STATEMENT

OF

PAUL G. CASSELL
RONALD N. BOYCE PRESIDENTIAL PROFESSOR OF CRIMINAL LAW
S.J. QUINNEY COLLEGE OF LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION

ON

PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS

IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS

ON

OCTOBER 20, 2009

DENVER, COLORADO
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Commission,

I am pleased to be here today to continue a discussion with the Sentencing Commission about how best to protect crime victims’ rights in the sentencing process. My testimony offers specific suggestions to the Commission for several policy statements the Commission could adopt to protect victims’ rights as well as legislative changes that the Commission should recommend to Congress.

In Part I of my testimony, I urge the Commission to adopt policy statements that would give victims a great role in the sentencing guidelines process. In Part I.A, I explain how courts frequently treat crime victims information as largely irrelevant to determining the ultimate sentence. In Part I.B., I argue that this limited role for victims is inconsistent with the role for victims that crime envisioned when it passed the Crime Victims’ Rights Act. Congress wanted victims have an expanded role in the sentencing process, so that their information would make a real difference in the sentencing process. In Part I.C., I explain why the Commission’s 2006 policy statement concerning crime victims’ rights – § 6A1.5 – while well-intentioned appears to have had virtually no substantive effect in protecting crime victims. In Part I.D., I urge the Commission to adopt policy statements regarding victim impact statements and victim access to pre-sentencing reports so that victims can participate in the process of determining the applicable sentencing guideline. I conclude in Part I.E. by giving a specific example of a case in which a crime victims was unfairly denied the opportunity to participate in the process of determining the Sentencing Guidelines.

Part II of my testimony turns to another important part of sentencing – restitution – and urges the Commission to recommend to Congress that judges be given greater power to craft restitution awards. Current federal law authorizes judges to order restitution only for certain narrow categories of losses, such as to compensate victims for damage to their property or to reimburse them for medical expenses. The need to fit restitution awards into these narrow categories has led to considerable litigation about whether particular restitution awards made by district court judges were authorized by statute. But in the midst of resolving those disputes, a larger point has been missed: that judges should have broad authority to order defendants to pay restitution. Congress has mandated that restitution's purpose is to restore victims to where they would have been had no crime been committed. Unfortunately, the current restitution statutes do not permit trial judges to achieve that goal. In my testimony, I discuss specific examples of appellate court cases that have overturned quite appropriate district court restitution orders on the grounds that they were not statutorily-authorized. I urge the Sentencing Commission to recommend to Congress to extend these statutes and give judges appropriate power to craft proper restitution awards – a recommendation that the Judicial Conference of the United States has also recently made.

Part III of my testimony urges the Commission to recommend to Congress that it pass legislation giving judges greater power to prevent profiteering by criminals. The current federal law on the subject is apparently unconstitutional, yet neither the Justice Department nor the Congress has taken steps to correct the problem. It would be an embarrassment to the federal system of justice if criminals were able to be profit from their crimes merely because no one had
taken the time to draft appropriate, constitutional legislation. Corrective legislation could be easily drafted, by giving judges discretionary power to prevent profiteering as a condition of supervised release. In addition, it is possible to draft a constitutional statute that forbids profiteering by criminals. I offer some specific legislative suggestions along these lines, including a suggested statute for dealing with the problem of “murderabilia.”

A brief note about my background may be in order. I previously served as a U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Utah (2002-07) and am currently the Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah, where I teach and write on crime victims’ rights and other criminal law subjects.1 I am also special litigation counsel to the National Crime Victims’ Law Institute.

I. THE COMMISSION SHOULD INTEGRATE CRIME VICTIMS INTO THE SENTENCING PROCESS.


The outlines of the current sentencing system are well-known to the Commission. Here it is worth briefly highlighting the important role for victims provided for by the Guidelines and Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the current system, a “victim impact statement” is typically included in the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation office. This victim impact statement is often written by the victim and explains the effect of the crime. Later, at the sentencing hearing, victims are allowed to speak or “allocute.” As Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently provides, “[b]efore imposing sentence” the court must “address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.”

Yet while this rule gives many victims the right to allocute, courts typically seem to treat this right of allocation as a mere general exhortation about the effects of the crime rather than for providing specific information that goes into the Guidelines calculation or other specific information that bears on the sentencing. Handling victim allocation in this way often means that victims’ information will have little or no effect on the sentence imposed. The most important determinant of most sentences is the applicable guideline. To be sure, the Supreme Court recently held in the well-known Booker decision that the federal sentencing guideline scheme is “advisory.”3 But most district judges continue to give the Guidelines “heavy weight”4 and statistics collected by the Sentencing Commission show the most sentences continue to fall within

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2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B).
the Guideline recommendations or are based on Guideline calculations in some fashion.\textsuperscript{5} Indeed, while recognizing the right of district court judges to vary from the Guidelines, the Supreme Court has been quite clear that the sentencing judges “must treat the Guidelines as the starting point and initial benchmark” for calculating any sentence.\textsuperscript{6} If crime victims do not participate in the sentencing guideline process – or are unable to provide information that influences the sentencing guideline calculation – then their right of allocution will have little effect on sentencing.

\textbf{B. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act Commands that Victims Be Given an Expanded Role in the Sentencing Process, Including Access to Pre-Sentence Reports.}

Limiting crime victims’ role in federal sentencing to mere general exhortation is inconsistent with the role that Congress envisions victims should play. In October 2004, Congress passed the “Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act.”\textsuperscript{7} Congress intended through this legislation to make crime victims real participants in the criminal justice process. To that end, the Act guarantees crime victims a series of rights, such as the right to be present and heard at appropriate points in the criminal justice process and the right to be treated fairly.\textsuperscript{8}

Specifically, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act guarantees crime victims the right “to be reasonably heard” and “to be treated with fairness” throughout the criminal justice process, including at sentencing hearings.\textsuperscript{9} This congressional command is not an invitation for business as usual. Instead, Congress expected “meaningful participation of crime victims in the justice system . . .”\textsuperscript{10} In federal sentencings, crime victims cannot be such participants unless they are allowed an appropriate role in the process of determining the applicable sentencing guideline. In the great majority of cases, the Guidelines are the major factor driving a defendant’s sentence. The Commission should allow victims an opportunity to be involved in that guidelines determination. The Commission should draft procedures that allow victims to review relevant parts of the pre-sentence report, including the all-important Guidelines calculation; to raise objections to any improper calculation; and to be heard on that calculation. Anything less will

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\textsuperscript{5} U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (Sept. 8, 2009) (57.4% of all cases sentenced within the guideline range and an additional 25.0% were sentenced based on a government recommendation to go below the Guideline range). \textit{See generally} Frank O. Bowman, III, \textit{The Year of Jubilee . . . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker}, 43 U. HOUSTON L. REV. 279, 319 (2006) (“[I]t seems reasonable to predict that the guidelines will remain the predominant factor in determining individual sentences for years to come.”).
\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Kimbrough v. United States}, 552 U.S. 85, __ (2007).
\textsuperscript{9} 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) & (8).
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leave victims on the outside looking in at the process, rather than participating in the process as Congress – and justice – require.

One particular provision in the Act is worth highlighting here because of its effects on Guidelines procedures. Among its comprehensive list of rights, the Act gives victims “the right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . . sentencing . . . .” The right is not narrowly circumscribed to just impact information, however. To the contrary, the right conferred is a broad one – to be “reasonably heard” at the sentencing proceeding.

The CVRA appears to legally entitle victims to be heard on disputed Guidelines issues and, as a consequence, to review parts of the pre-sentence report relevant to those issues. As Senator Kyl explained, the right includes sentencing recommendations:

When a victim invokes this right during . . . sentencing proceedings, it is intended that he or she be allowed to provide all three types of victim impact: the character of the victim, the impact of the crime on the victim, the victim's family and the community, and sentencing recommendations. A “sentencing recommendation” will often directly implicate Guidelines issues, particularly where a court gives significant weight to the Guidelines calculation (as most currently do). For example, if the victim wishes to recommend a 60-month sentence when the maximum guideline range is only 30 months, that sentencing recommendation may be meaningless unless a victim can provide a basis for recalculating the Guidelines or departing from the Guidelines.

Congress intended the victim's right to be heard to be construed broadly, as Senator Feinstein stated:

The victim of crime, or their counsel, should be able to provide any information, as well as their opinion, directly to the court concerning the . . . sentencing of the accused.

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12 See generally DOUGLAS BELOOF, PAUL CASSELL & STEPHEN TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 10 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing victim impact statements); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1373, 1395-96 (same).
14 See supra note 6.
Again, it is hard to see how victims can meaningfully provide “any information” and their “opinion” about a sentence without being told what everyone else in the courtroom knows – the Guidelines calculations that likely will drive the sentence.

Victims may often possess information quite relevant to the district court’s assessment of the Guidelines range. The Guidelines themselves contain an entire part devoted to “victim-related adjustments” and issues relating to the victim are often part of the Guidelines calculation process.16 This part requires the court to make such determinations as whether a defendant selected his victim because of race, whether a defendant should have known that a victim was vulnerable, and whether a victim was physically restrained during the course of an offense. In addition, other Guidelines look to victim-related characteristics. The kidnapping provision, for example, looks to such things as the degree of injury suffered by the victim.17 The fraud provision looks to loss to the victim.18

To be sure, in many cases a prosecutor may bring some of these relevant facts to the court’s attention. Indeed, under the new Act prosecutors are required to “use their best efforts” to insure that victims’ rights are protected.19 But the Act clearly indicates that the prosecutor’s representations are not a substitute for the victim’s personal right to be reasonably heard. Thus, the Act begins: “A crime victim has the following rights . . . .”20 Moreover, the Act specifically provides that victims can “assert the rights” provided in the statute both before the district court and on appeal by way of expedited mandamus relief.21 This demonstrates that Congress intended victims to be involved in sentencing proceedings as the functional equivalent of parties, that is, as equal participants in the process.22 As Senator Kyl explained about the right-to-be-heard provision:

This provision is intended to allow crime victims to directly address the court in person. It is not necessary for the victim to obtain the permission of either party to do so. This right is a right independent of the government or the defendant that allows the victim to address the court. To the extent the victim has the right to independently address the court, the victim acts as an independent participant in the proceedings.23

An independent basis for the victim reviewing pre-sentence reports is the victim’s broad

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16 U.S.S.G. § 3A.1.1 et seq. For a specific illustration, see Part I.E, infra.
17 U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(2).
19 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c).
right under the CVRA to be “treated with fairness.” This right seems to comfortably encompass a right of access to relevant parts of the pre-sentence report. The victim’s right to fairness gives victims a free-standing right to due process. As Senator Kyl instructed:

The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational. One of these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course, fairness includes the notion of due process. . . . This provision is intended to direct government agencies and employees, whether they are in the executive or judicial branches, to treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford them due process. Due process principles dictate that victims have the right to be apprised of Guidelines calculations and related issues. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is . . . fundamental that the right to . . . an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” It is not “meaningful” for victims to make sentencing recommendations without the benefit of knowing what the recommended Guidelines range is. Yet Congress plainly intended to pass a law establishing “[f]air play for crime victims, meaningful participation of crime victims in the justice system, protection against a government that would take from a crime victim the dignity of due process. . . .”

A victim’s right to be heard regarding sentencing issues is important for another reason: insuring proper restitution. Federal law guarantees most victims of serious crimes the right to restitution. While reinforcing those laws, the new Crime Victims Rights Act also guarantees that victims have “[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” As a practical matter, many of the calculations undergirding an award of restitution will rest on information contained in the pre-sentence report. While the restitution statutes have their own detailed procedural provisions, it is unclear how those provisions are integrated with the Guidelines procedural provisions.

For all these reasons, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act should be understood as giving victims the right to be heard before a court makes any final conclusions about Guidelines calculations and other sentencing matters. It is therefore incumbent on the judiciary to take

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specific steps to integrate victims into the sentencing process.

C. The Commission's Victims’ Policy Statement is Inadequate.

It would not be difficult for the judiciary to fold victims into sentencing process. All that would be needed are a few straightforward changes to the federal rules and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Elsewhere I have offered suggested changes to the federal rules and, after considering my proposals, the Rule Advisory Committee recently made changes to protect victims’ rights. Here I will focus on the changes needed in the Manual. As the Commission is aware from my previous testimony, I believe that specific changes are need to the Manual. The Commission apparently agreed with other victims’ rights advocates and me that some change was appropriate, as it adopted a new policy statement on crime victims' rights. Before turning to my own recommendations, it may therefore be worth briefly noting why the Commission's policy statement has proven to be inadequate.

The Commission adopted a new policy statement that instructed judges to adhere to federal law on crime victims’ rights:

§ 6A1.5 Crime Victims' Rights (Policy Statement)

In any case involving the sentencing of a defendant for an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and in any other provision of Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims.

This provision did nothing more than instruct judges to follow the law. Such an instruction is unhelpful. Of course federal judges will try to follow the law – on crime victims' rights no less than on other subjects. This point is reinforced by the fact that ordinarily a court will not award an injunction that does nothing more than require a party of follow the law. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Courts will not issue injunctions against administrative officers on the mere


32 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 60 (rule dealing with victim’s rights). For reasons that I have articulated at length elsewhere, I believe that Advisory Committee’s changes do not go far enough. See Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly, supra note 31. I understand that the Advisory Committee is continuing to monitor how its new rules are operating and may consider additional rules changes in the future.

apprehension that they will not do their duty or will not follow the law. Thus, courts have been skeptical of requests to order compliance with the law.

Several years ago in testifying I expressed skepticism about whether the policy statement would have any substantive effect of the law. It appears that my skepticism may have been warranted, at least as measured by references to the provision. Since the effective date of this Guideline provision nearly three years ago (November 1, 2006), it has yet to be cited in even a single published court opinion.

D. The Commission Should Make Specific Changes to the Guidelines to Protect Victims’ Rights.

Rather than a purely symbolic injunction to follow the law, what trial judges need is specific guidance from the Commission on how to appropriately integrate crime victims into the sentencing process. It is here that the Commission, as the judiciary’s expert agency on the subject, could be particularly helpful. In particular, the Commission should change the policy statements in the Guidelines to explain how crime victims are to participate in the Guidelines process. Currently those provisions allow only “the parties” (i.e., the prosecution and the defense) to dispute sentencing factors contained in the pre-sentence report. For example, section 6A1.3 provides: “When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor.”

