Chair Ricardo H. Hinojosa called the meeting to order at 1:15 p.m. in the Commissioners’
Conference Room.

The following Commissioners were present:
- Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair
- Judge William K. Sessions, III, Vice Chair
- Michael E. Horowitz, Commissioner
- Beryl Howell, Commissioner
- Kelli Ferry, Commissioner Ex Officio
- Edward F. Reilly, Jr., Commissioner Ex Officio

The following Commissioners were present via telephone:
- Judge Ruben Castillo, Vice Chair
- Dabney L. Friedrich, Commissioner

The following staff participated in the meeting:
- Judith Sheon, Staff Director
- Kenneth Cohen, General Counsel

Chair Hinojosa called for a motion to adopt the minutes of the December 11, 2007, and January
9, 2008, public meetings. Commissioner Howell made a motion to adopt the minutes, with Vice
Chair Sessions seconding the motion. Commissioner Friedrich stated that she had not reviewed
the minutes but was willing to proceed with the motion. Hearing no further discussion, the Chair
called for a vote and the motion was adopted by voice vote.

The Chair thanked the Staff Director and staff for their work during the Commission’s
amendment cycle. The Chair also thanked the other commissioners for their efforts during the
amendment cycle. Chair Hinojosa reminded the public that the Commission’s Seventeenth
National Annual Seminar on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines will be held in Orlando, Florida,

Ms. Sheon thanked the Chair and commissioners on behalf of the staff for their leadership during
the amendment cycle. She also thanked staff for its work during the amendment cycle.

Chair Hinojosa called on Mr. Cohen to advise the Commission on possible votes to amend the
sentencing guidelines.

Mr. Cohen stated that the first proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit A, modifies the
commentary to §2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking
(Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy) to revise
the manner in which combined offense levels are determined in cases involving cocaine base ("crack cocaine") and one or more other controlled substance. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of May 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed. Mr Cohen noted that the time between publication of a notice of final action and the effective date of the proposed amendment will be less than the 30-day notice period generally required under the Administrative Procedures Act (the "APA"). See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). However, he noted that the Commission has good cause to waive the 30-day notice requirement because the amendment resolves an urgent unintended sentencing anomaly present in cases involving cocaine base and one or more other controlled substances that recently was brought to the attention of the Commission.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Vice Chair Sessions made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Horowitz seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit B, expands the listing in §1B1.10(c) (Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)) to include Amendment 715, the previously adopted amendment, as an amendment that may be applied retroactively. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of May 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed. He again noted that the time between publication of a notice of final action and the effective date of the proposed amendment will be less than the 30-day notice period generally required under the APA and cited the same reasons given in the previous amendment as good cause for waiving the 30-day notice requirement.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Howell made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Horowitz seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit C, makes various technical and conforming changes to the guidelines. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Horowitz made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Vice Chair Sessions seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.
Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit D, responds to the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–81 ("the Act"). The Act created a criminal offense at 18 U.S.C. § 227 prohibiting a member or employee of Congress from influencing or attempting to influence, on the basis of political affiliation, employment decisions or practices of a private entity. The amendment modifies Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 227 to §2C1.1 (Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions). Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Horowitz made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Howell seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit E, implements the Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–22 (the "Act"). The Act amended the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156, to increase penalties for existing offenses and to create a new offense. Because 7 U.S.C. § 2156 is now a felony offense, the amendment deletes the reference of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 to §2X5.2 (Class A Misdemeanors) in Appendix A (Statutory Index) and references offenses under 7 U.S.C. § 2156 to §2E3.1 (Gambling Offenses). The amendment also creates a new alternative base offense level at §2E3.1(a)(2) if the offense involved an "animal fighting venture," which is defined in Application Note 1 as having the meaning given that term in 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g). The amendment also provides an upward departure provision that may apply if an offense involves extraordinary cruelty to an animal. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Howell made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Vice Chair Sessions seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit F, responds to two new offenses created by the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 (the "Act"), Pub. L. 110–177. First, the amendment addresses section 201 of the Act, which created a new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 1521 prohibiting the filing of, attempts, or conspiracies to file any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of officers or employees of the United States Government, on account of that individual's performance of official duties. The amendment references the new offense to §2A6.1 (Threatening or Harassing Communications; Hoaxes) and
also makes a number of modifications to §2A6.1 to address specific harms associated with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1521. Second, the amendment addresses section 202 of the Act, which created a new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 119 prohibiting the public disclosure of restricted personal information about a federal officer or employee, witness, juror, or immediate family member of such a person, with the intent to threaten or facilitate a crime of violence against such a person. The amendment references the new offense to §2H3.1 (Interception of Communications; Eavesdropping; Disclosure of Certain Private or Protected Information) and also makes a number of modifications to §2H3.1 to address specific harms associated with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 119. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Horowitz made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Vice Chair Sessions seconding. Vice Chair Castillo thanked staff and his fellow commissioners for their efforts to amend the guidelines to implement the Act. Hearing no further discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit G, sets forth the introduction to the Guidelines Manual as it first appeared in 1987, with the inclusion of amendments occasionally made thereto between 1987 and 2000, supplements the original introduction with an updated discussion of the role of the guidelines, their evolution, and Supreme Court case law, and redesignates §1A1.1 (Authority) as §1A3.1. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Howell made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Vice Chair Sessions seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit H, re-promulgates as a permanent amendment the temporary, emergency Amendment 714 (effective Feb. 6, 2008) that implemented the emergency directive in section 5 of the "Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007," Pub. L. 110–179 (the "Act"). The permanent amendment also implements several changes to §2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States) to fully implement the directive to the Commission by expanding the scope of the two-level enhancement in the emergency amendment to include all conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040; modifying the enhancement to include a minimum offense level of 12; adding a downward departure provision that may apply in a case in
which the minimum offense level applies, the defendant is a victim of a major disaster or emergency, and the benefits received illegally were only an extension or overpayment of benefits received legitimately; deleting certain commentary relating to the definition of loss that was promulgated in the emergency amendment; and making conforming changes to the guideline and the commentary. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Howell made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Horowitz seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the next proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit I, makes two changes to §2N2.1 (Violations of Statutes and Regulations Dealing With Any Food, Drug, Biological Product, Device, Cosmetic, or Agricultural Product) to address offenses under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (the "FDCA") and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub L. 100–293 (the "PDMA"). First, the amendment adds a specific offense characteristic at subsection (b)(1) of §2N2.1 that provides a four-level enhancement for repeat violations of the FDCA. Second, the amendment expands the upward departure provision at Application Note 3(A) of §2N2.1 to include an offense that created a substantial risk of bodily injury or death. Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.

