains key definitions and specific instructions for computing criminal history.

1. “Prior Sentence”

Under §4A1.2(a), a “prior sentence” is “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.”3 The term “prior sentence” “is not directed at the chronology of the conduct, but the chronology of the sentencing.”4 Thus, a previously imposed sentence counts even if it was for conduct that occurred after the offense of conviction.5 Courts are divided over whether to consider a sentence imposed after the original sentencing but before resentencing.6

a. Relevant conduct

A sentence cannot be counted in calculating criminal history if it encompassed conduct that would be considered relevant conduct to the offense of conviction under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct [Factors that Determine the Guideline Range]).7

b. Multiple prior sentences

Prior sentences are always counted separately if the offenses were separated by an intervening arrest (the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the

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3 USSG §4A1.2(a)(1). See also United States v. Baptiste, 876 F.3d 1057, 1062 (11th Cir. 2017) (Where adjudication is withheld, it does not qualify as “prior sentence” under §4A1.2).

4 United States v. Lopez, 349 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Espinal, 981 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1992)).

5 Lopez, 349 F.3d at 41.

6 Compare United States v. Burke, 863 F.3d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2017) (can consider); United States v. Klump, 57 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1995) (can consider); and United States v. Bleike, 950 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1991) (not plain error to consider), with United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (improper to consider intervening sentence under law of case doctrine).

7 Compare United States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (firearms and trespass); United States v. Fries, 796 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Salter, 241 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001) (tax evasion related to money laundering and drug offenses); and United States v. Thomas, 54 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1995) (state larceny related to federal forgery), with United States v. Yerena-Magana, 478 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2007) (illegal reentry not part of drug offense).
second offense). Section 4A1.2(a)(2) states that “[i]f there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.”

c. Single sentence

If prior sentences are treated as a single sentence, use the longest sentence if concurrent sentences were imposed, and the aggregate sentence if consecutive sentences were imposed.

d. Revocation sentences

Revocations of probation, parole, or supervised release sentences are also counted. The term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation, if any, is added to the original sentence to compute the correct number of total criminal history points to be assessed towards that offense as a whole.

2. “Sentence of Imprisonment”

This term refers to the maximum sentence imposed; that is, the sentence pronounced by the court, not the length of time actually served. Application Note 2 to §4A1.2 instructs that “[t]o qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have

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8. See United States v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (no intervening arrest where defendant was arrested for first offense after commission of second); but see United States v. Crippen, 627 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir. 2010) (felonies separated by intervening arrests were not single criminal episode counted separately); United States v. Smith, 549 F.3d 355, 361–62 (6th Cir. 2008) (no intervening arrest between first two prior offenses, but intervening arrest between second and third offense committed while on bond). See also United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (no intervening arrest for two “citations” for driving while license suspended because not considered formal arrests for criminal history purposes).


10. Id. See also United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 916 F.3d 522, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2019) (district court correctly applied §4A1.2’s single sentence rule to §21L.2 enhancement); United States v. Marroquin, 884 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2018) (error to count individual convictions where multiple convictions consolidated and single sentence was imposed); United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2013) (“consolidated sentence” for multiple offenses considered “one sentence” regardless of intervening arrest).

11. USSG §4A1.2(k)(1). Even when the conduct constituting the basis for the revocation is the same conduct at issue in the instant federal case, the rule requiring the revocation sentence to be added to the original sentence remains in effect. See United States v. Rivera-Berrios, 902 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejected argument that constituted impermissible “double counting”).

12. USSG §4A1.2(b)(1).
actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence.”13 In the case of an indeterminate sentence, the high end of the prescribed sentencing range is treated as the maximum sentence.14 If the court reduces the prison sentence, however, the reduced sentence controls.15

**a. Suspended sentence**

If part of the sentence is suspended, the “sentence of imprisonment” includes only the portion that was not suspended.16 If a defendant receives “time served,” the actual time spent in custody will be counted.17 A discharged sentence does not qualify as a suspended sentence under §4A1.2(b)(2) if the “suspension” was not ordered by a court.18

**b. What is a sentence of imprisonment?**

In determining whether a defendant has served a sentence of imprisonment, the court looks to the nature of the facility, rather than its purpose.19 In United States v. Brooks,20 the court held that incarceration in a boot camp was a prison sentence. The court distinguished between facilities like the boot camp “requiring 24 hours a day physical

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13 USSG §4A1.2, comment. (n.2). *See also* United States v. Valente, 915 F.3d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that defendant’s prior 60-day term of imprisonment should have been assigned one criminal history point, rather than two, because “he had not yet served it because of medical issues”).

14 USSG §4A1.2, comment. (n.2). *See also* United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2002) (indeterminate sentence of two days to 23 months scored as sentence “exceeding one year and one month” under §4A1.1(a), even though defendant actually served only two days).

15 United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (reduced sentence was appropriate for criminal history purposes where state rule permitted reconsideration of sentence based on the law and facts, and government failed to meet its burden of establishing that reconsideration of sentence was for good behavior).

16 USSG §4A1.2(b)(2). *See e.g.*, United States v. Tabaka, 982 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1992) (all but two days suspended); United States v. Gonzales, 506 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2007).