In the wake of the CVRA, district judges can no longer follow that approach. The Commission should give guidance on what approach district judges should follow. I believe that the Sentencing Commission should make four changes to the Guidelines:

1. Probation Officers Required to Investigate Victims Issues

The Commission should change section 6A1.1 to insure that the probation officers include

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34 Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1918) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Abright, 208 U.S. 548 (1908)).
35 Lauer Farms v. Waushara Country Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544, 554 (E.D. Wisc. 1997) (“Indeed, such an injunction would do little more than direct the defendant to follow the law in the future.”).
36 A Westlaw search on September 28, 2009, located only two citing references to the provision in two years in any database within Westlaw – an unpublished Third Circuit opinion and a citation in a defendant’s brief in the Second Circuit.
37 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (emphasis added).
38 In my earlier testimony to the Commission, I recommended changes similar to those proposed here. This testimony reflects my current thinking and research on these issues.
victim information in their pre-sentence reports as follows:

§ 6A1.1.  **Pre-sentence Report** (Policy Statement)

(a) The probation officer must conduct a pre-sentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes sentence unless —
   (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c) or another statute requires otherwise; or
   (2) the court finds that the information in the record enables it to meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court explains its finding on the record.
   Rule 32 (c)(1)(A), Fed. R. Crim. P.

(b) The defendant may not waive preparation of the pre-sentence report.

(c) If a pre-sentence report is prepared, the probation officer must determine whether any victim wishes to provide information for the pre-sentence report.

The proposed change would require the probation office to affirmatively seek out the victim. It seems unlikely that a probation officer could properly prepare a thorough pre-sentence report without obtaining the victim's views. Indeed, the rules already require the probation officer to include victim information in the report. Because there is no way to know in advance whether the victim will have relevant information for the report, the probation officer should be required to investigate whether the victim has useful information. Of course, nothing in the proposed change would require the probation officer to include irrelevant or argumentative information in the report.

2. **Disclosure of Pre-Sentence Report to the Victim**

The Commission should change section 6A1.2 to insure that victims have reasonable access to pertinent parts of the pre-sentence report as follows:

§ 6A1.2.  **Disclosure of Pre-sentence Report; Issues in Dispute** (Policy Statement)

(a) The probation officer must give the pre-sentence report to the defendant, the defendant's attorney, and an attorney for the government at least 35 days before sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum period. The attorney for the government shall, if any victim requests, communicate the relevant contents of the pre-sentence report to the victim. Rule 32(e)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P.

(b) Within 14 days after receiving the pre-sentence report, the parties or the victim, must state in writing any objections, including objections to material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained

[39](See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(B)).
in or omitted from the report. An objecting party or victim must provide a copy of its objections to the opposing party and to the probation officer. After receiving objections, the probation officer may meet with the parties and any involved victim to discuss the objections. The probation officer may then investigate further and revise the pre-sentence report accordingly. Rule 32(f), Fed. R. Crim. P.

(c) At least 7 days before sentencing, the probation officer must submit to the court, and to the parties, and any involved victim, the pre-sentence report and an addendum containing any unresolved objections, the grounds for those objections, and the probation officer’s comment on them. Rule 32(g), Fed. R. Crim. P.

Crime victims should have access to the substance of the pre-sentence report. The pre-sentence report is the central document at sentencing. Indeed, the main event at many sentencing hearings is resolving challenges to the report. Without access to the substance of that report, crime victims cannot effectively participate in the sentencing process. They will truly remain outsiders to a process, in spite of Congress’ command that they be brought in.

I made this argument before the Commission in February 2005. In response, the Practitioners’ Advisory Group disputed my proposal. In a letter to the Commission, they argued that “nothing in the CVRA or its legislative history states that crime victims should be permitted to review portions of the pre-sentence report, dispute guidelines calculations, raise grounds for departures, or as such rights would seem to imply, appeal a sentence on factual or legal grounds.” The Group also cited the legislative history of a proposed constitutional amendment protecting victim’s rights, which in its view limited a victim’s right to be heard to mere “allocution” at sentencing — that is, merely providing victim impact information.

The Practitioners’ Group’s arguments are flawed for several reasons. First, the Group too narrowly views the CVRA’s relevant legislative history. As explained above, Congress intended for victims to have broad rights in the sentencing process, including rights to be reasonably heard in a meaningful manner. It is not reasonable to deprive victims of the critical information in the pre-sentence report. Second, the Group misdescribes the relevant history of the constitutional amendment — known as the Victims’ Rights Amendment. It is true that the Amendment contained a right to be “reasonably heard,” just as the CVRA does. The Group does not recognize, however, that the legislative history of the Amendment suggests that Congress was taking an expanding view of the victim’s right to be heard at sentencing, including a view that would embrace victim opinion evidence, as discussed in the note below.

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41 Id. at 2.
42 The Group cites the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Victims’ Rights Amendment, which in 2000 referenced a Tenth Circuit decision restricting the right of victims to present opinion evidence:
Most important, the Practitioners' Advisory Group's letter fails to consider the impact of the victim's right to fairness on the issues. Presumably the Group (which is comprised primarily of defense attorneys) would be outraged if sentencings occurred without notice to defendants about relevant parts of the pre-sentence report – and properly so. It would be unfair to force defense counsel to argue sentencing issues without basic information about what is being considered at the sentencing hearing. These same due process principles dictate that victims should receive this information as well.

The Practitioners' Advisory Group also seemingly raises a concern that can be immediately dispelled. The Group wonders whether a victim's right to be heard on Guidelines issues would imply a right to appeal a sentence. It would not. The CVRA contains its own specific appellate provisions, which permit victim appeals only for denials of their rights. It specifically allows a right to seek “to re-open . . . a sentence" only for violations of a victim's “right to be heard." Moreover, while victims have due process protections, due process does not guarantee a right to an appeal. Finally, the Sentencing Reform Act spells out the limited rights of appeal on Guidelines issues available to only the government and the defense. For all these reasons, victims have the

At the same time, the victim's right to be heard at sentencing will not be unlimited, just as the defendant's right to be heard at sentencing is not unlimited today. Congress and the States remain free to set certain limits on what is relevant victim impact testimony. For example, a jurisdiction might determine that a victims' views on the desirability or undesirability of a capital sentence is not relevant in a capital proceeding. Cf. Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that victim opinion on death penalty not admissible). The Committee does not intend to alter or comment on laws existing in some States allowing for victim opinion as to the proper sentence.

S. REP. NO. 106-254 at 12 (2000). In 2003, however, the same passage in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report was changed to remove the citation to that case and instead cite the nation's leading exponent of expansive rights for victims:

Victim impact statements concerning the character of the victim and the impact of the crime remain constitutional. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 Cornell Law Review 282 (2003). The Committee does not intend to alter or comment on laws existing in some States allowing for victim opinion as to the proper sentence.


45 See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
right to review relevant parts of the pre-sentence report and be heard on Guidelines issues in the
trial court, but not the right to appeal Guidelines issues to the appellate courts.

Because victims have a right of access to the pre-sentence report, the question then arises
of how to provide that access. Nothing in current law precludes releasing pre-sentence reports to
victims. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3552 requires disclosure to government and defense counsel, but does
not forbid further dissemination. The federal courts that have considered the issue generally have
held that circulation is allowed to third parties upon a proper showing of particularized need
approved by the court.47 Some courts' local rules also allow additional distribution with approval
of the court.48 Victims always have a particularized need for access to the Guidelines calculations
and related parts of the pre-sentence report, as without such access they are unable to effectively
make their sentencing recommendation.

In view of that legal landscape, the ways in which the Guidelines could handle disclosure
of the pre-sentence reports to victims are:

(1) Complete Disclosure.

The Guidelines could direct full disclosure of the pre-sentence report to the victim. While
there are apparently no statutory barriers to this approach, legitimate policy objections might be
raised. Portions of the report may contain sensitive private information about the defendant
(results of psychiatric examinations, prior history of drug use, childhood sexual abuse, and the
like). The report may also reveal confidential law enforcement information that should not be
widely circulated. Victims may not always need access to these limited parts of the report.
While a number of states give victims unfettered right to access the pre-sentence report,49 in the

47 See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 238 (7th Cir. 1989) (compelling,
partially particularized need standard); United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir. 1988)
(interests of justice standard); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1173 (2d Cir.
48 See, e.g., D. Utah Crim. Local R. 32-1(c) (pre-sentence reports not released without
order of the court).
49 Ala. Code § 15-23-73 (1975) (“victim shall have the right to review a copy of the
pre-sentence investigative report, subject to the applicable federal or state confidentiality laws”);
Alaska Stat. § 12.22.023 (giving victim right to look at portions of sentencing report); Ariz.
Const. art. 2 § 2.1 (giving victim right to review pre-sentence report when available to the
defendant); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4425 (giving victim right to review pre-sentence report “except
those parts excised by the court or made confidential by law”); Col. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-304(5)
giving prosecutor discretion to allow victim or victim's family to see pre-sentence report); Fla.
Stat. § 960.001 (giving victim right to review pre-sentence report); Idaho Stat. § 19-5306
giving victim right to review pre-sentence report); Ind. Code § 35-40-5-6(b) (giving victim right
to read and “respond to” material contained in the pre-sentence report); La. Const. art. 1 § 25
giving victim “right to review and comment upon the pre-sentence report”); Mont. Stat. §
46-18-113 (giving prosecutor right to disclose contents of pre-sentence report to victim); Or. Rev.

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federal system a more limited approach is arguably appropriate. I will proceed on that assumption, although there is a certain simplicity and appeal to a flat rule simply giving the pre-sentence report to the victim.

(2) Selective Disclosure.

The Guidelines could direct that the probation office redact any pre-sentence report to remove confidential information and then provide the redacted report to the victim. This approach, too, is problematic; it would require considerable work by busy probation officers to prepare two separate documents – first a regular report, then a redacted report – presumably only after consulting with the attorneys on both sides of the case about what might be viewed as confidential.

(3) Disclosure Through Prosecutors.

The simplest solution to the competing concerns is to disclose the report to victims through an intermediary, specifically the prosecutor. The prosecutor would serve as the filter for confidential information and could assist the victim by highlighting critical parts of the report. One might raise the concern that this approach would burden prosecutors, who are no less busy than probation officers. But the CVRA already gives victims the right to “confer” with prosecutors50 – and presumably they will be conferring regarding the important topic of sentencing. Moreover, many U.S. Attorney’s Offices already have Victim-Witness Coordinators who communicate with victims regarding impact statements. The CVRA also authorizes increased funding of $22 million for the Victim/Witness Assistance Programs in U.S. Attorney’s Offices, so presumably they will be able to expand their victim services.

Requiring prosecutors to disclose pre-sentence reports to victims in all cases, even when they are not interested in such disclosure, seems like an unwise use of time and energy. Accordingly, disclosure of the report should be required only upon request by a victim.

Consideration of these Issues By the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

In a law review article published n 2005, I recommended that changes along these lines should be made not only to the Sentencing Guidelines manual but also to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.52 After considering my proposal, the Advisory Committee on the rules declined to adopt my proposal at that time, opining that “the prosecutor should remain the victim's source of information regarding the sentencing process and the contents of the presentence report, and the prosecutor should have discretion to determine what information from the presentence report should be shared with the victim.”

STAT. §137.077 (pre-sentence report must be made available to victim).
The conclusion of the advisory committee raises two issues. First, who has jurisdiction over questions regarding access to the PSR: The Advisory Committee or the Sentencing Commission? And, second, assuming that the Sentencing Commission has jurisdiction, is the Advisory Committee correct in concluding that victims should receive information about the PSR only at the suffrage of the prosecutor?

With regard to the first question – jurisdiction – the Commission has already asserted its authority to adopt policy statements in this area. By adopting sections 6A1.1 on presentence reports and 6A1.2 on disclosure of the reports, the Commission has given its view as to how presentence reports should be handled. Therefore, it is a natural extension of these policy statements for the Commission to fold crime victims’ rights into them.

Any view that the Sentencing Commission lacks power to promulgate policy statements protecting crime victims’ rights is quickly dispelled by a quick examination of the Commission’s charter statute. Title 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) authorizes (indeed commands) that the Commission shall promulgate “general policy statements regarding application of the Guidelines or any other aspects of sentencing or sentencing implementation that in the view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code . . . .” Those purposes include many purposes for which victims are ideally suited to provide information to courts. For example, a sentencing judge cannot begin to impose a sentence that “reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense” unless she fully understands the seriousness of the offense. The victim is often the only person who can provide first-hand information on that subject to the judge. As the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime has explained: “A judge cannot evaluate the seriousness of a defendant’s conduct without knowing how the crime has burdened the victim. A judge cannot reach an informed determination of the danger posed by a defendant without hearing from the person he has victimized.” Moreover, section 3553(a)(7) specifically addresses crime victims, requiring that any sentence that a judge imposes must consider “the need to provide restitution to any victim of the offense.” The Commission plainly has jurisdiction to issue policy statements regarding the treatment of crime victims during the sentencing process.

The second issue prompted by the Advisory Committee’s decision not to adopt specific rules giving victims a right of access to relevant parts of the PSR is whether the Committee is correct when it asserts “the prosecutor should remain the victim's source of information regarding the sentencing process and the contents of the presentence report.” It is not. The Committee’s

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53 Memorandum from Professor Sara Sun Beale, Reporter, to the Members of the Crim. Rules Advisory Comm. (Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinafter CVRA Subcomm. Memo.].
55 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 76-77 (1982).
reasoning clashes directly with the CVRA's guiding principle: that victims deserve their own rights in the criminal process. Congress wanted victims to become participants with rights “independent of the government or the defendant . . . .” For this reason, the CVRA allows both the victim to assert rights independently of the government. Senator Kyl explained the victim's right to independent action directly: “[T]here is no authority for] the government's attorney . . . to compromise or co-opt a victim's right . . . . The rights provided in this bill are personal to the individual crime victim and it is that crime victim that has the final word regarding which of the specific rights to assert and when.”

One of the victim's independent rights includes the opportunity to make “sentencing recommendations.” Congress' command that victims be independent participants cannot be faithfully implemented if prosecutors control the information victims receive. If allowed to do so, prosecutors could simply feed the victim information supporting the government's view, while withholding information undercutting it. Nothing in the CVRA provides any support for this approach.

The Advisory Committee was also concerned that presentence reports “are typically treated as confidential, because they include a great deal of personal information about the defendant . . . .” But this concern was easily handled by my requirement that prosecutors pass along only “relevant” contents of the presentence reports. Personal information only tangentially connected to sentencing issues would not be disclosed. And if personal information about the defendant were directly connected to sentencing issues, then fairness entitles the victim to that information to formulate a sentencing recommendation. After all, by the time of sentencing, the defendant has been found guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of harming a victim. By committing

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59 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) (a victim's rights may be asserted by both the prosecutor and the victim or victim's representative).
62 The Advisory Committee's view that prosecutors should control what information the victim receives is so fundamentally at odds with the animating principles of the CVRA that it makes one wonder where it came from. Interestingly the view seems to have originated in a small subcommittee with a representative from the Justice Department but no crime victim's representative. See CVRA Subcommittee Mem., supra note 53, at 1 (noting that Deborah Rhodes, Counselor to the Asst. Atty. Gen. of the Criminal Division, served on the Subcommittee drafting this language).
63 At another point in its memorandum, the CVRA Subcommittee refers to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(6), which provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.” But the simple act of giving information in a court document (the PSR) to crime victims does not impair the government's decision of whether and how to prosecute a defendant. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (discussing impairment issue under Rule 20).
64 CVRA Subcommittee Mem., supra note 53, at 18.
a crime against the victim, the defendant has certainly forfeited some privacy interests – including
the chance to keep from the victim information relevant to sentencing. It is also important to
recall that this information is not truly confidential in the sense that no one else will see it. It has
already been disclosed to the probation officer, defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge.