The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Vice Chair Sessions made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Howell seconding. Hearing no discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Mr. Cohen stated that the last proposed amendment, attached hereto as Exhibit J, addresses certain discrete issues that have arisen in the application of §2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States). First, the amendment clarifies the scope of the term "forcible sex offense" as that term is used in the definition of "crime of violence" in §2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(iii). Second, the amendment clarifies that an "offer to sell" a controlled substance is a "drug trafficking offense" for purposes of subsection (b)(1) of §2L1.2 by adding "offer to sell" to the conduct listed in Application Note 1(B)(iv). Finally, the amendment addresses the concern that in some cases the categorical enhancements in subsection (b) may not adequately reflect the seriousness of a prior offense. The amendment adds a departure provision that may apply in a case "in which the applicable offense level substantially overstates or understates the seriousness of a prior conviction." Mr. Cohen advised the commissioners that a motion to adopt the proposed amendment would be in order, with an effective date of November 1, 2008, with the staff being authorized to make technical and conforming changes if needed.
The Chair called for a motion as suggested by Mr. Cohen. Vice Chair Sessions made a motion to adopt the proposed amendment, with Commissioner Howell seconding. Vice Chair Castillo thanked the Chair for his leadership in the area of immigration. Vice Chair Castillo recognized that many members of the federal criminal justice system looked to the Commission for a comprehensive solution to the problem of illegal immigration. Vice Chair Castillo stated that the Commission was hesitant to adopt a comprehensive solution at this time because the commissioners want to adopt a solution that is satisfactorily to the many parties concerned by the issue of immigration. Hearing no further discussion, the Chair called for a vote and the motion was adopted with the Chair noting that at least four commissioners voted in favor of the motion.

Chair Hinojosa thanked all the members of the federal criminal justice system who assisted the Commission in its work during the amendment cycle.

The Chair asked if there was any further business before the Commission and hearing none, called for a motion to adjourn the meeting. Commissioner Horowitz made a motion to adjourn, with Vice Chair Sessions seconding. The Chair called for a vote on the motion, and the motion was adopted by voice vote. The meeting was adjourned at 2:40 p.m.
EXHIBIT A

Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment modifies the commentary to §2D1.1 [Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy] to revise the manner in which combined offense levels are determined in cases involving cocaine base ("crack cocaine") and one or more other controlled substance. Application of Note 10(D), as amended by Amendment 711, has resulted in some sentencing anomalies in which some offenders have not received the benefit of the two-level reduction provided by Amendment 706 merely because of the conversion of cocaine base to its marihuana equivalent. In order to remedy these anomalies, the proposed amendment modifies the Drug Equivalency Tables to provide that 1 gram of cocaine base equals 20 kilograms of marihuana, as it did prior to Amendment 706, and amends Application Note 10(D) to provide that the combined offense level for an offense involving cocaine base and one or more other controlled substance is determined initially in the same manner as for other polydrug cases under Application Note 10(B). The proposed amendment further provides, however, that the resulting combined offense level is reduced by two levels. There are three exclusions to application of the two-level reduction. First, the two-level reduction does not apply if the offense involved more than 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base because such offenses are unaffected by Amendment 706. Second, the two-level reduction does not apply if the offense involved less than 250 mg of cocaine base in order to ensure that the offense level does not reduce below level 12, the minimum offense level on the Drug Quantity Table for offenses involving cocaine base. Third, the two-level reduction does not apply if it would result in a combined offense level that is less than the combined offense level that would apply if the offense involved only the other controlled substance(s) (i.e., the controlled substance(s) other than cocaine base).

§2D1.1. Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy

(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):

(1) 43, if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance and that the defendant committed the offense after one or more prior convictions for a similar offense; or

(2) 38, if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance; or

(3) the offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth in subsection (c), except that if (A) the defendant receives an adjustment under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role); and (B) the base offense level under subsection (c) is (i) level 32, decrease by 2 levels; (ii) level 34 or level 36, decrease by 3 levels; or (iii) level 38, decrease by 4 levels.

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.

(2) If the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which (A) an aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial air carrier was used to import or export the controlled substance, or (B) the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain, navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer aboard any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 26, increase to level 26.

(3) If the object of the offense was the distribution of a controlled substance in a prison, correctional facility, or detention facility, increase by 2 levels.

(4) If (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were imported unlawfully, and (B) the defendant is not subject to an adjustment under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), increase by 2 levels.

(5) If the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 865, increase by 2 levels.

(6) If the defendant, or a person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), distributed a controlled substance through mass-marketing by means of an interactive computer service, increase by 2 levels.

(7) If the offense involved the distribution of an anabolic steroid and a masking agent, increase by 2 levels.

(8) If the defendant distributed an anabolic steroid to an athlete, increase by 2 levels.

(9) If the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(g)(1)(A), increase by 2 levels.

(10) (Apply the greatest):

(A) If the offense involved (i) an unlawful discharge, emission, or release into the environment of a hazardous or toxic substance; or (ii) the unlawful transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste, increase by 2 levels.

(B) If the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 860a of distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute, methamphetamine on premises where a minor is present or resides, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 14, increase to level 14.
(C) If—

(i) the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 860a of manufacturing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, methamphetamine on premises where a minor is present or resides; or

(ii) the offense involved the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine and the offense created a substantial risk of harm to (I) human life other than a life described in subdivision (D); or (II) the environment,

increase by 3 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 27, increase to level 27.

(D) If the offense (i) involved the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine; and (ii) created a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor or an incompetent, increase by 6 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 30, increase to level 30.

(11) If the defendant meets the criteria set forth in subdivisions (1)-(5) of subsection (a) of §5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases), decrease by 2 levels.

[Subsection (c) (Drug Quantity Table) is set forth on the following pages.]