17 *See United States v. Fernandez, 743 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2014)* (holding that “because a time-served ‘credit’ noted in a prior sentencing order cannot be suspended, the period credited serves as the measure for assessing criminal history points in accordance with §4A1.2(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines when the prior sentence is otherwise suspended.”); United States v. Dixon, 230 F.3d 109, 112 (4th Cir. 2000) (where sentences were suspended, “sentence of imprisonment” refers only to portion of sentence not suspended, thus 58 days spent in custody did not warrant two points); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 170 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1999) (adding two points for 62 days served). *See also* United States v. Hall, 531 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (“a defendant who receives full credit for time served on an entirely separate conviction does not in fact ‘actually serve’ any time for the offense in question.”).

18 *See United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002, 1005–06 (5th Cir. 2015)* (“suspended sentence” refers to decision by a judge, not government agency or correctional administrator).

19 United States v. Morgan, 390 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2004).

20 166 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1999).
“confined” and other dispositions such as “probation, fines, and residency in a halfway house.” Work release may constitute a sentence of imprisonment. Generally, community-type confinement is deemed to be a “substitute for imprisonment” and not a “sentence of imprisonment.” A 6-month sentence of home detention is not considered a sentence of imprisonment. The courts have largely held that community treatment centers or halfway houses are not imprisonment.

3. Felony Offense

A felony offense is any offense under federal, state, or local law that is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed. This definition requires careful review of certain prior misdemeanors in jurisdictions where some misdemeanor offenses carry 2-year or 3-year statutory maximums.

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21 Id. at 725–27.

22 United States v. Enrique-Ascencio, 857 F.3d 668, 675 (5th Cir. 2017) (sentence that qualified under California’s work release program deemed sentence of imprisonment).

23 USSG §§5B1.3(e)(1)–(2), 5C1.1(c)–(d). See United States v. Marks, 864 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2017).

24 United States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 2003) (“the Guidelines define a ‘sentence of imprisonment’ as a ‘sentence of incarceration’ and distinguish between ‘imprisonment’ and ‘home detention.’”).

25 See e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 504 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (“detention at a community treatment center, where the defendant is not subject to the control of the Bureau of Prisons, is not ‘imprisonment’”) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 59 (1995)); United States v. Cintron-Fernandez, 356 F.3d 340, 347 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that under §5C1.1(d) and (e) “home detention and community confinement are considered as ‘Substitute Punishments’ for imprisonment, not merely different forms of imprisonment itself”); United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999) (community confinement and home detention are substitutes for imprisonment); United States v. Horek, 137 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998) (community confinement, as a condition of probation, is not “imprisonment”); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 713 (11th Cir. 1998) (“the Sentencing Commission considered time served in community treatment centers and halfway houses to be equivalent to each other and distinct from a sentence of imprisonment.”); United States v. Thomas, 135 F.3d 873, n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We have, however, held that confinement in a community correctional center was not ‘imprisonment.’ It would, therefore, seem to follow that home detention is also not imprisonment.”). But see United States v. Rasco, 963 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging possible conflict with §4A1.1, court focused on fact that placement in community treatment center was result of a sentence upon revocation of parole, and viewed sentence as part of original term of imprisonment and, thus, additional incarceration for purposes of §4A1.2(k)(1)).

26 USSG §4A1.2(o).

27 United States v. Coleman, 635 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2011) (state misdemeanor punishable by less than two years is a qualifying felony for career offender purposes).
However, in at least one jurisdiction, certain classes of felonies are not punishable by more than one year.28

4. Misdemeanor and Petty Offenses

Sentences for certain enumerated misdemeanors (e.g., careless or reckless driving, gambling, driving without a license, disorderly conduct, prostitution, resisting arrest, and trespassing) “are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense.”29 Other petty offenses (e.g., fish and game violations, juvenile status offenses, hitchhiking, loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication, and vagrancy) are never counted.30 Convictions for driving while intoxicated and other similar offenses are always counted.31

5. Timing and Status Concerns

Whether a prior conviction is scored for the criminal history computation depends on several factors—the age of the prior conviction, the date of imposition of the sentence, the length of the prior sentence, and any sentence imposed upon revocation of the prior sentence—and whether the prior conviction was for an offense committed before the age of 18.32 Likewise, the status of the defendant at the time of the instant federal offense matters and may result in criminal history points.

a. 15-year window for prior sentences greater than 13 months

Three points are assigned to each adult sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within 15 years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense or resulting in incarceration of the defendant during any part of that 15-year period.33 Section 4A1.2(e)(1) may result in the scoring of remote convictions, especially where a defendant was on parole or supervised release and was revoked and

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28 United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (prior North Carolina felony that did not expose defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than one year was not a qualifying felony for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851).

29 USSG §4A1.2(c)(1). See e.g., United States v. Hawley, 919 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2019) (court affirmed imposition of criminal history point for 30-day imprisonment for an uncounseled misdemeanor offense).

