UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

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PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

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THURSDAY NOVEMBER 5, 2015

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The Public Hearing commenced in the Thurgood Marshall Building, Room 2-500, One Columbus Circle NE, Washington, D.C., at 9:00 a.m., Patti B. Saris, Chair, presiding.

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

PATTI B. SARIS, Chair CHARLES R. BREYER, Vice Chair RACHEL E. BARKOW DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH WILLIAM H. PRYOR, JR.

EX OFFICIO COMMISSIONERS PRESENT

JONATHAN WROBLEWSKI, Department of Justice

PANEL I: VIEWS FROM THE JUDICIARY

- HON. IRENE M. KEELEY, Chair, Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States
- HON. KATHLEEN CARDONE, United States District Court, Western District of Texas

PANEL II: VIEWS FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

ROBERT ZAUZMER, Chief of Appeals, U.S.
Attorney's Office, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, U.S. Department of Justice

PANEL III: VIEWS FROM THE PRACTITIONERS

- MOLLY ROTH, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Western District of Texas
- ANGELA CAMPBELL, Eighth Circuit Representative, Practitioners Advisory Group
- ZACHARY MARGULIS-OHNUMA, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

PANEL IV: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD

- RICHARD BOHLKEN, Chair, Probation Officers
 Advisory Group
- T. MICHAEL ANDREWS, Chair, Victims Advisory Group

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(9:05 a.m.)
3	CHAIR SARIS: Well good morning to
4	everyone. As you know, I am Patti Saris and I
5	am Chair of the Sentencing Commission and I want
6	to welcome everyone this morning to the public
7	hearing.
8	We will hear testimony about a
9	proposed amendment that the Commission published
10	in August seeking comment on proposed changes to
11	Guideline definitions relating to the nature and
12	impact of a defendant's prior conviction for a
13	crime of violence.
14	I am very glad to see the members of
15	the public join us here up in our cozy commission
16	room, but I'd also say that there are lots of
17	people I think watching us nationwide because we
18	are webcasting this proceeding.
19	We are so tech savvy these days, so
20	hopefully people are watching us across the
21	country.

1 The proposed changes that are the topic of the hearing are primarily intended to 2 Sentencing Guideline provision 3 comport the applicable to certain career offenders to the 4 5 recent Supreme Court case Johnson v. 6 States. 7 In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a portion of the 8 statutory definition of violent felony used in a 9 similar penalty in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 10 11 which today I think many people refer to as ACCA. While the Supreme Court in Johnson did 12 not address sentencing guidelines, the statutory 13 language the Court found unconstitutionally 14 15 vague, often referred to as the residual clause, is identical to language contained in the Career 16 Offender Sentencing Guideline. 17 several 18 For years we have been studying the statutory and guideline definitions 19 relating to the nature of an offender's prior 20 21 convictions.

This has included a study of 1 definitions of crimes of violence in the Career 2 Offender and other guidelines, as well as the 3 difficulties associated with the categorical 4 approach used in applying these definitions. 5 6 In the proposed amendment we attempt 7 to address these difficulties by the inclusion a list of enumerated offenses and possible definitions for those offenses. 9 are very interested in hearing 10 11 whether the list is over-inclusive or underinclusive. 12 We are also interested in your views 13 about whether the proposed definitions 14 15 workable and if they will achieve their intended purpose of simplifying the task of enumerating 16 whether a particular predicate offense qualifies 17 as an enumerated offense. Will these definitions 18 make matters more confusing or less confusing? 19 20 Likewise, we have heard concerns over the fact in some jurisdictions misdemeanors are 21

punishable by more than one year in prison and 1 therefore qualify as predicate offenses under the 2 current definition of felony. 3 The proposed amendment considers this 4 concern by requiring that a prior offense be 5 6 classified as a felony under the laws of 7 jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted. 8 interested in views 9 We about are whether proposed 10 this policy change will 11 appropriately address the severity concerns or whether it will add an increased 12 level of complexity to the career offender determination. 13 There is also an issue about when this 14 15 determination about whether it's a felony should be made. 16 As those of you who regularly follow 17 the Commission's work know this is really an 18 hearing for us because 19 unusual we typically consider amendments much later in our cycle. 20 21 But now we are publishing an amendment

1	for comment in August and having a public hearing
2	in November. So why is that?
3	We began seeing litigation over the
4	impact of Johnson on the Sentencing Guidelines
5	almost immediately after the decision came down
6	from the Supreme Court.
7	In light of resulting uncertainty we
8	decided it would be prudent to begin considering
9	whether as a matter of policy the guidelines
10	should also eliminate the residual clause.
11	By statute the Commission may vote on
12	a guideline amendment any time after the
13	beginning of a regular session of Congress or in
14	January, but not later than May 1st of any given
15	year.
16	Although the Commission traditionally
17	votes on amendments in April, you all know that,
18	and delivers them to Congress by May 1st, we may
19	vote on a proposal that is before us today as
20	early as January.
21	This is a complicated topic and, you

intellectually 1 it's of the most know, one difficult ones I have seen since I have been 2. here. 3 It's a very important topic and we 4 look forward to hearing from all our witnesses 5 today as well as to considering public comments 6 further informing us. The public comment period 7 remains open at least through November 12, 2015. 8 So, of course, I am going to introduce 9 my fellow and sister commissioners, and I start 10 11 with my immediate right, is Judge Charles R. 12 Breyer. He is a Senior District Judge for the 13 Northern District of California. Judge Breyer 14 15 has served as the United States District Judge since 1998 and serves as a Vice Chair of the 16 Commission having joined the Commission in 2013. 17 Next to him is Rachel Barkow, who also 18 joined the Commission in 2013. She is the Segal 19 Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy at 20 21 NYU School of Law where she focuses her teaching

1	and research on criminal and administrative law.
2	She also serves as the Faculty
3	Director for the Center on the Administration of
4	Criminal Law at the Law School.
5	Now turning to my left is Dabney
6	Friedrich who has served on the Commission since
7	2006.
8	Immediately prior to her appointment
9	on the Commission she served as an Associate
10	Counsel at the White House and as counsel to
11	Chairman Orrin Hatch of the United States Senate
12	Judiciary Committee and as an Assistant U.S.
13	Attorney for the Southern District of California
14	and then for the Eastern District of Virginia.
15	Next to her is Judge William H. Pryor,
16	who also joined the Commission in 2013. He is
17	the United States Circuit Court Judge for the
18	11th Circuit Court of Appeals appointed in 2004.
19	Before his appointment to the federal
20	bench Judge Pryor served as the Attorney General
21	for the State of Alabama.

1	And way over to the right next to
2	Commissioner Barkow is Jonathan Wroblewski. He
3	is the designated ex officio member of the United
4	States Sentencing Commission representing the
5	Department of Justice.
6	Mr. Wroblewski serves as the Director
7	of the Office of Policy and Legislation in the
8	Department's criminal division.
9	Now before I get to introducing our
10	first panel I wanted to ask whether anyone had
11	any opening statements that they wanted to make.
12	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: I would.
13	CHAIR SARIS: Mr. Wroblewski?
14	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: Thank you.
15	Thank you very much, Judge Saris. It's a
16	pleasure to be here and I am glad we are holding
17	this hearing today.
18	You may know that last week the
19	President spoke in Chicago at the Conference of
20	the International Association of Chiefs of Police
21	about criminal justice reform.

1	On Saturday the President's weekly
2	address also addressed criminal justice reform
3	and earlier this week he was in New Jersey
4	visiting an offender reentry program.
5	These are just the latest
6	manifestations of this Administration's
7	commitment to criminal justice reform, which goes
8	back to the very beginning of the Administration.
9	I had the great pleasure of working
10	with Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer in
11	the Spring of 2009 just a few weeks into the
12	Administration in preparation for his testimony
13	before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
14	eliminating the crack-powder disparity.
15	And in the seven years since we have
16	made tremendous strides, both with the
17	Commission, with Congress, and an internal
18	Department of Justice policy.
19	The Bureau of Prison population today
20	is now below 200,000. In fact I just checked
21	the website before I came out here, it's 198,953.

It's the first time since the first term of the 1 George W. Bush Administration that the prison 2. population has been below 200,000. 3 We believe that public safety can be 4 achieved better by using prison resources more 5 6 carefully and reinvesting the savings into more 7 productive public safety investments. However, all of these efforts and all 8 we have already achieved are threatened if we 9 don't collectively have the thoughtfulness, the 10 wherewithal and the fortitude to develop a policy 11 that consistently identifies the most dangerous 12 offenders and provides substantial prison terms 13 to incapacitate them. 14 15 There is a debate raging whether crime is going up across the country and to what extent 16 it is going up across the country. 17 Where is it going up? How much is it going up? What should 18 be done about it? 19 20 Tom Edsall, a columnist in the New 21 York Times, had about an op-ed the

neighborhood in which we are sitting today. 1 He described how violent crime is rising here on 2. Capitol Hill and the raging discussion on the 3 local LISTSERVs that have followed. 4 If we don't have a sensible policy 5 that addresses violent offenders as quickly as 6 7 you can say "crime of violence" the progress that we have made and are making will be reversed. 8 9 Now there are plenty of reasons, you know, plenty of excuses not to implement such a 10 11 sensible policy. There are 50 state criminal 12 codes. Many definitions, for example, 13 14 Judge Cardone mentions kidnapping. There are 15 imprecise categories. No matter how we try to define 16 who are dangerous offenders categories will not be perfect, they will not be 17 precise. 18 And we have a history that has led us 19 20 to categorical approach in the the use 21 Guidelines, but the empirical data is clear and

1	we believe the solutions are out there to be had.
2	A small number of offenders are the
3	repeat violent ones. These offenders repeatedly
4	offend and re-offend.
5	Violent offenders more often re-
6	offend violently and there can be a consistently
7	applied backup to the categorical approach that
8	can rigorously and carefully identify these
9	offenders relying on what judges do every day and
10	in every sentencing hearing, and that's
11	evaluating facts.
12	If we act responsibly we believe that
13	we can keep the trends of lower violent crime and
14	lower prison population going.
15	If we fail to do the unpleasant task
16	of identifying and incapacitating those dangerous
17	offenders we will likely see the trends change.
18	That's what we believe this hearing
19	is all about and I am looking forward to all the
20	testimony today. Thank you, Judge Saris.
21	CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. Anything

1	else?
2	All right. So I have the pleasure of
3	introducing our first panel. We are delighted
4	to have Judge Keeley and Judge Cardone here today
5	to provide us with a view from the judiciary.
6	Judge Irene Keeley really needs no
7	introduction. She's been here before as a
8	friend. She is the Chair of the Criminal Law
9	Committee of the Judicial Conference and, I
10	should say long-term, but then I figured that
11	might not be, so a long-term Judge in the United
12	States District Court for the Northern District
13	of West Virginia.
14	Judge Kathleen Cardone, I've not
15	known as long, but it's been a pleasure getting
16	to know her. She is a United States District
17	Judge for the Western District of Texas, the El
18	Paso Division, appointed in 2003.
19	She testified before the Commission
20	at the 25th Anniversary hearing held in Austin
21	in November 2010 and attended the Commission's

1	roundtable in 2014 discussing the problems with
2	the categorical approach and definitions of
3	crimes of violence.
4	So we begin with Judge Keeley. No
5	time limit, no lights, we're whatever, we're just
6	thrilled to hear from you, Judge Keeley.
7	HON. KEELEY: Thank you Judge Saris.
8	By the way in West Virginia it wouldn't be long-
9	term it would long in the tooth, so I really
10	appreciate what you said.
11	(Laughter.)
12	HON. KEELEY: Judge Saris and Members
13	of the Commission, on behalf of the Criminal Law
14	Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
15	United States I thank you for providing us the
16	opportunity to comment on proposed changes to the
17	Sentencing Guidelines definitions of crime of
18	violence and related issues.
19	The topic of today's hearing is
20	important to the Judicial Conference and judges
21	throughout the nation.

applaud the Commission 1 for We undertaking its multi-year study of statutory and 2. guideline definitions relating to the nature of 3 a defendant's prior conviction and the impact of 4 such definitions on the relevant statutory and 5 6 quideline provisions. 7 We also thank you for considering whether to promulgate these guideline amendments 8 to address questions that had been or may be 9 raised by the Supreme Court's recent decision in 10 11 Johnson v. United States. Conference 12 The Judicial has authorized the Criminal Law Committee to act with 13 regard to submission from time to time to the 14 15 Sentencing Commission of proposed amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, including proposals 16 that would increase the flexibility of 17 Guidelines. 18 out these carrying duties 19 20 Committee relies on the conference commitment to sentencing quideline system that is fair, 21

1	workable, transparent, predictable, and
2	flexible.
3	The Criminal Law Committee is
4	generally in favor of the Commission's proposed
5	amendments, particularly those intended to
6	address or anticipate questions raised by
7	Johnson.
8	As you know, the definition of the
9	term "crime of violence," for purposes of the
10	Career Offender Guideline has been the subject
11	of substantial litigation in the federal courts.
12	We support any efforts to resolve the
13	ambiguity and simplify the legal approaches
14	required by Supreme Court jurisprudence.
15	Additionally, as you know, our
16	Committee has repeatedly urged the Commission to
17	resolve circuit conflicts in order to avoid
18	unnecessary litigation and to eliminate
19	unwarranted disparity in application of the
20	guidelines.
21	The Commission's proposed amendment

would reduce uncertainty raised by Johnson while 1 making the guidelines more clear and workable. 2 In Johnson the Supreme Court held that 3 an increased sentence under the residual clause 4 of the ACCA's definition of violent 5 6 violates due process because the 7 unconstitutionally vague. As the Commission has explained in its Notice of Proposed Amendment in the Federal 9 Register the Guidelines definition of crime of 10 violence in Section 4B1.2 was modeled after the 11 statutory definition of violent felony. 12 The Guidelines definition is used in 13 determining whether a defendant is a career 14 15 offender under 4B1.1 and is also used in certain other guidelines. 16 While the statutory definition 17 violent felony in the ACCA and the Guidelines 18 definition of crime of violence in 4B1.2 are not 19 20 identical in all respects as we all know the 21 residual clauses are.

The Criminal Law Committee strongly 1 supports the proposed amendment to delete the 2 residual clause from the guideline definition of 3 crime of violence. 4 As you know there is now a circuit 5 conflict regarding whether the residual clause 6 7 in the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson. 8 The Eleventh Circuit has found that 9 the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the 10 Sentencing Guidelines while the Tenth Circuit has 11 held that the residual clause in the Sentencing 12 Guidelines is unconstitutionally vaque. 13 14 Another circuit, the Eighth, 15 remanded a case to the District Court instructions to consider the defendant's claim 16 that the guidelines definition of crime 17 violence is vague and violates due process. 18 Deleting the residual clause while 19 20 maintaining the elements and enumerated clauses 21 would reduce confusion and complexity bу

providing a definition of crime of violence that 1 conforms closely to the statutory definition. 2 Notably, in 1988 Sentencing 3 а Commission working group recommended that the 4 career offender guideline definition of crime of 5 violence should closely match the statutory 6 7 definition of violent felony in the ACCA. Moreover, in 1991 another Commission 8 working group noted that, and I am quoting, 9 "confusion may result if a crime is considered a 10 crime of violence under Title 18 but not under 11 the Sentencing Guidelines." 12 Because of the similarities between 13 the statutory and guideline definitions, courts 14 15 have also frequently treated cases dealing with these provisions interchangeably. 16 Elimination of the residual clause 17 and close conformity with the definition 18 violent felony in the ACCA 19 would also be 20 consistent with efforts simplify to the 21 Guidelines.

2014, the Commission 1 Since has identified simplification of Guidelines 2. the structure as a public priority. 3 The Criminal Law Committee has long 4 supported attempts to simplify the operation of 5 the Guidelines, including harmonization of the 6 7 language used in specific offense characteristics shared across the Guidelines. 8 The Commission's current examination 9 of quideline simplification 10 provides an 11 opportunity, in our view, to resolve differences in language across guidelines and statutes and 12 eliminating the residual clause 13 would be consistent with this goal. 14 15 In addition to deleting the residual clause, the Commission proposes amending Section 16 4B1.2 to revise the list of enumerated offenses 17 moving all the Guidelines and providing 18 to definitions for the enumerated offenses in the 19 20 commentary. 21 The Committee supports moving all

enumerated offenses to the Guideline to make 1 application more simple and clear. 2 Additionally, the Committee supports 3 include burglaries only 4 the proposal to dwellings in the list of enumerated offense. 5 ТΟ 6 be sure some of the burglaries of non-dwellings excluded by this definition involve serious 7 offenses by defendants that may pose a danger to 8 the community, and our Committee discussed this 9 at length. 10 11 Courts, we believe, may account for these situations through the elements clause of 12 Section 4B1.2 or by departing or varying when the 13 facts within the criminal history category under-14 15 represent the danger posed by the defendant. Moreover, while we generally support 16 close conformity between the statutory definition 17 of violent felony and the ACCA and the Guideline 18 definition of crime of violence, the balance of 19 20 considerations bу Congress when enacting 21 penalties for armed career criminals under the

ACCA may have been different when it included all 1 burglaries in the statutory definition of violent 2 felony. 3 Under the career offender quideline 4 the court must analyze both the instant offense 5 of conviction and the defendant's prior offenses 6 7 of conviction. To be a career offender the court must find first that the instant offense is a felony, 9 that it is a crime of violence or a controlled 10 11 substance offense, and, second, that the 12 defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a 13 controlled substance offense. 14 15 To implement the requirement that the offense be a felony, the definitions in 4B1.2 16 specify that the offense must have been 17 offense under federal or state law punishable by 18 imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 19 20 Commission proposes adding The additional requirement, that the offense must 21

also have been classified as 1 а felony or comparable classification under the laws of the 2 jurisdiction in which defendant 3 the was convicted. 4 Committee 5 The opposes adding an 6 additional requirement that the offense must also 7 have been classified as a felony or a comparable classification under the laws of the jurisdiction 8 in which the defendant was convicted. 9 supports retaining the 10 current Ιt 11 definition of a felony because it is clear, concise, and uniform. 12 The current definition of felony in 13 the career offender guideline also conforms to 14 15 definitions in other quideline sections which is with efforts 16 consistent to simplify the quidelines. 17 Sentencing Commission 18 In 1991, а the Commission had 19 working group noted that 20 considered a proposal to include only those 21 felonies so designated by the state.