Once the victim receives relevant information from a presentence report, the victim no less
than other participants at sentencing should be entitled to be heard on any disputed issues. For
example, in a fraud cause, if the defendant claims to have swindled only $5,000 and the
government claims the loss is $10,000, the victim should be entitled to press her argument that the
loss was $40,000. To do otherwise, is to deprive the victim of an opportunity to participate in the
sentencing process and to turn the victim impact statement into a meaningless charade.

The Advisory Committee’s view on this point is curious. The Advisory Committee did not
directly quarrel with the position that victims should have the opportunity to be heard on disputed
sentencing issues. Instead, the Advisory Committee would only go so far as to suggest that it

felt it would be desirable for the courts gradually to flesh out what the right to be
heard means in this [sentencing] context (determining, for example, when the right
to be heard would include the right to introduce evidence). It is by no means clear
that the CVRA contemplates that victims will be entitled to access all of the
particulars of the presentence report and be entitled to litigate issues concerning the
application of various guidelines, etc.65

This view is objectionable on many levels. First, given the congressional purpose of
fundamentally changing the way crime victims are treated in the criminal justice process, it can
hardly be desirable for courts to “gradually” determine what rights victims have. As Senator Kyl
explained, “A central reason for these rights is to force a change in a criminal justice culture which
has failed to focus on the legitimate interests of crime victims.”66 The CVRA was “meant to
correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims.”67

Second, the Committee diffidently opines that “[i]t is by no means clear” that victims have
the right to litigate disputed issues.68 I will turn to the substance of that claim in a second. But
even assuming it to be true, a fundamental purpose of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is to
provide clarity on issues that would otherwise have to be litigated.69 The Advisory Committee
could be “clear” that victims can litigate by simply putting in place my proposed rule.

65 Id. at 19.
67 150 CONG. REC. S10899 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also 150
and bolder approach than has ever been tried before in our Federal System”).
68 CVRA Subcommittee Mem., supra note 53, at 19.
69 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (providing illustrations of rules
changes made to provide clarity).
Fortunately, the Sentencing Commission is empowered to step in and provide uniformity to the sentencing process. Indeed, one of the Commission’s mandates is to ensure that sentences avoid “unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”

It is flatly inconsistent with this mandate to have differing rules around the country on access to PSR information, which may end up being reflected in differing sentences. The Commission should step in to provide uniformity here by insuring crime victims access to relevant parts of the PSR throughout the country.

Finally, perhaps the reason that the Advisory Committee would venture only that it is “unclear” whether victims have the right to dispute sentencing issues was a reluctance to stake out the contrary position. To maintain that victims cannot dispute sentencing issues would collide with both statutes and common sense. As for statutory requirements, it is hard to understand how victims will be “reasonably heard” at sentencing (as the CVRA commands) if they cannot contest the factors that may well drive a sentence – the sentencing guideline calculations. Moreover, Congress has already directly mandated that victims will have the opportunity to dispute sentencing factors when they relate to restitution.

Thus, if the Advisory Committee really wanted to stake out a victims-can’t-litigate-at-sentencing position, it would have to awkwardly carve out a restitution exception. Finally, a victim is simply not treated with “fairness” if she is entirely excluded from the guidelines process. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is . . . fundamental that the right to . . . an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

It is not “meaningful” for victims to make sentencing recommendations without the benefit of knowing what everyone else in that courtroom knows – what the recommended Guidelines range is. Yet Congress plainly intended to pass a law establishing “[f]air play for crime victims, meaningful participation of crime victims in the justice system, protection against a government that would take from a crime victim the dignity of due process . . . .” The Commission should help implement that statutory mandate by adopting specific policy statements on crime victims’ rights, as I outline in the next subsection.

3. Changes to Involve Victims in the Resolution of Disputed Guidelines Factors

The Commission should amend section 6A1.3 as follows to insure that crime victims have the opportunity to be involved in the resolution of disputed Guidelines factors:

§ 6A1.3. Resolution of Disputed Factors (Policy Statement)

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71 See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(2) (probation officer shall disclose to victim amount subject to restitution as calculated by the probation officer and the opportunity of the victim to file an affidavit seeking greater restitution); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (giving victims “the right to full and timely restitution as provided in law”).
73 150 Cong. Rec. S4264 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added); see also Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
(a) When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties and any involved victim shall be given adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor. . . .

[No further changes are recommended to this section.]

In addition, the Commission should amend section 6A1.4 as follows to recognize the possibility of a departure based on information contained in a victim impact statement:

§ 6A1.4. Notice of Possible Departure (Policy Statement)
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either in the pre-sentence report or in a party's or victim's prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure. The notice must specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. Rule 32(h), Fed. R. Crim. P.

For the reasons explained earlier, the victim's right to be "reasonably heard" at the sentencing hearing encompasses the right to be heard on guidelines issues. The changes in the Manual noted above would simply incorporate the victim in the process of determining the appropriate guideline.

Changing the rule in this fashion would also clarify the appropriate sequencing at sentencing hearings. Rule 32(i) requires the court to allow the victims to be "reasonably heard" on sentencing issues. Yet if the experience in my court is any guide, the victim's allocution frequently occurs only after the court has decided all the issues surrounding the pre-sentence report. If the victim's right to provide information to the court is going to have any meaning, that information must be allowed to have possible effect on critical sentencing issues, including issues about Guidelines calculations.

The proposed changes would allow the victim to comment at the sentencing hearing on matters within the pre-sentence report. While it might be objected that the victim is not a party to the case, Congress intended that the victim become a participant in the process with rights "independent of the government or the defendant." Those independent rights include the opportunity to make "sentencing recommendations." Given that matters in the pre-sentence report may often determine what effect a sentencing recommendation will have, the victim's right would seem to extend to participating in the process that determines the Guidelines range.

By building victims into the guidelines process, my proposal would also provide an important procedural protection to defendants. My proposed policy statement would require that

74 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i).
75 For an example of the victim being forced to wait until after important guideline calculations had been made, see the case discussed in Part I.E., infra.
77 Id.
the victim's attorney or the prosecutor would raise any reasonable objection to the pre-sentence report before the sentencing hearing, so that it could be discussed at a pre-sentence conference and then presented in an organized fashion to the sentencing judge. Setting up the procedures in this way creates an orderly process for victim objections to affect sentencing – with fair notice to the defense. Otherwise, the court – and the defendant – might hear for the first time at sentencing the court was considering an upward departure based on information in the victim impact statement.

Several years ago, the courts of appeals were split on the need for advance notice of an upward departure based on victim impact statements. In *United States v. Dozier*, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court is required to give notice to a defendant before departing upward from the advisory guideline range based on victim impact statements. The breadth of that holding may be limited, however, by unusual facts: the presentence report did not identify victim impact information as a possible basis for an upward departure and the government conceded that a sentencing remand was appropriate. The Third Circuit has expressly declined to follow *Dozier*. In *United States v. Vampire Nation*, the Third Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions making the Sentencing Guideline advisory, a defendant is always on notice that a judge might find a sentencing factor calling for a sentence higher than that advised by the Guidelines. With respect to victim impact statements, the Third Circuit highlighted the fact that victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing might provide a new, previously-undisclosed ground for an upward (or downward) departure:

The right of victims to be heard is guaranteed by the Crime Victims' Rights Act (“CVRA”) . . . . The right is in the nature of an independent right of allocution at sentencing. *See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (affording victims a “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding”). Under the CVRA, courts may not limit victims to a written statement. See Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.) (“Limiting victims to written impact statements, while allowing the prosecutor and the defendant the opportunity to address the court, would treat victims as secondary participants in the sentencing process. The CVRA clearly meant to make victims full participants.”). Given that it would be impossible to predict what statements victims might offer at sentencing, it would be unworkable to require district courts to provide advance notice of their intent to vary their discretionary sentence based on victim statements that had not yet been made.*

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*444 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006).*
*451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006), cert denied, 127 S.Ct. 424 (2006)*
*See United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 956 (2004).*
*Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 197 n.4.*
The contrasting positions of the Tenth and Third Circuits were part of a larger disagreement between the circuits on the extent to which the notice requirements in the criminal rules continue to operate under the now-"advisory" Sentencing Guidelines regime.82

The United States Supreme Court resolved the technical issue of whether a “variance” to the sentencing guidelines required advance notice to defense counsel in *Irizarry v. United States.*83 In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that because the Guidelines are no longer binding, due process considerations did not require that advance notice be given to defendants before a trial judge could vary from the Guidelines. The Court explained that, while an earlier decision (*Burns v. United States*) had read the sentencing statutes as requiring such advance notice for departures, the underpinnings of that decision did not apply to variances. Instead of categorically requiring notice, the Court concluded that the issue could be left to the sound discretion of trial judges.84 Four justices dissented, concluding that advance notice was “essential to assuring procedural fairness at sentencing.”85

The majority and dissenting judges were divided on a question of statutory and rules interpretation – specifically, how to interpret the statutes and rules regarding notice. The underlying policy question remains, however, whether it is sensible to provide advance notice to defendants so that they can prepare to respond to issues raised by victims before a court varies upward (or downward86) based on information provided by a victim. This issue was not addressed at all in the *Irizarry* decision, which apparently did not consider the question.87 But regardless of what the current statutes require, the Sentencing Commission is of course empowered to adopt rules that facilitate fairness at sentencing. The fairest way to proceed for defendants, the prosecution, and victims to build victims into the process and have them provide advance notice of the issues that they will raise when they seek to alter a guideline sentence.88

82 The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits ruled that Rule 32(h) continues to apply. See *United States v. Anati,* 457 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2006); *United States v. Davenport,* 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006); *United States v. Evans-Martinez,* 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006). The Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held the opposite. See *United States v. Vampire Nation,* 451 F.3d 189, 195-98 (3d Cir. 2006); *United States v. Walker,* 447 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 2006); *United States v. Egenberger,* 424 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2005). The First and Eleventh Circuits have held only that the failure to provide notice does not constitute plain error. *United States v. Mateo,* 2006 WL 1195676, at *1 (1st Cir. May 5, 2006); *United States v. Simmerer,* 156 Fed. Appx. 124, 128 (11th Cir. 2005).
84 *Id.* at 2203-04.
85 *Id.* at 2207 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 For a helpful correction to the idea that victims’ interests are always adverse to defense interests at sentencing, see Benjamin McMurray, *The Mitigating Power of a Victim Focus at Sentencing,* 19 FED. SENT’ING RPTR.125 (2007).
87 See 128 S.Ct. at 2203 (listing unanticipated issues that might arise at sentencing; not listing victims issues).
88 This recommendation assumes that legal counsel is available to a victim and that the victim is seeking a sentencing outside of the guideline range rather than within the guideline range.
E. A Case Illustrating the Need for Change – In re Brock.

For all the reasons just explained, crime victims should be allowed to participate in the sentencing guideline process. But it may be helpful to illustrate this point with an example of a specific case in which a crime victim was unfairly denied this opportunity. The treatment of Wade Brock is such a case.89

On February 8, 2006, Wayne Brock (a decorated war veteran and career U.S. Postal Service supervisor) received a report from a distraught postal supervisor that she had been threatened by two workers – Gregory Bermudez and John Bermudez. Mr. Brock went to see what was happening and found the two workers accosting another worker on a loading dock. Mr. Brock then directed the Bermudez’s to go to the shop steward’s office. When they refused to comply with his instructions, Brock said he going to call the Postal Police and he turned to walk away towards the nearest telephone. As he approached the phone, the Bermudez’s jumped him from behind. John Bermudez struck him with his fist, dropping Mr. Brock to the ground. Gregory Bermudez then joined in the attack and they proceeded to kick, stomp, and hit Mr. Brock as he curled up in a ball in an attempt to protect himself. The Bermudez’s hit Mr. Brock in the head, rendering him unconscious. Bermudez’s were ultimately pulled off of Mr. Brock and one of Mr. Brock’s supervisory picked him up, bleeding and dizzy.

Mr. Brock then was taken to the hospital by ambulance, where he remained for 5 and 1/2 hours. He was treated for injuries to his head, face, neck, back, and shoulders and the records indicate a loss of consciousness, double vision, headaches, trouble walking, contusions, and swelling. The attack on Mr. Brock resulted in post-traumatic stress disorder that caused him to remain away from work for more than six months (including about six weeks without pay).

Following indictment, defendant Gregory Bermudez pled guilty to criminal assault against Mr. Brock and defendant John Bermudez was found guilty by a jury. Mr. Brock then obtained pro bono legal assistance from Russell Butler, Esq., of the Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center. Through counsel, Mr. Brock filed a motion for accept to relevant parts of the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), explaining that it was necessary to have information in the PSR to effectively allocate at sentencing about proper guidelines calculations. The district judge denied the motion, noting that he had received a written statement from Mr. Brock and concluding: “So given all that is before me, he’s here, I just can’t imagine that he doesn’t have enough to make whatever impact statement he believes I should hear, whether he sees the Presentence Report or he

89 The following facts are taken from Wade Brock’s petition for a writ of mandamus to the Fourth Circuit. Petn. for Writ of Mandamus, In re Wayne Brock, No. 08-1086 (Jan. 28, 2008). The petition for the writ of mandamus cites, in turn, specific points in the record documenting each of its assertion. An appendix to the writ of mandamus contains various documents relevant to the petition, including a transcript of the sentencing hearing, and is available on the Fourth Circuit’s PACER website. As will be discussed, the Fourth Circuit ultimately denied the petition in an unpublished opinion. See In re Brock, 2008 WL 268923 (4th Cir. Jan. 31, 2008).
doesn’t. I’m going to . . . simply deny the motion.”

The trial court then turned to the question of calculating the applicable sentencing guidelines. The court noted that there were competing positions on whether or not to apply the “serious bodily injury” enhancement to the aggravated assault guideline (§ 2A2.2) that the parties had agreed was applicable. Rather than resolved this dispute about whether to enhance the aggravated assault guideline, however, the court *sua sponte* ruled that the crime was not an aggravated assault at all but merely a minor assault. The basis for this determination was said to be the court’s review of Mr. Brock’s medical records. The court relied on a limited part of those records to conclude that Mr. Brock had not been seriously injured. The Court made this ruling before hearing from the Government or the victim.

The Government then asked to be heard on the issue and the Court allowed Government argument on the question. However, the Government was apparently caught by surprise: “We weren’t put on any notice that this issue was going to be raised here today,” the prosecutor stated, and asked about the possibility of bringing in witnesses to prove the seriousness of the injuries. The prosecutor continued: “We’re in a situation today where there really was no advance notice that this was going to be contested. We couldn’t evaluate the additional evidence that might be out there that would help us for this argument.” The prosecutor then noted that the victim, Mr. Brock, might be able to provide information on the severity of what were, after all, *his own* injuries. The Court bluntly stated: “I’m not going to hear from you, Mr. Butler [counsel for Mr. Brock] with regard to issues dealing with guideline calculations.”