30 USSG §4A1.2(c)(2).

31 USSG §4A1.2, comment. (n.5).

32 USSG §4A1.2.

33 USSG §§4A1.1(a), 4A1.2(e)(1).
incarcerated during the 15-year period immediately preceding the instant offense.\textsuperscript{34} The court will count a conviction of a defendant whose parole is revoked during the operative time period, even if the defendant is incarcerated for a new offense at the time of revocation.\textsuperscript{35} A defendant on escape status is deemed incarcerated.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{b. 10-year window for sentences less than 13 months}

For prior sentences of less than 13 months’ imprisonment, there is a 10-year time limitation, which runs from the date the prior sentence was imposed, not when it was served.\textsuperscript{37} Likewise, the time limit runs from the original imposition date, not the revocation date, unless the original sentence added to the revocation sentence exceeds 13 months.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{c. Status of defendant at time of federal offense}

Two criminal history points are added if the instant offense was committed while the defendant was under a criminal justice sentence.\textsuperscript{39} This provision covers virtually all forms of suspended sentences where there is a possibility of a custodial sentence, even if there is no active supervision associated with the prior sentence at issue.\textsuperscript{40} However, a sentence where a fine is the only sanction is not considered to be a criminal justice sentence.\textsuperscript{41} A defendant whose probation would have otherwise expired but for an outstanding revocation warrant is deemed to be under a criminal justice sentence even if

\textsuperscript{34} USSG §4A1.2(k)(2)(A). \textit{See e.g.}, United States v. Allen, 809 F.3d 1049 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Semsak, 336 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (revocation of parole).

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Semsak}, 336 F.3d. at 1128.

\textsuperscript{36} United States v. Pearson, 312 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{37} USSG §4A1.2(e)(2).

\textsuperscript{38} USSG §§4A1.2(a)(1), (e)(2), (k)(2)(B). \textit{See also} United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2006) (sentence “imposed” when defendant found guilty and sentence of probation was pronounced); United States v. Arnold, 213 F.3d 894, 895–96 (5th Cir. 2000) (“a sentence is ‘imposed’ when it is first pronounced by the court, and not when the term of imprisonment begins . . . . [S]entence pronouncement is the sole, relevant event for purposes of §4A1.2(e)(2).”).

\textsuperscript{39} USSG §4A1.1(d).

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See e.g.}, United States v. Perales, 487 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2007) (diversion); United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 721 (6th Cir. 1995) (conditional discharge sentence as “functional equivalent” of “unsupervised probation”); United States v. Giraldo-Lara, 919 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1990) (deferred adjudication probation counted as a prior sentence although “does not involve a finding of guilt”). \textit{See also} United States v. Brown, 909 F.3d 698, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding suspended sentence in Virginia that is predicated on “good behavior” qualifies as criminal justice sentence under §4A1.1(d)).

\textsuperscript{41} USSG §4A1.1, comment. (n.4); \textit{see e.g.}, United States v. Spikes, 543 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th Cir. 2008) (fine alone is not criminal justice sentence).
the state did not use due diligence to execute the warrant. For purposes of §4A1.1(d), a defendant must be “under a criminal justice sentence” at the time he or she committed the instant offense. Note, however, that a defendant who fails to report for service of a sentence of imprisonment shall be treated as having escaped and therefore is under a criminal justice sentence.

d. Offenses committed prior to age 18

For an offense committed by the defendant before age 18 that resulted in an adult prison sentence exceeding 13 months within the prior 15-year period, three criminal history points are added. For an offense committed before age 18 that resulted in a juvenile or adult sentence to confinement of at least 60 days, two points are added if the defendant was released from that confinement within five years of the instant offense. Otherwise, one point is added for an offense committed before age 18 that resulted in a juvenile or adult sentence imposed within five years of the instant offense.

Under §4A1.2(d)(2), the courts may add one or two points for juvenile offenses committed before 18 that resulted in juvenile adjudications. Application Note 7 provides that for juvenile adjudications, “only those that resulted in adult sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, or resulted in imposition of an adult or juvenile sentence or release from confinement on that sentence within five years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense are counted.” Because states treat juvenile convictions in differing ways, it is the conduct involved and not terminology that is important. A sentence of commitment to the custody of the state’s juvenile authority constitutes a sentence within the meaning of §4A1.2(d)(2). The juvenile’s age at the time

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42 USSG §4A1.2(m); see also United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Anderson, 184 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 1999).

43 See United States v. Caldwell, 585 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2009) (not under a “criminal justice sentence” where, at time of offense, defendant was on probation for driving while a habitual offender but had not served any portion of 30-day sentence).

44 USSG §4A1.2(n); see also United States v. Aska, 314 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Fisher, 137 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998).

45 USSG §4A1.2(d)(1); United States v Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011).

46 USSG §4A1.2(d)(2)(A) & comment. (n.7).


48 USSG §4A1.2, comment. (n.7).

49 See United States v. Stewart, 643 F.3d 259, 263 (8th Cir. 2011).

50 See e.g., Howard v. United States, 743 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Stewart, 643 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2011).
of a revocation resulting in confinement, rather than at the time of the offense, controls.\footnote{United States v. Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 17 (5th Cir. 1996).} Juvenile detention that did not result from an adjudication of guilt does not count.\footnote{United States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).}

6. \textbf{Military, Foreign, and Tribal Court Sentences}

Military sentences resulting from a general or special court-martial are counted. Sentences imposed as a result of a summary court-martial or Article 15 proceeding do not count.\footnote{USSG §4A1.2(g).} Foreign sentences and Native American tribal court sentences do not count but may be considered under §4A1.3 (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category [Policy Statement]).\footnote{USSG §4A1.2(h), (i); see also §4A1.3, comment. (n.2(C)) (listing factors, in addition to standard ones set forth in §4A1.3(a), to be considered in determining whether, or to what extent, upward departure based on tribal court conviction(s) may be warranted).}