But then it rejected the proposal due 1 to concerns that use of state labels could create 2. disparity among offenders with similar criminal 3 histories. 4 In 2000, the Seventh Circuit noted 5 that the current definition "makes considerable 6 7 because "by ignoring how crimes sense" in jurisdictions different classified are looking instead to what punishment is authorized 9 a court can avoid the vagaries of sentencing 10 11 defendants on the basis of idiosyncratic unusual felony misdemeanor classifications." 12 In cases where the current definition 13 felony does not adequately represent the 14 15 defendant's criminal history, the Court may, of course, depart or vary from the criminal history 16 category of the Guidelines to account for the 17 circumstances of the individual case. 18 As this Committee has stressed in the 19 20 past departures provide the flexibility needed 21 to assure adequate consideration of circumstances

that the Guidelines cannot adequately capture and 1 ability 2 provide judges the to exercise individualized judgment based on the facts. 3 Judicial 4 Over the the years the Committee have advocated 5 Conference and 6 criminal history departures to account for the 7 dangerousness of defendants or to otherwise address the inadequacy of the criminal history 8 score based on either degree of risk or type of 9 risk. 10 If the Commission believes that the 11 current Guidelines definition of felony does not 12 adequately represent the defendant's criminal 13 14 history in all circumstances the Committee 15 recommends that the Commission account for these circumstances not by changing the definition of 16 felony, but by providing guidance for how and 17 when departures from the criminal history 18 category may address these circumstances. 19 20 Section 2L1.2 sets forth a definition 21 of crime of violence that contains a somewhat

1	different list of enumerated offenses and does
2	not contain a residual clause.
3	It also sets forth the definition of
4	drug trafficking offense that is somewhat
5	different from the definition of controlled
6	substance offense in 4B1.2.
7	The Commission's proposed amendment
8	would revise the definitions of crime of violence
9	and drug trafficking offense in Section 2L1.2 to
10	make them more parallel with the definitions in
11	4B1.2.
12	Under the proposed amendment the
13	definitions in 2L1.2 would generally follow the
14	proposed amended definitions in 4B1.2.
15	The Committee supports revising other
16	guidelines to conform to the definitions used in
17	the career offender guideline to reduce
18	complexity and make the guidelines system more
19	simple and workable.
20	Turning to retroactivity, finally,
21	the Commission's public notice of these proposed

1	amendments also requests comment regarding
2	whether the proposed amendments should be applied
3	retroactively to previously-sentenced
4	defendants.
5	As we all know in recent years the
6	Federal Judiciary has effectively managed several
7	rounds of retroactivity stemming from guideline
8	amendments to the Drug Quantity Table.
9	On each of these occasions the
10	Committee, on behalf of the Judicial Conference,
11	expressed support for retroactivity while also
12	recommending that retroactivity be implemented
13	in ways that minimize the burdens on the courts
14	and maximize the effective re-entry of inmates.
15	In supporting retroactivity on these
16	occasions the Committee was influenced by the
17	fact that the Commission was able to identify
18	eligible inmates and supply those names to each
19	court.
20	The Committee also considered the
21	relative ease in applying the new guidelines

1	based on the available record. Probation
2	Officers working with staff from the Federal
3	Public Defenders Offices and the U.S. Attorney's
4	Offices were able to recalculate the guidelines
5	efficiently and without the need for any
6	extensive reinvestigation.
7	Based on currently available data we
8	recognize that it would be difficult to produce
9	accurate estimates of the number of cases that
10	would be impacted if these amendments under
11	consideration are made retroactive.
12	The gauging of the workload impact or
13	the courts would be an important consideration
14	for the Committee.
15	Furthermore, regardless of the number
16	of cases that might be involved we expect that
17	retroactively applying the proposed amendments
18	would be considerably more complex than the
19	recent amendments to the Drug Quantity Table and
20	would require more effort and resources.
21	Accordingly, the Committee would

1 prefer to defer any reco	mmendations about
2 retroactivity until we have ac	dditional data from
3 the Commission and can be	etter assess the
4 potential impact on the courts	s.
5 In conclusion, o	n behalf of the
6 Criminal Law Committee, I that	ank the Sentencing
7 Commission for providing the	opportunity for us
8 to comment on proposed changes	s to the Sentencing
9 Guidelines definitions of cri	me of violence and
10 related issues.	
11 As we have in the	past, the members
of the Criminal Law Committe	ee look forward to
working with the Commission t	to ensure that our
14 sentencing system avoi	ids unnecessary
15 complication and is consisten	t with the central
16 tenets of the Sentencing Refo	rm Act. Thank you
very much.	
18 CHAIR SARIS: Th	nank you. Judge
19 Cardone?	
20 HON. CARDONE: Wel	ll I want to thank
21 you for giving me the oppor	tunity to be here

I also want to thank you for having me 1 today. go second because really I hadn't -- I have 2 nothing more to say. 3 But I am a Judge from the Western 4 District of Texas. I have a big caseload so I 5 6 tend to be a more practical person in looking at 7 this and so as you saw from my statement I sort of focused on one area, which was the area of kidnapping. 9 Everything that Judge Keeley said, I 10 11 don't disagree with anything. Ι like the 12 changes. I think they help make it more clear, more uniform when you are applying it, especially 13 when you have a big caseload and you are jumping 14 15 from case to case and you are trying to figure out okay, is this under the Armed Career Criminal 16 Act, is it a crime of violence as defined under 17 the admissibility portion. 18 It becomes -- you are having to apply 19 As you all well know the 20 law all over the place. 21 5th Circuit, I have received а number of

decisions just on the issue of kidnapping, 1 when I saw the definition of kidnapping that 2. raised a red flag with me. 3 As I explained to you in my statement 4 the term "nefarious" I think is a very vaque 5 6 I think it's going to put us right back 7 where we were under the residual clause with an attempt to try to define nefarious. 8 As I said in my statement my concern 9 about nefarious is that I couldn't find it in 10 Black's Law Dictionary and it's very rarely even 11 referred to in statutes throughout the country. 12 I feel that, and I recommended 13 So that, in order for consistency, in order to --14 kidnapping is such an amorphous crime anyway as 15 you go from state to state, so my recommendation 16 was to the Committee to follow the Model Penal 17 Code. 18 In my statement I asked what are we 19 20 trying to gain here and if we are trying to gain 21 consistency, if we are trying to look at a way

1	to encompass all of the states.
2	First of all, I just don't think you
3	can, under kidnapping in particular, but I think
4	it would go for all of the definitions.
5	I think the definitions are a huge
6	help, but particularly when it comes to
7	kidnapping, I'll give you an example, nefarious,
8	as I state in my statement, means wicked,
9	iniquitous, villainous, and despicable.
10	If we talk about things like parental
11	abduction of children, in some states that's
12	considered kidnapping and in other states they
13	have a specific think called parental abduction.
14	To some people that would fall under
15	the category of despicable or villainous. You
16	know, I just really don't want to have to try to
17	make those kinds of decisions, so I focused on
18	kidnapping because I felt that was an area that
19	I had a little bit of experience in.
20	I don't have a long statement because
21	I prepared my written statement and I figured we

had a limited amount of time so I wanted to give 1 you the guys the opportunity to ask us whatever. 2 But in general as to all the other 3 4 portions of it I am in support. I agree with Judge Keeley on her statements on behalf of the 5 6 Committee. 7 I think retroactivity is a concern, especially when you have a huge caseload, and we 8 9 are talking about going back and looking at definitions of these cases and all of 10 the 11 different statutes in 50 states and so I really would echo what she said about the concern about 12 retroactivity. I am here for any questions. 13 14 CHAIR SARIS: Great. Do you want to 15 ask questions? VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well maybe make a 16 First of all. Judge Cardone, 17 statement. appreciated your reference to nefarious. 18 word that I rather enjoyed using when I was a 19 District Attorney 40 years ago, but it's a word 20 21 that iust very different things means to

different people and I think that's an excellent 1 example, the child abduction cases. 2 also, in California, 3 And, an example, kidnapping may be simply moving a person 4 from one room to another. I think that it's 5 6 extremely important and Ι know that 7 Commission is wrestling with this to try to establish some uniformity. 8 I mean that's really one of the basic 9 purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines and to the 10 extent that we can reduce ambiguities we are 11 completely in favor of that and what you said 12 today is very, very helpful. 13 Judge Keeley, I thought that that was 14 15 also very helpful presentation with Criminal Law Committee. 16 The issue of retroactivity as far as 17 I am concerned, speaking as one person, depends 18 in large part on impact and I don't think we are 19 20 at a point know where we can make a determination as to what would be the impact of any changes and 21

I for one want to take a look at the impact 1 because I see with the two of you and with 846 2. of our colleagues dockets that if we decide that 3 it should have a retroactivity impact it's got 4 to be with such clarity that judges will find it 5 relatively straightforward, as they did I think 6 7 in the drugs minus two and the crack cocaine powder disparity, a relatively direct way to 8 implement changes if that's what we are going to 9 do. 10 11 Otherwise, it's a nightmare. Not 12 only is it a nightmare but it creates a further further disparity 13 disparity, а among the treatment of defendants and I think that that's, 14 15 we should avoid that if we can. found both 16 So Ι statements very helpful, thank you. 17 I'11 jump in then 18 CHAIR SARIS: Commissioner Barkow. So one of the things we 19 20 struggle with is if you knocked out the residual 21 clause do you just leave the enumerated offenses

1	as they are and let all the circuit precedence
2	that flowed into construing them before govern
3	or should we try to come up with a Model Penal
4	Code, a statutory, some combination of those
5	approaches to come up with a standard generic
6	definition.
7	So I'd like that You would
8	certainly want to go with the Model Penal Code,
9	right, or another possibility would be going with
10	the statutory definition in the U.S. Code, and I
11	just, and the Criminal Law Committee didn't weigh
12	in so much on how you would define them, all the
13	different crimes.
14	HON. CARDONE: Oh, and let me Can
15	I just clarify before Judge Keeley?
16	CHAIR SARIS: Yes.
17	HON. CARDONE: I looked at all the
18	definitions of murder and arson and in general I
19	think that those are well thought out and I don't
20	say, I'm not a proponent of going to the Model
21	Penal Code for all of those.

1	I agree with Judge Keeley that I think
2	they are very workable under the case law that
3	we have today. I primarily focused on kidnapping
4	because I just was, frankly I was taken aback, I
5	am reading along and I go oh, my God, this is
6	So the only reason that I focused on
7	the Model Penal Code as to kidnapping was I find
8	it to be the most workable because of the kind
9	of statute that kidnapping is.
10	CHAIR SARIS: Let's say we went with
11	the Model Penal Code for all predicates.
12	HON. CARDONE: Okay.
13	CHAIR SARIS: What would your life be
14	like under the immigration law? Would it change
15	a lot what's happening in the 5th Circuit? In
16	other words, would you have to redo everything
17	in terms of what's a predicate or not?
18	HON. CARDONE: I don't think so, but
19	it does concern me a little bit because of the
20	so many state statutes out there that are so
21	varied when you are talking about some of the

other offenses.

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I like sort of the flexibility of your 2. definitions because Ι think it helps 3 to 4 encompass, I mean I don't want to be varying all over the place when I look at statutes and what's 5 6 happened in different states and I liked the 7 definitions that you had for most of the other offenses. 8

CHAIR SARIS: Judge Keeley, what do you think, well at least from your practice, if not across the country, if we came up with a definition whether it's statutory, out of other parts of the Federal Code, or the Model Penal Code or the hybrid that actually staff put together, tried to do the best of the case law kind of thing, would that be good because it reduces disparity across the nation or would it make life very hard for a trial judge to start all over?

20 HON. KEELEY: Probably no trial judge 21 thinks starting all over is a good thing in terms

1	of the vast development of the case law that
2	we've had over the years under the Guidelines.
3	What we would like to see, what I
4	personally would like to see is congruency
5	between, or the harmonization of the statute to
6	our language and the Guidelines to make things
7	as simple and as clear as they can be.
8	To the extent that that can occur, as
9	I had commented in my prepared remarks, then
10	we're looking at varying and departures under the
11	Guidelines which are available to us.
12	But I don't think incorporating a
13	whole new set of ideas for the definitions is
14	necessarily a best practice here in these
15	circumstances.
16	CHAIR SARIS: So you would rather
17	have us just cut out the clause, enumerate the -
18	_
19	HON. KEELEY: Right.
20	CHAIR SARIS: and then the circuit
21	case law would be where it is?

1 HON. KEELEY: Right. I think so. 2 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: So Ι have a question for each of you, the first one follows 3 4 up on the kidnapping, and I was just curious, 5 Judae Cardone, the Department of Justice 6 recommended to us that we use the Federal 7 standards and definitions for things and so I just was hoping I could read you the kidnapping 8 one to see if you have a quick take on it, whether 9 or not it would be better, worse, equivalent, to 10 11 the Model Penal Code. 12 HON. CARDONE: Okay. 13 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: So they have 14 kidnapping "seizing, confining, means 15 inveigling, decoying, kidnapping, abducting, or carrying away and holding for ransom or reward 16 or otherwise any person expect in the case of a 17 minor by the parent thereof." 18 Well 19 HON. CARDONE: Ι quess my 20 concern is that as I stated in my statement I 21 think that as I go out to analyze there are

certain terms in there and one of them, I don't 1 have it in front me, but you said 2. of "or otherwise," I exactly 3 am not sure how "or otherwise" is going to relate to the different 4 terms of art, inveigling, decoying, et cetera, 5 and so I would have a concern there. 6 7 And I think that when we are talking about a statewide interpretation we are trying 8 9 to encompass as many issues as we can, parental kidnapping is one, but there is a lot of others. 10 11 I mean let's take the line between 12 false imprisonment and kidnapping is so fine, I mean as Judge Breyer said, you know, moving a 13 person from one room to another, I just think 14 15 that the Model Penal Code for me at least tended specific 16 be very and yet gave enough flexibility to be able to encompass what really 17 are crimes of violence. 18 I mean one of the things I said here 19 20 is what are we trying to do here and we are trying to focus on crimes of violence and in looking at 21

all of the different definitions I just kind of 1 felt that that was one that would encompass most 2. of the things that I would see. 3 4 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: That's really helpful, thank you. And if I could just ask a 5 6 question to Judge Keeley which is 7 question of classifying things as a felony for purposes of state law. 8 We've got another set of comments that 9 had this idea that we use the same definition of 10 11 felons that's in 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(1), the felon 12 in possession of a firearm. The way that statutory structure is 13 they talk about a felony but then they say the 14 15 crime punishable by imprisonment for a exceeding one year just doesn't include any state 16 offense by the laws of that state that 17 classified as a misdemeanor and punishable by a 18 term of imprisonment of two years or less. 19 20 So it's kind of, it keeps the one year 21 or more definition of felony, but just as for

purposes of that definition we're not going to 1 include anything classified by the state as a 2 misdemeanor that has a punishment of two years 3 4 or less. And I just didn't know if that would 5 6 take care of the uniformity problems because we'd 7 be borrowing from another federal provision and maybe could even do it across the board if it 8 worked, I don't know. 9 Or if your concerns are that even 10 doing that would create that kind of variation 11 12 that you are worried about. I think our Committee 13 HON. KEELEY: is concerned about variation in that regard. 14 15 Obviously, this is within the Commission's discretion, but the theme you heard from me this 16 morning is simple, concise, and to keep these as 17 close to federal statutory language as possible, 18 and that's not always possible, I am aware of 19 20 that. 21 But I think there is a disparity

1	aspect, too, incorporating state definitions and
2	changing the one year provision. That would be
3	somewhat problematic and as a District Judge, I
4	think Judge Cardone would agree with this, trying
5	to sift through various state laws, not your own,
6	but those of the defendant and where the
7	defendant was convicted, can become, or is
8	challenging and often arduous.
9	So the attraction retaining the one
10	year definition and not enlarging it to look at
11	other, or at state definitions, was exactly that,
12	keeping it as simple and as concise as possible.
13	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: Judge
14	Keeley, you've emphasized the importance of
15	making the definitions between ACCA and the
16	Guidelines, having them conform and the
17	importance of that, and yet with respect to
18	burglary
19	HON. KEELEY: Yes.
20	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: you are
21	supporting the decisions restricted to burglary

1	of a dwelling.
2	HON. KEELEY: Yes.
3	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: And this is
4	an issue the Commission struggled with mightily
5	a few years ago in trying to resolve a circuit
6	conflict and part of the problem was that
7	CHAIR SARIS: A Commission conflict,
8	okay.
9	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: Yes.
10	CHAIR SARIS: We couldn't
11	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: Right. So
12	the Supreme Court has interpreted ACCA to include
13	all burglaries and you in your testimony said
14	that Congress's considerations may have been
15	different.
16	So I'm just interested in your thought
17	process there. This was an issue we struggled
18	with a lot on the Commission in large part because
19	of the Supreme Court's interpretation of ACCA.
20	HON. KEELEY: Yes. Well we share
21	your struggle on the Committee and I realize that

might not 1 there have been comments mУ as enlighteningly helpful as you might have wished. 2 But after a lot of discussion 3 concluded that burglaries only of dwellings on 4 the list of enumerated offenses was simple and 5 6 clear and that, as I commented, using variances 7 and departures to take up the questions of the violence and other circumstances was adequate to 8 handle the issue and the judges do that every 9 day. 10 So we were -- that's where we came out 11 12 on that. COMMISSIONER PRYOR: I want to follow 13 14 up to Commissioner Barkow's question. So the 15 definition of felony, what she proposed was basically keeping the same definition of felony 16 but tying it to, one, that's already in federal 17 law --18 19 HON. KEELEY: Yes. 20 COMMISSIONER PRYOR: which as I 21 understand you said is something you

1	support, and the exception for a state
2	misdemeanor that's punishable by a term of
3	imprisonment of two years or less is in federal
4	law.
5	HON. KEELEY: Yes.
6	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: And it would
7	seem to me that would be a pretty mechanical
8	thing to apply, not difficult. What is there
9	about that that you find problematic?
10	HON. KEELEY: I agree it's
11	applicable. You could apply it, Judge Pryor.
12	Our Committee's view was more simple, more
13	straightforward the definition the better for
14	everyone.
15	I am aware that there are other
16	definitions. It was our preference to keep it
17	that way.
18	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: I mean because
19	it seemed to me that the concern about disparity
20	that you raised could go both ways.