Mr. Butler, counsel for Mr. Brock then explained why he should be heard on the issue. Counsel noted that the sentence in the case was clearly going to be calculated with reference to the sentencing guidelines. The key issue in determining the guidelines was “particular facts as to whether it’s extreme injury, whether there was medical treatment, whether there is prolonger injury . . . .” On these subjects, counsel explained, “My client has unique information that . . . is relevant to the court when the Court has to make its independent determination as to what the guidelines are.” Nonetheless, the Court refused to allow counsel to be heard on the Guidelines issues.

The Government then requested a recess over the lunch break and came back after lunch to request a continuance to provide additional evidence in support of the aggravated assault guideline. The Court agreed that notice had not been given to the Government that this would be an issue, but declined to grant a continuance:

> I empathize with the government, given the fact that no notice was provided by me earlier than today with regard to my view as to the guideline calculations. I don’t know that I could have, given the paper that’s been flowing in here up until

| 90 | Appx. to Mandamus Petn. at 43. |
| 91 | *Id.* at 62. |
| 92 | *Id.* at 65. |
| 93 | *Id.* at 65A-66. |
and including this morning, with respect to sentencing. But I empathize more with the defendants, who are here to be sentenced today. And I do not believe that it’s in the interest of justice to put this matter off any further. So I am going to deny the motion for a continuance and proceed forward.94

At this point, Mr. Brock’s counsel made on last effort to protect his clients rights:

COUNSEL FOR MR. BROCK: Your Honor, if I may just briefly. Russell Butler on behalf of Mr. Brock, who’s here.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You Honor, we object, again. We’re not at allocution or the Victim Impact Statement. I don’t think it’s appropriate under the rules or the statute for Mr. Butler [counsel for Mr. Brock] to be heard at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Butler, make it brief.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, under the guidelines provisions, they [the U.S. Sentencing Commission] added a new crime victims’ right provision, which is 6A1.5, which requires this Court to insure that the rights of crime victims are afforded under 18 U.S.C 3771 and any other provision of federal law.95

Counsel for Brock explained that he would be filing a petition for a writ of mandamus, as provided in the CVRA,96 and requested a stay of proceedings to permit that. The Court, however, refused to grant any delay.

The district court then made findings on the guidelines, concluding that for committing a “minor” assault John Bermudez fell within a guideline range of 10 to 16 months and that Gregory Bermudez fell within a guideline range of 4 to 10 months.

The district court then heard allocution from both defense counsel, the defendants, and the government, and finally from Mr. Brock. Mr. Brock explained that he wasn’t a punitive person, but that he wanted a fair decision on sentencing. He explained that he disagreed with the court’s conclusion that this wasn’t a severe assault because “I missed six months of work because of this assault.”97

The district judge then proceeded to sentence the Bermudez’s, imposing a ten-month sentence on John Bermudez and an eight-month sentence on Gregory Bermudez for the minor assaults that the judge found had occurred. Both of the sentences were within the applicable guideline ranges.

At this point, defense counsel rose to raise a concern about subsequent appellate review. Defense counsel explained that, in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions, the district court could make a finding that it would have varied from the Guidelines (even if the appellate court

94 Id. at 75.
95 Id. at 75-76.
97 Id. at 139-41.
later concluded that they were calculated incorrectly) to impose the same sentence. The Government objected, but without explanation or elaboration, the district court made the finding that defense counsel proposed.

Mr. Brock filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Fourth Circuit, arguing that he should have received access to at least the Guidelines calculation of the PSR and that he should have been heard on Guidelines issues. The Fourth Circuit, however, denied the petition in a brief, unpublished decision. It first concluded that Mr. Brock could prevail only if he established that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The Fourth Circuit then concluded that the district judge had not abused his discretion in denying Mr. Brock access to the PSR because Mr. Brock was provided other information about the sentencing guidelines to formulate his victim impact statement.

Turning to the issue of whether Mr. Brock should have been heard on the issue of the sentencing guideline calculation, the Fourth Circuit summarily found no abuse of discretion:

We likewise cannot conclude that the district court’s refusal to consider arguments from Brock concerning Guidelines calculations prevented him from being reasonably heard or treated fairly. The district court considered Brock’s written victim impact statement and also afforded him the opportunity to offer any further statements he wished to make regarding the assault. Moreover, the district court emphasized that the Guidelines represented only one of many factors that it considered and explicitly stated that it would have imposed the same sentences regardless of what the Guidelines ranges had been.

My point in recounting all these facts is not to quarrel with the substantive conclusion of the district court judge about whether the assault on Mr. Brock was an aggravated assault or a minor assault. Nor is my point to argue that the Fourth Circuit should have found an abuse of discretion in how Mr. Brock was treated. Rather, I have recounted the facts of Mr. Brock’s situation in some detail so that no one can accuse me of hyperbole when I say that crime victims in federal court today are denied the right to be heard on the very issue of whether they were seriously injured!

As a matter of public policy, prevent victims from being heard on important victim-related issues – such as whether they were seriously injured – makes no sense whatsoever. When a district judge is trying to determine whether person is injured – and that determination has an important effect on the guideline calculation – the victim should have a right to be heard on that issue. In Mr. Brock’s case, even after the government and the defendant agreed to the fact that this was an aggravated assault on Mr. Brock, the district court sua sponte made a contrary finding – and then refused to give the government an opportunity to present evidence on the point and refuse to the hear from the very person who was assaulted on that issue.

The Sentencing Commission’s current policy statement allows such a travesty of justice to

99 Id. at 3.
result. The Commission should amend its statements to make sure that victims are fully and fairly heard on Guidelines issues.

**F. Giving Crime Victims Rights Will Not Overburden the System.**

It is my understanding that some judges may have suggested to the Commission that giving crime victims rights to be heard on Guidelines issues will burden the system. One response to this concern is simply that Congress has ordered federal courts to take whatever time is necessary to hear victims at the appropriate point of the process. Congress has spoken, and the courts must implement the congressional will.

But a more direct response to this concern is that victims rights will not overwhelm the federal system for the simple reason that only a relatively modest percentage of federal criminal cases present crime victims issues. Of course, for the victims in those particular cases, protecting their rights is extremely important. But from a system-wide perspective, the number of cases presenting crime victims issues is not overwhelming.

Nor would the amount of time to hear from victims on Guidelines issues be substantial. Often times this could be handled through little more than rearranging the order in which victim impact information is taken, allowing the victim to allocate before a final Guideline calculation was made rather than after.

**II. THE SENTENCING COMMISSION SHOULD RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS LEGISLATION TO EXPAND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY ON RESTITUTION.**

The Sentencing Commission should also urge Congress to expand the federal restitution statutes to give judges greater authority to order convicted criminals to pay restitution to their victims. Current federal law authorizes judges to order restitution only in certain narrow categories, such as to compensate for damage to property or medical or funeral expenses. These narrow categories have led to considerable litigation about whether various restitution awards were properly authorized by statute. But in the midst of resolving those disputes, a larger point has been missed: that judges should have broad authority to order defendants to make restitution to restore victims to where they would have been had no crime been committed.

Trial courts should have broader authority to award restitution where the interests of justice so require. After all, the core purpose of restitution is to “ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society.”\textsuperscript{100} Indeed, the congressional mandate for restitution is “to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being to the highest degree possible.”\textsuperscript{101} Unfortunately, however, because judges must fit restitution orders within the existing narrow statutory pigeon holes, this congressional purpose is not being fully achieved.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{United States v. Reano}, 298 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2002).

Before turning to the details of my proposal, it is appropriate to explain why the Sentencing Commission should give its attention to restitution. The current sentencing guidelines say little on the subject, essentially deferring to existing law. But the Sentencing Commission has been charged with “[m]aking recommendations to Congress concerning modification or enactment of statutes relating to sentencing, penal, and correctional matters that the Commission finds to be necessary and advisable to carry out an effective, humane and rational sentencing policy.” In my view, crime victims’ rights at sentencing generally and restitution awards at sentencing in particular are areas where modification of current statutes is necessary for carrying out “an effective, humane and rational sentencing policy.”

It is also important for the Sentencing Commission to speak to help implement provisions of the Crime Victims Rights Act. The Act guarantees crime victims the “right to full and timely restitution as provided by law.” In light of that statutory command, the Sentencing Commission should help insure that victims’ rights to restitution are fully protected.

A. Current Restitution Statutes Permit Judges to Award Restitution Only for Very Specific Items of Loss and for Narrow Connections to a Crime.

The Supreme Court has held that a district court's power to order restitution must be conferred by statute. The main federal restitution statutes – 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A – permit courts to award restitution for several specific kinds of loss, including restitution for loss of property, medical expenses, physical therapy, lost income, funeral expenses, and expenses for participating in all proceedings related to the offense. The statutes contain no general authorization for restitution to crime victims, even where such restitution is indisputably just and proper.

A case I handled as a district court judge will illustrate the problem. In United States v. Gulla, I sentenced a defendant for the crimes of bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. Ms. Gulla had pled guilty to stealing personal information out of the mail from more than 10 victims, and then running up false credit charges of more than $50,000. Government search warrants recovered an expensive Rolex watch and eleven leather jackets purchased by Ms. Gulla. Following the recommendation of the government, I sentenced Ms. Gulla to a term of 57 months in

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102 U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1 (“In the case of an identifiable victim, the court shall . . . enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim’s loss, if such order is authorized . . . ”).
105 Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1990); see also United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is well-established that a federal court may not order restitution except when authorized by statute.”); United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Federal court have no inherent power to order restitution. Such authority must be conferred by Congress.”).

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prison. I also ordered her to pay restitution for the direct losses she caused.

But the victim impact statements in the case revealed that they had suffered more than just financially from these crimes. One victim wrote about the considerable time expended on straightening things out:

I was 71 years of age when two fraudulent checks were written on courtesy checks that were stolen from my mailbox. . . . There is no way to describe the frustration and time involved in contacting the various financial institutions, to determine if there were any other fraudulent charges. We had to stop automatic withdrawals since there were not funds available to cover the checks. We are grateful that we did not have to cover the checks because this would have been a problem. There was considerable time and frustrations involved in getting everything straightened out. I believe that justice should be satisfied and the guilty person be held accountable for breaking the law. Even to this day we worry about someone tampering with our mail. We have investigated a locked mail box and have not made any decision as yet.

Another victim wrote that she spent a great deal of time clean up her credit:

My husband and I are victims of Ms. Gulla's scam. We had a check stolen from our mailbox, and apparently she forged her name to it, and changed the amount... . Since then, it has cost us more than $200 in check fees, fees for setting up a new account, and fees for stopping payment on checks. This does not include my time (about 20 hours, and still counting) to track down outstanding checks, talking to the banks (mine and the one where she tried to cash the check), rearranging automatic deductions, talking to the sheriff and filling out appropriate paperwork.

Now I am not able to put mail out in my mailbox, so I have to make [a] special trip to the post office to mail letters. As of this date, I am still attempting to clear up the affected account.

This has been a great inconvenience for us, and it makes me question my safety in my home, if someone is able to gain access to my personal mail, what is next?

Finally, one last victim wrote about losing time with her children to deal with the crime:

We felt, and continue to feel, very vulnerable now that something has been stolen out of our mailbox, something that allows someone with dishonest, selfish intentions access into our personal information. . . .

[Another way the crime] impacted us was by loss of time. Ms. Gulla's selfish act caused us countless phone calls to the credit card company (and although they've been very helpful, they have not always been very speedy). We have had to spend time filling out forms and sending in paperwork to resolve this situation, which was no fault of our own. It has been extremely frustrating to do all this,
especially since we are self-employed and have 3 small children. Any time we have spend[ed] on Ms. Gulla's theft is time we are not running our own livelihoods or enjoying our precious children. That has been the biggest loss of all.

In light of these victim statements, it seemed to me that I should have been able to order restitution beyond the direct financial losses of the phony charges run up by the defendant. In particular, I thought it would be fair to order restitution for the lost time the victims suffered in responding to the defendant's crime. Unfortunately, as the government explained at the hearing, current law does not allow this. Restitution is not permitted for consequential losses or other losses too remote from the offense of conviction.

The case law around the country demonstrates that this particular problem is not unique. In many circumstances, courts of appeals have overturned restitution awards that district judges thought were appropriate, not because of any unfairness in the award but simply because the current restitution statutes failed to authorize them:

- In *United States v. Reed*, the trial court ordered restitution to victims whose cars were damaged when the defendant, an armed felon, fled from police. The Ninth Circuit reversed the restitution award because the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and the victims were not victimized by that particular offense.