7. \textbf{Sentences on Appeal and Diversionary Dispositions}

Prior sentences under appeal are counted. Where the execution of a prior sentence has been stayed pending appeal, subsections (a) through (e) of §4A1.1 still apply in computing criminal history.\footnote{USSG §4A1.2(l).}

Diversions from the judicial system where no actual finding of guilt is made are not counted.\footnote{USSG §4A1.2(f).} However, where diversion from the judicial system comes about \textit{after} a finding of guilt has been made, or a plea of nolo contendere has been entered, the diversionary disposition should be counted as a 1-point sentence under §4A1.1(c).\footnote{Id.; see also United States v. Baptiste, 876 F.3d 1057, 1062 (11th Cir. 2017) (findings, pursuant to §4A1.2(f), that Florida marijuana charge warranted one criminal history point because defendant had either pled guilty or nolo contendere to it despite receiving diversionary sentence).}

\section*{III. REPEAT OFFENDERS}

Part B of Chapter Four (Career Offenders and Criminal Livelihood) provides instruction on how to calculate enhanced criminal history scores and offense levels for certain repeat offenders, such as career offenders, armed career criminals, and repeat and dangerous sex offenders against minors.
A. Career Offender

1. General Application (§4B1.1)

An individual is a “career offender” if (1) he or she was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the offense of conviction is a felony that is either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense,” and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.58

a. Offense level and criminal history category

The guidelines provide significantly enhanced offense levels for career offenders. Generally, the offense level is increased based on the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction.59 Likewise, the guidelines establish that a career offender’s Criminal History Category is automatically VI in every case, regardless of what it is calculated to be under Chapter Four, Part A.60

b. Career offender and section 924(c)

The interplay between the career offender enhancement and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) warrants careful consideration.61 If the defendant is only convicted of the firearms offense, the guideline range is 360 months to life, although the reduction for acceptance of responsibility is still available.62 If there are multiple counts of conviction, the applicable guideline range is the greater of the mandatory minimum consecutive sentence plus the guideline range for the underlying offense or the guideline range derived from the career offender table for section 924(c) or section 929(a) offenders in §4B1.1(c)(3).63 The sentence is then to be apportioned among the counts to meet any mandatory minimum requirements.64 If the defendant is not a career offender but has multiple convictions pursuant to section 924(c), the court can depart upward.65 The court can also depart

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58 USSG §4B1.1(a). See also §4B1.2, comment. (n.1) (noting that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using, carrying, or possessing firearm during violent felony or drug trafficking offense may qualify as predicate offense for career offender purposes).

59 See the table set forth in USSG §4B1.1(b).

60 Id.

61 See USSG §4B1.1(c), the §4B1.1(c)(3) table, and §4B1.1, comment. (n.3). See also United States v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 2011).

62 USSG §4B1.1(c)(3).

63 See USSG §4B1.1(c)(2).

64 USSG §5G1.2(e).

65 USSG §2K2.4, comment. (n.2(B)).
upward if, in the rare case, the defendant’s guideline range is actually lower than if he had not sustained a section 924(c) conviction.66

c. Acceptance of responsibility

A career offender may receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). However, other Chapter Three adjustments, whether upward or downward, do not apply.67

d. Predicate convictions

(1) Adult convictions required

Unlike other criminal history provisions, only adult convictions can serve as a predicate under the career offender guideline.68 However, a defendant who was convicted as an adult but was only 17 can be considered a career offender.69

(2) Predicate conviction must be prior to federal offense

Because the career offender enhancement applies to criminal “convictions,” not sentences, the defendant must have been convicted of the offense before he committed the instant federal offense.70 The date of conviction is the date that the guilt of the defendant has been established, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.71

66 USSG §2K2.4, comment. (n.4).

67 See USSG §1B1.1(a) (providing in application instructions that adjustments under Parts A, B, and C of Chapter Three are to be considered prior to operation of any potential Chapter Four, Part B overrides). See also United States v. Cashaw, 625 F.3d 271, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2010) (minor role adjustment not available to defendant sentenced under the career offender guidelines); United States v. Warren, 361 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2004) (plain error to apply obstruction of justice enhancement to career offender offense level); United States v. Perez, 328 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (career offender cannot receive minor role reduction if it would result in offense level below career offender minimum).

68 See USSG §4B1.2, comment. (n.1).

69 Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Otero, 495 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2004); but see United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 558–62 (4th Cir. 2002) (adult conviction did not count because defendant was sentenced as a juvenile).

70 USSG §4B1.2(c). See also United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014).

71 USSG §4B1.2(c).
(3) **Predicate convictions must be counted separately**

The prior convictions must be counted separately under the provisions of §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c) to qualify as predicate convictions for career offender purposes. But, a sentence for a prior conviction that is included in a “single sentence” with a non-qualifying offense may be treated as a predicate offense if the sentences independently would have received criminal history points but for the single sentence rule. However, “no more than one prior sentence in a given single sentence may be used as a predicate offense.”

(4) **Predicate convictions must be scored**

Prior convictions must not be too old (i.e., outside the time limits set forth in §4A1.2(d), (e)), and must receive criminal history points under §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c) to qualify as predicates for the career offender enhancement. A prior sentence included in a single sentence, that is remote in time, and would not independently receive criminal history points, cannot serve as a predicate offense.

e. **Inchoate offenses**

The vast majority of circuits to address the issue agree that the career offender guideline includes convictions for inchoate offenses such as aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit a “crime of violence” and “controlled substance offense.”