(d) Cross References

(1) If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply §2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) or §2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder), as appropriate, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined under this guideline.

(2) If the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(7) (of distributing a controlled substance with intent to commit a crime of violence), apply §2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) in respect to the crime of violence that the defendant committed, or attempted or intended to commit, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

(e) Special Instruction

(1) If (A) subsection (d)(2) does not apply; and (B) the defendant committed, or attempted to commit, a sexual offense against another individual by distributing, with or without that individual’s knowledge, a controlled substance to that individual, an adjustment under §3A1.1(b)(1) shall apply.

(c) DRUG QUANTITY TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controlled Substances and Quantity*</th>
<th>Base Offense Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 30 KG or more of Heroin;</td>
<td>Level 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 KG or more of Cocaine;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-9-
- 4.5 KG or more of Cocaine Base;
- 30 KG or more of PCP, or 3 KG or more of PCP (actual);
- 15 KG or more of Methamphetamine, or 1.5 KG or more of Methamphetamine (actual), or 1.5 KG or more of "Ice";
- 15 KG or more of Amphetamine, or 1.5 KG or more of Amphetamine (actual);
- 300 G or more of LSD;
- 12 KG or more of Fentanyl;
- 3 KG or more of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- 30,000 KG or more of Marihuana;
- 6,000 KG or more of Hashish;
- 600 KG or more of Hashish Oil;
- 30,000,000 units or more of Ketamine;
- 30,000,000 units or more of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- 1,875,000 units or more of Flunitrazepam.

(2)  
- At least 10 KG but less than 30 KG of Heroin;
- At least 50 KG but less than 150 KG of Cocaine;
- At least 1.5 KG but less than 4.5 KG of Cocaine Base;
- At least 10 KG but less than 30 KG of PCP, or at least 1 KG but less than 3 KG of PCP (actual);
- At least 5 KG but less than 15 KG of Methamphetamine, or at least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of "Ice";
- At least 5 KG but less than 15 KG of Amphetamine, or at least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Amphetamine (actual);
- At least 100 G but less than 300 G of LSD;
- At least 4 KG but less than 12 KG of Fentanyl;
- At least 1 KG but less than 3 KG of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- At least 10,000 KG but less than 30,000 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 2,000 KG but less than 6,000 KG of Hashish;
- At least 200 KG but less than 600 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 10,000,000 but less than 30,000,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 10,000,000 but less than 30,000,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 625,000 but less than 1,875,000 units of Flunitrazepam.

(3)  
- At least 3 KG but less than 10 KG of Heroin;
- At least 15 KG but less than 50 KG of Cocaine;
- At least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Cocaine Base;
- At least 3 KG but less than 10 KG of PCP, or at least 300 G but less than 1 KG of PCP (actual);
- At least 1.5 KG but less than 5 KG of Methamphetamine, or at least 150 G but less than 500 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 150 G but less than 500 G of "Ice";
- At least 1.5 KG but less than 5 KG of Amphetamine, or at least 150 G but less than 500 G of Amphetamine (actual);
- At least 30 G but less than 100 G of LSD;
- At least 1.2 KG but less than 4 KG of Fentanyl;
- At least 300 G but less than 1 KG of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- At least 3,000 KG but less than 10,000 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 600 KG but less than 2,000 KG of Hashish;
- At least 60 KG but less than 200 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 3,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 3,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 187,500 but less than 625,000 units of Flunitrazepam.
(4) ● At least 1 KG but less than 3 KG of Heroin;
   ● At least 5 KG but less than 15 KG of Cocaine;
   ● At least 150 G but less than 500 G of Cocaine Base;
   ● At least 1 KG but less than 3 KG of PCP, or at least 100 G but less than 300 G of PCP (actual);
   ● At least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Methamphetamine, or at least 50 G but less than 150 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 50 G but less than 150 G of "Ice";
   ● At least 500 G but less than 1.5 KG of Amphetamine, or at least 50 G but less than 150 G of Amphetamine (actual);
   ● At least 10 G but less than 30 G of LSD;
   ● At least 400 G but less than 1.2 KG of Fentanyl;
   ● At least 100 G but less than 300 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
   ● At least 1,000 KG but less than 3,000 KG of Marihuana;
   ● At least 200 KG but less than 600 KG of Hashish;
   ● At least 20 KG but less than 60 KG of Hashish Oil;
   ● At least 1,000,000 but less than 3,000,000 units of Ketamine;
   ● At least 1,000,000 but less than 3,000,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
   ● At least 62,500 but less than 187,500 units of Flunitrazepam.

(5) ● At least 700 G but less than 1 KG of Heroin;
   ● At least 3.5 KG but less than 5 KG of Cocaine;
   ● At least 50 G but less than 150 G of Cocaine Base;
   ● At least 700 G but less than 1 KG of PCP, or at least 70 G but less than 100 G of PCP (actual);
   ● At least 350 G but less than 500 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 35 G but less than 50 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 35 G but less than 50 G of "Ice";
   ● At least 350 G but less than 500 G of Amphetamine, or at least 35 G but less than 50 G of Amphetamine (actual);
   ● At least 7 G but less than 10 G of LSD;
   ● At least 280 G but less than 400 G of Fentanyl;
   ● At least 70 G but less than 100 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
   ● At least 700 KG but less than 1,000 KG of Marihuana;
   ● At least 140 KG but less than 200 KG of Hashish;
   ● At least 14 KG but less than 20 KG of Hashish Oil;
   ● At least 700,000 but less than 1,000,000 units of Ketamine;
   ● At least 700,000 but less than 1,000,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
   ● At least 43,750 but less than 62,500 units of Flunitrazepam.

(6) ● At least 400 G but less than 700 G of Heroin;
   ● At least 2 KG but less than 3.5 KG of Cocaine;
   ● At least 35 G but less than 50 G of Cocaine Base;
   ● At least 400 G but less than 700 G of PCP, or at least 40 G but less than 70 G of PCP (actual);
   ● At least 200 G but less than 350 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 20 G but less than 35 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 20 G but less than 35 G of "Ice";
   ● At least 200 G but less than 350 G of Amphetamine, or at least 20 G but less than 35 G of Amphetamine (actual);
   ● At least 4 G but less than 7 G of LSD;
   ● At least 160 G but less than 280 G of Fentanyl;
   ● At least 40 G but less than 70 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
   ● At least 400 KG but less than 700 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 80 KG but less than 140 KG of Hashish;
- At least 8 KG but less than 14 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 400,000 but less than 700,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 400,000 but less than 700,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 25,000 but less than 43,750 units of Flunitrazepam.