- In *United States v. Romines*, a defendant on supervised release absconded from his residence and employment, driving away on his employer's motorcycle and later cashing an $8,000 check from his employer's bank account. He was caught, and the district court ordered restitution of $8,000 to the employer as part of the sentence for the supervised release violation. The Eleventh Circuit reversed because the government, rather than the employer, was the victim of the defendant's violation: “The only victim of that crime was the government, whose confidence in [the defendant's] rehabilitation seems to have been misplaced.” Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the restitution order because "of the absence of textual authority to grant restitution."
In United States v. Cutter,\textsuperscript{113} the defendant sold a house to his niece, then filed a fraudulent bankruptcy petition. The defendant was convicted of false statements in the petition. At sentencing, the district court ordered the defendant to pay his niece $21,000 in restitution because of her losses in a fraudulent conveyance action instituted by the bankruptcy trustee. The First Circuit overturned the order because the niece was not a direct victim of the defendant's criminal action of filing a fraudulent petition before the bankruptcy court.\textsuperscript{114}

In United States v. Havens,\textsuperscript{115} the defendant pleaded guilty to various offenses relating to identity theft. The victim had earlier pursued a civil action against the defendant, receiving $30,000 in damages, and the district court ordered restitution in that amount. The Seventh Circuit reversed this restitution order, holding that it was unclear which damages and costs qualified as appropriate losses under the Mandatory Victims Rights Act.\textsuperscript{116}

In United States v. Shepard,\textsuperscript{117} a hospital social worker drained a patient's bank account through fraud. The hospital paid the patient $165,000 to cover the loss. The social worker was later convicted of mail fraud and the district court ordered restitution of the $165,000 to the hospital. But the Seventh Circuit held that the patient was the only direct victim of fraud in the case and reversed the restitution order to the hospital.\textsuperscript{118}

In United States v. Rodrigues,\textsuperscript{119} a defendant, an officer of a savings and loan, was convicted of numerous charges stemming from phony real estate transactions. The district court found that Mr. Rodrigues usurped a S&L's corporate opportunities by substituting himself for the S&L in four real estate deals and ordered him to pay $1.5 million in restitution – his profits in those deals. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that since the defendant's profits arose from the defendant taking his victim's corporate opportunities, rather than from direct losses by the S&L, restitution was improper. “Although the corporate opportunity doctrine allows recovery for a variety of interests, including mere expectancies, restitution under the VWPA is confined to direct losses.”\textsuperscript{120}

In United States v. Stoddard,\textsuperscript{121} the trial court ordered substantial restitution by the

\textsuperscript{113} 313 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 8-9.
\textsuperscript{115} 424 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2005).
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 538-39.
\textsuperscript{117} 269 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2001).
\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 886-87.
\textsuperscript{119} 229 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2000).
\textsuperscript{120} Id. at 846.
\textsuperscript{121} 150 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 1998).
defendant, an official of a savings bank. The defendant misappropriated $30,000 from an escrow account and used the money to fund two real estate purchases. He subsequently netted $116,223 in profits from the real estate transactions. Although the trial court ordered restitution to the savings bank based on the defendant's profits, the Ninth Circuit set the order aside because that the restitution statute only allowed restitution for direct losses.122

- In *Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis*,123 the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud, forgery, and related counts in connection with an attempt to defraud an estate of more than a million dollars in real and personal property. The trial judge ordered restitution that included the attorney's fees spent by the estate to recover its assets, but the Third Circuit reversed: "Although such fees might plausibly be considered part of the estate's losses, expenses generated in order to recover (or protect) property are not part of the value of the property lost (or in jeopardy), and are, therefore, too far removed from the underlying criminal conduct to form the basis of a restitution order."124

- In *United States v. Arvanitis*,125 the trial court awarded attorney's fees in favor of a victim who had spent considerable money investigating the defendant's fraud. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the restitution statute for property offenses "limits recovery to property which is the subject of the offense, thereby making restitution for consequential damages, such as attorney's fees, unavailable."126

- In *United States v. Elias*,127 the defendant forced his employees to clean out a 25,000 gallon tank filled with cyanide sludge, without any treatment facility or disposal area. He was convicted of violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act by disposing of hazardous wastes and placing employees in danger of bodily harm. The district court ordered the defendant to pay $6.3 million in restitution. The Ninth Circuit overturned the restitution order because the restitution statute only authorizes imposition of restitution for violations of Title 18 and certain other crimes, not environmental crimes.128

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122 *Id.* at 1147.
123 43 F.3d 41 (3rd Cir. 1994).
124 *Id.* at 47.
125 902 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1990).
126 *Id.* at 496.
127 269 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2001).
128 *Id.* at 1021-22; see also *United States v. Hoover*, 175 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court lacked legal authority to order restitution to the IRS for the defendant's tax liability); *United States v. Minneman*, 143 F.3d 274, 284 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the VWPA does not authorize restitution for Title 26 tax offenses).
• In *United States v. Sablan*, a defendant was convicted of computer fraud, and the district court ordered restitution including consequential damages of $5,350 incurred by the victim. The Ninth Circuit reversed the part of the restitution order based on consequential damages, such as expenses arising from meeting with law enforcement officers investigating the crime, because such expenses were not strictly necessary to repair damage caused by defendant's criminal conduct.

• In *United States v. Blake*, the defendant was convicted of using stolen credit cards and the district court ordered restitution to victims for losses that resulted from their stolen credit cards. Even though there was a clear factual connection between Mr. Blake's conduct and the offense of his conviction, the Fourth Circuit reversed a restitution order reluctantly. "Although the result we are compelled to reach represents poor sentencing policy, the statute as interpreted requires the holding that the persons from whom Blake stole the credit cards do not qualify as victims of his offense of conviction, and as such he cannot be ordered to pay restitution to them . . . the factual connection between his conduct and the offense of conviction is legally irrelevant for the purpose of restitution."

• In *United States v. Hays*, the defendant was convicted of possession of stolen mail, specifically three credit cards. The trial court ordered him to pay restitution to the credit card companies of $3,255 for charges to those stolen credit cards. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, because the charges were not caused by the specific conduct that was the basis of the offense of conviction (mail fraud).

The point here is not that any of these restitution awards were correctly or incorrectly made by the trial judges under the current statutory framework. Instead, the point is that the judges in these cases *should* have had undisputed statutory authority to make these awards. After all, at sentencing a trial judge has full and complete information about the nature of the offense, the impact of the crime on the victim, and the defendant's personal and financial circumstances.

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129 92 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1996).
130 81 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 1996).
131 *Id.*
132 32 F.3d 171, 173-74 (11th Cir. 1995).
133 *Cf. United States v. Elson*, 577 F.3d 713, 726 (6th Cir. 2009) (suggesting ways in which consequential damages can sometimes be awarded as restitution); *United States v. Battista*, 575 F.3d 226, 233 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (questioning circuit decisions declining to award attorney’s fees because they are mere consequential damages); *United States v. Amato*, 540 F.3d 153, 159-61 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
134 See FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 32(d)(1)(B), (2)(A)(i)-(iii) (“The presentence report must . . . calculate the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category; . . . the defendant’s history and characteristics, including; any prior criminal record; the defendant’s financial condition; any circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in correctional treatment . . .’’); see also Rule 32(c)(B) (“If the law requires restitution, the probation
When a judge has reviewed all of that information and determined that restitution is appropriate, it is not clear why that order should be subject to further litigation about whether it fits into some narrow statutory category. After all, the core purpose of restitution is to “ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society.” Indeed, the congressional mandate for restitution is “to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being to the highest degree possible.” Unfortunately, however, because judges must fit restitution orders within narrow pigeon holes, this congressional purpose may not be fully achieved.

B. **The Restitution Statutes Should Be Broadened to Give Judges Power to Make Such Restitution Awards as are Just and Proper in Light of all the Circumstances.**

The Sentencing Commission should recommend that the main federal restitution statute – 18 U.S.C. § 3663A – should be amended to give judges broad discretionary authority to enter restitution awards that are just and proper in light of all the circumstances. Congress should amend § 3663A to read as follows:

§ 3663A. Mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes
(a) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "victim" means a person directly and proximately harmed or who suffered loss or injury as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered, or who suffered harm, injury, or loss that would not have happened but for the defendant's crime, including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim's estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the victim's rights under this section, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.
(3) The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.

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135 United States v. Reano, 298 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2002).
(b) The order of restitution shall require that such defendant--

(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense--

(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or
(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impracticable, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to--

(i) the greater of--

(I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or
(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less

(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned;

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim--

(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and
(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense;

(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury that results in the death of the victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services and, in the court's discretion, any appropriate sum to reflect income lost to the victim’s surviving family members or estate as a result of the death; and

(4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense;

(5) in any case, to pay to the victim any amount or transfer to the victim any property that the court in its discretion finds is just and proper to help restore the victim to the position the victim would have been in had the defendant not committed the crime or to compensate the victim for any form of injury, harm, or loss, including emotional distress or other consequential injury, harm, or loss, that the victim has suffered as a result of the defendant's crime or that would not have happened but for the defendant's crime.

(c) (1) This section shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of, or plea agreements relating to charges for, any offense--

(A) that is--

(i) a crime of violence, as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16];
(ii) an offense against property under this title, or under section 416(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 856(a)), including any offense committed by fraud or deceit; or
(iii) an offense described in [18 U.S.C. § 1365] (relating to tampering with consumer products); an offense against the United States and
(B) in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss or other harm of any type, including any consequential loss.

(2) In the case of a plea agreement that does not result in a conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this section shall apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense listed under such paragraph gave rise to the plea agreement.

(3) This section shall not apply in the case of an offense described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) if the court finds, from facts on the record, that--

(A) the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable; or
(B) determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.

(d) An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with [18 U.S.C. § 3664].

These modifications make several important changes. First, in section (c)(1)(A), restitution would be authorized for any federal offense. It is nonsensical to limit restitution to offenses found in certain parts of Title 18. This leads to the results described above in cases such as United States v. Elias, where the Ninth Circuit was forced to overturn a restitution award against a defendant who committed criminal violations of environmental laws only because Congress had not thought to authorize it in the restitution statutes.

Second and most important, the restitution statute would be changed to broadly authorize trial judges, in their discretion, to award restitution where it was fair. Restitution would be authorized any time it was “just and proper to help restore the victim to the position the victim would have been in had the defendant not committed the crime or to compensate the victim for any form of injury, harm, or loss, including emotional distress or other consequential injury, harm, or loss, that the victim has suffered as a result of the defendant's crime or that would not have happened but for the defendant's crime.” This sweeping authorization would avoid pointless litigation about whether a restitution award happened to fit into one statutory cubby hole or another. Instead, the focus would be on whether restitution was “just and proper.” Obviously, a defendant would be free to appeal such awards (just as restitution awards can be appealed now). But the focus on appeal would be on the appropriateness of the award, not parsing technical statutory authorizations.

It is important to emphasize that this authorization would give discretion to trial judges to enter broad restitution awards. Because a sentencing judge has considerable information – both about the defendant and the victim – it is appropriate to vest discretion over this particular kind of award. Other, more indisputable areas of restitution (such as for loss of property or medical or funeral expenses) would remain mandatory, as they are under current law.

Third, the statute would be changed to give judges discretion in homicide cases to award restitution to surviving family members for the income that the murder victim would have earned.
This is an issue that is currently before the appellate courts, with the question being whether the “lost income” provision in the statute applies only to bodily injury cases or to homicide cases as well.137 Regardless of how that litigation about the current statutory regime ultimately plays out, it is hard to see any argument against permitting judges to order this kind of restitution. Prominent members of Congress have spoken in favor of lost income restitution in homicide cases.138 The proposed changes would reflect that position.

Fourth, the statute would be changed to recognize “but for” causation as a basis for awarding restitution. Under current law, the fact a loss would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s crime is an insufficient basis for a restitution award. As the Third Circuit explained, legal “fees might plausibly be considered part of [the victim’s] losses, [but] expenses generated in order to recover (or protect) property are not part of the value of the property lost (or in jeopardy)” even if those expenses would not have resulted “but for” the criminal conduct.139 Restitution for “but for” losses, however, seems entirely fair and is indisputably what Congress wants. Congress wants restitution “to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being to the highest degree possible.”140 Permitting judges to require defendants to make restitution for losses that would not have occurred but for the defendant’s crimes would go a long way towards helping to restore victims to their prior state of well-being.

137 Compare United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d. 1285 (D. Utah 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 413 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that lost income calculation and restitution proper under the MVRA) and United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that prosecution produced sufficient evidence that $100,000 award to widow of murder victim for lost income was relatively conservative and that the award had adequate support) and United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d without discussion of restitution issues sub nom., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (ordering restitution of direct and indirect victims of arson in which one firefighter was killed and one seriously injured, and requiring payment for the lost earnings of the deceased paid to his widow) with United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 795-96 (10th Cir.1999) (vacating a district court’s restitution order based on insufficient evidence after the district court found that a murder victim paid Child and Family Services for the upbringing of his children) and United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 945 (1993) (reversing a district judge’s restitution order for the victims' lost income and funeral expenses in a well-publicized murder and kidnaping because the district court did not make any factual findings concerning the amount of the victims’ losses) and United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that future income calculations and restitution “unduly complicates the sentencing process and hence is not authorized by the [VWPA].”).

138 See 150 CONG. REC. S10910 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement by Sen. Kyl) (“We specifically intend to endorse the expansive definition of restitution given . . . in U.S. v. Bedonie and U.S. v. Serawop in May 2004 [awarding lost income in two homicide cases]”).

139 Davis, 43 F.3d at 46-47.

Fifth, the proposed changes would allow a judge to award restitution for consequential damages. As a matter of policy, there is no justification for the results in cases like *Government of the Virgin Islands v. Davis*, where a victim suffers a consequential loss from a crime (such as attorney's fees) and yet a sentencing judge is not empowered to award restitution. When a victim suffers a loss as a consequence of a defendant's crime, the sentencing judge should be able to order a defendant to pay for it.

One form of consequential damage is emotional distress. Crime victims have often had to resort to a separate civil suit to obtain such damages. From a policy perspective, this makes little sense. When a criminal is convicted, his guilt has been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and harm to a victim – such as emotional distress – is an obvious and foreseeable consequence. It is therefore entirely appropriate to allow the sentencing judge to award restitution for emotional distress as part of the criminal proceeding when the judge believes it is appropriate to do so. Nothing in the proposal would alter existing law provided that, if a victim chooses to file a separate civil suit, any resulting civil judgment would be reduced by the amount of the restitution award.

One last note: In many cases, defendants will lack the financial resources to pay sizable restitution awards. But that is not a good reason for depriving trial judges of authority to order such awards in appropriate cases. And in all cases, after restitution is awarded, the sentencing judge will set an appropriate payment schedule based on a defendant's ability to pay.\textsuperscript{141}

C. Expanding Judicial Authority to Award Restitution Does Not Violate a Defendant's Constitutional Rights.

Expanding restitution in the fashion described here will not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. It is important to understand that the changes proposed here would operate within the framework of a larger statutory scheme. Defendants would, of course, still be entitled to notice and hearing about any proposed restitution.\textsuperscript{142} Defendants would also be able to appeal any inappropriate award.

The constitutional questions that have been raised about expanding restitution have typically centered around two points: first, whether the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Hughey* requires that losses be directly tied to an offense of conviction; and, second, whether expanded restitution awarded by judges would violate a defendant's right to a jury trial under either the Sixth or Seventh Amendments. Neither of these concerns is well-founded.


In 1990, the Supreme Court in *Hughey v. United States* considered a narrow statutory issue. The Court reviewed an award of restitution made by the federal trial court under VWPA which

\textsuperscript{141} 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)-(3).
\textsuperscript{142} 18 U.S.C. § 3664(b), (d)(3), (e).
called for restitution for charged and convicted offenses. After pleading guilty to one count of a six count indictment, the trial court ordered Mr. Hughey to pay restitution in the amount of $90,431. This figure resulted from Mr. Hughey's alleged theft and unauthorized use of 21 credit cards, although Mr. Hughey pleaded guilty to the use of only one specific credit card. Looking at the language of the restitution statute itself, the Court held that "restitution as authorized by the statute is intended to compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense." Although faced with policy questions "surrounding VWPA's offense-of-conviction limitation on restitution orders," the Court declined to resolve such issues. Rather, the Court relied on the "statutory language regarding the scope of a court's authority to order restitution," finding the language unambiguous. And even if such language had been ambiguous, the Court's "longstanding principles of lenity, which demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant . . . preclude[d its] resolution of the ambiguity" in favor of criminal restitution.

It is clear this case simply turned on what the restitution statute in question authorized – restitution only for the offense of conviction – and therefore the Court clearly held that the sentencing judge was without authority to do anything more. Of course, a broader statute of the type proposed above would not suffer from this defect. Because it is a decision of statutory interpretation, Hughey cannot be read as shedding light on constitutional issues.

2. A Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Jury Trial on Restitution, Even if Broad Forms of Restitution are Allowed.