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72 USSG §4A1.2, comment. (n.3(A)).
73 Id.
74 See United States v. Dewey, 599 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming reliance on 18-year old sentence where defendant was incarcerated within previous 15 years).
75 See USSG §4B1.2, comment. (n.1) (“‘Crime of violence’ and ‘controlled substance offense’ include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”). See e.g., United States v. Medina-Campo, 714 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2013) (solicitation of controlled substance offense included in career offender definition); United States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the Commission acted within this broad grant of authority in construing attempts to commit drug crimes as controlled substance offenses for purposes of determining career offender status.”); United States v. Shumate, 329 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (the word “include” in application note 1 to §4B1.2 allows inclusion of solicitation for crimes of violence and for controlled substance offenses); United States v. Smith, 54 F.3d 690, 693 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that the Commission, in construing attempts to commit narcotics crimes as controlled substance offenses for purposes of determining career offender status, acted within its authority pursuant to section 994(a).”); United States v. Mendoza–Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (commentary including drug conspiracies “is reasonable interpretation of the career offender guidelines that is well within the Sentencing Commission’s statutory authority”); United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e conclude that both 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a) and 994(h) vested the Commission with authority to expand the definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ to include aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”). But see United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“The text of §4B1.2(b) controls, and it makes clear that attempt crimes do not qualify as
Nevertheless, in various contexts, the circuit courts continue to scrutinize predicate conviction statutes to insure the requisite intent to distribute. \(^{76}\)

2. **Crime of Violence (§4B1.2(a))**

The term “crime of violence” is defined in subsection (a) of §4B1.2 (Definition of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1) as:

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or

(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use
or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c). \(^{77}\)

The “crime of violence” definition is used not only to determine whether a defendant’s sentence is subject to the career offender enhancement in §4B1.1, but also whether a defendant’s sentence is subject to enhancement in other guidelines. \(^{78}\)

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76 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 945 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding Maryland “offer to sell” statute proscribed intentional conduct, consistent with §4B1.2); United States v. Mohamed, 920 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 2019) (“We have held that the definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ requires that the statute under which the defendant was charged involve[] an intent to distribute or other indicia of trafficking.”); United States v. Lopez–Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The Guidelines could have defined a drug trafficking offense based on the quantity of drugs possessed. Instead, they require that a state prove an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”); United States v. Villa–Lara, 451 F.3d 963, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2006) (focusing on the guidelines’ definition of a drug trafficking offense to conclude that the defendant’s Nevada trafficking by possession conviction did not qualify); United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder the Guidelines, simple possession—that is, possession without the proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the requisite intent to ‘manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense’—is not a controlled substance offense.”); United States v. Herrera–Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the government’s argument that the guidelines permit an inference of intent to distribute based on the defendant’s possession of more than 50 pounds of marijuana); and United States v. Hernandez, 218 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (New York penal law criminalizes an intent crime, consistent with the career offender definition).

77 USSG §4B1.2(a).

78 See id.; e.g., USSG §2K1.3(a)(1)–(2) & comment. (n.2); §2K2.1(a)(1), (2), (3)(B), (4)(A) & comment. (n.1), §2K2.1(b)(5) & comment. (n.13(B)); §2S1.1(b)(1)(B)(ii) & comment. (n.1); §4A1.1(e) & comment. (n.5).
addition, it is used to determine whether an upward departure may be warranted under §5K2.17 (Semiautomatic Firearms Capable of Accepting Large Capacity Magazine [Policy Statement]).

3. Controlled Substances Offense (§4B1.2(b))

The career offender guidelines define a “controlled substance offense” as follows: “[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”

a. Predicate drug offense punishable by more than one year

Note that this guideline covers drug trafficking offenses punishable by more than one year and therefore applies to a number of drug offenses that are not covered by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which limits “serious drug offenses” to offenses for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. In fact, some state misdemeanor convictions may even qualify under this definition.

b. Predicate drug conviction limited to drug trafficking offenses

Unlike the statutory drug enhancements (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)), this guideline provision is limited to trafficking-type offenses and does not cover mere possession of a controlled substance.

c. Specific listed offenses

The commentary to §4B1.2 lists other types of drug offenses that may qualify as a “controlled substance offense” including: possession of listed chemicals and equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(1), 843(a)(6)), using a communication facility to commit a felony drug offense (21 U.S.C. § 843(b)), and

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79 USSG §4B1.2(b).
81 See "felony" definition at USSG §4A1.2(o). See also USSG §4B1.1, comment. (n.4) (noting possibility that downward departure may be warranted in case where one or both predicates are classified as misdemeanor(s) at time of sentencing for instant federal offense).
maintaining premises to facilitate a drug offense (21 U.S.C. § 856). Use of a communication facility to buy drugs for personal use is not a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) because mere possession of a controlled substance is a federal misdemeanor.

4. Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach

The categorical approach and modified categorical approaches apply to the determination whether an offense is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense.”

B. Criminal Livelihood (§4B1.3)

If the defendant committed an offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood, his offense level must be at least 13 unless acceptance of responsibility applies, in which case the minimum offense level shall be 11. The Commentary to §4B1.3 includes definitions of the key terms “pattern of criminal conduct” and “engaged in as a livelihood.” The full face value of stolen checks and gross income from drug trafficking have been used to calculate the defendant’s derived income for purposes of applying the enhancement.