(7) - At least 100 G but less than 400 G of Heroin;
- At least 500 G but less than 2 KG of Cocaine;
- At least 20 G but less than 35 G of Cocaine Base;
- At least 100 G but less than 400 G of PCP, or at least 10 G but less than 40 G of PCP (actual);
- At least 50 G but less than 200 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 5 G but less than 20 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 5 G but less than 20 G of "Ice";
- At least 50 G but less than 200 G of Amphetamine, or at least 5 G but less than 20 G of Amphetamine (actual);
- At least 1 G but less than 4 G of LSD;
- At least 40 G but less than 160 G of Fentanyl;
- At least 10 G but less than 40 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- At least 100 KG but less than 400 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 20 KG but less than 80 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 100,000 but less than 400,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 100,000 but less than 400,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 6,250 but less than 25,000 units of Flunitrazepam.

(8) - At least 80 G but less than 100 G of Heroin;
- At least 400 G but less than 500 G of Cocaine;
- At least 5 G but less than 20 G of Cocaine Base;
- At least 80 G but less than 100 G of PCP, or at least 8 G but less than 10 G of PCP (actual);
- At least 40 G but less than 50 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 4 G but less than 5 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 4 G but less than 5 G of "Ice";
- At least 40 G but less than 50 G of Amphetamine, or at least 4 G but less than 5 G of Amphetamine (actual);
- At least 800 MG but less than 1 G of LSD;
- At least 32 G but less than 40 G of Fentanyl;
- At least 8 G but less than 10 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- At least 80 KG but less than 100 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 16 KG but less than 20 KG of Hashish;
- At least 1.6 KG but less than 2 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 80,000 but less than 100,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 80,000 but less than 100,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 5,000 but less than 6,250 units of Flunitrazepam.

(9) - At least 60 G but less than 80 G of Heroin;
- At least 300 G but less than 400 G of Cocaine;
- At least 4 G but less than 5 G of Cocaine Base;
- At least 60 G but less than 80 G of PCP, or at least 6 G but less than 8 G of PCP (actual);
- At least 30 G but less than 40 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 3 G but less than 4 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 3 G but less than 4 G of "Ice";
- At least 30 G but less than 40 G of Amphetamine, or at least 3 G but less than
4 G of Amphetamine (actual);
- At least 600 MG but less than 800 MG of LSD;
- At least 24 G but less than 32 G of Fentanyl;
- At least 6 G but less than 8 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
- At least 60 KG but less than 80 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 12 KG but less than 16 KG of Hashish;
- At least 1.2 KG but less than 1.6 KG of Hashish Oil;
- At least 60,000 but less than 80,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 60,000 but less than 80,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 3,750 but less than 5,000 units of Flunitrazepam.

Level 20

(10) ● At least 40 G but less than 60 G of Heroin;
   ● At least 200 G but less than 300 G of Cocaine;
   ● At least 3 G but less than 4 G of Cocaine Base;
   ● At least 40 G but less than 60 G of PCP, or at least 4 G but less than 6 G of PCP (actual);
   ● At least 20 G but less than 30 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 2 G but less than 3 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 2 G but less than 3 G of "Ice";
   ● At least 20 G but less than 30 G of Amphetamine, or at least 2 G but less than 3 G of Amphetamine (actual);
   ● At least 400 MG but less than 600 MG of LSD;
   ● At least 16 G but less than 24 G of Fentanyl;
   ● At least 4 G but less than 6 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
   ● At least 40 KG but less than 60 KG of Marihuana;
   ● At least 8 KG but less than 12 KG of Hashish;
   ● At least 800 G but less than 1.2 KG of Hashish Oil;
   ● At least 40,000 but less than 60,000 units of Ketamine;
   ● At least 40,000 but less than 60,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
   ● 40,000 or more units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
   ● At least 2,500 but less than 3,750 units of Flunitrazepam.

Level 18

(11) ● At least 20 G but less than 40 G of Heroin;
   ● At least 100 G but less than 200 G of Cocaine;
   ● At least 2 G but less than 3 G of Cocaine Base;
   ● At least 20 G but less than 40 G of PCP, or at least 2 G but less than 4 G of PCP (actual);
   ● At least 10 G but less than 20 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 1 G but less than 2 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 1 G but less than 2 G of "Ice";
   ● At least 10 G but less than 20 G of Amphetamine, or at least 1 G but less than 2 G of Amphetamine (actual);
   ● At least 200 MG but less than 400 MG of LSD;
   ● At least 8 G but less than 16 G of Fentanyl;
   ● At least 2 G but less than 4 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
   ● At least 20 KG but less than 40 KG of Marihuana;
   ● At least 5 KG but less than 8 KG of Hashish;
   ● At least 500 G but less than 800 G of Hashish Oil;
   ● At least 20,000 but less than 40,000 units of Ketamine;
   ● At least 20,000 but less than 40,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
   ● At least 20,000 but less than 40,000 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
   ● At least 1,250 but less than 2,500 units of Flunitrazepam.

Level 16

(12) ● At least 10 G but less than 20 G of Heroin;

-13-
• At least 50 G but less than 100 G of Cocaine;
• At least 1 G but less than 2 G of Cocaine Base;
• At least 10 G but less than 20 G of PCP, or at least 1 G but less than 2 G of PCP (actual);
• At least 5 G but less than 10 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 500 MG but less than 1 G of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 500 MG but less than 1 G of "Ice";
• At least 5 G but less than 10 G of Amphetamine, or at least 500 MG but less than 1 G of Amphetamine (actual);
• At least 100 MG but less than 200 MG of LSD;
• At least 4 G but less than 8 G of Fentanyl;
• At least 1 G but less than 2 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
• At least 10 KG but less than 20 KG of Marihuana;
• At least 2 KG but less than 5 KG of Hashish;
• At least 200 G but less than 500 G of Hashish Oil;
• At least 10,000 but less than 20,000 units of Ketamine;
• At least 10,000 but less than 20,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
• At least 10,000 but less than 20,000 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
• At least 625 but less than 1,250 units of Flunitrazepam.