HON. KEELEY: Yes.

1	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Because it could
2	just as easily be said that when you are including
3	prior convictions that are, that fall within the
4	federal definition of felony, you are over-
5	inclusive when you are bringing in state crimes
6	that some states classify as a misdemeanor that
7	are punishable up to two years but in many cases
8	do not result in terms of imprisonment anywhere
9	near there.
10	HON. KEELEY: Yes, I am aware.
11	CHAIR SARIS: Mr. Wroblewski.
12	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: Thank you,
13	Judge. Judge Cardone, Judge Keeler, thank you
14	both for your testimony. I read through them
15	carefully, I found them both very, very helpful.
16	Judge Cardone, I was intrigued by your
17	testimony on the discussion of kidnapping and I
18	went back and I read the three 5th Circuit cases
19	on kidnapping and as I understand it they were
20	evaluating kidnapping convictions in Tennessee,
21	Oklahoma, and California, and they came to a

split decision that one was a crime of violence 1 and two were not a crime of violence. 2. And then the discussion we were having 3 here about the definition, it strikes me that as 4 long as we use the categorical approach that 5 regardless of how we and the Commission define 6 7 kidnapping you are going to continue to have this kind of haphazard decision making. 8 Some states will include kidnapping 9 of a minor by a parent, others will not, and so 10 11 the exact same conduct that might be committed in Oklahoma, California, and Tennessee that might 12 result in precisely the same conviction for 13 kidnapping will nonetheless be treated very 14 15 differently as long as we use the categorical approach, and that's the concern that we have 16 about the categorical approach. 17 It's less about the concern about the 18 definition. I think reasonable minds can differ 19 20 about whether it should include this or include 21 that, but regardless of what we settle on as long

1	as we use the categorical approach you are going
2	to have tremendous inconsistency.
3	Number one, do you agree with that,
4	and then second, for both of you, you both talked
5	about the need for a fact-finding backup in your
6	testimony.
7	You said, Judge Cardone, that the
8	sentencing courts should be able to and can,
9	using departures, correct for the oddities of the
10	categorical approach, and, Judge Keeley, you said
11	that in your testimony and you said it here.
12	Do either of you have any concerns
13	about the ability of district court judges to
14	evaluate the facts and whether they are
15	appropriate, whether it's for a departure or for
16	application, of these prior convictions?
17	Are there practical concerns about
18	evaluating them or any kind of legal concerns?
19	So those are the two questions.
20	HON. CARDONE: Well I definitely have
21	a concern about evaluating the facts because I

1	think it goes both ways.
2	As you know when you are in the
3	courtroom and you have these defendants in front
4	of you and when you are doing the categorical
5	approach and you are looking at the crime and
6	being very sort of what is this crime and does
7	it fall within this category is very different
8	than knowing the facts and when you get a PSR you
9	have all the facts.
10	So if it's very heinous but somehow
11	the categorical approach doesn't take you
12	CHAIR SARIS: Nefarious?
13	HON. CARDONE: Very nefarious,
14	exactly. But somehow the categorical approach
15	doesn't get you there. You know, as a judge it's
16	very difficult to sort of wipe out of your mind
17	the facts, but that's what it calls for.
18	So, yes, of course, I have a concern,
19	but I think, I don't know what's better than the
20	categorical approach.
21	I just don't know any other way when

you are talking about 50 states and the variety 1 of statutes in the 50 states I don't know what 2. other way we can do, what other thing we can do 3 to try to make it uniform for every defendant 4 when we are looking at it other than to say okay, 5 is this that kind of crime of violence as defined 6 7 by the Sentencing Commission and, you know, use the tools that we have to get there. 8 I just think -- I don't know any other 9 way to get there, but I do have my concerns. 10 Ι 11 just think that we have to take each defendant 12 as we see them and do the best we can to figure out if this is the kind of sentence that's going 13 to deal with that person. 14 15 HON. KEELEY: So every day of the week a defendant comes before either Judge Cardone or 16 me or all of my colleagues here who may have a 17 criminal history category that looks 18 19 benign, a one or a two. 20 But you look at what the charges were, 21 you look at what the plea was, and maybe make a

determination that that criminal history category 1 under-represents the seriousness of the offenses 2 and the potential for violence on the part of the 3 4 defendant that you are sentencing and consider a departure on that ground or you may 5 6 look at a group of other factors, including 7 criminal history, and determine whether variance is in order because the criminal history 8 9 category may over-represent the seriousness of the defendant's actual criminal 10 history particularly history for violence. 11 12 Now you asked about the practical concerns of evaluating the facts. 13 How many of us has had a case in front of us where you can't 14 15 find the criminal history from the state conviction? 16 You don't know what occurred at the 17 state level and all you have in front of you is 18 the what the ultimate 19 what crime was and 20 conviction looking was and you are at the categorical approach, the modified categorical 21

approach, and you have to look at those elements. 1 That's certainly a guidance for us and 2. it gives us the basis upon which to consider the 3 It's often difficult to find not only the 4 facts of the conviction, which the categorical 5 approach would tell us not to look at, but the 6 7 convictions themselves. Now this is very interesting. can have someone in front of you who should be, 9 by virtue of where 10 iust the, what their 11 incarceration history has been, a four or five, 12 somewhere there. because the probation officer 13 But 14 can't obtain any information from the state 15 they're a one or maybe a two. This is a serious issue because you are looking at what's the 16 possible impact on the community if this person 17 is sentenced that way. 18 There is so many factors that come in 19 20 to play when you are evaluating those facts and 21 Ι believe that sentencing, iudaes who most

1	sentence believe that simplicity is not
2	necessarily naiveté.
3	Simplicity gives us very good
4	guidelines and then we have the flexibility to
5	confront the case that's in front of us and go
6	from there with the tools we have for sentencing.
7	That's the point that I am trying to
8	make here because we don't always get the perfect
9	box of facts and criminal history. The probation
LO	officers cast wide nets but they often come back
L1	with very few fish.
L2	CHAIR SARIS: So I just In the 21
L3	in the immigration area if we switched it to the
L4	ACCA definition of just a burglary rather than
L5	burglary of a dwelling, which is currently in the
L6	Guidelines, in your experience what affect would
L7	that have in the immigration area?
L8	HON. CARDONE: I am not sure I I
L9	am not exactly sure I understand the question as
20	it pertains to the, why it would make that big
21	of a difference or

1	CHAIR SARIS: Well could we get a lot
2	more people Do you see a lot of burglaries
3	that are not burglaries of dwellings where you'd
4	get a plus 16?
5	HON. CARDONE: No, no. No, I don't.
6	I see a lot If it's anything it's burglary of
7	dwellings. I don't see a lot of other
8	burglaries.
9	CHAIR SARIS: That's interesting.
10	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: What if it were
11	burglary of an occupied dwelling?
12	HON. CARDONE: Of an unoccupied?
13	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: No, occupied.
14	What if we limited the definition to an occupied
15	dwelling?
16	HON. CARDONE: Well my understanding
17	of the reason that it's dwelling is because when
18	you go into a dwelling you just never know if
19	it's going to be occupied or not.
20	And so I think it's trying to say what
21	kind of a person is this that's going into a

1	dwelling where, you know, you never know, you
2	might find young children, whatever.
3	So I'm not so sure I take comfort in
4	the idea that it's an unoccupied versus occupied.
5	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: How many
6	of the cases that you've evaluated involving
7	state burglary statutes, do you recall many or
8	any that defined burglary with respect to
9	occupation, whether the dwelling is occupied or
10	not?
11	And, again, under the categorical
12	approach it would be required because if it's not
13	in the statute then it wouldn't count.
14	HON. CARDONE: Honestly, I don't
15	recall a lot of the states, you know, this is
16	just off the top of my head, but I don't recall
17	a lot of states sort of drawing that line between
18	occupied versus unoccupied.
19	I just don't make that I just don't
20	see a huge difference between the two. I tend
21	to think it's just defined as a, you know,

dwelling. 1 VICE CHAIR BREYER: In the, in your 2. District where you have a high number of illegal 3 entry cases do you have any sense of whether the 4 criminal history of those individuals reflects 5 6 the fact that, one, they may be homeless, two, 7 that they go into a house or into an area essentially as a trespass, as a place to stay or 8 stop and so forth, yet they are charged with a 9 burglary, do you have a sense of that, is that a 10 11 large number or is that really an insignificant number? 12 It's an insignificant 13 HON. CARDONE: 14 number. Most of the people, obviously, that we 15 see, I mean a lot of them are, you know, family reunification issues where they are trying to get 16 back to wherever their family is in the United 17 States or they, you know, are coming here to 18 work. 19 20 It's very rare I see somebody who is

homeless.

One more thing on the 1 CHAIR SARIS: definition of felony. I come from one of the 2. states where the misdemeanor is punishable by up 3 to 2-1/2 years, so I hear such strong complaints 4 from judges who say I got a guy who is convicted 5 6 of two misdemeanors, never did any jail time and 7 suddenly he is a career offender. So we are struggling with what to do 8 with it, over-inclusive, under-inclusive, that 9 kind of thing, and I think The Defender says 10 11 there were eight such states, so it's not just 12 limited to my state. the other issue that we 13 But have struggled with is the fact that states start 14 15 reclassifying things from, how does it go, from felony to misdemeanor and from misdemeanor to 16 felony, and it goes both ways. 17 And so I guess, I had never heard this 18 term till I heard Judge Breyer speak, there's 19 20 something called a wobbler in California, we call 21 them birds who sing a certain way, but I guess

1	there are crimes that are called wobblers in
2	California.
3	VICE CHAIR BREYER: These are
4	wobblers not warblers or
5	(Laughter.)
6	CHAIR SARIS: So I suppose that is it
7	becomes, what, it's a misdemeanor and then it
8	becomes a felony and
9	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well you have the
10	case in California, you have a number of crimes
11	in California that depending on the sentence
12	that's given will be either a misdemeanor or a
13	felony and you have assault cases, you have
14	certain types of cases that are wobblers, go
15	either way, then you have questions of how they
16	are characterized at the time of sentencing and
17	the time that they are plead.
18	You also have issues as to what
19	happens on a revocation and does a revocation or
20	X then re-characterize the initial offense and
21	if it does re-characterize the initial offense

1	what does that mean.
2	What does that mean because after all
3	the sentencing judge of the original offense said
4	I think you ought to do 30 days, 60 days, 90
5	days. Anyway, those are issues that we have.
6	CHAIR SARIS: And the other was we
7	were at the National Conference, I mean Denise
8	was with me in Alaska and we were all out there
9	and we heard about all these states that were
10	starting to reclassify downwards.
11	In other words, things that used to
12	be felonies are now becoming misdemeanors. So
13	as we think about this it's an issue of when do
14	you make the decision or whether you just stick
15	with the date of the sentencing and then allow
16	it as a departure issue.
17	It's simplicity, you don't want to
18	make it too complicated. On the other hand it
19	is troubling and I didn't know if you had thoughts
20	on that.
21	HON. KEELEY: Well, you know, you

1	just have to go back to experience, what
2	experience teaches us on the bench and I can only
3	speak personally here, but becoming an expert on
4	the law, felony and misdemeanor law of Michigan,
5	California, North Carolina, the 4th Circuit
6	jurisprudence of the last five years is, there
7	is a plethora of discussion about North Carolina
8	law and the modified categorical approach.
9	This complicates matters so
10	tremendously and delayed sentencing often times
11	for quite long periods of time while you are
12	trying to find out just what is the law, what's
13	going on, what actually happened, and at the end
14	you can't because the information is not
15	available.
16	My experience was shared across the
17	Committee, this is why we came with the
18	recommendation that we've made.
19	CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. Does
20	anybody else have any other questions?
21	I want to thank you very much for

1	coming in, difficult question, and we always want
2	to hear from the Courts. Thank you.
3	HON. CARDONE: Thank you for inviting
4	us.
5	HON. KEELEY: Thank you for inviting
6	us.
7	CHAIR SARIS: All by yourself up
8	here.
9	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Wow, that's
10	brave.
11	MR. ZAUZMER: Intimidating, Your
12	Honor.
13	CHAIR SARIS: You're all set?
14	MR. ZAUZMER: All set, Your Honor.
15	CHAIR SARIS: All right, well
16	welcome. Next we'll hear from the Executive
17	Branch and the witness is Robert Zauzmer who has
18	become a regular testifier before the Commission
19	on behalf of the Department of Justice.
20	He is the Appellate Chief in the
21	United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern

1	District of Pennsylvania. So welcome back. I
2	want to We have about 30 minutes, and not for
3	your statement, for the whole thing.
4	So I think at this point, do we have
5	the little lights go off? Yes, okay, there we
6	go. Thank you.
7	MR. ZAUZMER: Thank you very much,
8	Your Honor. Members of the Commission, it's an
9	honor, of course, to appear again before you and
10	I appreciate the opportunity speak on behalf of
11	the Department regarding this very important
12	issue.
13	My initial statement, please cut me
14	off when you are ready to ask questions, it may
15	be a bit longer than five minutes, but I am an
16	appellate advocate, I'll work in the answers and
17	what I want to say at some point, but we have
18	some important points to address.
19	Obviously what we are all here for is
20	very clear, which is we want to target the
21	appropriate people, the people who are the

violent recidivists, but we don't want to over 1 target and we want to make sure that these very 2 significant penalties are reserved for the people 3 who do tend to be recidivists and do tend to be 4 violent recidivists. 5 6 And we want to make sure that the 7 definitions are clear enough and applicable enough so that they can readily be applied across 8 the country based on the statutes of all 50 states 9 and make the work doable by all the judges and 10 11 prosecutors and defense attorneys and probation 12 officers. The current system has not worked well 13 and what I would mainly like to talk about this 14 15 morning, and I am really happy to have the it, is 16 opportunity to do the categorical approach. 17 The root of the problems in our view 18 is the definitions, 19 not much but the 20 application of this very inflexible, very odd 21 approach, that is not good sentencing policy.

1 With respect to the many questions the Commission has asked we have set forth our 2. positions in our letter. We support the idea of 3 eliminating the residual clause and making the 4 Guidelines consistent with what the Supreme Court 5 6 has determined with respect to ACCA. 7 with the suggestion We agree defining enumerated offenses so that we have more 8 9 uniformity across the country in what this predicate Commission believes should be 10 the crimes of violence. 11 12 For similar reasons we agree that all definitions in the Guidelines 13 should be consistent for ease of application, between 2L 14 15 and 4B and the other places the crime of violence definitions appear in the Guidelines. 16 We do not agree with the suggestion 17 regarding the definition of a felony to look to 18 the State's designation because that, and I can 19 20 explain more if you have questions about it, 21 that's an invitation to disparity where similarly

situated people who committed the same crimes 1 would be treated differently. 2. But most importantly, like I said, I 3 want to talk about the categorical approach 4 because that's what creates such inconsistent and 5 6 even bizarre results. 7 We can spend all the time in the world coming up with the best definition of what a 8 crime of violence is and we will still have these 9 very strange results once we go out and try to 10 apply it to the different laws in all 50 states. 11 12 Judge Cardone, for example, very eloquently and has written eloquently about 13 the kidnapping problem. 14 Well there are very 15 brilliant minds on this Commission and on the staff of this Commission who can come up with the 16 right definition of kidnapping. 17 But when we go then -- If we are 18 limited to the categorical approach we are going 19 20 to have a different result in Tennessee and 21 Oklahoma and California and an untold number of

other states because their statutes will not 1 match up to that perfect definition we came up 2 with. 3 It will be over-broad, it will be 4 under-inclusive, it will be wrong, and that's the 5 reason that we keep coming up with these odd 6 7 outcomes. In our letter we cite the example of 8 robbery in my home state of Pennsylvania. 9 As common a crime as we see in the records of violent 10 11 recidivists, and this happens regularly, even 12 weekly, where people come to me with cases in which we have committed armed serial robbers who 13 have repeatedly been convicted of robbery under 14 Pennsylvania law and in many instances it's now 15 the case where it's determined they are not 16 offenders and thev 17 career are not criminals under ACCA. 18 Why is that? It's simply because 19 20 Pennsylvania has a robbery statute that has six

subsections of which only a couple clearly apply

to what you would call robbery.

But because of the practice of state 2. District Attorneys in just listing 3 subsection and the practice of clerks in not 4 specifying any further in the judgment what was 5 the nature of the conviction, we have to concede 6 7 in court that people who we know beyond any doubt are violent criminals are not simply because of 8 the categorical approach and the various rules 9 that apply to it. 10

This is wrong as a matter of sentencing policy. It was foisted on us because of ACCA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of ACCA.

But the Supreme Court was acting in a very different context with focusing on statutory and mandatory, maximum sentences, and it explained that one of the reasons it did this was because of the constitutional concerns that would apply that no longer apply to the advisory quidelines.