Turning to constitutional issues, the main constitutional challenge that has been raised to broad restitution statutes is that they would trigger a need for a jury trial, under either the Sixth Amendment or the Seventh Amendment. These challenges are unfounded.

a. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Give a Defendant a Right to Jury Trial on Restitution Issues.

Even in the wake of Blakely and Booker's expansion of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, it is clear that restitution of the type proposed here would not trigger the need for a jury trial.

The Circuits that have looked at the question have uniformly held that judges can undertake the fact-finding necessary to support restitution orders under Blakely and Booker.

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144 Id. at 414.
145 Id. at 416.
146 Id. at 419.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("We
As the Sixth Circuit recently explained, “Nor does [] Booker’s analysis of the Sixth Amendment affect restitution, because a restitution order for the amount of loss cannot be said to ‘exceed the statutory maximum’ provided under the penalty statutes.” Of course, the proposed changes described above expand the existing statutory maximum, so that a defendant who commits a federal crime would be on notice that he was subject to a restitution order for any amount that was “just and proper” to restore a victim. Judicial fact-finding under that broad umbrella would not increase the penalty to which a defendant is exposed, the trigger for a Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

The conclusion that a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on restitution is supported by another consideration: historically, dating to the earliest days of this country, judges have made restitution decisions. At common law, for example, restitution was a statutory remedy “to be awarded by the justices on a conviction of robbery or larceny.” This common law rule was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1842 in United States v. Murphy:

The statute of 21 Hen. VIII., c. 2, gave full restitution of the property taken, after the conviction of an offender, of robbery. The writ of restitution was to be granted by the justices of the assize . . . .

And forcible entry and detainer is one crime in which it was common to encounter provision of a restitutionary remedy at common law. Upon conviction by a jury of forcible entry and detainer, for example, Blackstone’s Commentaries explains that “besides the fine on the offender, the justices shall make restitution by the sheriff of the possession . . . .” Many states early on criminalized forcible entry upon and detainer of land, and often these statutes authorized the judge

agree with our sister Circuits, who have uniformly held that judicial fact-finding supporting restitution orders does not violate the Sixth Amendment."; United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 462 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We have accordingly held that Apprendi v. United States . . . does not affect restitution . . . and that conclusion is equally true for Booker.”); United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Several circuits have affirmatively rejected the notion that . . . Booker affect the manner in which findings of restitution can be made. . . These cases are persuasive.”); United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In contrast to its application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court's orders of restitution and costs are unaffected by the changes worked by Booker.”); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006).

151 The following material is taken from United States v. Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1323-26 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 428 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2005).
152 16 C.J.S. Criminal Law §3255 (1918) (citing 21 Hen. VIII c 11; 7 & 8 Geo. IV c 29 § 57) (emphasis added).
153 41 U.S. 203, 206 (1842).
to order restitution and the payment of damages upon conviction.155

It is quite clear that restitution ordered by judges was routinely available at common law and in the early American courts as a remedy for the crimes of larceny and forcible entry and detainer. This also supports the conclusion that restitution has historically been understood as a "civil" and not a "punitive" remedy. Judge-ordered restitution as part of the sentence for these crimes did not appear to be controversial around the time of the country's founding. And even if most larceny sentences did not require judges to find additional facts to calculate restitution, the evidence does not establish that this was universally so and it seems probable that judges would sometimes have been required to set a specific valuation for restitutionary purposes when an indictment only specified (or the jury only found) value as "less than 200 shillings" for purposes of establishing the degree of the crime. To the extent that this kind of additional judicial fact-finding likely occurred in some larceny cases, it supports the conclusion that the Framers would have understood the "criminal prosecution" to which the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial extended as not implicating restitution.

For all these reasons, a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on restitution awards.

b. The Seventh Amendment Does Not Give Defendant's a Right to Jury Trial on Restitution Issues.

It might be argued that expanding restitution to cover such things a consequential damages (including emotional distress damages) would trigger a defendant's right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment, of course, protects the constitutional right of all persons – not just criminal defendants – to a jury trial in a civil case. The amendment provides, "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."156 It would be odd, to say the least, to discover that while the amendment directly addressing the procedural rights of criminal defendants – the Sixth Amendment – does not give defendants a right to a jury trial on restitution, somehow the Seventh Amendment jury trial provision does. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the general rule of constitutional construction that the specific must take precedence over the general. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that if "a constitutional claim is covered by a specific provision . . ., the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that

155 See Allen v. Ormsby, 1 Tyl. 345 (Vt. 1802) (citing sec. 5 of the forcible entry and detainer act of February 27, 1797); Crane v. Dodd, 2 N.J.L. 340 (N.J. 1808) (citing sec. 13 of the state's forcible entry and detainer act providing for an award of "treble costs"); People ex rel. Corless v. Anthony, 4 Johns. 198 (N.Y. Supp. 1809) (citing St. 11th Sess. c. 6, forcible entry and detainer statute authorizing an award of restitution and damages to the aggrieved party). But see Commonwealth v. Stoever, 1 Serg. & Rawle 480 (Pa. 1815) (no damages allowed under state's forcible entry and detainer statute).

156 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process." As the Seventh Amendment applies only to civil suits, and does not specifically discuss criminal prosecutions, criminal procedures, or restitution orders, the specific again must take precedence over the general.  

As the Seventh Amendment applies only to civil suits, and does not specifically discuss criminal prosecutions, criminal procedures, or restitution orders, the specific again must take precedence over the general.158

A few courts, however, have noted that there is a possible issue in this area. In *United States v. Scott*,159 a panel of the Seventh Circuit stated that "to blur the line" between criminal restitution and common law damages "would create a potential issue under the Seventh Amendment because the amount of criminal restitution is determined by the judge, whereas a suit for damages is a suit at law within the amendment's meaning." Scott dealt with a restitution order for audit expenses incurred by the employers which Mr. Scott defrauded. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the MVRA required restitution in the amount equal to the loss of the value of property that resulted from the criminal conduct. Although that court discussed whether common law damages applied to such a restitution order, it ultimately affirmed the award of restitution because "damage-to-property" had occurred.160 At the end of the day, Scott does not actually say much about the Seventh Amendment as a potential barrier to judicially-determined restitution orders, but rather touches on the issue to point out the distinction between restitution and common law damages.

It is clear from the cases cited in *Scott*, however, that the overwhelming view in the Circuit Courts is that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to a criminal restitution hearing. While the Supreme Court itself has yet to reach the question, it has recognized that every "Federal Court of Appeals that has considered the question [of whether judicially-ordered restitution violates the Seventh Amendment] has concluded that criminal defendants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to the protections of the Seventh Amendment."162 The Circuits that have decided the issue often take the position that a restitution order is "penal" rather than "compensatory" and therefore conclude the Seventh Amendment simply does not apply.163

159. 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2005).
160. Id.
161. Id.
My own view is that it is better to avoid a debate about whether to label restitution as penal or compensatory. Indeed, I believe a strong case can be made that restitution is, at least for some purposes, best described as “compensatory.” The notion of compensating victims for losses attributable to the defendant's crime is logically and intuitively non-punitive. Restitution is, instead, a device ultimately aimed at restoring the victim back into the position he occupied prior to his victimization. And regardless of the context, as the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Newman, while “[t]he criminal law may impose punishments on behalf of all of society, . . . equitable payments of restitution in this context inure only to the specific victims of a defendant's criminal conduct and do not possess a similarly punitive character.” After all, even the Supreme Court has noted that the ordinary meaning of restitution is to “restor[e] someone to a position he occupied before a particular event.”

Regardless of whether restitution is in some sense penal or compensatory, however, there is a straightforward way to reach the conclusion that restitution is not covered by the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee. As explained by the Second Circuit in Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, because “adjudication of the restitution is an adjunct of sentencing and is therefore part of a criminal proceeding, the Seventh Amendment providing for the preservation of the right of a trial by jury in civil suits does not apply.” The Circuit noted that “judicially ordered restitution in criminal cases has a long history, rooted in the common law at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.” Finally, the Second Circuit relies on “the purpose and process of adjudicating the amount of restitution in a criminal proceeding . . . as part of a defendant's sentence [to serve] the traditional penal functions of punishment, including

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164 See Visinaiz, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1320-23 (developing the argument and citing supporting authority), aff'd, 428 F.3d 1300. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1279 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e believe the district court erred in viewing restitution as a punitive act, thus leading it into the albeit logical but nonetheless erroneous conclusion it could not apply the MVRA.”); United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1993) (“the VWPA's purpose is not to punish defendants or to provide a windfall for crime victims but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses”).
165 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998).
167 211 F.3d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 2000).
168 Id.
169 Id.
rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{170}

In a widely-quoted opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit has reached much the same conclusion. In \textit{United States v. Fountain},\textsuperscript{171} the Circuit considered the constitutionality of a federal restitution statute under the Seventh Amendment. The Circuit concluded that “criminal restitution is not some newfangled effort to get around the Seventh Amendment, but a traditional criminal remedy; \textit{its precise contours can change through time without violating the Seventh Amendment}.”\textsuperscript{172} Looking at the historical analogy of the restitution statute, the Circuit commented that restitution of stolen goods was an established criminal remedy predating the Seventh Amendment.\textsuperscript{173} And since restitution is “frequently an equitable remedy, meaning of course, that there is no right of jury trial,” then a district judge’s restitution order does not violate the Seventh Amendment.\textsuperscript{174}

Judge Posner’s conclusion makes sense as a matter of the historical record. Indeed, from certain historical examples, consequential damages, including treble damages were often awarded as restitution. This common law practice of restitution was retained in several state statutes in the early years of the Republic.\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Ross v. Bruce},\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Commonwealth v. Andrews},\textsuperscript{177} and \textit{Crane v. Dodd}\textsuperscript{178} cite state statutes which provided for treble damages to the victim of theft after the defendant had been convicted. It is clear that as a historical matter, consequential damages, through an award of treble damages upon conviction of the defendant, were awarded by some state courts as a matter of course. Thus restitution, including certain compensatory damages awards, were clearly an established criminal remedy in earlier times.

Judge Posner’s conclusion also makes sense as a matter of practicalities. Today, a

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{171} 768 F.2d 790, 800-02 (7th Cir. 1985).
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Id.} at 801 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id.} Interestingly, Judge Posner wrote a later opinion in which, in the context of an ex post facto challenge to a restitution order, he held that restitution was a civil remedy and therefore not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. \textit{United States v. Bach}, 768 F.3d 790, 801 (7th Cir. 1985). \textit{Bach} did not discuss the earlier \textit{Fountain} opinion.
\item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{See} Act of September 15, 1786 (12 St.L. 282-283 Ch. 1241 (Penn.); \textit{Ross v. Bruce}, 1 Day 100 (Conn. 1803) (citing state statute 413 authorizing “treble damages” for theft); \textit{Commonwealth v. Andrews}, 2 Mass. 14, 24, 1806 WL 735, 7 (Mass. 1806) (citing larceny act of March 15, 1785, authorizing award of treble the value of goods stolen to the owner upon conviction).
\item \textsuperscript{176} 1 Day 100 (Conn. 1803) (citing state statute 413 authorizing “treble damages” for theft).
\item \textsuperscript{177} 2 Mass. 14, 24, 1806 WL 735, 7 (Mass. 1806) citing larceny act of March 15, 1785, authorizing award of treble the value of goods stolen to the owner upon conviction).
\item \textsuperscript{178} 2 N.J.L. 340 (N.J. 1808) (citing sec. 13 of the state’s forcible entry and detainer act providing for an award of “treble costs”).
\end{itemize}}
defendant who is found guilty by a jury of, for example, bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 faces a penalty of up to 30 years in prison, a fine of up to $1,000,000, and restitution for property that the bank lost even if it is in the millions of dollars. It would odd in the extreme to say that, on her own, a judge could order a defendant to be sent off prison for many years and to pay restitution for millions of dollars in losses, but nevertheless had to hold a jury trial before awarding such things as attorney's fees or other consequential damages. The jury trial protections of the Constitution should not be trivialized by being read in such a haphazard fashion.

D. The Judicial Conference of the United States Has Made This Recommendation to Congress.

In concluding this section, it is worth noting that the Judicial Conference of the United States has made an identical recommendation to Congress. In 2006, the Conference adopted the following recommendation:

Currently, there is no authorization under federal law for general restitution to crime victims. A judge may order restitution only if the loss suffered by the victim falls within certain categories specified by statute. On recommendation of the [Criminal Law] Committee, the Judicial Conference agreed to support legislation that would authorize general restitution in any criminal case at the discretion of the judge when the circumstances warrant it.179

The Sentencing Commission should add its voice to that of the Judicial Conference by making this recommendation as well.

III. The Sentencing Commission Should Urge Congress to Give Judges Greater Authority to Prevent Criminals from Profiting from Their Crimes.

The Sentencing Commission should encourage Congress to pass legislation that would give judges sufficient power to insure that criminals do not profit from their crimes. The current federal law on the subject is apparently unconstitutional, yet neither the Justice Department nor the Congress has taken steps to correct the problem. It would be an embarrassment to the federal system of justice if criminals were able to be profit from their crimes merely because no one had taken the time to put in place an effective prohibition. Corrective legislation could be easily drafted, by giving judges discretionary power to prevent profiteering, and the Sentencing Commission should urge Congress to do so.

A. The Current Federal Law Forbidding Profiteering from Crimes is Unconstitutional.

179 Report of the Proceeding of the Judicial Conference of the United States 18 (Sept. 19, 2006). In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I served as Chair of the Criminal Law Committee at the time this recommendation was made.
By way of background, the federal criminal code, like the codes of various states, contains a provision concerning forfeiture of profits of crime. This provision, found in 18 U.S.C. § 3681, allows federal prosecutors to seek a special order of forfeiture whenever a violent federal offender will receive proceeds related to the crime. Congress adopted this statute in 1984, and modeled it after a New York statute popularly known as the “Son of Sam” law. In 1977, New York passed its law in response to the fact that mass murderer David Berkowitz received a $250,000 book deal for recounting his terrible crimes.

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court found that the New York Son of Sam law violated the First Amendment. In *Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.*, the Court explained that the New York law “singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed only at works with a specified content.” The New York statute that was struck down covered reenactments or depictions of a crime by way of “a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio, or television presentation, [or] live entertainment of any kind.”

The federal statute is widely regarded as almost certainly unconstitutional, as it contains language that is virtually identical to the problematic language in the old New York statute. In particular, the federal statute targets for forfeiture depictions of a crime in “a movie, book, newspaper, magazine, radio or television production, or live entertainment of any kind.” Thus, it can easily be argued by a criminal that the statute contains the same flaw – the targeting of protected First Amendment activity – that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in the New York statute. Indeed, the Supreme Court in *Simon & Schuster* cited the federal statute as similar to that of New York’s. Moreover, the current guidance from the Justice Department to its line prosecutors is that this law cannot be used because of constitutional problems.