(13) • At least 5 G but less than 10 G of Heroin;
• At least 25 G but less than 50 G of Cocaine;
• At least 500 MG but less than 1 G of Cocaine Base;
• At least 5 G but less than 10 G of PCP, or at least 500 MG but less than 1 G of PCP (actual);
• At least 2.5 G but less than 5 G of Methamphetamine, or at least 250 MG but less than 500 MG of Methamphetamine (actual), or at least 250 MG but less than 500 MG of "Ice";
• At least 2.5 G but less than 5 G of Amphetamine, or at least 250 MG but less than 500 MG of Amphetamine (actual);
• At least 50 MG but less than 100 MG of LSD;
• At least 2 G but less than 4 G of Fentanyl;
• At least 500 MG but less than 1 G of a Fentanyl Analogue;
• At least 5 KG but less than 10 KG of Marihuana;
• At least 1 KG but less than 2 KG of Hashish;
• At least 100 G but less than 200 G of Hashish Oil;
• At least 5,000 but less than 10,000 units of Ketamine;
• At least 5,000 but less than 10,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
• At least 5,000 but less than 10,000 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
• At least 312 but less than 625 units of Flunitrazepam.

(14) • Less than 5 G of Heroin;
• Less than 25 G of Cocaine;
• Less than 500 MG of Cocaine Base;
• Less than 5 G of PCP, or less than 500 MG of PCP (actual);
• Less than 2.5 G of Methamphetamine, or less than 250 MG of Methamphetamine (actual), or less than 250 MG of "Ice";
• Less than 2.5 G of Amphetamine, or less than 250 MG of Amphetamine (actual);
• Less than 50 MG of LSD;
• Less than 2 G of Fentanyl;
• Less than 500 MG of a Fentanyl Analogue;
• At least 2.5 KG but less than 5 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 500 G but less than 1 KG of Hashish;
- At least 50 G but less than 100 G of Hashish Oil;
- At least 2,500 but less than 5,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 2,500 but less than 5,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 2,500 but less than 5,000 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
- At least 156 but less than 312 units of Flunitrazepam;
- 40,000 or more units of Schedule IV substances (except Flunitrazepam).

(15) At least 1 KG but less than 2.5 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 200 G but less than 500 G of Hashish;
- At least 20 G but less than 50 G of Hashish Oil;
- At least 1,000 but less than 2,500 units of Ketamine;
- At least 1,000 but less than 2,500 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 1,000 but less than 2,500 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
- At least 62 but less than 156 units of Flunitrazepam;
- At least 16,000 but less than 40,000 units of Schedule IV substances (except Flunitrazepam).

(16) At least 250 G but less than 1 KG of Marihuana;
- At least 50 G but less than 200 G of Hashish;
- At least 5 G but less than 20 G of Hashish Oil;
- At least 250 but less than 1,000 units of Ketamine;
- At least 250 but less than 1,000 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- At least 250 but less than 1,000 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
- Less than 62 units of Flunitrazepam;
- At least 4,000 but less than 16,000 units of Schedule IV substances (except Flunitrazepam);
- 40,000 or more units of Schedule V substances.

(17) Less than 250 G of Marihuana;
- Less than 50 G of Hashish;
- Less than 5 G of Hashish Oil;
- Less than 250 units of Ketamine;
- Less than 250 units of Schedule I or II Depressants;
- Less than 250 units of Schedule III substances (except Ketamine);
- Less than 4,000 units of Schedule IV substances (except Flunitrazepam);
- Less than 40,000 units of Schedule V substances.

*Notes to Drug Quantity Table:

(A) Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance. If a mixture or substance contains more than one controlled substance, the weight of the entire mixture or substance is assigned to the controlled substance that results in the greater offense level.

(B) The terms "PCP (actual)", "Amphetamine (actual)", and "Methamphetamine (actual)" refer to the weight of the controlled substance, itself, contained in the mixture or substance. For example, a mixture weighing 10 grams containing PCP at 50% purity contains 5 grams of PCP (actual). In the case of a mixture or substance containing PCP, amphetamine, or methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance, or the offense level determined by the weight of the PCP (actual), amphetamine (actual), or methamphetamine (actual), whichever
is greater.

The term "Oxycodone (actual)" refers to the weight of the controlled substance, itself, contained in the pill, capsule, or mixture.

(C) "Ice," for the purposes of this guideline, means a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.

(D) "Cocaine base," for the purposes of this guideline, means "crack." "Crack" is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form.

(E) In the case of an offense involving marihuana plants, treat each plant, regardless of sex, as equivalent to 100 G of marihuana. Provided, however, that if the actual weight of the marihuana is greater, use the actual weight of the marihuana.

(F) In the case of Schedule I or II Depressants (except gamma-hydroxybutyric acid), Schedule III substances, Schedule IV substances, and Schedule V substances, one "unit" means one pill, capsule, or tablet. If the substance (except gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) is in liquid form, one "unit" means 0.5 ml. For an anabolic steroid that is not in a pill, capsule, tablet, or liquid form (e.g., patch, topical cream, aerosol), the court shall determine the base offense level using a reasonable estimate of the quantity of anabolic steroid involved in the offense. In making a reasonable estimate, the court shall consider that each 25 mg of an anabolic steroid is one "unit".

(G) In the case of LSD on a carrier medium (e.g., a sheet of blotter paper), do not use the weight of the LSD/carrier medium. Instead, treat each dose of LSD on the carrier medium as equal to 0.4 mg of LSD for the purposes of the Drug Quantity Table.

(H) Hashish, for the purposes of this guideline, means a resinous substance of cannabis that includes (i) one or more of the tetrahydrocannabinols (as listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(25)), (ii) at least two of the following: cannabinol, cannabidiol, or cannabichromene, and (iii) fragments of plant material (such as cystolith fibers).

(I) Hashish oil, for the purposes of this guideline, means a preparation of the soluble cannabinoids derived from cannabis that includes (i) one or more of the tetrahydrocannabinols (as listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(25)), (ii) at least two of the following: cannabinol, cannabidiol, or cannabichromene, and (iii) is essentially free of plant material (e.g., plant fragments). Typically, hashish oil is a viscous, dark colored oil, but it can vary from a dry resin to a colorless liquid.