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Importantly, this Commission itself 1 never expressly adopted the categorical approach. 2 If you go back, and I know you have, and you look 3 at the original Commission's work in 1987 and 4 it spoke of the conduct charged in the 5 6 previous offense and that language is still there 7 in the commentary to 4B1.2. But after the Supreme Court decided 9 in Taylor in 1990 the courts pretty much in lockstep decided we're going to apply the same 10 11 categorical approach to the guidelines that apply to ACCA, this Commission never acted differently, 12 and what we are left time after time is having 13 to say that somebody who we know committed a 14 15 violent crime did not. talking about 16 What Ι am are isolated examples, this is something that happens 17 consistently in state after state based on the 18 vagaries of how the laws are created and 19 20 vagaries of what records are kept how 21 specific those records are.

1	Judge Cardone moments ago asked, you
2	know, what's the better way? We think there is
3	a better way. The better way is let judges do
4	what judges always do, which is evaluate the
5	facts.
6	When we look at any other part of
7	application of the Guideline manual we don't
8	limit judges in these very odd specific ways to
9	look at the particular elements of statutes.
LO	We don't say, for example, in the loss
L1	calculation you should only use some verified,
L2	certified financial statement and if it's not
L3	there you can't find the loss number.
L4	We let judges do what they do, which
L5	is consider all relevant evidence and make
L6	factual findings.
L7	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Can I ask a
L8	question?
L9	MR. ZAUZMER: Yes, sir.
20	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Because you used
21	two different terms there, one is look at the

1	facts and look at the elements and it's,
2	obviously judges all the time look at the
3	elements, I mean that's a legal issue and that's
4	easy.
5	Looking at the facts can be easy, or
6	not, depending on what facts a judge can look at.
7	Are you suggesting that really we should go
8	beyond what the charging documents are, and we're
9	now looking at a crime that didn't occur in front
10	of us, right?
11	MR. ZAUZMER: Right.
12	VICE CHAIR BREYER: We're now looking
13	at something in the history and I thought that
14	we are confined or constrained as to what
15	documents we can look at.
16	An example would be we couldn't look
17	at a police report or we have difficulty with
18	police reports. Are you suggesting And in
19	the police report will probably be at least one
20	person's version of what the facts are.
21	So how do we do that? How do we just

1	look at those facts
2	MR. ZAUZMER: Well let me
3	VICE CHAIR BREYER: if you can't
4	look at a police report?
5	MR. ZAUZMER: Sure, if I may explain.
6	First of all, we're not suggesting eliminating
7	the categorical approach entirely. There is a
8	place for it in those instances where the
9	elements of a state offense happen to line up
10	with the definitions that you define and that can
11	be the end of the matter.
12	So it will not be a tremendous number
13	of cases in which what we have called the conduct-
14	based backup would come up. When it does what
15	we are proposing, Your Honor, is that the
16	evidence should be any reliable evidence.
17	The same that is considered, not just
18	the police report, which probably wouldn't be
19	sufficient to meet the government's burden, but
20	whether there are witnesses or other things the
21	government could produce, the government would

1	have the burden by a preponderance of the
2	evidence.
3	The reason When Your Honor says the
4	premise that you have stated is we are limited
5	in what we can look at it. The reason we are
6	limited now is because of the Shepard decision.
7	But the Shepard decision, again, is
8	based on ACCA and when we read Shepard we see
9	that the reason the Supreme Court limited Courts
10	to specific documents, specific judicial records,
11	is because it worried that going further than
12	that would offend Apprendi, but if we went
13	further
14	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Well let's talk
15	about that.
16	MR. ZAUZMER: Sure.
17	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Okay. Because
18	the Department's position for years, and one with
19	which I have a lot of sympathy, is that we need
20	to be simplifying the Guidelines, that we need
21	to be moving toward a different model than this

1	530-page monstrosity, okay.
2	I don't see how we do that with your
3	approach. It seems to me that if we're going to
4	simplify the Guidelines, if we're going to move
5	toward a different model, we need to be concerned
6	about the Apprendi implications of these prior
7	conviction enhancements.
8	MR. ZAUZMER: Well, Your Honor, we
9	believe we do have to simplify the Guidelines and
10	the place for simplification with respect to
11	crime of violence is in these definitions of
12	enumerated offenses.
13	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Aren't we going
14	to have to say though with respect to all prior
15	convictions that we have to be compliant with
16	Apprendi?
17	MR. ZAUZMER: We don't, nor do we do
18	that in any other aspect of the Guidelines. We
19	
20	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: You're talking
21	about doing this by a preponderance of the

1	evidence and you are talking about doing it with
2	a fact-based inquiry, that's not going to be
3	Apprendi compliant.
4	MR. ZAUZMER: It's not, but, again,
5	Your Honor, nothing in the Guideline application
6	currently is. Currently judges
7	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Current, yes, I
8	know, I'm talking about something for the future.
9	COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: A
10	presumptive system, for those of who are
11	interested in that, would your proposal not run
12	
13	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: But the
14	Department, that's what the Department was
15	interested in.
16	MR. ZAUZMER: The Department has
17	looked at number of things. I don't believe the
18	Department has ever taken the position that
19	Apprendi should apply to the Sentencing
20	Guidelines.

In fact, that was the opposite of our

1	position in the Booker litigation. Our position
2	since Booker was decided, which has been affirmed
3	by every Appellate Court, is that Guideline facts
4	are found by a preponderance of the evidence
5	based on reliable evidence that's submitted at
6	sentencing.
7	Our view is still that that should be
8	the correct approach at sentencing. But
9	Apprendi, we abide by Booker, Apprendi does not
10	apply to the Sentencing Guidelines so long as
11	they are advisory and the court has the ability
12	to vary within the statutory maximum sentence.
13	So what we are proposing with respect
14	to crime of violence is the same, and the
15	categorical approach, is the same as what courts
16	are doing every single day with regard to every
17	single other issue in this book.
18	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Except for
19	mandatory minimums. Can I just ask you a
20	question?
21	MR. ZAUZMER: Sure.

COMMISSIONER BARKOW: 1 So you said we should let judges do what they do, this is their 2 freedom to do it, they are very good at it, but 3 inconsistent with the Department's it seems 4 position that we need mandatory minimums in some 5 6 because that obviously constrains 7 ability of judges. I see it as kind of the flipside of 8 this and so I am just a little curious why the 9 Department has one view with respect with man 10 11 mins and another with this one? 12 MR. ZAUZMER: Again, Commissioner, I don't know that we do. The mandatory minimums 13 14 come up in a narrow set of areas. They exist and 15 they are important but they don't govern any more than a fraction of sentencings that happen, and 16 that's a matter of course for Congress. 17 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: But you said 18 this would be a fraction, too, because you said 19 20 in most cases we'd be able to use the categorical 21 approach and it would just be the smaller subset

that we do your conduct based. 1 2. MR. ZAUZMER: Right. COMMISSIONER BARKOW: So, you know, I 3 don't know we'd have to look at data to see how 4 many, but it just seems as a theoretical matter 5 6 there is a, we use categories of things 7 different places. You know, when it's used in mandatory 8 minimum context we know that's it's going to be 9 over-broad but the Department has kind of weighed 10 11 the pluses and minuses and come out and said look, we still want them. 12 here, again, the categorical 13 And 14 rule, it has its problems, it has its benefits, 15 pluses and minuses, and I guess the logic of just let judges do what they do I have a little bit 16 of a problem with the Department saying that when 17 it does seem inconsistent with the way the 18 Department views the mandatory minimum landscape 19 20 where however many cases it's used the Department 21 is still very much in favor of having them.

MR. ZAUZMER: Well, Your Honor, there 1 are very few areas, but they are important, where 2 there are mandatory minimums. They come in the 3 quantity, 924(c), child drug area based on 4 pornography, those are the prominent ones. 5 6 The Department has stated that it, and 7 they are an issue for Congress, of course, and what the Department has stated under this 8 9 Administration in recent years is that we want to work with Congress to make sure that those 10 11 mandatories are applied correctly and only in the 12 areas in which they serve important purposes. We have stated our position that we 13 are willing to, we want to talk to Congress about 14 15 lowering some of the mandatories where that may 16 be appropriate, that's an issue for Congress. In general though our view absolutely 17 is not, and I hope I am not misunderstood on 18 this, our view is not mandatory sentencing, that 19 20 we want some code that lists a mandatory sentence 21 for offense and take iudicial every away

discretion, that absolutely is not our position 1 when you look at the broad landscape of federal 2 sentencing. 3 4 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Can I ask you one other question though. 5 I quess I was, you 6 it is worrying to hear Judge Keeley 7 describe that you can't even get the state records that you need to do this, right, and it 8 does seem like a big part of this is just that 9 the records aren't there and I'm just --10 11 Has the Department made any efforts 12 to try to get Congress to redress that particular issue, you know, maybe with the way we use 13 congressional grants or state funding 14 15 condition of that that states do a better job with their recordkeeping? 16 Because it does seem to me no matter 17 what we do, whatever rule we have, if we can't 18 get information from the states about even the 19 20 offenses of conviction the idea that we could go 21 even further and get these facts, right, it's

just going to lead us down that same path. 1 And so I am just -- In the bigger 2. picture is the Department doing anything to try 3 to improve that kind of record gathering? 4 I personally don't know 5 MR. ZAUZMER: 6 the answer to that. Ι think that's an 7 outstanding idea and it's something I definitely take back because I think it's a great 8 idea. 9 Though realize that in looking at the 10 11 near future, the next five, ten, 15 years, we are still dealing with the ramifications of what came 12 before. 13 Where I have the problems every day 14 15 is I have defendants who started their criminal career in 1990 and I am looking at records from 16 that date forward and when I am getting beyond 17 ten, 15, 20 years, the burden is on the government 18 and it's the government that then fails to be 19 able to prove what those convictions were because 20 21 the recordkeeping is so poor.

1	VICE CHAIR BREYER: I'd like to go
2	back if I can to Judge Pryor's observation
3	because it does, I am not quite sure I clearly -
4	- I understand your position.
5	You say look, let the judges look at
6	the facts, this is what they do all the time.
7	And, again, I come back to In those cases
8	where it's not clear from the Shepard documents
9	that we can ascertain the facts what do you want
10	us to do?
11	Is it your position well, look, we can
12	look beyond it because we can look at police
13	reports, we can look at statements that are made
14	outside of court and so forth. Do you think we
15	can for this approach?
16	MR. ZAUZMER: Yes, and I also think
17	we could call witnesses. I think what we are
18	asking is that the government be given the
19	opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
20	evidence that someone committed a violent
21	offense.

1	CHAIR SARIS: But, you know, that's
2	where If I can just jump in. It is different
3	from what we do every day in a sentencing. I
4	have been sentencing for 20 years.
5	When you make facts on how much drug
6	quantity is or whether or not the financial fraud
7	involved X, those are hard enough, but they are
8	at least the instant offense that's in front of
9	you I find it
LO	You know, I've been doing this for
L1	years and you go back to a domestic abuse
L2	situation and he said/she said and you're trying
L3	to untangle exactly what happened and then the
L4	probation office is flipping out because they
L5	can't find the records, it is different.
L6	I mean it's hard to capture the full
L7	case without actually taking testimony or at
L8	least having major proffers from the police
L9	officers themselves rather than just a police
20	report, it would expand.

MR. ZAUZMER: There would be cases in

which it would expand it, but, Your Honor, what 1 I see are cases that are not difficult and those 2. are the cases in which the government would elect 3 to try to show its burden. 4 see are the cases in which 5 Т 6 people are doing shootings and gunpoint robberies 7 and assaults in which it is readily obvious from all of the records and all of the known facts. 8 So if I could just say one thing. 9 There is no question that this would be a new 10 area and new work, but what we are balancing here 11 is we are balancing this against the unfairness 12 that comes when similarly situated people are 13 treated differently. 14 15 When that person who unquestionably kidnapping in 16 committed а Tennessee gets totally different sentence. 17 COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Yes, but they're 18 -- But with the paucity of evidence that's going 19 20 to exist in lots of cases then you are going to 21 have the same, you're going to have disparity.

1	You're going to have cases where there
2	were offenders who were in that position but you
3	just can't prove it, too.
4	MR. ZAUZMER: Absolutely, but we want
5	the opportunity because we know
6	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: But there is
7	disparity either way.
8	MR. ZAUZMER: Well there is
9	disparity, Your Honor, I think with all respect
10	in the enforcement of criminal law in what we can
11	prove and what we can't prove and this would be
12	another example of that.
13	But we want the opportunity because
14	we have seen so many cases, and, again, this is
15	not anecdotal, this is something that's happening
16	in every district where because of the
17	categorical approach, and it's happening even
18	more now in the wake of Johnson.
19	I am working now on a petition where
20	now we don't have the residual clause we
21	basically only have the elements clause for ACCA,

1 so now someone has presented to me a very strong third-degree 2 argument that murder under Pennsylvania law, which is basically any murder 3 other than premeditated, is not a crime 4 because of 5 violence how Pennsylvania 6 interpreted it and how courts have interpreted 7 the elements clause. When we see an argument like that, one 8 9 that I can't commit right now, but that the government may have to concede, that's where we 10 11 know this enterprise has gone off the rails and 12 so we are balancing one problem against another. COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: 13 In the 14 District Court Judge Keeley suggested that right now District Court judges in say the robbery 15 cases that you talked about in Pennsylvania where 16 you can prove these were armed robberies and yet 17 they didn't qualify, is the government getting 18 those documents and making arguments like you are 19 20 talking about for purposes of departures 21 variances, is that happening now?

1 MR. ZAUZMER: It happens but I can tell you that it's very inconsistent as to when 2 judges will depart or not. Most judges, in my 3 District I can speak of and I know in many others, 4 do not give upward departures or variances and 5 certainly nothing approaching the Career Offender 6 7 Guideline that would apply, so when we talk about disparity there is enormous disparity in how that 8 9 plays out. We don't secure upward variances that 10 11 often on those grounds. COMMISSIONER FRIEDRICH: 12 Back to the Apprendi point, would you agree that for those 13 14 of who would support a simplified and presumptive 15 system that your approach would run afoul guidelines 16 Apprendi if the longer were no advisory? 17 MR. ZAUZMER: Oh, certainly. If the 18 guidelines were not advisory it would run afoul 19 of that and so would every other application. 20 21 You know, we would have jury findings regarding

1	everything in the Guidelines if Apprendi applied
2	given the
3	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Not prior
4	convictions you wouldn't.
5	MR. ZAUZMER: Not prior convictions,
6	that's
7	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: As long as you
8	were compliant with
9	MR. ZAUZMER: That's true. No, the -
10	_
11	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: the
12	categorical approach, right?
13	MR. ZAUZMER: Absolutely. And what I
14	am suggesting is
15	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Which is what we
16	are here talking about.
17	MR. ZAUZMER: Right. I am suggesting
18	that if Apprendi applied to the Guidelines we'd
19	have much bigger problems than what we are
20	talking about today.
21	If the first majority opinion of

1	Booker controlled
2	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: That's what
3	we're talking about, a very different manual.
4	MR. ZAUZMER: No, I understand, sir.
5	Now one question that did come up is regarding
6	the elements clause. My friends from the
7	defenders I know have suggested that the elements
8	clause takes care of this and we don't even need
9	any enumerated offenses.
10	And I would invite you to look at the
11	litigation that is happening around the country
12	right now after Johnson in which defense lawyers,
13	as they should, are now attacking all sorts of
14	crimes that are indisputably violent crimes but
15	saying that they don't satisfy the elements
16	clause.
17	The most prominent one that the
18	defenders are briefing I can tell you in every
19	District is Hobbs Act robbery.
20	Hobbs Act robbery, the most commonly
21	charged federal robbery offense, it's being

1	argued is not a crime of violence under ACCA
2	because it can be committed through a threat
3	against property as well as a threat against the
4	person and then you use the categorical approach,
5	you go back and look at the charging documents
6	and the judgment and you don't see that any
7	distinction was made, if it's even a divisible
8	statute to begin with.
9	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Well that's a
10	problem for Congress not for us.
11	MR. ZAUZMER: No, correct, but should
12	this body adopt only an elements approach
13	CHAIR SARIS: Can you just The
14	Hobbs Act robbery is a federal offense?
15	MR. ZAUZMER: It is, it is. So if
16	you have a defendant with a prior Hobbs Act
17	CHAIR SARIS: A federal offense?
18	MR. ZAUZMER: Correct.
19	CHAIR SARIS: Well couldn't you get
20	the modified Shepard documents to figure that
21	out? In other words you're not, you don't have

1	to plea colloquy the, generally, right, the
2	prosecutor states all, everything, and then you
3	say to the defendant is this true and the person
4	says yes then you consider that, right?
5	VICE CHAIR BREYER: It isn't the real
6	problem, not that, isn't the real problem, the
7	state offense is, because the state offenses, and
8	I will, well from my experience and I'm sure my
9	colleagues would agree, I get the police reports
10	in 20 percent of the cases.
11	I mean 80 percent of the cases you
12	Now we can't describe the, it says in the
13	presentence report we can't describe the offense
14	because we don't have a police report or we don't
15	have enough information about it.
16	Now that's the majority of cases that
17	we look at in terms of what happened, what
18	happened. So if you don't have the categorical
19	approach what are you left with?
20	And as I understand your solution to
21	that is I'll tell you what we're left with, we're

left with a hearing and at the hearing the United 1 States Attorney has the option of trying to 2 produce evidence which would satisfy the court. 3 4 Maybe that's the answer. Well the other part of 5 MR. ZAUZMER: the answer is we still do have the categorical 6 7 As I said there are many offenses in approach. which the will elements match uр to 8 definitions that you adopt and we think it's a 9 very good idea for this Commission just for that 10 11 reason to define these enumerated offenses as you have endeavored so far and informed by all the 12 13 comment that you are getting. 14 So not eliminating the we are 15 categorical approach, but we want the option of a hearing for these cases that really result in 16 inconsistent results. 17 Yes, yesterday, I'm not 18 CHAIR SARIS: up on it, I'm sure you are far more up on it then 19 20 I am, the Supreme Court argument on the word "as described in." 21

1	MR. ZAUZMER: Yes.
2	CHAIR SARIS: I don't pretend to be
3	an expert on it. So you had a very interesting
4	suggestion, which is don't make up a new
5	definition, just use the existing federal
6	statutes and eliminate the interstate commerce
7	nexus requirement "as described in."
8	Should we be waiting on doing that
9	till we hear from the Supreme Court on what they
10	think about that language?
11	MR. ZAUZMER: I don't think so. I
12	don't have the exact words in front of me, but
13	in preparing our suggestion and our submission
14	we had that case in mind and we drafted the phrase
15	in a manner that we believe satisfies any concern
16	about that.
17	And now we are only suggesting federal
18	definitions for consistency where they exist.
19	There are still about half of the enumerated
20	offenses that the Commission has proposed, that
21	we have proposed, where there isn't a comparable

1	rederal definition and you would need your own
2	definition.
3	But where we are using the federal
4	definition we propose language and, of course,
5	I'm sure you can improve it, that would just make
6	clear this is the definition, we are not using
7	the federal jurisdictional hooks, we're not using
8	the other things that might appear in the
9	statute.
10	CHAIR SARIS: So what if we adopted
11	the federal statute for the, and then with the
12	ones that don't have a federal statute just leave
13	the existing case law where it is?
14	MR. ZAUZMER: You could certainly do
15	that but I think that there are ways to improve
16	on the case law and there are circuit conflicts
17	out there that haven't been addressed regarding
18	what the "generic" meaning of this Commission's
19	enumerated offenses were.
20	CHAIR SARIS: And so those are the
21	ones you would say fix?