C. Armed Career Criminal

1. General Application

A defendant convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who has three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, is considered an “armed career criminal.” Such a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

83 USSG §4B1.2, comment. (n.1).
86 See USSG §4B1.3.
87 See United States v. Gordon, 852 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Quertermous, 946 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1991).
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and USSG §4B1.4, comment. (n.1).
a. **Offense level and criminal history category**

Section 4B1.4 provides that the offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of the following:

1. the offense level applicable from Chapters Two and Three;
2. the offense level from §4B1.1 (Career Offender), if applicable;
3. an offense level of 34 if the defendant used or possessed the firearm, or ammunition, in connection with a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, or possessed a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); or
4. an offense level of 33 in other circumstances.\(^89\)

The Criminal History Category is raised to a minimum level of IV and is calculated as the greatest of the following:

1. the category determined under Chapter Four, Part A;
2. the category determined under the Career Offender Guideline, if applicable;
3. Category VI, if the defendant used or possessed a firearm or ammunition in connection with either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; or the firearm possessed by the defendant was of the type described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a);\(^90\) or
4. Category IV.

b. **Armed career offender and sections 844(h), 924(c), or 929(a)**

Sections 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and (c)(2) do not apply if a defendant is also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a).\(^91\) However, if the maximum penalty resulting from the guideline range, combined with the mandatory consecutive sentences, is lower than the maximum penalty that would have resulted if such provisions applied, an upward departure may be warranted. Note that the upward departure has a cap.\(^92\)

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\(^{89}\) USSG §4B1.4(b).


\(^{91}\) USSG §4B1.4 comment. (n.2).

\(^{92}\) Id.
c. Acceptance of responsibility

Acceptance of responsibility under §3E1.1 is available and will decrease the offense level, but not below the statutorily-required minimum sentence of 180 months.

d. Predicate convictions

Unlike the career offender guideline, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) does not provide for time limitations in predicate convictions. It also refers to convictions “committed on occasions different from one another,” rather than using §4B1.2’s requirement that sentences for such convictions count separately. In addition, burglary is included as a predicate offense.93

2. Violent Felony

The term “violent felony” means:

Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that:

  1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or

  2) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.94

3. Serious drug offense

The term serious drug offense refers to an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., § 951 et seq., or 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq., or an offense under state law involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance for which “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”95


94 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Supreme Court invalidated the italicized portion of the definition of “violent felony” as unconstitutionally void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

4. Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach

The categorical approach and modified categorical approaches apply to the determination whether an offense is a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense.”

D. Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors

1. General Application (§4B1.5)

If the defendant's instant offense is one of the covered sex crimes, and the defendant has a prior qualifying sex offense conviction, or has engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct, then the defendant is subject to the overrides set forth in §4B1.5.

a. Offense level and criminal history category

If the defendant has a prior qualifying sex conviction and is not a career offender, then the offense level shall be the greater of: (1) the offense level determined under Chapters Two and Three; or (2) the offense level taken from the table set forth in §4B1.5(a)(1)(B), decreased by any applicable reduction for acceptance of responsibility under §3E1.1. The criminal history category is the greater of the criminal history determined under Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History), or Criminal History Category V.

If the defendant is not a career offender and the above does not apply because the defendant does not have a prior qualifying sex conviction, a 5-level enhancement under §4B1.5(b) will instead be applied if “the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct.”

b. Acceptance of responsibility

Acceptance of responsibility under §3E1.1 is applicable.

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96 See CATEGORICAL APPROACH PRIMER, supra note 87.
97 USSG §4B1.5, comment. (n.2) (listing the “covered sex crime[s]” as “(A) an offense, perpetrated against a minor, under (i) chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code; (ii) chapter 110 of such title, not including trafficking in, receipt of, or possession of, child pornography, or a recordkeeping offense; (iii) chapter 117 of such title, not including transmitting information about a minor or filing a factual statement about an alien individual; or (iv) 18 U.S.C. § 1591; or (B) an attempt or a conspiracy to commit any [such] offense”).
98 USSG §4B1.5(a)(1).
99 USSG §4B1.5(a)(2).
100 USSG §4B1.5(b).
c. Predicate convictions

In 2014, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the time limitations concerning use of prior convictions set forth in §4A1.2 do not limit the potential use of prior convictions to trigger an enhancement under §4B1.5. Furthermore, §4B1.5(a) applies to a defendant whose prior sex conviction is based on an adjudication of guilt but has not yet been sentenced for that particular offense.

2. Categorical and Modified Categorical Approach

The categorical approach and modified categorical approaches apply to the determination of whether an offense is a qualifying prior sex conviction.

IV. CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH

The following is a brief discussion of the categorical approach. For an in-depth look at the process, history, and caselaw concerning this doctrine, see the Commission’s Primer on Categorical Approach. As discussed above, there are sentencing guidelines and federal statutes that provide enhanced penalties for offenders whose criminal history evidences violence or other types of serious felony conduct. Typically, the relevant guidelines that require the categorical approach are §§4B1.1 and 4B1.2 (Career Offender), §4B1.4 (Armed Career Criminal), §4B1.5 (Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offenders Against Minors), and §2L1.2 (Unlawful Entering or Remaining in the United States). The relevant statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 16 (Crime of Violence Definition), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (Armed Career Criminal Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Prior Sex Offense Convictions), and 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (Reentry of Removed Aliens).