**Commentary**

Statutory Provisions: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)-(3), (7), (g), 860a, 865, 960(a), (b); 49 U.S.C. § 46317(b). For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1. "Mixture or substance" as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials include the fiberglass in a cocaine/fiberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue, and waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance. If such material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or substance that appropriately is counted in the Drug Quantity Table, the court may use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be counted.
An upward departure nonetheless may be warranted when the mixture or substance counted in the Drug Quantity Table is combined with other, non-countable material in an unusually sophisticated manner in order to avoid detection.

Similarly, in the case of marihuana having a moisture content that renders the marihuana unsuitable for consumption without drying (this might occur, for example, with a bale of rain-soaked marihuana or freshly harvested marihuana that had not been dried), an approximation of the weight of the marihuana without such excess moisture content is to be used.

2. The statute and guideline also apply to "counterfeit" substances, which are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802 to mean controlled substances that are falsely labeled so as to appear to have been legitimately manufactured or distributed.

3. Definitions of "firearm" and "dangerous weapon" are found in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions). The enhancement for weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet. The enhancement also applies to offenses that are referenced to §2D1.1; see §§2D1.2(a)(1) and (2), 2D1.5(a)(1), 2D1.6, 2D1.7(b)(1), 2D1.8, 2D1.11(c)(1), 2D1.12(c)(1), and 2D2.1(b)(1).

4. Distribution of "a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration", 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4), is treated as simple possession, to which §2D2.1 applies.

5. Analogues and Controlled Substances Not Referenced in this Guideline.—Any reference to a particular controlled substance in these guidelines includes all salts, isomers, all salts of isomers, and, except as otherwise provided, any analogue of that controlled substance. Any reference to cocaine includes ecgonine and coca leaves, except extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine and ecgonine have been removed. For purposes of this guideline "analogue" has the meaning given the term "controlled substance analogue" in 21 U.S.C. § 802(32). In determining the appropriate sentence, the court also may consider whether the same quantity of analogue produces a greater effect on the central nervous system than the controlled substance for which it is an analogue.

In the case of a controlled substance that is not specifically referenced in this guideline, determine the base offense level using the marihuana equivalency of the most closely related controlled substance referenced in this guideline. In determining the most closely related controlled substance, the court shall, to the extent practicable, consider the following:

(A) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in this guideline has a chemical structure that is substantially similar to a controlled substance referenced in this guideline.

(B) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in this guideline has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance referenced in this guideline.

(C) Whether a lesser or greater quantity of the controlled substance not referenced in this guideline is needed to produce a substantially similar effect on the central nervous system as a controlled substance referenced in this guideline.

6. Where there are multiple transactions or multiple drug types, the quantities of drugs are to be added. Tables for making the necessary conversions are provided below.
7. Where a mandatory (statutory) minimum sentence applies, this mandatory minimum sentence may be "waived" and a lower sentence imposed (including a downward departure), as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), by reason of a defendant’s "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." See §5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance to Authorities). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) provides an exception to the applicability of mandatory minimum sentences in certain cases. See §5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases).

8. Interaction with §3B1.3.—A defendant who used special skills in the commission of the offense may be subject to an adjustment under §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill). Certain professionals often occupy essential positions in drug trafficking schemes. These professionals include doctors, pilots, boat captains, financiers, bankers, attorneys, chemists, accountants, and others whose special skill, trade, profession, or position may be used to significantly facilitate the commission of a drug offense. Additionally, an enhancement under §3B1.3 ordinarily would apply in a case in which the defendant used his or her position as a coach to influence an athlete to use an anabolic steroid.

Note, however, that if an adjustment from subsection (b)(2)(B) applies, do not apply §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).

9. Trafficking in controlled substances, compounds, or mixtures of unusually high purity may warrant an upward departure, except in the case of PCP, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or oxycodone for which the guideline itself provides for the consideration of purity (see the footnote to the Drug Quantity Table). The purity of the controlled substance, particularly in the case of heroin, may be relevant in the sentencing process because it is probative of the defendant’s role or position in the chain of distribution. Since controlled substances are often diluted and combined with other substances as they pass down the chain of distribution, the fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs. As large quantities are normally associated with high purities, this factor is particularly relevant where smaller quantities are involved.

10. Use of Drug Equivalency Tables.—

(A) Controlled Substances Not Referenced in Drug Quantity Table.—The Commission has used the sentences provided in, and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)), as the primary basis for the guideline sentences. The statute, however, provides direction only for the more common controlled substances, i.e., heroin, cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, fentanyl, LSD and marihuana. In the case of a controlled substance that is not specifically referenced in the Drug Quantity Table, determine the base offense level as follows:

(i) Use the Drug Equivalency Tables to convert the quantity of the controlled substance involved in the offense to its equivalent quantity of marihuana.

(ii) Find the equivalent quantity of marihuana in the Drug Quantity Table.

(iii) Use the offense level that corresponds to the equivalent quantity of marihuana as the base offense level for the controlled substance involved in the offense.

(See also Application Note 5.) For example, in the Drug Equivalency Tables set forth in this Note, 1 gm of a substance containing oxymorphone, a Schedule 1 opiate, converts to an equivalent quantity of 5 kg of marihuana. In a case involving 100 gm of oxymorphone, the equivalent quantity of marihuana would be 500 kg, which corresponds to a base offense level of 28 in the Drug Quantity Table.
Combining Differing Controlled Substances (Except Cocaine Base).—The Drug
Equivalency Tables also provide a means for combining differing controlled substances to
obtain a single offense level. In each case, convert each of the drugs to its marihuana
equivalent, add the quantities, and look up the total in the Drug Quantity Table to obtain
the combined offense level. To determine a single offense level in a case involving cocaine
base and other controlled substances, see subdivision (D) of this note.