Well I think if we are 1 MR. ZAUZMER: doing this once and for all to do it. 2. Ι understand, Ι heard Your Honor's, you know, 3 thoughtful question before to the previous panel 4 about well if the judges have done all this work 5 6 why don't we keep that. 7 But I think if we take the long view of sentencing, not just in the next couple of 8 years, but for the next ten, 20 years and beyond, 9 it's a helpful exercise to do this and do this 10 11 right and not so much rely on the existing case 12 law that we have where we know there are conflicts, we know there is uncertainty, we know 13 there is some disparate results. 14 15 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Can I ask you, with the using of the, I mean I wasn't -- In just 16 trying to figure out which if you were going to 17 have a uniform set of definitions trying to think 18 about, you know, Model Penal Code versus federal 19 20 versus something we make up on our own, what's 21 the thinking behind using the federal definitions

1	for things?
2	Because my initial reaction was the
3	states don't really use the Federal Code as a
4	model for anything. They are way more likely to
5	have turned to the Model Penal Code.
6	And so we were just kind of
7	anticipating where we are more likely to get
8	overlap. I would have predicted it would have
9	been the Model Penal Code, but I mean you must
10	have a reason that you think the federal one
11	would be the better uniform standard and I just
12	kind of wanted to hear a little bit more about
13	why.
14	MR. ZAUZMER: Sure. Well we
15	suggested the federal definitions because they
16	have been approved by Congress and because they
17	have been litigated, there is case law regarding
18	those areas as opposed to coming up with new
19	definitions.
20	When we then go to the next step and
21	say let's compare it to the all of the state

1 statutes that are out there, that as opposed to Penal 2 the Model Code, as opposed to other treatises, really there is no overlap at all 3 among any of them. The statutes out there are 4 just so different. 5 6 You know, Judge Breyer mentioned 7 kidnapping of moving somebody from one room to another, that's what we are dealing with here, 8 where you could take any single one of these 9 crimes and then wade out into the state statutes 10 11 and we just don't find any consistency. So we think it's important to get the 12 definitions right and I hope I am not heard to 13 14 say that if the categorical approach stays around 15 well who cares about the definitions. We have to get the definitions right 16 and then do the best we can in applying it. 17 we're going to be frustrated if we have these 18 excellent new definitions that the Commission 19 20 adopts and we then have to apply it categorically 21 to state statutes.

1	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Can I ask you
2	one other question? On the communication of
3	threats proposal that you had why, what's the
4	Department's thinking including threats to injure
5	somebody's reputation as a crime of violence?
6	MR. ZAUZMER: Well the predicate that
7	we have in that definition is that it has to be
8	you are threatening violence in order to threaten
9	reputation, so there always Violence has to
10	be involved in all that.
11	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Okay. So you
12	would read that's how this is interpreted?
13	MR. ZAUZMER: Correct.
14	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: It's always a
15	threat of violence to
16	VICE CHAIR BREYER: So extortion has
17	to be limited.
18	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Yes.
19	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Because in
20	California the definition of extortion, and I am
21	sure as in other states as well, is the threat

1	to take, you want to take property in exchange
2	for not exposing a secret that would cause some,
3	you know, discomfort to the victim.
4	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Right.
5	MR. ZAUZMER: Right. Threatening
6	reputation should not be a crime of violence if
7	I say I am going to give some unpleasant fact
8	about somebody.
9	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Right.
10	MR. ZAUZMER: Extortion though, yes.
11	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Otherwise you are
12	outlawing all politics.
13	MR. ZAUZMER: Right, yes, and court
14	argument, too, perhaps.
15	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: And that's
16	clear from this? Because I didn't read this this
17	way. This wasn't a, it's not an intuitive
18	reading to say any threat of use of violence to
19	threaten, like so you are threatening to
20	threaten.
21	MR. ZAUZMER: Sorry, it probably

could be worded better but I want to make clear 1 that we think a threat of violence has to be 2. involved. 3 4 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Okay. But extortion, another 5 MR. ZAUZMER: 6 example of the inconsistency in state 7 that makes this such a frustrating statutes exercise no matter what definition you have, 8 starting with the federal definition, you know, 9 which we limit in our proposal because it expands 10 11 beyond violent conduct to other things. 12 CHAIR SARIS: And just going back to this whole issue of trying to get the most 13 14 dangerous of the dangerous, and I think everyone 15 would agree with that one, you know, making sure offenders 16 that career get the appropriate punishment. 17 But the question that I have is in 18 these 19 states you said you were against 20 reclassifying felonies, so take the eight states 21 where misdemeanors go very high and you've got

two people who were, you know, if somebody is 1 convicted of two predicates of misdemeanors, no 2. jail time, maybe a barroom brawl or that kind of 3 then suddenly they 4 thing, and are career offenders, I'm trying to figure out how you would 5 6 handle that. In fact, in our District many of the 7 prosecutors request a variance or a downward 8 departure because it's so disproportionate and I 9 notice in the immigration area they have 10 11 sentence imposed requirements that so 12 actually have to have gone to jail for a certain period of time. 13 14 How would you deal with it, to go back 15 to Commissioner Wroblewski's comment, we really want to make sure that the truly violent people 16 are the ones who get this? 17 MR. ZAUZMER: Well a variance is the 18 right way to do it but I can tell you that in 19 20 Pennsylvania where I live it's another one of 21 those states and what Pennsylvania classifies as

a misdemeanor are actually serious offenses and 1 serious controlled substance offenses, and that's 2. the problem with looking to state definitions. 3 So what happens is, for example, a 4 controlled substance offense in Pennsylvania can 5 6 be up to a five year mandatory, misdemeanors, not 7 mandatory, misdemeanor, goes up to five years in Pennsylvania. 8 And so you can have somebody selling 9 drugs in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and a few miles 10 11 away in Binghamton, New York, it's a felony by any definition. 12 So the state in deciding to call 13 something a misdemeanor they weren't thinking 14 15 about our crime of violence definition here, they were just thinking about classifying for whatever 16 reasons they had, but it will result in disparate 17 treatment. favor the 18 We current approach because it's consistent. 19 Was the crime 20 punishable by more than a year? That's a

definition of seriousness that works from state

1	to state so that you won't have somebody in one
2	state say I did the same thing as him but that
3	his state calls it a felony and mine doesn't.
4	CHAIR SARIS: But if we went back to
5	the statutory definition in 922 (g)(1),
6	whatever it is.
7	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Right, 2-year
8	cap.
9	CHAIR SARIS: Which is the two years,
LO	maybe we're not wedded to two, maybe it should
L1	be three, maybe 2-1/2, I don't know what the
L2	right number is, but basically follow the
L3	statutory scheme that's already set up.
L4	Obviously Congress was worried about
L5	that before and that would just be another way
L6	of doing it, or do the sentence imposed approach
L7	of the Immigration Act.
L8	MR. ZAUZMER: So a couple of things
L9	there. It's in Section 921, is where the
20	definition applies.

And it applies to the whole --

1	CHAIR SARIS: I don't know where my
2	code
3	MR. ZAUZMER: Yes, I didn't have my
4	code book either.
5	And it applies to the whole chapter
6	so it's an important definition. That definitely
7	is the second best option to what we have proposed
8	because it's consistent, it's fair.
9	Time imposed we have suggested is not
10	a good option and the reason is we talk about the
11	difficulty of getting court records.
12	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Right.
13	MR. ZAUZMER: It is even more
14	difficult to prove how long somebody actually
15	served. We would actually be subpoenaing
16	witnesses for that in some cases. And so
17	CHAIR SARIS: So it's hard to
18	MR. ZAUZMER: Exactly. And so this
19	definition we think that We have always
20	suggested that for crime of violence punishable
21	by more than a year is sufficient to identify the

1	right people, but if you like the Congressional
2	definition we would favor that simply because it
3	gives us the same important consistency that we
4	need.
5	CHAIR SARIS: All right, thank you.
6	Does anyone else have anything else?
7	Thank you very much.
8	MR. ZAUZMER: Thank you.
9	CHAIR SARIS: We'll take a 15-minute
10	morning break. Thank you.
11	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
12	went off the record at 10:37 a.m. and resumed at
13	10:54 a.m.)
14	CHAIR SARIS: So our next panel Do
15	we have, yes. Our next panel presents a view
16	from the practitioners.
17	We're very pleased to have with us
18	Molly Roth who is an assistant federal public
19	defender for the Western District of Texas in San
20	Antonio.
21	In 2008 and 2009, Ms. Roth worked in

1	Washington, D.C., and as an attorney advisor to
2	the Defender Services Office and as a visiting
3	assistant federal public defender at the United
4	States Sentencing Commission. Do you recognize
5	the room?
6	MS. ROTH: I do.
7	(Laughter.)
8	CHAIR SARIS: Also joining us today
9	is Angela Campbell who is the co-founder of
10	Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC. Ms. Campbell
11	is currently a voting member of the Practitioners
12	Advisory Group to the United States Sentencing
13	Commission. Thank you for all the work you do
14	on that as well.
15	And the final member of this panel is
16	Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma. Did I say that right?
17	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Yes.
18	CHAIR SARIS: Okay, who currently
19	practices in federal and state court proceedings
20	in the New York metropolitan area, including
21	serving as member of the Criminal Justice Act

1	panels for the Southern and Eastern District of
2	New York. He is the current vice chair of the
3	sentencing committee for the National Association
4	of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
5	Welcome to all three of you. Ms.
6	Roth, you may proceed.
7	MS. ROTH: Thank you. Judge Saris,
8	Commissioners, thank you very much for giving us
9	this opportunity and we join everyone who has
10	spoken so far in applauding your proposal to
11	remove the residual clause language. Thank you
12	for that proposal.
13	We also strongly support the
14	Commission's proposal to limit the consideration
15	of prior convictions for offense level
16	enhancements to felonies that are also classified
17	as felonies under state law.
18	While we believe there might be more
19	to be done in order to ensure that the Commission
20	narrowly capture the most serious prior
21	convictions, we sincerely appreciate the

Commission's attentiveness to this issue 1 and support the current proposal as a significant and 2. positive step. 3 counting prior convictions, 4 Double using them for both criminal history purposes and 5 also instant offense seriousness purposes, 6 7 unduly complicated, often recognized as unjust by courts across the country, and does not serve 8 the purposes of sentencing. 9 We know that it's often recognized as 10 11 unjust by courts across the country because of 12 your own data, and I just point to two, highlight two situations. 13 One is the career offender guideline 14 15 in which the 2014 Commission data shows us that 71.5 percent of folks facing the career offender 16 enhancement were sentenced below the guidelines 17 and 72.5 percent of individuals facing the 16-18 level guideline enhancement in illegal reentry 19 20 cases were sentenced below the guidelines during 21 this same time period.

counting 1 Double complicates the quidelines. 2. There currently several are definitions of crime of violence in 3 the guidelines applied to offense level increases in 4 a variety of ways. 5 6 Our concern with the Commission's 7 proposed list of enumerated offenses and their definitions is that we believe that they would 8 to, 9 add rather than subtract from, the complication and the confusion. 10 11 It would introduce new definitions 12 not previously used in the quidelines or anywhere else and would spawn years of intense litigation, 13 and you know that we will be intensely litigating 14 on behalf of our clients, especially when the 15 sentences for these enhancements so dramatically 16 increase. 17 have talked today about 18 We some efficiency, but we're interested in our clients' 19 20 liberty and when their liberty is so threatened 21 by extreme enhancements you know that we're going

1 to be litigating, as is our duty in zealous 2 advocacy. The Commission's proposed definitions 3 are also unduly broad and would not operate to 4 better identify the serious offenses, but would 5 6 instead sweep in even more of the less serious 7 offenses. This broad sweep could also raise ex 8 post facto concerns in all of the situations 9 where the new definitions include priors that did 10 11 not previously count, for instance the California conviction of kidnapping. 12 Critical, in our opinion, is the human 13 cost of double counting prior convictions and 14 15 defining crime of violence too broadly, and we ask that you consider the situations of these 16 clients. 17 I want to talk first about Jessie. 18 Earlier this year he was convicted of 19 illegal 20 reentry after deportation after being pulled over 21 for making an improper left turn.

the backbone 1 Jessie of was one laborers of our nation's vibrant construction 2. He and his wife provide for three 3 industry. children, all of whom are in public schools in 4 Texas and involved in after-school athletics and 5 6 doing well. 7 He was sentenced to time served, which five and a half months, but his properly 8 scored guideline range was 41 to 51 months. 9 properly scored quideline range was 41 to 10 51 11 months based on a 17-year-old robbery conviction 12 in Fort Bend County, Texas. Jessie was sentenced to probation for 13 this robbery, but in 2009 his probation was 14 15 revoked for what the presentence report described as technical violations, failing to pay fines and 16 things like that, and he was sentenced to four 17 18 years. Jessie's prior robbery 19 conviction 20 counted only because his original sentence was 21 revoked 11 years after the crime occurred based

Jessie's case is also an example of 2. robbery not being what the describes. 3 name Unlike the Model Penal Code, which focuses on 4 serious bodily injury or fear of such injury in 5 6 defining robbery, Texas robbery has a broad 7 definition that covers intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another 8 or knowingly threatening or placing another in 9 fear of imminent bodily injury in the course of 10 committing a theft with intent to obtain entry 11 12 into or control of the property. The actual conduct underlying this 13 conviction was a low-level shoplifting at Wal-14 Jessie became frightened after exiting 15 16 the store and pepper sprayed a plain clothes Perhaps that's why Texas decided to 17 officer. charge him with robbery instead of misdemeanor 18 shoplifting or misdemeanor assault. 19 20 Whatever the reason, Jessie did not commit a common law robbery, yet he was convicted 21

on technical violations.

1	of robbery in Texas, righteously under Texas
2	statute. He would face the same 41- to 51-month
3	range if we proceed with the Commission's
4	proposed definition of robbery.
5	Andrew, on the other hand, is a client
6	who would be more justly treated under the
7	guidelines should the Commission amend its
8	definition of felony.
9	He was convicted of possessing a
10	firearm after sustaining a felony conviction. He
11	had two prior possession with intent to
12	distribute marijuana convictions, so his
13	guidelines range was 92 to 115 months. However,
14	these two prior convictions are misdemeanors in
15	the convicting jurisdiction of Massachusetts.
16	For one, Andrew received a sentence
17	of 314 days, which was deemed time served and
18	ordered to run concurrently with another
19	sentence.
20	Andrew was sentenced to probation for
21	the second prior conviction but was sentenced to

1 of prison after his probation year revoked. 2. Andrew's federal sentencing 3 judge assessed 41 months of prison after determining 4 the offense level called 5 t.hat. for by the 6 quidelines overstated the seriousness 7 instant offense. urge the Commission to exclude 8 9 statutory rape from its list of enumerated offenses. 10 11 Edwin, who had six-year-old а 12 California conviction for statutory rape when immigration officials found him walking along a 13 14 street intersection in Uvalde, Texas, 15 sentenced to 41 months for illegal reentry after deportation. 16 The statutory rape conviction was his 17 only prior conviction and it was for having 18 sexual relations with his 14-year-old girlfriend 19 20 when he was 19. The couple had maintained their 21 common law marriage and created two children when

1	immigration arrested Edwin.
2	For statutory rape, he received a
3	three-year probation sentence and a six-month
4	jail term served through a work furlough. His
5	sentence for illegal reentry after deportation
6	was seven times that long.
7	Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit held
8	Monday that Texas statutory rape is not a crime
9	of violence under 4B1.2. That's U.S. versus
10	Madrid.
11	If the Commission were to adopt its
12	present proposal of enumerated offenses and their
13	definitions without excluding statutory rape, it
14	would be at odds with that Tenth Circuit case and
15	make consensual conduct between two people who
16	intend to and later do marry a crime of violence.
17	You know that we're asking that you
18	consider to completely remove burglary from the
19	list of enumerated offenses. Let me give you an
20	example.
21	Michael was convicted last year of

possession with intent to distribute 87.4 grams 1 of methamphetamine. This placed him squarely at 2. base offense level 26. Today it would place him 3 squarely at base offense level 24. His role in 4 this crime was to drive a bag of methamphetamine 5 from one side of town to the other. 6 7 the career offender enhancement elevated him to base offense level 34, moved his criminal history 8 category from 4 to 6. 9 2007, Michael was convicted 10 of unarmed burglary of a habitation in Texas. 11 Не was sentenced to eight years' probation but that 12 was revoked and he was sentenced to five years' 13 prison upon revocation. 14 15 This conviction, in combination with a stalking conviction, which involved texting 16 another person and did not involve physical 17 conduct, supported the offender 18 career His guidelines range was 188 to 19 enhancement. 20 235 properly scored over our objection. 21 The court, citing Michael's history

and characteristics and the nature of the instant 1 federal offense, sentenced him instead to 96 2 months. 3 Double counting prior convictions is 4 unjust. We have a criminal history calculation 5 that fully accounts for prior convictions. 6 7 know that we may be alone in saying this, but we join the Commission in working toward simplified 8 quidelines that are consistently applied, 9 seeking just sentences, and in striving to reduce 10 11 mass incarceration. these 12 То ends, urge that the we Commission take thoughtful and critical steps to 13 ensure that only the most narrow group of truly 14 serious, violent crimes against people receive 15 offense level enhancements. 16 The easiest way to accomplish that is to use the elements clause. 17 Thank you. 18 19 CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. 20 MS. CAMPBELL: Judge Saris and 21 members of the committee, on behalf of the