**B. Anti-Criminal-Profitereing Legislation Could Give Judges Expanded Power to Prevent Profitereing as a Condition of Supervised Release.**

Unfortunately, neither the Department of Justice nor Congress have taken steps to revise the defective federal anti-profitereing statute in the wake of *Simon & Schuster*. Fortunately, there appears to be a relatively straightforward and constitutional solution available to Congress. As

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183 Id. at 116.
186 See 502 U.S. at 115.
the Massachusetts Supreme Court has recognized in analyzing *Simon & Schuster*, nothing in the First Amendment forbids a judge from ordering in an appropriate case, as a condition of a sentence (including supervised release), that the defendant not profit from his crime. As *Commonwealth v. Powers*\(^{188}\) explains, such conditions can be legitimate exercises of court power to insure rehabilitation of offenders and to prevent an affront to crime victims. These conditions do not tread on First Amendment rights, because they do not forbid a criminal from discussing or writing about a crime. Instead, they simply forbid any form of "profiteering."

I recommend that the Sentencing Commission urge Congress to give judges the power to order, in an appropriate case, that a term of supervised release be extended beyond what would otherwise be allowed for the sole purpose of insuring that a criminal not profit from his crime. For example, in a notorious case, upon appropriate findings, a judge might be empowered to impose a term of supervised release of life with the single extended condition that a criminal not profit from his crime. Legislation that the Sentencing Commission could urge Congress to pass might look like this:

\[18\text{ U.S.C. § 3583}\]

\[
\text{(b) Authorized terms of supervised release.--Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are--}
\]

\[
(1) \text{for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years;}
\]

\[
(2) \text{for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and}
\]

\[
(3) \text{for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty offense), not more than one year.}
\]

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a court may impose a term of supervised release for any term of years or life that includes as a provision the requirement that a defendant not profit from his or her crime. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at any time the court may extend an existing term of supervised release to any term of years or life upon a finding that a defendant may profit from his or her crime.

This approach would recognize that sometimes after sentencing facts come to light suggesting that a defendant might be about to profit from his crime. Accordingly, this approach would allow extension of an existing term of supervised release (thereby assuring that the court has jurisdiction over a defendant) upon a finding that the defendant might profit.

**C. Broader Legislation Could Forfeit any Profits from Profiteering.**

While extending the terms of supervised release is a good way to prevent profiting that is about to occur, it does not address the problem of a criminal who has already profited. For example, a sentenced criminal might receive funds from a book deal before a court or victim becomes aware of this fact. Alternatively, a defendant might traffic in some tangible article that has gained notoriety – and value – because of its role in a crime.

\(^{188}\) 650 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1995).
To deal with such situations, it would be appropriate to amend the federal anti-profiteering statute – 18 U.S.C. § 3681 – so that it can address such situations by forfeiting any profits a defendant obtains from a crime. The problem with the statute now, as with the old New York law, is that it targets First Amendment speech – and only First Amendment speech – for forfeiture. The statute could be redrafted to cover all forms of profiteering from a crime, not just those involving speech. A new statute could also be put in place to forbid defendants from profiting by selling tangible articles that have gained notoriety (and thus value) because of their association with the crime.

“Son of Sam” laws generally target the profits from book or movie deals, thereby trying to prevent the specter of a criminal profiting at the expense of his victim. Son of Sam laws typically forfeit any profits a criminal obtains from his crime and makes them available to crime victims. As noted earlier, in 1991 the Supreme Court found that the New York Son of Sam law, which required any entity contracting with an accused or convicted person to turn over income relating to that contract, to be an unconstitutional restriction on speech. Simon & Schuster, Inc., held that the New York statute was a content-based restriction on speech because it imposed a financial disincentive only on one particular kind speech. The Court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored enough to constitutionally achieve the compelling state interest of compensating crime victims.

After Simon & Schuster, Inc., a number of states adopted what might be called “second generation Son of Sam laws. These statutes attempted to comply with Simon & Schuster, Inc. by broadening their focus. Surprisingly, however, many of these statutes continued to target expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, leading to a rocky reception in appellate courts.

The fate of Nevada’s anti-profiteering statute can serve to illustrate the problem of laws focusing on speech. In 1993, the Nevada legislature changed its Son of Sam law – Nevada Revised Statute § 217.007 – to address constitutional issues raised in Simon & Schuster, Inc. The revised Nevada statute created a cause of action for a victim’s right to sue within five years of the time when a convicted person “becomes legally entitled to receive proceeds for any contribution to any material that is based upon or substantially related to the felony which was perpetrated against the victim.” The Nevada Legislature defined “material” as “a book, magazine or newspaper article, movie, film, videotape, sound recording, interview or appearance on a television or radio

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station and live presentations of any kind. In 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated the statute in *Seres v. Lerner*. Given that the statute clearly targeted expressive activity and was content-based, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it chilled First Amendment speech. Indeed, the statute targeted solely expressive activity, rather than “all fruits of the crime” or anything “related to the crime” to provide a victim’s right of action to the proceeds due a convicted person.

A similar fate befell California’s anti-profiteering statute in 2002, which also singled out income from speech. The California statute, first enacted in 1983, sought to forfeit proceeds from expressive activities related to crime. The salient provision (enacted before *Simon and Schuster, Inc.*) imposed an involuntary trust, in favor of crime victims, on a convicted felon’s “proceeds” from expressive “materials” (books, films, magazine and newspaper articles, video and sound records, radio and television appearances, and live presentations) that “include or are based on” the “story” of a felony for which the felon was convicted, except where the materials mention the felony only in “passing . . . , as in a footnote or bibliography.” In *Keenan v. Superior Court*, the California Supreme Court invalidated this provision, concluding that it “focuses directly and solely on income from speech.” As a content-based restriction on speech, it confiscated proceeds from “the content of speech to an extent far beyond that necessary to transfer the fruits of crime from criminals to their uncompensated victims.” The statute was “calculated to confiscate all income from a wide range of protected expressive works by convicted felons, on a wide variety of subjects and themes, simply because those works include substantial accounts of the prior felonies.” Interestingly, the California Supreme Court did not address a newer part of the statute – one that confiscated profits deriving from sales of memorabilia, property, things or rights for a value enhanced by their crime-related notoriety value.

As one last example, in 2002 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that a proposed Massachusetts’ “Son of Sam” law violated the First Amendment and a parallel provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The proposed statute required “any entity (contracting party) contracting with a ‘defendant’ to submit a copy of the contract to the [Attorney General’s] division within thirty days of the agreement if the contracting party [knew] or reasonably should [have known] that the consideration to be paid to the defendant would constitute ‘proceeds

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193  *Id.* at (3)(a).
194  *Seres*, 102 P.3d at 94.
196  *Id.* at 718.
197  *Id.* at 729 n.14 (emphasis added).
198  *Id.* at 731.
199  *Id.* at 722.
200  *Opinion of the Justices to the Senate*, 764 N.E.2d 343, 352-53 (Mass. 2002). In the interest of full disclosure, I consulted on the drafting of an amicus brief in the case which urged that the proposed statute was constitutional.
related to a crime.\textsuperscript{201} The statute was not limited to convicted felons, but also swept in persons with pending criminal charges. And it defined "proceeds related to a crime" as "any assets, material objects, monies, and property obtained through the use of unique knowledge or notoriety acquired by means and in consequence of the commission of a crime from whatever source received by or owing to a defendant or his representative, whether earned, accrued, or paid before or after the disposition of criminal charges against the defendant.\textsuperscript{202} It then provided the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office the opportunity to determine whether the proceeds under the contract were "substantially related to a crime, rather than relating only tangentially to, or containing only passing references to, a crime," and required the contracting party to pay the Attorney General's Office the monies owed to the defendant under the contract or post a bond covering such amount within fifteen days.\textsuperscript{203}

The Supreme Judicial Court concluded the proposed statute was unconstitutional for a number of reasons. First, the statute was overbroad as it applied not only to convicted felons, but also to anyone with pending criminal charges.\textsuperscript{204} Second, the statute held the funds in escrow for over three years, during which a claims process was required. The Supreme Judicial Court found this to be overexcessive and lengthy.\textsuperscript{205} Finally, the statute called for a final determination by the Attorney General's Office, rather than the court, which the court found to be an invalid prior restraint of expressive speech.\textsuperscript{206} The Court noted that the statute "burdens only expression with a particular content, namely, works that describe, reenact or otherwise are related to the commission of a crime.\textsuperscript{207} In the alternative, it suggested "less cumbersome and more precise methods of compensating victims and preventing notorious criminals from obtaining a financial windfall from their notoriety.\textsuperscript{208} These included "probation conditions, specifically designed to deal with a defendant's future income and obligations, [to] be imposed," while lamenting the statute's targeting of "publishing and entertainment industries and interfering with an entire category of speech."\textsuperscript{209}

To my mind, the First Amendment problem with these statutes (at least as determined by the courts that invalidated them) is that they continued to "directly and solely" target speech in some way or another. A broader statute aimed at all profits from a crime – not just profits from expressive activity – would not suffer from this First Amendment problem. A clear example comes from Arizona, which allows forfeiture of anything connected with a racketeering offense. An Arizona statute permits a prosecutor to obtain a forfeiture order for "any property or interest in property acquired or maintained by a person in violation [of the racketeering statute]" and "all proceeds traceable to an offense included in the definition of racketeering . . . [including] all

\textsuperscript{201} Id. at 345.
\textsuperscript{202} Id.
\textsuperscript{203} Id.
\textsuperscript{204} Id. at 348-49.
\textsuperscript{205} Id. at 349-50.
\textsuperscript{206} Id. at 351-52.
\textsuperscript{207} Id. at 347.
\textsuperscript{208} Id. at 350.
\textsuperscript{209} Id.
monies, negotiable instruments, securities and other property used or intended to be used in any manner or part to facilitate the commission of the offense."  The statute defines the proceeds as any interest in property of any kind acquired through or caused by an act or omission, or derived from the act or omission, directly or indirectly, and any fruits of this interest, in whatever form.

The validity of this statute was tested by “Sammy the Bull” Gravano. He was convicted of racketeering and drug distribution, and the state later moved for forfeiture of all of Mr. Gravano’s rights to payments, royalties, and other interests in connection with a forthcoming book about his life as a New York mobster. In Napolitano v. Gravano, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute because it was inherently content neutral and required forfeiture of anything connected with his racketeering offense.

As the Arizona Court of Appeals found, “Arizona's forfeiture statutes contain[ed] no reference to the content of speech or expressive materials.” It also found that the “purposes of these statutes apparently include removing the economic incentive to engage in [criminal racketeering], . . . compensating victims of racketeering, and reimbursing the State for the costs of prosecution.” As such, despite the concern “the work from which the Mr. Gravano's royalties arise is expressive in nature,” that court found that the “purposes [of the statute were] speech- and content-neutral, and any effect on speech [was] incidental.” In addition, the forfeiture would “not occur if the expressive material mentions a crime only tangentially or incidentally; Arizona's law [was] based on a causal connection with racketeering, not just a mention of it in an expressive work.” Finally, that court distinguished Arizona’s forfeiture statute with the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate because “Arizona's forfeiture laws require the State to file an action in court and to prove the underlying racketeering and the connection between the racketeering and the property subject to forfeiture.” Such a “burden of proof . . . on the State [would alleviate] the due process concerns expressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.”

The Arizona forfeiture statute was not only content-neutral, but also dealt with the other concerns raised in cases such as Seres, Keenan, and Opinion of the Justices to the Senate. First, the statute did not target expressive activity, but targeted the “proceeds" of racketeering, including “any interest in property of any kind acquired through or caused by an act or omission, or derived from the act or omission, directly or indirectly.” Finding that Mr. Gravano's book royalties “derived from the act" directly or indirectly, the court could reasonably find that such activity was ripe for forfeiture. And the court, rather than the Attorney General's Office, was to make such a

210 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ¶ 13-2314(G)(1),(3).
211 Id. at (N)(3).
213 Id. at 253.
214 Id. at 252.
215 Id. at 255.
216 Id.
217 Id.
determination. Finally, the court ordered forfeiture from the defendant, rather than the publishing company or any other person.

Congress should pass an anti-profiteering statute that follows the approach taken by Arizona. A defendant should not be permitted to profit from a crime. A crime should be an occasion for punishment and restoration of victims, not an occasion for profit – in short, crime shouldn't pay. There appears to be wide agreement on this proposition around the country, as proven by the pervasiveness of Son of Sam statutes.\footnote{See Validity Construction, and Application of "Son of Sam" Laws Regulating or Prohibiting Distribution of Crime-Related Book, Film, or Comparable Revenues to Criminals, 60 A.L.R.4th 1210 (collecting about 20 state statutes).} Congress should make sure that federal felonies do not become profit-making ventures.

Congress should therefore adopt an anti-profiteering statute that broadly forbids profiting from a crime in any way – not profiting solely through protected First Amendment activities. Congress should amend the anti-profiteering statute – 18 U.S.C. § 3681 – to cover all profits that a defendant receives from a crime. In addition, the federal statute's coverage should be extended. Currently it applies to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 794 (delivering defense information to a foreign government) or “an offense against the United States resulting in physical harm to an individual.” There is no reason that the statute should be limited to such offense. Victims of any felony federal crime should be able to prevent any kind of profiteering by a defendant. The statute should cover serious criminals – e.g., felons – and only after they have been convicted. And, in addition to prosecutors, crime victims should be able to initiate forfeiture actions themselves.

Accordingly, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3681 should be revised to provide:

§ 3681. Order of special forfeiture

(a) Upon the motion of the United States attorney or a victim of a crime, as recognized under section 3771 of this title, made at any time after conviction of a defendant for an offense under section 794 of this title or for an offense against the United States resulting in physical harm to an individual, or upon the court’s own motion, and after notice to any interested party, the court shall, if the court determines that the interest of justice the defendant is profiting from the crime or an order of restitution under this title so requires, order such defendant to forfeit all or any part of funds and property received from any source by a person convicted of a specified crime to the extent necessary to prevent profiting from the crime or to satisfy an order of restitution. proceeds received or to be received by that defendant, or a transferee of that defendant, from a contract relating to a depiction of such crime in a movie, book, newspaper, magazine, radio or television production, or live entertainment of any kind, or an expression of that defendant's thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime. A defendant is not profiting from a crime if the financial advantage he or she obtains is only
tangentially or incidentally connected with the crime. (b) An order issued under subsection (a) of this section shall require that the person with whom the defendant contracts pay to the Attorney General any proceeds due the defendant under such contract. (c) —

(b)(1) Proceeds paid to the Attorney General under this section shall be retained in escrow in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury by the Attorney General for five years after the date of an order under this section, but during that five year period may—(A) be levied upon to satisfy—(i) a money judgment rendered by a United States district court in favor of a victim of an offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) a fine imposed by a court of the United States; and(B) if ordered by the court in the interest of justice, be used to—(i) satisfy a money judgment rendered in any court in favor of a victim of any offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent of the total proceeds may be so used. (2) The court shall direct the disposition of all such proceeds in the possession of the Attorney General at the end of such five years and may require that all or any part of such proceeds be released from escrow and paid into the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury.