For certain types of controlled substances, the marihuana equivalencies in the Drug
Equivalency Tables are "capped" at specified amounts (e.g., the combined equivalent weight
of all Schedule V controlled substances shall not exceed 999 grams of marihuana). Where
there are controlled substances from more than one schedule (e.g., a quantity of a Schedule
IV substance and a quantity of a Schedule V substance), determine the marihuana
equivalency for each schedule separately (subject to the cap, if any, applicable to that
schedule). Then add the marihuana equivalencies to determine the combined marihuana
equivalency (subject to the cap, if any, applicable to the combined amounts).

Note: Because of the statutory equivalences, the ratios in the Drug Equivalency Tables do
not necessarily reflect dosages based on pharmacological equivalents.

Examples for Combining Differing Controlled Substances (Except Cocaine Base).—

(i) The defendant is convicted of selling 70 grams of a substance containing PCP
(Level 22) and 250 milligrams of a substance containing LSD (Level 18). The PCP
converts to 70 kilograms of marihuana; the LSD converts to 25 kilograms of
marihuana. The total is therefore equivalent to 95 kilograms of marihuana, for
which the Drug Quantity Table provides an offense level of 24.

(ii) The defendant is convicted of selling 500 grams of marihuana (Level 8) and five
kilograms of diazepam (Level 8). The diazepam, a Schedule IV drug, is equivalent
to 625 grams of marihuana. The total, 1.125 kilograms of marihuana, has an
offense level of 10 in the Drug Quantity Table.

(iii) The defendant is convicted of selling 80 grams of cocaine (Level 16) and five
kilograms of marihuana (Level 14). The cocaine is equivalent to 16 kilograms of
marihuana. The total is therefore equivalent to 21 kilograms of marihuana, which
has an offense level of 18 in the Drug Quantity Table.

(iv) The defendant is convicted of selling 56,000 units of a Schedule III substance,
100,000 units of a Schedule IV substance, and 200,000 units of a Schedule V
substance. The marihuana equivalency for the Schedule III substance is 56
kilograms of marihuana (below the cap of 59.99 kilograms of marihuana set forth
as the maximum equivalent weight for Schedule III substances). The marihuana
equivalency for the Schedule IV substance is subject to a cap of 4.99 kilograms of
marihuana set forth as the maximum equivalent weight for Schedule IV substances
(without the cap it would have been 6.25 kilograms). The marihuana equivalency
for the Schedule V substance is subject to the cap of 999 grams of marihuana set
forth as the maximum equivalent weight for Schedule V substances (without the cap
it would have been 1.25 kilograms). The combined equivalent weight, determined
by adding together the above amounts, is subject to the cap of 59.99 kilograms of
marihuana set forth as the maximum combined equivalent weight for Schedule III,
IV, and V substances. Without the cap, the combined equivalent weight would have
been 61.99 (56 + 4.99 + .999) kilograms.

Determining Base Offense Level in Offenses Involving Cocaine Base and Other Controlled
Substances.
(i) **In General.**—If the offense involves cocaine base ("crack") and one or more other controlled substance, determine the base offense level as follows:

(I) **Determine the base offense level for the quantity of cocaine base involved in the offense.**

(II) **Using the marihuana equivalency obtained from the table in this subdivision, convert the quantity of cocaine base involved in the offense to its equivalent quantity of marihuana:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Offense Level</th>
<th>Marihuana Equivalency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.7 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>6.7 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>6 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.7 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>14 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.4 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>5 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>16 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>15 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>10 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10 kg of marihuana per g of cocaine base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(III) **Determine the combined marihuana equivalency for the other controlled substance or controlled substances involved in the offense as provided in subdivision (B) of this note:**

(IV) **Add the quantity of marihuana determined under subdivisions (II) and (III), and look up the total in the Drug Quantity Table to obtain the combined base offense level for all the controlled substances involved in the offense.**

(ii) **Example.**—The case involves 1.5 kg of cocaine, 10 kg of marihuana, and 20 g of cocaine base. Under the Drug Quantity Table, 20 g of cocaine base corresponds to a base offense level of 26. Pursuant to the table in subdivision (II), the base offense level of 26 corresponds to a marihuana equivalency of 5 kg per gram of cocaine base. Therefore, the equivalent quantity of marihuana for the cocaine base is 100 kg (20 g x 5 kg = 100 kg). Pursuant to subdivision (B), the equivalent quantity of marihuana for the cocaine and marihuana is 310 kg. (The cocaine converts to an equivalent of 300 kg of marihuana (1.5 kg x 200 g = 300 kg), which, when added to the 10 kg of marihuana, results in an equivalent quantity of 310 kg of marihuana.) Adding the equivalent quantities of marihuana of all three drug types results in a combined quantity of 410 kg of marihuana (100 kg + 310 kg = 410 kg), which corresponds to a combined base offense level of 28 in the Drug Quantity Table.

(D) **Determining Base Offense Level in Offenses Involving Cocaine Base and Other Controlled Substances.**—

(i) **In General.**—Except as provided in subdivision (ii), if the offense involves cocaine
base ("crack") and one or more other controlled substance, determine the combined offense level as provided by subdivision (B) of this note, and reduce the combined offense level by 2 levels.

(ii) Exceptions to 2-level Reduction.—The 2-level reduction provided in subdivision (i) shall not apply in a case in which:

(I) the offense involved more than 4.5 kg, or less than 250 mg, of cocaine base; or

(II) the 2-level reduction results in a combined offense level that is less than the combined offense level that would apply under subdivision (B) of this note if the offense involved only the other controlled substance(s) (i.e., the controlled substance(s) other than cocaine base).

(iii) Examples.—

(I) The case involves 20 gm of cocaine base, 1.5 kg of cocaine, and 10 kg of marihuana. Under the Drug Equivalency Tables in subdivision (E) of this note, 20 gm of cocaine base converts to 400 kg of marihuana (20 gm x 20 kg = 400 kg), and 1.5 kg of cocaine converts to 300 kg of marihuana (1.5 kg x 200 gm = 300 kg), which, when added to the 10 kg of marihuana results in a combined equivalent quantity of 710 kg of marihuana. Under the Drug Quantity Table, 710 kg of marihuana corresponds to a combined offense level of 30, which is reduced by two levels to level 28. For the cocaine and marihuana, their combined equivalent quantity of 310 kg of marihuana corresponds to a combined offense level of 26 under the Drug Quantity Table. Because the combined offense level for all three drug types after the 2-level reduction is not less than the combined base offense level for the cocaine and marihuana, the combined offense level for all three drug types remains level 28.