1	Practitioners Advisory Group, we welcome the
2	opportunity to comment on the proposed
3	amendments.
4	We also agree that eliminating the
5	residual clause is important and it appears that
6	everyone is in agreement with that.
7	I do have some other comments,
8	however, if the Commission is truly concerned
9	about only punishing the most severe violent
10	offenders.
11	We aren't talking about the right
12	provision of the career offender guideline
13	because we're still counting controlled
14	substances offenses, and controlled substances
15	offenses can still count as our priors and can
16	still count in some states if they are
17	misdemeanors.
18	The Commission's work in changing the
19	definition of felony will resolve some of those
20	problems but won't resolve all of them. It's
21	still going to be a felony to sell marijuana in

many states and that is still going to count as 1 conviction under offender 2. prior career а guidelines purposes to put people in prison for 3 a very long time. 4 And so I think that while some of the 5 work is beneficial, I think there's more work 6 7 that could be done in relation to making sure we're only targeting the violent offenders. 8 That being said, in Iowa we do have 9 a, we're one of the states that has a misdemeanor 10 11 that's punishable by years and the two 12 Commission's proposed definition and also proposed definition, which referenced the felon 13 14 in possession statute that Congress has passed, 15 would fix the problem in Iowa, at least for those misdemeanors. 16 aggravated In Iowa it's punishable by up to two years in prison for that 17 last category of misdemeanors. 18 other problem 19 that you 20 though, is that you can still have things like 21 simple assault where there's no injury where it's

a threat of harm or even a slapping or spitting 1 or something that can become enhanced into a 2. felony category because of the prior convictions 3 within the state system or for other reasons that 4 are not based on offense conduct. 5 6 What we as the Practitioners Advisory 7 Group is urging is that the Commission take a more extensive study and more time in trying to 8 decide whether or not certain offenses should be 9 added to this quideline. 10 I think you'll notice that we didn't 11 submit elements that we think should define the 12 offenses and that's because you're writing a 13 You're writing the Model Penal Code 14 treatise. again and, frankly, it would take a long time to 15 build consensus and to study what 16 elements actually should be included in kidnapping, what 17 elements should be included in robbery, what 18 should be included in all of 19 elements 20 offenses.

And in the meantime, while you're

conducting that study, if that's the way that you 1 go, simply eliminating the residual clause would 2. fix the instant problem and the Commission could 3 undertake that extensive study. 4 That being said, I think also there 5 6 are problems within the proposed definitions that 7 have a deeper root than just whether or not they're going capture certain 8 to 9 convictions or not, and that deeper root is are we capturing the people we want to capture and 10 11 what harm is it that we're trying to encompass? 12 At least from my perspective, the harm should be 13 that we trying to encompass is intentional actions to hurt another person. 14 15 lot of the definitions and the discussion involve recklessness. It is the PAG's 16 position that recklessness is not something that 17 should be punished by such extreme 18 penalty enhancements as the career offender. 19 In addition, you should have some sort 20 21 of injury requirement or intent to cause injury

1	requirement for each of these offenses.
2	That would resolve many of these
3	problems with whether or not you should count a
4	burglary of a structure that's unoccupied.
5	You're not trying to hurt somebody, you're not
6	truly a violent person, you're not someone
7	deserving of essentially a life sentence under
8	the guidelines.
9	And so that's been the basis for our
10	recommendations, that the Commission maybe take
11	a step back, don't push through new definitions
12	at least for the offenses, and take more time to
13	reflect on what harm it is exactly that we're
14	trying to prevent.
15	Currently, the career offender
16	guideline will encompass most of these things.
17	The current definition includes applying force
18	to someone or threatening to have force against
19	somebody.
20	That's going to encompass a large
21	number of offenses and, in fact, will over-

offenses. 1 It's going to include encompass It's going to include threats of 2. assaults. It's going to include when there's 3 assaults. actual intentional harm to anybody. It's always 4 going to include those because you will have 5 6 included the force element. And so we would 7 recommend that when deciding what offenses to count that we take more time. 8 We do think though, however, it is an 9 important and reasonable step to take now to 10 11 change the definition of felony now and we've set 12 forth а proposal that matches one of the definitions that Congress has used and we would 13 support additional changes to that. I think that 14 while it fixes Iowa's problem, it's not going to 15 16 fix, say, Massachusetts' problems, so thank you. CHAIR SARIS: 17 Thank you. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Chair 18 MR. members of the Commission, thank you for inviting 19 20 the National Association of Criminal Defense 21 Lawyers to this important public meeting.

1	We were founded in 1958 as a
2	professional bar association. We represent
3	something like 40,000 criminal defense lawyers
4	across 90 state, provincial, and local affiliate
5	organizations in 28 countries.
6	I myself am a life member of NACDL.
7	I'm the vice chair of the NACDL's sentencing
8	committee and I am in private practice in New
9	York City. I sit on both the Eastern District
10	and the Southern District of New York CJA panels.
11	And I, like all of our members, are
12	at the front lines of interacting directly with
13	the individuals who after they're out of the
14	courtroom and even after they're out of prison
15	are affected by the words that you all write.
16	Let me begin by stating the obvious.
17	NACDL strongly supports the elimination of the
18	residual clause from the guideline's definition
19	of crime of violence.
20	We filed an amicus brief in the
21	Johnson case because it had become clear by then

that the nine or ten words, "otherwise involves 1 conduct that presents a serious potential risk 2. of physical injury to another," were not capable 3 of being understood or applied in any consistent 4 or meaningful way. 5 6 The use of those words to dramatically 7 increase criminal liability therefore violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of 8 the Constitution. 9 As defense lawyers, our members know 10 11 that our clients' lives and those of 12 families have been irreparably damaged by those mysterious words. 13 14 And I think I sense in the room a 15 consensus that it's time to excise those from the Sentencing Guidelines as the Supreme Court has 16 done from the Armed Career Criminal Act. 17 What I want to focus my short time on 18 is the question of retroactivity. NACDL believes 19 20 that that's probably the most important of the 21 questions in the proposal before the open

Commission and we strongly support retroactivity 1 of the elimination of the residual clause in the 2. definition. 3 Under the proposed amendments, 4 sorry, as the proposed amendment itself noted, 5 6 question of retroactivity raises 7 subsidiary questions in determining whether a new provision will be retroactive. 8 The Commission considers the purpose 9 of the amendments, the magnitude of the change 10 11 in the guideline range made by the amendments, and the difficulty of applying the amendment 12 retroactively to determine an amended guideline 13 14 range. 15 It's our view that each of militates in favor of retroactivity of 16 17 change. The retroactive application of the 18 amendment is consistent with the purpose of the 19 20 amendment, which is to ensure what ex officio 21 Commissioner Wroblewski focused on, that the

people who are repeatedly violent have 1 large enhancements in their sentences, but only people 2. who repeatedly violent have 3 are enhancements in their sentences and that that is 4 done consistently with constitutional norms. 5 6 Retroactive application the 7 amendment is consistent with the current broadbased and bipartisan movement to address the 8 incarceration in 9 problem of mass the United 10 States. 11 In particular, retroactive 12 elimination of the clause would parallel President Obama's clemency initiative, which is 13 limited to non-violent, low-level federal inmates 14 15 whose sentences would be lowered today 16 operation of law or policy. Retroactivity would 17 grant discretion to provide similar relief to those 18 sentenced under the residual clause but whose 19 20 conduct or actual criminal history may not have 21 warranted the very high sentences that the clause

1	triggers.
2	In that respect, I anticipate that if
3	the amendment is made retroactive there will be
4	a larger effect on people who were sentenced
5	prior to Booker.
6	I don't have data to back that up but
7	it seems to me before Booker there was no
8	discretion for judges who may have been concerned
9	that a crime of violence definition captured
10	something that wasn't really a violent crime.
11	As my colleague noted, after Booker
12	judges reluctantly apply the career offender
13	enhancement. Seventy percent of the time they
14	go underneath it, whereas before Booker they were
15	far more constrained.
16	So those old sentences that are still
17	being served and more than ten years old would
18	get another look that's warranted if the
19	amendment was made retroactive.
20	The magnitude of the effect on the
21	guideline ranges will be substantial but

experience shows that the effect on the actual sentences imposed, at least for those post-Booker sentences, will be less dramatic since so many of them fall outside the guideline range.

submit. t.hat. it. We won't. be SO difficult to apply the new guideline range. Ιf the probation report is clear that a person has been sentenced under the residual clause opposed to another clause of the crime of violence definition, then it's mechanical а exercise, but it's also in recalculating the sentence because it's simply excised.

The advantage of the rubric of 1D1.10 it that limits. allows discretion for resentencing but it limits it to the new quideline, will give judges another look they've had with the recent amendments to drugs to the individuals affected by the retroactive amendment in a way that will allow for individual assessments that I think has gone smoothly so far with those amendments, with the past amendments

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1	and would happen here too.
2	I don't see this as fundamentally more
3	difficult than the retroactive application of the
4	2007 Crack Cocaine Amendment or the 2010
5	amendment if we're going to take the Fair
6	Sentencing Act or last year's drugs minus two
7	amendment.
8	CHAIR SARIS: You need to start
9	wrapping up.
10	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Okay. My last
11	point on retroactivity and then I will wrap up
12	is that the impact of retroactivity has been
13	shown by the Commission's own reports to not
14	increase recidivism, to not raise a public safety
15	issue.
16	And the experience with the, I think
17	we can anticipate in these cases where people
18	have already served long sentences where judges
19	will have another look at individuals, we can
20	also expect that it would not increase recidivism
21	to make the amendment retroactive.

1	I did have a word or two to say but
2	I'll wait for questions about the government's
3	proposal essentially doing away with the
4	categorical approach, if the Commission wants to
5	address that. It's not really on the agenda so
6	I didn't include it in my prepared remarks.
7	CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. Questions?
8	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well, I'd like to
9	hear why not
10	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Okay. Well, I
11	think what they're saying, I mean, you've
12	obviously picked up on the fact that their asking
13	for basically three trials in one, right? We
14	try the case and then we're going to try the two
15	priors to see what, quote/unquote, "really
16	happened," and they're asking to set aside the
17	outcome of state convictions.
18	And those state conviction, I mean,
19	that raises a comity issue I think because there
20	should be respect for those state convictions and
21	the meaning of those convictions, and those state

1	convictions, they're a negotiated outcome. It's
2	a proxy for what really happened.
3	The fact is a judge can't sit in the
4	courtroom and ever know what really happened.
5	They know what witnesses say and what defendants
6	might say to oppose those witnesses, but having
7	some sort of paper trial undermines the value of
8	those state convictions.
9	Some state convictions overstate what
LO	a person actually really did because he didn't
L1	want to litigate it. Others understate it.
L2	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well, we accept
L3	that. How is that observation not inconsistent
L4	with your position on retroactivity, because when
L5	you point to examples of drugs minus 2 or
L6	crack/powder disparity, I found it was a very
L7	simple thing.
L8	First of all, what was said. What
L9	was said about it is the sentence is too long.
20	Sentence is too long and, therefore, it's going
21	to be adjusted downward. Okay.

1	And then the only reason that a judge
2	might not go along with it is if any given case
3	the judge didn't think it was too long. Well,
4	that's a fairly straightforward, easy
5	determination.
6	However, the determination that I
7	think you're asking us to make in making it
8	retroactive seems to me of a totally different
9	exercise.
10	Now, after saying that, I would say,
11	you know, there are certain issues as to
12	retroactivity. By the way, the circuits are now
13	debating that. It's right in front of the
14	circuits so you're going to get all different
15	decisions from all the different circuits.
16	And then you're going to run into a
17	real problem of disparities, because what do you
18	want us to do? You want us to admit Eleventh
19	Circuit it's one thing and then Ninth Circuit,
20	assuming they come out with a single decision,
21	it's another thing.

1 You know, you're going to have wide disparities across 2 the country. Is that appropriate to start to then apply retroactivity 3 retroactively? 4 MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: 5 I'm suggesting 6 to you that especially those pre-Booker 7 sentences, they're also too long, that they're too long, that we know when we freed up judges 8 to depart and there were things that weren't 9 listed as crime of violence, where there was some 10 11 ambiguity, they imposed shorter sentences and 12 this is giving them a chance to do that across 13 the board, so I don't see a disparity problem there at all. 14 15 CHAIR SARIS: The other thing that's just really interesting, there's about 75 percent 16 of them, the instant offense was drug trafficking 17 and that most of the predicates that, even your 18 examples were drug trafficking and we've heard 19 20 that time and time again, that you have two little 21 drug priors and then a third little drug case and

1	then it, but we haven't heard as much evidence
2	on the violent side of the ledger, if you will,
3	and we may get to the drug side next cycle.
4	Right now we're focusing on violent
5	crimes and I don't know what you're seeing out
6	there as to whether the injustices we've heard
7	of really apply as much in the violent side.
8	MS. CAMPBELL: I can give you a good
9	example. I had a gentleman that was convicted
10	and was sentenced as a career offender and he had
11	a prior conviction for eluding, which at the time
12	was pre-Begay and was in the Eighth Circuit and
13	he, that counted as a crime of violence.
14	CHAIR SARIS: What did you say?
15	Looting?
16	MS. CAMPBELL: Eluding, running from
17	the police. He didn't want to get caught.
18	CHAIR SARIS: I thought you were
19	looting, you know, like Okay, okay, okay.
20	MS. CAMPBELL: Running from the
21	police.

1 CHAIR SARIS: Yes. And the second was an 2. MS. CAMPBELL: assault that didn't have an injury. 3 Both of them 4 were aggravated misdemeanors, meaning they were punishable by up to two years. 5 6 And he didn't do two years on them. 7 They weren't considered that serious in the state system, which is why he was out. They didn't 8 think he was that much of a danger and he hasn't 9 ever hurt anyone, but yet he's sentenced as a 10 career offender because he was selling drugs. 11 12 So you have the situation where when you combine the two you actually can have someone 13 that has a drug offense, you know, one prior drug 14 15 offense, a current drug offense, and then one 16 assault perhaps or a bar fight or a, you know, it can be a number of things that you, burglary 17 of a unoccupied dwelling, for example, that will 18 drastically enhance what was already a very long 19 20 sentence under the drug guidelines and it's

doubling it.