Sentencing and appellate courts have interpreted terms such as “crime of violence” or “serious drug offense” found within these provisions through application of the “categorical approach,” first mandated by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, and the “modified categorical approach” that was introduced and discussed in Shepard v.

102 See United States v. Leach, 491 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2007).
103 See CATEGORICAL APPROACH PRIMER, supra note 85; United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345 (3rd Cir. 2016) (concluding it was plain error for district court to fail to apply categorical approach in determining applicability of enhancement under §4B1.5).
104 CATEGORICAL APPROACH PRIMER, supra, note 85.
United States,106 and further clarified in Descamps v. United States107 and Mathis v. United States.108 Although these cases dealt with statutory enhancements at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), lower courts have applied the same principles concerning the categorical approach in other contexts where a sentencing enhancement is based on a prior conviction, including the career offender guideline.109

The categorical approach was first adopted in Taylor v. United States.110 Under the categorical approach, courts must look to the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the defendant’s conduct, when determining the nature of a prior conviction. Thus, Taylor held that when deciding whether a prior conviction falls within a certain class of crimes, a sentencing court may “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”111 A court is not concerned with the “facts underlying the prior convictions;” in other words, the court may not focus on the underlying criminal conduct itself.112 This form of analysis permits a federal sentencing court to examine only the statute under which the defendant sustained a conviction (and, in certain cases, judicial documents surrounding that conviction) in determining whether the prior conviction fits within a federal predicate definition.

The modified categorical approach may only be used “when a prior conviction is for violating a ‘divisible statute’—one that sets out one or more of the elements in the alternative, e.g., burglary involving entry into a building or an automobile.”113 Under the modified categorical approach, sentencing courts may only consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative element formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.

For a prior trial conviction, the sentencing court may consult judicial records such as the indictment and jury instructions. For a prior guilty plea conviction, the sentencing court’s review is “limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of the plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis
for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.”

In the absence of supporting documents that limit the scope of a conviction under an overbroad statute, the enhancement does not apply.

“The modified approach serves—and serves solely—as a tool to identify the elements of the crime of conviction when a statute’s disjunctive phrasing renders one (or more) of them opaque.” Once the elements of the crime of conviction are identified, the categorical approach is followed, i.e., “the elements of the offense of conviction are compared with the elements of the statutory offense and only if they align may the offense count.”

In Descamps, the Supreme Court explained that, in the categorical approach, the comparison is between the prior conviction's elements of the offense and the elements of the generic offense. If the “relevant statute has the same elements of the ‘generic’ ACCA crime, then the prior conviction can serve as an ACCA predicate, so too if the statute defines the crime more narrowly.” But, a “state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”

Descamps held that “sentencing courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.” In other words, the sentencing court cannot look at the documents as defined in Taylor in a trial conviction, or the documents set forth in Shepard in the context of a conviction upon a plea, in the categorical approach. Descamps clarified that “Taylor recognized a ‘narrow range of cases’ in which sentencing courts—applying what we would

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114 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.
115 See e.g., United States v. Rendon-Duarte, 490 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding conviction for “assault in violation of a court order” could not categorically be crime of violence where government did not provide statute of conviction).
116 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253 (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263–65).
118 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263–64.
119 Id. at 261.
120 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251.
121 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 258.
122 See United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2016).
later dub the ‘modified categorical approach’—may look beyond the statutory elements to ‘the charging paper and jury instructions’ used in a case.”

In *Mathis*, the Court held that when the predicate conviction statute enumerates factual means of committing a single element of an offense, those alternative factual means are not elements of the offense. The sentencing court cannot use the modified categorical approach when the statute of conviction is indivisible, i.e., it cannot look beyond the fact of conviction to establish the defendant’s conduct in the prior offense. Therefore, the “first task for a sentencing court faced with an alternatively phrased statute is thus to determine whether its listed items are elements or means.” The Court went further and identified aids to be used to determine if a statute enumerates alternative elements or factual means. Specifically, the Court explained that, in making this determination, the sentencing court may examine state supreme court opinions, review the statute to determine whether it provides different punishments for each alternative, and examine any “illustrative examples” provided in the statute. Additionally, if the “state law fails to provide clear answers,” the sentencing court may take a “peek at the record documents” to determine if the “listed items are elements of the offense.”

**V. DEPARTURES (CHAPTER FOUR, PART A)**

In addition to establishing the general rules to be used in calculating an individual’s criminal history category, Part A of Chapter Four also provides guidance for potential upward and downward departures from the otherwise-properly-calculated criminal history category where the defendant’s criminal history either overstates or understates the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal record or his/her risk of recidivism. There are some limitations on the availability of the departure, particularly for career and sex offenders.

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123 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.
124 See United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017).
125 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See USSG §4A1.3(a), (b).
A. Upward Departures

An upward departure may be warranted if "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes."¹²⁹

1. Basis for Upward Departure

Factors to be considered in considering the imposition and, if so imposed, degree of an upward departure are set forth in subdivisions (A) through (E) of §4A1.3(a)(2) and include the following:

a. Prior sentence not used in criminal history score

The court may rely on a sentence not used in computing criminal history, such as tribal or foreign convictions.¹³⁰ If the conviction and sentence at issue derive from a tribal court, the commentary to §4A1.3 lists six additional factors courts should consider in determining whether that tribal court conviction should serve as the basis for an upward departure.¹³¹ This non-exhaustive list includes whether:

(i) The defendant was represented by a lawyer, had the right to a trial by jury, and received other due process protections consistent with those provided to criminal defendants under the United States Constitution.