(d)(c) As used in this section, the term "interested party" includes the defendant and any transferee of proceeds due the defendant under the contract, the person with whom the defendant has contracted, and any person physically harmed as a result of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.

This reconstructed anti-profiteering statute would require a judicial determination that a convicted felon is "profiting from the crime." The phrase is not further defined, so that the federal courts can construe it broadly but constitutionally. The phrase is negatively defined as not including any profits that are only tangentially or incidentally linked to the crime, an exclusion similar to that found in the Arizona statute and highlighted by the Arizona Court of Appeals as an appropriate qualification. (In addition, the statute would allow a crime victim to obtain money to satisfy a previously-entered restitution award, but this part of the statute is simply an

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220 See Napolitano, 60 P.3d at 255 (“Forfeiture should not occur if the expressive material mentions a crime only tangentially or incidentally; Arizona's law is based on a causal connection with racketeering, not just a mention of it in an expressive work.”); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2314(G)(1),(3), (N)(3).
enhancement of already well-established law.)

Rather than linking to the content of any speech or the expressive activity, the statute attacks more broadly the general problem of criminals profiting from their crimes. As such, this proposed statute—like the Arizona statute—would not target any expressive activity. It therefore does not run afoul of any First Amendment constraints.

This reconstructed statute would retain the constructive trust provision found in current law. Under subsection (b), when the government forfeits profits from a crime, they would go to the Crime Victims Fund. This provision of the statute serves a compelling state interest, further enhancing the constitutionality of the statute.

The relationship between preventing profiteering and awarding restitution deserves brief exploration. Any income source available to a convicted person who has been ordered to pay restitution should be tapped to satisfy the restitution award. An example of the compelling need to attach a defendant’s income to satisfy a restitution award comes from the District of Maryland case of *Kimberlin v. Dewalt*.221 This case dealt with a parolee convicted of detonating eight dynamite bombs in the Speedway, Indiana area in 1978. The victims were grievously injured, and one committed suicide a few years later. One of the victims obtained a $1.61 million jury verdict for her injuries and the wrongful death of her husband. The parolee did not satisfy this award and was released on supervised parole. He then inherited a substantial amount of money from his father. He also entered into a recording and book contract, centering around allegations he had sold marijuana to Dan Quayle and his subsequent treatment by the Bureau of Prisons. The Probation Office imposed a special condition of parole ordering the parolee to make payments to the victim in accordance with the civil judgment. Although the Probation Office required payment by the parolee, it did not cite the federal restitution statute as its authority for the special condition of parole.222 When challenged, the district court held that the order did not violate *Simon & Schuster* because, the District Court concluded, “the book money was but one of several resources from which the judgment could have been paid.”223

The situation in *Kimberlin* is addressed, at least to some extent, by current restitution law. The Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act’s procedural provision—18 U.S.C. § 3664(n)—requires any substantial new moneys received by a criminal to go to restitution. Unfortunately, that statute is restricted to situations where a defendant is incarcerated. It thus would not apply to the *Kimberlin* facts, which involved a defendant on supervised release. The restitution provision on this topic should therefore be amended as follows:

If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration, supervised release, or probation, such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed.

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222 Id. at 496.
223 Id.
D. Congress Should Adopt a Federal “Murderabilia” Statute.

The problem of preventing profiteering from crimes will not be completely addressed unless Congress also puts in place a statute preventing criminals from profiting by trafficking in what is known as “murderabilia.” In recent years, a number of notorious criminals have tried to make money by selling items that have gained notoriety (and thus value) simply because of their association with the criminal or his crime. For example, numerous items belonging to convicted serial killers, including toenail clippings, hair, autographed t-shirts, and used television sets, among others, have all recently been sold within the last five years. All of these types of items have become known as “murderabilia.” A typically used definition for such items is “manufactured items representative of criminals or crimes, such as murderer trading cards or figurines, and non-manufactured items associated with the criminals or crimes themselves.”

A recent case from my home state of Utah will illustrate the problem. Mark Hacking was

224 Andy Kahan in the City of Houston's Crime Victims' Office deserves special recognition for leading the crusade on this issue. See Tracey B. Cobb, Comment, Making a Killing: Evaluating the Constitutionality of the Texas Son of Sam Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1483, 1503 n.156 (2003) (“[Andy] Kahan has been a leader in the movement to prevent the trade of murderabilia and worked with the Texas Legislature to draft the murderabilia statute in 2001.”); ABC News: 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 7, 2001) (interviewing Andy Kahan, who stated that “No one should be able to rob, rape and murder and then turn around and make a buck off it.”); Jeff Barnard, Murderabilia: People Want to get Closer to Killer; Internet Accessible: City Official Wants to Eradicate the Ghoulish Industry, TELEGRAPH-HERALD (Dubuque, IA), at A4 (Oct. 8, 2000) (crediting the coining of the term “murderabilia” to Andy Kahan, and crediting him as a key player in the “crusade to wipe [the murderabilia market] out.”).

225 See Eric Berger, Lawmakers Seek to Halt Killer Sales, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2001, at 31 (reporting that Angel Maturino Resendiz, who murdered twelve people in a five-state killing spree, agreed to offer feet scrapings for sale); John Ellement, SJC Offers Warning on Proposed Crime-Profits Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at B3 (noting that nails and hair clippings from admitted murderer Coral Eugene Watts were all sold via an Internet auction); see also Rog-Gong Lin II & Wendy Lee, Unabomber "Murderabilia "for Sale, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 26, 2005 at A1 (noting following for sale on "murderabilia" websites: William George Bonin, known as the "Freeway Killer" -- 13-inch Sony stereo sound and color television, offered for $750; John William "Possun" King, who dragged to death a black man in Texas -- autographed T-shirt, offered for $2,000; Charles Manson -- Manson's handprint, signed, and a drawing done by another inmate depicting Manson behind bars with a saw, offered for $900; Scott Peterson, killer of his wife, Laci, and their unborn son -- a letter written from the county jail during his trial, sold for $500; Richard Ramirez, the “Night Stalker” serial killer -- photocopy of two childhood pictures of Ramirez with his inscription, “On a tricycle rolling on a highway to Hell, Richard,” offered for $200; Aileen Wuornos, serial killer and subject of the movie “Monster" -- a handwritten envelope mailed from death row, offered for $300).

226 Cobb, supra note 173.
convicted of murdering his wife Lori and then sentenced to serve a term of six-year-to-life in prison in 2004. Six month ago, however, a letter purportedly from Hacking given details of his sex life with his wife was selling for $24. Also for sale was moustache hair from the notorious killer. Prison officials have attempted to deal with the problem, but it has proven difficult because the website selling the items is not clearly within Utah jurisdiction and the laws governing murderabilia are not entirely clear.

The proposed revisions to the federal anti-profiteering statute described above may go a long way towards addressing such deplorable money-making by federal felons. After all, selling tangible crime-related items for money is a classic example of “profiting from the crime,” which would lead to forfeiture under my proposal. But to avoid any misunderstanding, a federal statute squarely addressing the point should be put on the books.

A federal statute addressing murderabilia should have several features. First, it should be limited to serious crimes—felony crimes seems like a reasonable approach. Second, it should cover federal offenses (unless Congress determines to stamp out the inter-state market in murderabilia, as discussed below). Third, it should cover not only a criminal but also his representatives and assignees, lest a criminal be able to profit by the simple expedient of using a family member or friend. Fourth, to avoid First Amendment complications, it should not cover book or movie rights, but rather should focus primarily on tangible, non-expressive items.

One way of drafting such a federal statute would be as follows, based on the California provision:

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3681A. Forfeiture of Proceeds from Sale of Memorabilia by Convicted Felon

(a) Upon a motion of the United States attorney or a victim of a crime, made at any time after conviction of a defendant for a felony offense against the United States, or upon the court's own motion, and after notice to any interested party, the court shall, if the court determines that the defendant, his representative, or assignee, is profiting from the sale or transfer for profit any memorabilia or other property or thing of the felon, the value of which is enhanced by the notoriety gained from the commission of the felony for which the felon was convicted, order the proceeds received by the defendant, his representatives, or assignees, forfeited to the extent necessary to prevent profiting from the crime or to satisfy an order of restitution. Memorabilia and property shall include any tangible memorabilia, property, autograph, or other similar tangible thing, but not including any book, movie, painting, or similar rights addressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3681. An order of restitution shall not apply to sale of materials where the defendant is exercising his or her First Amendment rights, and shall not apply to the sale or transfer of any other expressive work protected by

228 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225.
the First Amendment, unless the sale or transfer is primarily for a commercial or speculative purpose.

(b)(1) Proceeds paid to the Attorney General under this section shall be retained in escrow in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury by the Attorney General for five years after the date of an order under this section, but during that five year period may--(A) be levied upon to satisfy--(i) a money judgment rendered by a United States district court in favor of a victim of an offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) a fine imposed by a court of the United States; and(B) if ordered by the court in the interest of justice, be used to--(i) satisfy a money judgment rendered in any court in favor of a victim of any offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent of the total proceeds may be so used.(2) The court shall direct the disposition of all such proceeds in the possession of the Attorney General at the end of such five years and may require that all or any part of such proceeds be released from escrow and paid into the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury.

(c) As used in this section, the term “interested party” includes the defendant and any transferee of proceeds due the defendant under the contract, the person with whom the defendant has contracted, and any person physically harmed as a result of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.

As discussed above, the California Supreme Court declared certain provisions of the California Son of Sam law facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the California Constitution. The salient provision of that statute imposed an involuntary trust, in favor of crime victims, on a convicted felon’s “proceeds” from expressive “materials” (books, films, magazine and newspaper articles, video and sound records, radio and television appearances, and live presentations). Concluding that the statute “focus[ed] directly and solely on income from speech,” the California Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. Indeed, that statute was “calculated to confiscate all income from a wide range of protected expressive works by convicted felons, on a wide variety of subjects and themes, simply because those works include substantial accounts of the prior felonies.” But, as also noted above, the California Supreme Court failed to address the issue at play in this murderabilia proposal – confiscation of the profits derived from sales of memorabilia, property, things, or rights enhanced by their crime-related notoriety value. Narrowly drafting this proposed statute to solely target tangible items that do not constitute expressive activity or speech would enable it to survive constitutional review. It would also allow district court judges to insure that convicted felons do not profit further from their crimes, or the notoriety of their crimes.

Another possible way of drafting the federal statute would be to follow the approach taken

\[\text{\textsuperscript{229}}\text{See supra note 144-148; Keenan, 40 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2002).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{230}}\text{CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225, as described in Keenan v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 718, 730-31 (Cal. 2002).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{231}}\text{Id. at 729 n.14 (emphasis added).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{232}}\text{Id. at 722.}\]
in Texas.\textsuperscript{233} A federal statute drafted to track that statute might look like the following:

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3681A. Forfeiture of Proceeds from Sale of Memorabilia by Convicted Felon

(a) Upon a motion of the United States attorney or a victim of a crime, made at any time after conviction of a defendant for a felony offense against the United States, or upon the court's own motion, and after notice to any interested party, the court shall determine whether a sale has occurred of tangible property belonging to the defendant, the value of which is increased by the notoriety gained from the conviction. Upon a finding by the court that such a sale has occurred, the court shall transfer to the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury all income from the sale of tangible property the value of which is increased by the notoriety gained from the conviction of an offense by the person convicted of the crime. The court shall determine the fair market value of the property that is substantially similar to that property that was sold but that has not increased in value by the notoriety and deduct that amount from the proceeds of the sale. After transferring the income to the Crime Victims Fund, the United States attorney shall transfer the remainder of the proceeds of the sale to the owner of the property.

(b)(1) Proceeds paid to the Attorney General under this section shall be retained in escrow in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury by the Attorney General for five years after the date of an order under this section, but during that five year period may--(A) be levied upon to satisfy--(i) a money judgment rendered by a United States district court in favor of a victim of an offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) a fine imposed by a court of the United States; and(B) if ordered by the court in the interest of justice, be used to--(i) satisfy a money judgment rendered in any court in favor of a victim of any offense for which such defendant has been convicted, or a legal representative of such victim; and(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent of the total proceeds may be so used.(2) The court shall direct the disposition of all such proceeds in the possession of the Attorney General at the end of such five years and may require that all or any part of such proceeds be released from escrow and paid into the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury.

(c) As used in this section, the term “interested party” includes the defendant and any transferee of proceeds due the defendant under the contract, the person with whom the defendant has contracted, and any person physically harmed as a result of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.

\textsuperscript{233} TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 59.06(k)(1)-(2).
This approach, mirroring the Texas murderabilia statute, would essentially tax the profits of the convicted felon's sale of tangible property as long as the profit arose from the notoriety of the conviction. It would not prohibit convicted felons from selling their tangible property, but would only forfeit the proceeds of any sale based on the value of similar items. The Texas murderabilia provision has yet to be challenged in the Texas courts, but recent commentary concludes that the “murderabilia provision [is the] Texas Son of Sam law's strongest element." That commentary indicates that by “shifting the focus away from speech and toward a more generalized category of notoriety for profit, the murderabilia provision lends acceptability to the Texas Son of Sam law under the [Simon & Schuster, Inc.] framework." As the proposed statute avoids content-based speech, does not consider whether the content of what is sold is related to the crime, and allows for felons to reap fair market value for the sale, the proposed statute would pass constitutional muster as well.

One last note is worth briefly mentioning. Congress might reasonably conclude that the problem of trafficking in “murderabilia” is an inter-state problem that warrants a federal prohibition. Congress might reasonably conclude that in this age of the Internet, the only way to truly stamp out the gruesome trade is to pass a federal law forbidding not only criminals but all persons from dealing in murderabilia. Such a statute would go beyond the scope of my testimony today, which focuses on sentencing issues related to criminals. I simply highlight the point here in case the Sentencing Commission or other are interested in pursuing it.

CONCLUSION

In my testimony, I have tried to offer specific suggestions about how the Sentencing Commission should change the Guidelines and recommend legislation to Congress so as to improve the treatment of crime victims during sentencing. In closing, I would like to make a plea that, regardless of what the Commission does with my particular ideas, the Commission should at least take part in the discussion in this country about crime victims' rights.

The Commission's current contribution to the dialog – the policy statement directing judges to follow existing victims' law – is not particularly instructive. Perhaps this is by design, as it can be argued that the Sentencing Commission should do nothing in the area of crime victims' rights, abandoning the field to the Criminal Rules Committee or the Criminal Law Committee (and perhaps ultimately Congress). But I would encourage the Commission to at least be a part of the victims' rights discussion. In particular, the Commission has fact-finding and other powers that may be particularly helpful in investigating the proper role of crime victims at sentencing. Crime victims' rights have received too little attention from the courts, from Congress, from the Executive, from academic commentators – and from the Sentencing Commission. I would respectfully urge the Commission to help bring to an end the benign neglect of victims of crime.

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234 Cobby, supra note 173, at 1514.
235 Id.