1	And so those are the kinds of things,
2	I think it's the combination of the two. You're
3	never going to, it's very rare you're going to
4	have a violent offender that then has two violent
5	offenses that is under the career offender. I
6	think that's a small group.
7	MS. ROTH: All of our examples,
8	except Andrew, involved what were deemed to be
9	crimes of violence, but it's interesting. In
LO	Michael's case that was a
L1	CHAIR SARIS: I just don't remember
L2	their names.
L3	MS. ROTH: I'm sorry.
L 4	CHAIR SARIS: He was the marijuana
L5	person?
L6	MS. ROTH: No, he was the person who
L7	was facing the career offender enhancement after
L8	transporting a bag of methamphetamine from one
L9	side of town to the next.
20	So it was a drug trafficking instant
21	offense, nonviolent, unarmed, and yet the crime

1	of violence determination is how he fell under
2	the career offender.
3	CHAIR SARIS: Can I ask you if we were
4	to go with a very helpful suggestion, which is
5	go back to the statute, the 921 and you exclude
6	anything, where the state classifies as a
7	misdemeanor, and it says in here up to two years,
8	how many states does that help and how many does
9	it not help? Because it helps Iowa. Doesn't
10	help Pennsylvania or Massachusetts.
11	What would be the sweet spot number
12	to capture what would be a fair Of those eight
13	states, what are most of them doing?
14	MS. ROTH: I would need to spread out
15	the statutes and classifications from the eight
16	states to be able to answer that and I'm sure
17	that we could do that for you quickly but I can't
18	do that on the spot for you right now.
19	CHAIR SARIS: And do you know why
20	Congress picked two years because, I mean, the
21	impulse would be to, even hurts myself, but it

would be to go with what Congress said too. 1 intellectually consistent 2 that's the mean, 3 approach to do it. it wouldn't 4 MS. ROTH: But 5 states And you've mentioned upcoming 6 litigation which is why we favor your language, 7 your proposed language minus the bracketed area, because it's flexible enough to account for what 8 9 you're talking about. 10 I mean, as soon as we start getting 11 into the minutiae of exactly what every state 12 needs, we start becoming more complicated and losing track of the real issue, which is how do 13 we draw the circle of these enhancements which 14 15 are so significant around the narrow, 16 number of people that really should be encompassed by it? 17 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: 18 Do we have a sense, though, of what Congress had in mind when 19 20 it passed the two years? I mean, do we know if 21 Congress did this kind of spreading out of the

1	statutes and kind of looked or what the baseline
2	was for where that exception came from? I don't
3	know if you guys happen to know and if you don't
4	that's obviously fine, but.
5	MS. CAMPBELL: I don't. I brought it
6	up because I've had situations where people are
7	sentenced under it where they're not felons for
8	that statute but then they get the enhancement.
9	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Can I ask
10	another question?
11	CHAIR SARIS: Oh, sure.
12	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: So I wanted to
13	ask you, Ms. Roth, why the defenders reject
14	listing offenses with definitions. I just wanted
15	to get a better sense of the rationale behind it.
16	I mean, is it kind of this path
17	dependency idea that we have all this case law,
18	we kind of have the existing structure of law
19	there where we kind of know. Is it the specific
20	ones we propose and so you'd really rather not
21	have those because, you know, those aren't set

1 in stone one way or another? Is it something else? 2. I just want the reason that you don't 3 want them listed. I just wanted to hear a little 4 bit more what the rationale was. 5 6 MS. ROTH: We think that they add to 7 complexity instead of simplicity. We do think they're vaque. 8 the kidnapping 9 Let just take me example for a minute. I imagine that a lot of 10 11 work went into that and it's very possible that 12 a 50-state survey was done in compiling this definition of kidnapping. 13 But the fact of the matter is that 14 15 this definition is vaque. The word nefarious already discussed this 16 morning, overinclusive and would draw in not 17 onlv kidnapping statute in the country, very possibly 18 including ones that have been deemed to not be 19 crimes of violence, but also false imprisonment 20 21 and other like statutes that are not kidnapping

1	and so
2	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Let's say we
3	went with a different, I guess, without kind of
4	commenting on, are you just saying inevitably we
5	will screw up no matter how much time we take
6	and, therefore, we'll
7	CHAIR SARIS: That's a legal term.
8	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: always have
9	this example like a wobbler, or is it this
10	That's what I was trying to get at. Is it kind
11	of looking at this list and not liking the list,
12	or is it that the exercise of ever trying to
13	create any definition is something that, as a
14	matter of principle or legal argument, you don't
15	think we could get?
16	So, yes, we could do the DOJ's
17	proposal and look at federal offenses or we could
18	go to the Model Penal Code, and I'm just trying
19	to figure out why a world without definitions is
20	better than one with one, assuming we can get
21	them crafted in the right way after getting

1 comment from people. MS. Ιt is exceedingly 2. ROTH: difficult to come up with definitions that would 3 4 be not vague and not over-inclusive, certainly starting with 18 3550 9(c) minus the 5 inchoate offenses, minus the 924[®] drug offenses, 6 7 minus the residual clause is a good starting point because it is an already known definition 8 9 that's part of our statute so that is an understandable way. 10 11 Remember, of course, that we're 12 starting from the proposition that we shouldn't be doing this double counting in the first place. 13 14 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: But assuming 15 that we think that Congress, you know, Congress has told us we need to double count. 16 I mean, we have statutes that tell us Congress disagrees 17 with that. 18 So assuming that we get, at least I'm 19 20 speaking for me, you know, Congress says there 21 are some people that fall into this bucket and

1	as we try to define the people for that bucket
2	I'm just trying to get a handle on how we can
3	best do that.
4	And I just wonder without giving the
5	definitions, is it that they'll, the definitions,
6	you know, in ACCA are already okay without
7	specifying things? I'm just trying to get a
8	sense of what the down sides are to defining it
9	versus the plus sides of kind of keeping it away.
10	MS. ROTH: Well, certainly the list
11	of enumerated offenses in ACCA in 924(e) is much
12	shorter than this list or than any list that
13	currently exists in the guidelines of enumerated
14	offenses. We don't think that this many need to
15	be counted. We think this draws too wide of a
16	net and brings in too many people.
17	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: What about
18	murder? Think murder ought to be on there?
19	MS. ROTH: First-degree, premeditated
20	murder?
21	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: Well, what if

1	you murdered someone by poisoning? Do you
2	consider that a violent offender?
3	MS. ROTH: I think the circuit courts
4	are currently debating that.
5	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: That doesn't
6	really answer the question for me.
7	MS. ROTH: Well, and I don't know how
8	I
9	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: I mean, you see
10	my concern? I mean, I think reasonable people
11	would agree murder ought to be in, murder. I
12	mean, there's a bigger debate about burglary
13	versus burglary of a dwelling, occupied dwelling.
14	There's a bigger debate about what you
15	do with forcible sex offenses versus statutory
16	rape, but how about the rape that uses a date
17	rape drug?
18	MS. ROTH: Well, we would submit that
19	if we're trying to capture the most violent
20	persons, then the definition would be
21	intentional, knowing crimes that have

1	intentional, substantial injury or death to real
2	people. So, you know
3	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: But you can see
4	how an enumerated offense list that's broader
5	than ACCA could make things easier for judges and
6	bring in offenses that belong there, that fit
7	that definition
8	MS. ROTH: I can.
9	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: intentional
10	and that involve either serious injury or death.
11	MS. ROTH: I can but I can also see
12	the very wide net that is perhaps unintentionally
13	cast, and Jessie's example with a robbery
14	conviction in Texas is a very good one and not
15	an unusual one.
16	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: The one who
17	pepper sprayed the police officer?
18	MS. ROTH: Right.
19	VICE CHAIR BREYER: But wouldn't
20	there have been a better way to approach it which
21	would be, say, look, looking at the original

1	offense, the judge in that case gave the person,
2	I forget what he gave Jessie, 30, 60, 90 days and
3	maybe I'm thinking of the wrong person.
4	MS. ROTH: Five and a half months.
5	VICE CHAIR BREYER: What?
6	MS. ROTH: Five and a half months.
7	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Five and a half
8	months, okay. He gave him five I saw exactly
9	what you did, you pepper sprayed, you did this,
10	you went into the store, you dah, dah, dah, dah,
11	dah. I'm giving you five and a half months.
12	That's what I think.
13	So later what happens to Jessie is
14	that he doesn't complete his probation or
15	whatever you want to call it successfully. You
16	would characterize it as technical violations,
17	but it could have been a drug sale. It could
18	have been any number of things where we see what
19	happens is you revoke probation and then you
20	impose the sentence that you have under the law
21	for the original offense. You haven't carried

1	it out, whatever that is, whether it be statutory
2	max.
3	So what if we go back and look at what
4	was the sentence that was imposed, some sentence
5	originally as distinct from subsequently as a
6	result of other conduct?
7	MS. ROTH: That would be better. He
8	would not have counted under 4(b) because it was
9	a probatory sentence so, and the PSR was the one
10	who described the violations as technical, Judge
11	Breyer, so.
12	But in any case, that would help, to
13	not include time imposed upon revocation but just
14	look at the original sentence.
15	VICE CHAIR BREYER: So that's sort of
16	different from the I know we've been talking
17	about definitions, what's a robbery, what's this,
18	what's that, can't we all agree, and maybe we
19	can't. Maybe we can't, burglary being a good
20	example.
21	But what we can all agree on is what

1	did the judge do. Because we know exactly what
2	the judge did. The judge imposed six months,
3	four months, three months, whatever it is, eight
4	months, so isn't that a way to approach this
5	problem?
6	MS. ROTH: Well, the interesting
7	thing is to notice that in the career offender
8	guideline 71-1/2 percent of judges sentenced
9	people below the guidelines.
10	And so it seems that if the guidelines
11	are our initial benchmark, we would not want that
12	to be necessary. We would want the career
13	offender enhancement, which is huge, to
14	appropriately limit the number of very serious
15	crimes that it includes.
16	CHAIR SARIS: Can I ask you on the
17	retroactivity piece, drugs minus two was easy.
18	It's an algorithm basically, unless somebody's a
19	public safety risk and then you address that.
20	So in the First Circuit, for example,
21	the First Circuit frequently said we're not sure

whether this meets the elements clause test, but 1 in any event, everyone can agree that it's a 2. residual clause problem. 3 So let's say you knock out -- I don't 4 know whether that's true across the circuits but 5 6 that's how the -- so then you knock out the 7 residual clause. You still have to go back and do the analysis with the elements. 8 And now let's assume you agree that 9 because of the categorical approach you can't 10 figure out whether it's an element. 11 You still 12 might, as a judge, might want to say, well, this arson, whatever it happens, you know, whatever 13 14 it happens to be, in Massachusetts, say, assault 15 and battery with a dangerous weapon may be So that's why it may not qualify, all 16 reckless. right? 17 You still may want to think about that 18 in terms of what kind of sentence you'd want to 19 20 give, even if it doesn't qualify. It's just not 21 as simple as the drugs.

1	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: It's true that
2	it may be hard to figure out which prong of the
3	crime of violence was used but that's the
4	vagueness we're trying to avoid by excising it,
5	right? I mean, that's
6	CHAIR SARIS: Right, but then you got
7	to come back
8	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: If we're not
9	even sure what he was sentenced under, I think
10	it deserves another look, especially if it's pre-
11	Booker.
12	CHAIR SARIS: I'm just saying on the
13	manageable piece, it's just a, it may be worth
14	it and because of the length of the sentences it
15	may well be worth it. It's just more
16	complicated.
17	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Right, and it's
18	worth it also because there's far fewer, it
19	affects far, far fewer defendants than the
20	thousands of defendants who got resentenced
21	during the drugs minus two.

1	I mean, these are much, much smaller
2	numbers altogether, especially the pre-Booker
3	ones. You know, a lot of them are still serving
4	but there's not, I don't think you're going to
5	see anything like the numbers for drugs.
6	CHAIR SARIS: So you would say, yes,
7	it might be a lot tougher but the numbers are a
8	lot smaller.
9	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: The numbers are
10	a lot smaller so the total burden is the same or
11	less and the importance of it is even greater
12	because the swings are so great.
13	CHAIR SARIS: That's interesting. Go
14	ahead.
15	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: A couple
16	of questions. First of all, are you certain the
17	numbers are less, because I think there are a lot
18	of, tens of thousands of career offenders who are
19	in and so I think we need to look at those
20	numbers.
21	CHAIR SARIS: We need to look at that,

Τ	yes.
2	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: But they would
3	have to be career offenders under the residual
4	clause, so if it was one of the
5	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: Other
6	clauses.
7	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: other
8	clauses, not an issue.
9	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: I don't
10	think we
11	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: I don't know.
12	I'm not sure.
13	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: I don't
14	think we know that number.
15	VICE CHAIR BREYER: How do you know
16	that?
17	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: Well, we know
18	how many career offenders there were last year.
19	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Yes.
20	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: So we know it's
21	something less than, you know, 2,300 last year.

1	CHAIR SARIS: Convictions and
2	sentencing.
3	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: That's right.
4	CHAIR SARIS: Not people in prison.
5	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: But the
6	equivalent numbers I'm sure must be much higher
7	for drugs last year. I don't know, but it's in
8	the tens of thousands.
9	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: That's
10	probably true. If I could just, one question
11	for Ms. Roth but before I mention that
12	Commissioner Barkow mentioned about the double
13	counting.
14	What you call double counting is, I
15	think, what I would call counting criminal
16	history or letting criminal history drive the
17	offense rather than making incremental changes
18	we do normally under the sentencing table.
19	And I think if we took your position
20	and eliminated that, we not only would go
21	contrary to Congress but we would go contrary to

1	virtually every single state that has an habitual
2	offender statute.
3	But my question for you has to do with
4	Edwin, the statutory rape case. You mentioned
5	the case United States versus Jonathan Madrid
6	which was decided by the Tenth Circuit earlier
7	this week.
8	Mr. Madrid was convicted of a statute
9	in Texas. It was aggravated sexual assault and
10	it was aggravated sexual assault because his
11	victim was under the age of 14. His victim was
12	9 years old. He committed a forcible rape
13	against a 9-year-old.
14	The policy that we think is
15	appropriate is to count the case of Mr. Madrid
16	but not count the case of Edwin and we're trying
17	to find a sensible way to do it. And if you look
18	at our proposal in terms of the definition,
19	you'll see how we try to do it.
20	The problem is that there are many,
21	many states that say that there is no requirement

that the government prove force when the victim 1 is under a certain age. In Texas it's under the 2. age, I believe, of 14. 3 4 And under the categorical so approach, whether there is a rape of a 9-year-5 6 a 6-year-old, а 3-year-old, forcible, 7 whatever, if we have the categorical approach, that case will always be considered a non-violent 8 crime. 9 What we're trying to do is find a 10 11 policy that counts Mr. Madrid but doesn't count 12 Edwin. Do you think that's a sensible policy and I don't know if you've had a chance to look 13 and see the approach that we've taken that Mr. 14 Zauzmer talked about. 15 Is that a way to achieve 16 that sensible policy? Well, ROTH: first the 17 MS. Circuit called the conviction statutory rape in 18 its opinion and the Texas statute is the only way 19 20 that someone can be convicted. So it was a And so I don't know that there 21 statutory rape.

Madrid and Edwin. 2. COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: And do you 3 think it's sensible not to make that distinction 4 between the two? I understand legally both are 5 6 considered non-violent crimes because neither 7 charge requires force to be proven by the government to get a conviction. 8 9 MS. ROTH: I don't know any good replacement for the categorical approach and we 10 11 already, in federal court, spend so much time 12 discussing someone's prior convictions that if we were to proceed with something 13 like suggested earlier, the back-up position I believe 14 15 it's called, we would be having trials for prior in 16 convictions, Jessie's case 17-year-old convictions, in federal court and I think that's 17 unworkable and unfair. 18 something that 19 And the government 20 should know from its assistants is that when a 21 plea agreement is reached in federal or state

would be a whole lot of difference between Mr.

1

1 it's negotiated by parties who court, are supposed to know the case better than anyone 2 else. 3 And doing something else other than 4 the categorical approach in attempts to invade 5 and discern what was decided at the time, facts 6 7 we don't know about at all -- When I was looking at Justice Alito's dissent in Johnson and he was 8 giving an example about a gang member hiding a 9 gun inside his coat and walking in the direction 10 rival gang 11 of member and clearly that's 12 violent, I just involuntarily started writing notes in the margin. 13 Really? What if he actually had that 14 gun there because somebody else was after him and 15 he had gotten word of that and it was for self-16 defense? He didn't intend to look for anybody 17 at all. 18 What if the prosecutor in that case 19 20 government informant witness had to that 21 mitigating fact and didn't want to say it because

1	he didn't want to reveal his informant?
2	So the defense attorney and the
3	prosecutor agree on a resolution of that case
4	that's a charge that's under what was originally
5	brought. These are facts we could never discern
6	and they're critical ones. I don't see something
7	better than the categorical approach that would
8	lead to justice.
9	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: And so the
10	implication of that position is that in
11	California, which defines burglary broadly, it
12	doesn't define it with relation to a home, it
13	doesn't even define it with relation to an
14	unlawful entry, no matter what, that's always
15	categorically going to be a non-violent crime.
16	That's your position.
17	And in Texas, if you rape a child
18	under the age of 14, it will always be a non-
19	violent crime.
20	And in New York where you can commit
21	a crime, a murder through something called

1	depraved indifference, which I think you would
2	say is roughly the equivalent of recklessness
3	because that's one of the ways you can commit it,
4	then all murders would be categorically non-
5	violent crimes. That's the policy that I hear
6	you advocating. Am I right about that?
7	MS. ROTH: Saying something does not
8	fit within the net of narrowly drawn, most
9	heinous crimes that deserve severe enhancements
10	does not make an activity right. It is not as
11	though we are saying that because murder doesn't
12	fit within this definition, murder is right.
13	We're talking here about the
14	importance of narrowly drawing the definition so
15	that only the most violent crimes are actually
16	included.
17	VICE CHAIR BREYER: But, of course,
18	that's The examples that Mr. Wroblewski gives
19	are by any stretch very violent crimes so what
20	he's saying is that and he knows you're not
21	an advocate for violent crime or these crimes,

1	but I think his question is a fair one.
2	So what do you do about that type of
3	case, because isn't it under your argument that
4	that kind of case will not be counted? Isn't
5	that correct?
6	And so the government comes back and
7	says, okay, but we want the opportunity of at
8	least demonstrating to the judge that the 9-year-
9	old was raped or that the gun was used or this
10	or that and so forth. We want that opportunity
11	to demonstrate to the judge that it is, that the
12	prior case was a violent case and nobody would
13	disagree it wasn't. What about that? Is that
14	so complicated?
15	MS. ROTH: I think it's very
16	complicated to add a back-up approach. Right
17	now, in a circumstance like that, the government
18	can request an upward variance and ask the court
19	to consider certain factors if there is reliable
20	evidence.
21	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Do you see that

Τ	often, any of you, in your practice? I mean, do
2	you have examples where the government, because
3	the government said it's pretty rare for that to
4	occur and I'm just trying to get a sense of if
5	we know how often when it is these cases, if it's
6	California and it's burglary or it's Texas and
7	it's the rape of a child, how often you see the
8	judge go up. Do you have kind of a sense from
9	your own practice experience?
10	MS. ROTH: Not often.
11	MS. CAMPBELL: It's not a question of
12	going up. It's a question of whether or not they
13	go down because the career offender guideline is
14	so high.
15	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: But someone not
16	in the career offender guideline because the
17	categorical approach needs that The government
18	is saying there are some people who aren't in the
19	net who should be but they're not because we use
20	a categorical approach.
21	And I'm just curious if you had people

1	like that where the conviction is not eligible
2	under career offender guideline but the judge
3	says, you know what, I didn't meet this
4	definition but separate and apart from that I'm
5	going to vary upward because they should be and
6	the only reason I can't do it is because of the
7	categorical approach but there's all this other
8	reliable evidence under the usual preponderance
9	of the evidence standard that we have in the
10	manual.
11	MS. ROTH: Your statistics show us
12	that that's not the case, that upward departures
13	Let's just take the illegal reentry and the
14	career offender guidelines. Tiny, tiny, tiny
15	numbers in the upward departure range.
16	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Why is that do
17	you suppose? I mean, is it because the cases
18	are
19	MS. CAMPBELL: Because it's over-
20	inclusive.
21	MS. ROTH: Your definition captures