(ii) The defendant received the due process protections required for criminal defendants under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Public Law 90–284, as amended.

(iii) The tribe was exercising expanded jurisdiction under the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Public Law 111–211.

(iv) The tribe was exercising expanded jurisdiction under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Public Law 113–4.

¹²⁹ USSG §4A1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
¹³⁰ See United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014).
¹³¹ See USSG §4A1.3, comment. (n.(2)(C)). Additional language in the amendment was meant to provide “guidance to courts on how to apply the departure provision at §4A1.3 in cases involving a defendant with a history of tribal convictions.” USSG App C, amend. 805 (effective Nov. 1, 2018).
(v) The tribal court conviction is not based on the same conduct that formed the basis for a conviction from another jurisdiction that receives criminal history points pursuant to this Chapter.

(vi) The tribal court conviction is for an offense that otherwise would be counted under §4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History).

b. Prior sentence substantially longer than one year

Prior sentences of substantially more than one year imposed as a result of independent crimes committed on different occasions may form the basis for an upward departure.

c. Similar misconduct established by an alternative proceeding

The Court may consider prior misconduct adjudicated in a civil proceeding or by a failure to comply with an administrative order that is similar to the instant offense.132

d. Whether the defendant was pending trial or sentencing

The court may consider whether the defendant was pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the time of the instant offense.133

e. Prior similar conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction

Similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in conviction may be relied upon for an upward departure.134 Note that the offense(s) must be similar135 and, according to some courts, significant.136

132 USSG §4A1.3(a)(2)(C); see United States v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287 (8th Cir. 2015).
133 United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1990).
134 See United States v. Bolt, 782 F.3d 388 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hefferon, 314 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Luna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1989).
135 See United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007).
136 See e.g., United States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990) (departure not justified by remote misdemeanor conviction).
2. Other Considerations

a. Nature of prior conviction

The nature, rather than the number, of prior convictions is often more indicative of the seriousness of a defendant’s criminal record.\(^{137}\)

b. Previous lenient treatment

The court may also depart because the defendant previously received “extreme leniency” for a serious offense.\(^{138}\)

c. Relevant conduct

The court cannot rely on a prior conviction as the basis for a departure because the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the past criminal conduct if the court previously determined that the conduct underlying that conviction is relevant conduct to the instant offense and considers it in calculating the offense level.\(^{139}\)

d. Prior arrests without conviction

The court cannot depart based on a prior arrest record itself.\(^{140}\)

e. Interplay with categorical approach

In *United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez*,\(^{141}\) the district court departed above the guideline range because a misdemeanor state firearm conviction could have been prosecuted as a more serious federal felony, and the police report suggested that a drug conviction was a trafficking offense even though the categorical approach prohibited treating it as such. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that adjusting the offense level based on a hypothetical federal crime was an inappropriate mechanism for a departure based on the inadequacy of criminal history. Second, reliance on a police report—which the district

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137 USSG §4A1.3, comment. (n.2(B)). See e.g., United States v. Kortgaard, 425 F.3d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 2005) (“it is the quality of the defendant’s criminal history not the quantity which is decisive.”) (citation omitted).


139 See United States v. Cade, 279 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hunerlach, 258 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001).


141 581 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2009).
court could not use under Shepard to define a prior offense as a “drug trafficking offense” — was an invalid ground for a §5K2.0 departure.

**B. Downward Departures**

A downward departure may be warranted where “reliable information indicates that the criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.”

1. **Lower Limit**

Departing below the lower limit of the applicable guideline range for Criminal History Category I is prohibited.

2. **Limitation for Career Offenders**

A downward departure under §4A1.3 for a career offender may not exceed one Criminal History Category.

3. **Prohibitions for Certain Repeat Offenders**

Downward departures for overrepresentation of criminal history are prohibited for defendants who are armed career criminals under §4B1.4 or who are repeat and dangerous sex offenders against minors within the meaning of §4B1.5.

**C. Departures: Procedural Concerns**

The criminal history departures are procedurally regulated as well. In considering an upward departure based on inadequacy of the criminal history, the court is instructed to use “as a reference, the criminal history category applicable to defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant's.” If a defendant is already at the highest criminal history category, the court should move “incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal

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142 USSG §4A1.3(b)(1) (emphasis added). See e.g., United States v. Marin-Castano, 688 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2012).
143 USSG §4A1.3(b)(2)(A).
144 USSG §4A1.3(b)(3)(A).
145 USSG §4A1.3(b)(2)(B).
146 USSG §4A1.3(a)(4)(A).
History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case.”147 Courts have held that the sentencing court must consider adjacent categories, determine on the record whether each category is inadequate, and provide reasons for these findings.148 The same findings should be made for downward departures.149

In a post-Booker world, strict compliance with this procedure may no longer be required.150 The Sixth Circuit reviews criminal history departures under the analytical framework concerning the procedural and substantive reasonableness of sentences set forth in Gall v. United States.151

147 USSG §4A1.3(a)(4)(B). See also United States v. Pennington, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th Cir. 1993).

148 United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See also USSG §4A1.3(c)(1).

149 USSG §4A1.3(c)(2).

150 See United States v. Colon, 474 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2006).

151 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2008).