1	everything already.
2	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: I mean, so
3	maybe with the residual clause it wasn't
4	necessary and so we don't know yet if they
5	otherwise fall within it. Is it like we just
6	won't know until, like now going forward we might
7	have those examples.
8	MS. CAMPBELL: I can give you an
9	example why this isn't going to work. If they're
10	going to start trying to prove something that
11	didn't count counts, we're going to start
12	subpoenaing victims again to come in and testify
13	again. You're not going to have finality of
14	these violent crimes. I mean, you want that 14-
15	year-old to come when she's 28 and testify again?
16	That, to me, is not something you want to do.
17	CHAIR SARIS: Can I ask, how often is
18	it that the modified Shepard approach doesn't
19	answer the question?
20	In other words, you go to the plea
21	colloquy and maybe a trial transcript or a motion

1 t	to suppress or a presentence report, you know,
2 t	the kind of things that you can look at under the
3 [Deschamps case. Is that answering most of the
4 c	questions
5	MS. CAMPBELL: Yes.
6	CHAIR SARIS: as to which clause
7 i	it's under?
8	MS. CAMPBELL: And you can't rely on
9 t	these other, we going to have an eyewitness from
10 €	eight years ago?
11	MR. MARGULIS-OHNUMA: You can use
12 p	proffer statements of the defendant.
13	COMMISSIONER WROBLEWSKI: It would
14 k	be the government's burden and if the government
15 c	couldn't meet the burden, either because they
16 d	didn't want to call the child or because nobody
17 -	That would be the end of it. It wouldn't
18 c	count, okay? The judge couldn't apply it,
19 p	period, end of story. And so all the usual
20 t	chings, just like when you have a 14-year-old at
21 t	the trial level. There has to be a decision

1	whether
2	MS. CAMPBELL: Part of me already is
3	thinking, well, you know what I'm going to do as
4	a defense attorney is I'm going to use your
5	approach and I'm going to challenge convictions
6	where he admitted the conduct but he really
7	wasn't guilty. I'm going to call the victims,
8	you know, the domestics or, you know
9	MS. ROTH: Well, we did that
10	recently.
11	(Simultaneous speaking.)
12	CHAIR SARIS: I think just to get a
13	sense of it. Are there other questions? Thank
14	you very much. Very complicated area and it's
15	useful to hear from people who are in the field.
16	Thank you.
17	Welcome, and I know we went a little
18	bit over so we took too long a break I think. My
19	fault.
20	So at this point we are going to hear
21	from the views from the field, from the probation

1	department.
2	The first witness is Richard Bohlken,
3	the chair of the Commission's Probation Officers
4	Advisory Group. He has been a member of POAG,
5	as we call it, since 2010. Mr. Bohlken is the
6	assistant deputy chief probation officer in the
7	District of New Mexico, and welcome back.
8	And the other witness on the panel is
9	Michael Andrews who is the chair of the
10	Commission's Victims Advisory Group. He's also
11	the managing attorney for the D.C. Crime Victims
12	Resource Center and assistant professor of the
13	University of Maryland University College in the
14	Public Safety Department.
15	Welcome to both of you. Thank you.
16	MR. BOHLKEN: First, I wanted to
17	thank Judge Saris and all the Commissioners for
18	the opportunity to be here today and to comment
19	on this proposed amendment.
20	When POAG first learned about this
21	proposed amendment, we reached out to

1 representatives across the country and tried to solicit information input 94 2. and from all districts. 3 And the overwhelming response that we 4 received from across the country was positive and 5 6 this was move in а positive direction а 7 overwhelmingly. Over the past several years, as you 8 all know, POAG has written and commented on 9 several occasions about trying to come up with 10 11 one crime of violence definition in the quidelines and we feel that that's the move that 12 this amendment makes. 13 14 We'd also single encourage 15 definitions for other terms used in multiple quidelines as helpful also. This would reduce 16 confusion and it maintains uniformity. 17 We like the fact that this amendment 18 addresses the issues that have been raised with 19 20 the residual clause in the Johnson case, and by 21 eliminating the residual clause, we think that's

1	a positive also.
2	We received positive feedback on the
3	enumerated offense definitions in the application
4	notes. We believe that the contemporary generic
5	definitions will be helpful.
6	And the probation office, when using
7	the categorical approach and the modified
8	categorical approach, we already go to the Model
9	Penal Code and things like that, so we saw these
10	definitions as just putting them in the
11	application notes and it would be useful to us.
12	We did receive a lot of feedback that
13	the list didn't include some offenses that many
14	across the country would like to see, such as
15	aggravated fleeing from law enforcement officers,
16	shooting at or from a motor vehicle, battery on
17	a peace officer.
18	But we also acknowledge there will
19	never be a perfect list that everyone agrees
20	upon. That's just not something that can happen.
21	And I said during one of the breaks

1 I've been to many round table discussions on this
2 topic and I've been in rooms with a lot of smart
3 people and if there was an easy answer to all of
4 this the Commission would have already come up
5 with it so I know how complicated it is.
6 So the list, we like the list. Maybe
7 it could be a little better with a few additions
8 but we know it'll never be perfect.
9 POAG struggled with reaching a
10 consensus on two items within the amendment. The
first was deciding between burglary of a dwelling
and just burglary. We've had numerous meetings
and discussions on this topic.
Some like the narrowness and the
similarity of the burglary of a dwelling which
is what we use now with most crime of violence
definitions within the guidelines, while others
18 like the broadness and uniformity of burglary
19 with the approach that we take to the ACCA. So
we couldn't come up with one consensus on that.
21 Secondly we split on the proposed

changes to the requirements determining whether 1 or not an offense was classified as a felony 2. under state law. 3 believe that the definition 4 Many should remain unchanged the way it's been right 5 6 now where we look at the amount of imprisonment 7 for the offense as whether or not it's going to be misdemeanor felony under 8 or а 9 quidelines. And this would avoid, those felt, would avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity 10 11 amongst the different jurisdictions across the 12 country. And then on the other hand, others 13 14 believe that the proposed change requiring the 15 offense to be classified as a felony under state law would ease or simplify the application for 16 them in a lot of cases. 17 of the things that did 18 One we unanimously agree on was that should the change 19 20 in requirements be implemented, we'd like the 21 inclusion of the phrase "at the time the

1	defendant was initially sentenced, because
2	across different jurisdictions offenses change
3	from initial sentencing to the time they complete
4	a term of supervision.
5	In sum, this is a good and a needed
6	amendment. As I said before, will it fix all
7	the issues and make it simple to apply? No, it's
8	still going to be a complicated process
9	determining whether predicate offenses are crimes
10	of violence, but it's definitely a move in the
11	right direction so thank you.
12	CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. Mr.
13	Andrews.
14	MR. ANDREWS: Thank you, Chairman
15	Saris and the distinguished Commission. My name
16	is Mike Andrews and I'm the chair of the Victims
17	Advisory Group and I appreciate the opportunity
18	to come and speak with you on behalf of the crime
19	victims community.
20	I had an opportunity to speak to our
21	panel as well and we have just some

1	recommendations for the Commission to consider.
2	First, I think the group as a whole
3	agrees that there needs to be a simplified and
4	standardized approach to the definition that
5	would provide clarity and consistency.
6	The group is also aware of the
7	multiple different definitions of crime of
8	violence and they're aware of that.
9	And I think the ultimate approach is
10	to find some consistency where victims feel that
11	the rules aren't changing depending on the type
12	of crime that has been committed and which
13	they're a victim of.
14	The VAG supports expanded definition
15	of crime of violence. They propose three
16	possibilities. One is the current element, so
17	use, attempted use, threatened use of physical
18	force against the person of another.
19	Of course, they also agree that that
20	definition of itself may not catch all the
21	different types of crime of violence and also

agrees that an enumerated offense approach would also be consistent with some of the crimes that aren't part of that definition, such as rape, murder, terrorism, some of the things that were discussed in a previous panel.

The third which we discussed just before coming here and prior to submission of the testimony is the other circumstances where are not caught between the definition of crime of violence or the enumerated offenses but those will give the judge discretion to determine those relevant facts that could also consider crime of violence because we know that there is also situations where even the enumerated offenses don't really fall in the definition of what a traditional crime of violence would be and this way this would give victims a third opportunity to have the court make that determination.

The one part that there is a unanimous approach is if the Commission is to adopt a new definition of crime of violence is to have any

2.

1	type of retroactive application be perhaps taken
2	out or not considered for the simple fact that
3	relitigating any new application could induce
4	further revictimization of victims and would
5	cause further trauma.
6	Two definitions that the VAG did want
7	to comment on was the murder definition. The
8	VAG supports the proposed definition.
9	And the other one is the aggravated
10	assault definition and, like my colleague here,
11	I don't know how many different, I guess, special
12	classifications you can come up with.
13	The VAG would add to the list, besides
14	the ones that are already mentioned, athletic
15	officials, military, clergy, or public officials.
16	These are the folks that are often the most
17	vulnerable victims to interface with the public
18	the most and, of course, first responders would
19	be included
20	CHAIR SARIS: Did you say athletic?
21	MR. ANDREWS: Athletic officials.

1	CHAIR SARIS: Helicopter parents or -
2	-
3	(Laughter.)
4	MR. ANDREWS: Well, one of the
5	members of the panel indicated that there was a
6	horrific case in Utah which a family member was
7	a soccer referee and was
8	CHAIR SARIS: And a parent hit him?
9	MR. ANDREWS: Well, a player
10	assaulted the referee.
11	CHAIR SARIS: Really?
12	MR. ANDREWS: Yes. It killed him
13	actually.
14	CHAIR SARIS: And how frequent is
15	that?
16	MR. ANDREWS: Probably infrequent but
17	they said that, you know, there's an opportunity
18	that, you know, it's something that's not really
19	considered. That's kind of a rare example with
20	the death but they were saying about other
21	assaults that have happened with either hockey

1	referees, soccer referees.
2	CHAIR SARIS: Really?
3	MR. ANDREWS: And then, of course, we
4	just saw most recently in the state of Texas
5	where there's assault on a football referee.
6	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: By two players.
7	MR. ANDREWS: By two players. I
8	don't have the statistics. It was a
9	COMMISSIONER PRYOR: They don't play
10	football in Massachusetts.
11	(Simultaneous speaking.)
12	CHAIR SARIS: That's very
13	interesting. So that was viewed as a common
14	national problem.
15	MR. ANDREWS: Yes. They thought that
16	when we were going through the extensive list,
17	and it was exhaustive and I think, you know, we
18	were just trying to pare it down and that was a
19	consensus that they wanted me to bring up.
20	Perhaps isn't on everybody's radar but it's
21	something to consider.

Well, thank you. 1 CHAIR SARIS: MR. ANDREWS: Thank you. 2 COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Can I ask you a 3 4 question, Mr. Andrews? So the last panel when we were discussing this the issue was if we 5 6 expanded our, went beyond the categorical 7 approach and we did kind of take into account additional things, kind of like your 8 three, relevant facts the court could consider, 9 there's this issue of whether it would mean 10 11 bringing victims in to testify or having people 12 come in. I don't know if you have a sense of 13 14 whether or not going beyond the categorical 15 approach, whether we, because it seems like what you're saying with retroactivity is don't do that 16 because it'll mean that the victims have to come 17 in, relitigate uncertainty. 18 And I'm wondering if you have the same 19 20 concerns if we were to expand and go beyond the 21 categorical approach to include these other

1	conduct-based things.
2	MR. ANDREWS: Yes, thank you.
3	Obviously I do have that concern but, you know,
4	with that my clients definitely know that part
5	of the criminal justice process is, you know, the
6	right of testifying and the right for the
7	accused.
8	So not a lot of my clients like to do
9	that but they know that's part of the deal, but
10	I would probably err on, you know, to shy away
11	from any type of relitigating those issues.
12	VICE CHAIR BREYER: So, I mean,
13	that's the trade-off that I see, is that on the
14	one hand you have finality. You have whatever
15	the sentence was at the time and there could be
16	some closure by some victims as to the offense.
17	And then what we're suggesting now is
18	that that closure, it's not really closure
19	because we'll look at it all over again. If we
20	go beyond the categorical approach, we'll look
21	at it all over again.

1	So I wonder, and maybe there's no
2	general rule. Maybe some victims would say,
3	well, I want to make sure that the sentence is,
4	quote, "just," is appropriate to the
5	circumstances.
6	And some people will say, well, I have
7	closure on this and I have to move on with my
8	life.
9	Is it that there are these two sort
10	of slightly irreconcilable views of victims and
11	we can't address both of them?
12	MR. ANDREWS: Yes. Oh, thank you.
13	And that's exactly right. That's always an
14	inherent conflict that I have with my clients
15	especially when, you know, how much the
16	government is asking them to participate in the
17	criminal justice program.
18	And, you know, for most victims it's,
19	you know, it's a unique situation. It's an
20	environment they are very, you know, it's very
21	strange to them.

1	And to ask them to rehash the incident
2	that happened to them the first time, let alone,
3	but then come back for a second or perhaps third
4	time is very debilitating and that's where you
5	see the I don't want any part of this. I just
6	want to move on.
7	But as you indicated, yes, there is a
8	sense of justice as well because in the back of
9	the victim's mind is if I don't participate what
LO	about the next victim or the next victim that
L1	could possibly be in that situation.
L2	So, you know, I don't have an answer.
L3	I'd like to find some middle ground there where
L4	it would give a victim an opportunity or that
L5	option.
L6	CHAIR SARIS: Or at least give them
L7	notice that this is what's happening and
L8	right.
L9	MR. ANDREWS: You're exactly right,
20	Judge, is to give them that notice of the event
21	and then really engage them and see how much they

1	want to participate and want to be, you know, an
2	active victim.
3	CHAIR SARIS: Good point. Okay,
4	thank you. I have one question for you. We
5	heard from the government that a sentence imposed
6	requirement which is in the immigration area but
7	people have been proposing in terms of limiting
8	the predicate so the sentence imposed being at
9	least 13 months, various proposals, would be very
LO	hard to prove.
L1	And from a probation point of view,
L2	you implemented on the immigration side. How
L3	hard is it to figure out actually what they, what
L4	time they spent?
L5	MR. BOHLKEN: It's very difficult. I
L6	concur. It's still very challenging for us to
L7	obtain all the documents that we need to obtain
L8	from different jurisdictions.
L9	And if we had to come up with a
20	definitive amount of time someone actually
21	served, we would also have to try to get records

1	from detention centers, prisons, different things
2	like that.
3	And then that brings into play
4	sentence imposed and how much time someone
5	actually does. Some jurisdictions give 50
6	percent off for good time. Sometimes they do 80
7	percent on violent crimes in different
8	jurisdictions. So I think that would open it up
9	to a lot more unwarranted disparity.
10	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well, it comes up
11	all the time in the immigration area, right,
12	because it's right embedded in there so how big
13	a deal is it in
14	MR. BOHLKEN: Well, in the plus 16
15	and the plus 12, it is sentence imposed and you
16	just have to figure out if the sentence was
17	imposed. You don't have to figure out exactly
18	how much time they actually did.
19	CHAIR SARIS: So it would be I impose
20	five years in jail and you don't have to figure
21	out what the good time was, what the offsets were

1	for detention centers or a state so that's why
2	it's simple, is you word it that way.
3	MR. BOHLKEN: And the only difficulty
4	see there would be what we have right now which
5	is trying to track down all the necessary
6	documents.
7	VICE CHAIR BREYER: Well, looking at
8	the documents, I mean, one of my great concerns
9	is that you can't get, and maybe for good reasons,
10	but you can't get police reports on prior
11	incidences. It's a very uneven thing.
12	Sometimes they're there and I'd say most of the
13	time they're not. Has that been a problem? Am
14	I the only one having this problem or is it just
15	nationwide?
16	MR. BOHLKEN: It is nationwide. Some
17	jurisdictions are better than others. Some
18	jurisdictions are better at record keeping than
19	others.
20	Across the 94 districts in the United
21	States probation office, different districts do,

1	some do better collateral investigations for
2	other districts while some maybe don't do as good
3	of collateral investigation. So it's always an
4	issue of tracking down the core documents and the
5	police reports.
6	As you know, we don't rely through the
7	categorical approach and modified categorical
8	approach on the police reports at all, but it is
9	good information to have because one of our
10	functions is to try to give the sentencing judge
11	all the information that we have about a
12	predicate offense and in a lot of cases there are
13	no police reports available.
14	CHAIR SARIS: Thank you. Does anyone
15	have any other questions?
16	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Yes, can I just
17	ask, has probation tried to urge Congress to do
18	something about making it more easy for you to
19	obtain records of conviction?
20	So since we heard from the earlier
21	panels and you're saying again, like, it just

1	seems like we have this weird patchwork in the
2	United States and Congress should have an
3	interest in making sure that stops and that we
4	are able to get from every state the convictions
5	that are the backbone of this kind of a regime.
6	And I'm just kind of curious if, has
7	probation ever made that point or, I'm just
8	trying to, I want to alert Congress to the fact
9	that this seems like a real problem, like that
10	we should be able to get these records from people
11	and I just wasn't sure if you knew of any effort
12	to try to
13	MR. BOHLKEN: I don't, but that would
14	be something worthwhile to do because, like I
15	said, it is different across Some
16	jurisdictions, courts charge the United States
17	probation office to make copies of actual records
18	so it varies across the board.
19	COMMISSIONER BARKOW: Thank you.
20	CHAIR SARIS: Any other questions? I
21	want to thank you very much for coming in

1	MR. ANDREWS: Thank you.
2	MR. BOHLKEN: Thank you.
3	CHAIR SARIS: sharing your
4	thoughts. We care. Probation has been you
5	always come in and it's terrific. That round
6	table we had, was it last year where everyone
7	That was great. And the VAG, I mean,
8	you always give us good feedback so thank you
9	very much.
10	MR. ANDREWS: Thank you very much.
11	MR. BOHLKEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
13	went off the record at 12:08 p.m.)
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