(II) The case involves 5 gm of cocaine base and 6 kg of heroin. Under the Drug Equivalency Table in subdivision (E) of this note, 5 gm of cocaine base converts to 100 kg of marihuana (5 gm x 20 kg = 100 kg), and 6 kg of heroin converts to 6,000 kg of marihuana (6,000 gm x 1 kg = 6,000 kg), which, when added together results in a combined equivalent quantity of 6,100 kg of marihuana. Under the Drug Quantity Table, 6,100 kg of marihuana corresponds to a combined offense level of 34, which is reduced by two levels to 32. For the heroin, the 6,000 kg of marihuana corresponds to an offense level 34 under the Drug Quantity Table. Because the combined offense level for the two drug types after the 2-level reduction is less than the offense level for the heroin, the reduction does not apply and the combined offense level for the two drugs remains level 34.

(E) Drug Equivalency Tables.—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schedule I or II Opiates*</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of Heroin =</td>
<td>1 kg of marihuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of Alpha-Methylfentanyl =</td>
<td>10 kg of marihuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of Dextromoramide =</td>
<td>670 gm of marihuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of Dipipanone =</td>
<td>250 gm of marihuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of 3-Methylfentanyl =</td>
<td>10 kg of marihuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gm of 1-Methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypip eridine/MPPP =</td>
<td>700 gm of marihuana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 gm of 1-(2-Phenylethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetyloxypiperidine/PEPAP = 700 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Alphaprodine = 100 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Fentanyl (N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] Propanamide) = 2.5 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Hydromorphone/Dihydromorphinone = 2.5 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Levorphanol = 2.5 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Meperidine/Pethidine = 50 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Methadone = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of 6-Monoacetylmorphine = 1 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Morphine = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Oxycodone (actual) = 6700 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Oxymorphone = 5 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Racemorphan = 800 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Codeine = 80 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Dextropropoxyphene/Propoxyphene-Bulk = 50 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Ethylmorphine = 165 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Hydrocodone/Dihydrocodeinone = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Mixed Alkaloids of Opium/Papaveretum = 250 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Opium = 50 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Levo-alpha-acetylmethadol (LAAM)= 3 kg of marihuana

*Provided, that the minimum offense level from the Drug Quantity Table for any of these controlled substances individually, or in combination with another controlled substance, is level 12.

Cocaine and Other Schedule I and II Stimulants (and their immediate precursors)*

1 gm of Cocaine = 200 gm of marihuana
1 gm of N-Ethylamphetamine = 80 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Fenethylline = 40 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Amphetamine = 2 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Amphetamine (Actual) = 20 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Methamphetamine = 2 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Methamphetamine (Actual) = 20 kg of marihuana
1 gm of "Ice" = 20 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Khat = .01 gm of marihuana
1 gm of 4-Methylaminorex ("Euphoria")= 100 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Methylphenidate (Ritalin)= 100 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Phenmetrazine = 80 gm of marihuana
1 gm Phenylacetone/P P (when possessed for the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine) = 416 gm of marihuana
1 gm Phenylacetone/P P (in any other case) = 75 gm of marihuana
1 gm Cocaine Base ("Crack") = 20 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Aminorex = 100 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Methcathinone = 380 gm of marihuana
1 gm of N-N-Dimethylamphetamine = 40 gm of marihuana

*Provided, that the minimum offense level from the Drug Quantity Table for any of these controlled substances individually, or in combination with another controlled substance, is level 12.
LSD, PCP, and Other Schedule I and II Hallucinogens (and their immediate precursors)*

1 gm of Bufotenine = 70 gm of marihuana
1 gm of D-Lysergic Acid Diethylamide/Lysergide/LSD = 100 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Diethyltryptamine/DET = 80 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Dimethyltryptamine/DMT = 100 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Mescaline = 10 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Mushrooms containing Psilocin and/or
Psilocybin (Dry) = 1 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Mushrooms containing Psilocin and/or
Psilocybin (Wet) = 0.1 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Peyote (Dry) = 0.5 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Peyote (Wet) = 0.05 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Phencyclidine/PCP = 1 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Phencyclidine (actual)/PCP (actual) = 10 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Psilocin = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Psilocybin = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Pyrrolidine Analog of Phencyclidine/PHP = 1 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Thiophene Analog of Phencyclidine/TCP = 1 kg of marihuana
1 gm of 4-Bromo-2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine/DOB = 2.5 kg of marihuana
1 gm of 2,5-Dimethoxy-4-methylamphetamine/DOM = 1.67 kg of marihuana
1 gm of 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine/MDA = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine/MDMA = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of 3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine/MDEA = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Paramethoxymethamphetamine/PMA = 500 gm of marihuana
1 gm of 1-Piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile/PCC = 680 gm of marihuana
1 gm of N-ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine (PCE) = 1 kg of marihuana

*Provided, that the minimum offense level from the Drug Quantity Table for any of these controlled substances individually, or in combination with another controlled substance, is level 12.

Schedule I Marihuana

1 gm of Marihuana/Cannabis, granulated, powdered, etc. = 1 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Hashish Oil = 50 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Cannabis Resin or Hashish = 5 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Tetrahydrocannabinol, Organic = 167 gm of marihuana
1 gm of Tetrahydrocannabinol, Synthetic = 167 gm of marihuana

Flunitrazepam **

1 unit of Flunitrazepam = 16 gm of marihuana

**Provided, that the minimum offense level from the Drug Quantity Table for flunitrazepam individually, or in combination with any Schedule I or II depressants, Schedule III substances, Schedule IV substances, and Schedule V substances is level 8.

Schedule I or II Depressants (except gamma-hydroxybutyric acid)
1 unit of a Schedule I or II Depressant (except gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) = 1 gm of marihuana

Gamma-hydroxybutyric Acid

1 ml of gamma-hydroxybutyric acid = 8.8 gm of marihuana

Schedule III Substances (except ketamine)***

1 unit of a Schedule III Substance = 1 gm of marihuana

***Provided, that the combined equivalent weight of all Schedule III substances, Schedule IV substances (except flunitrazepam), and Schedule V substances shall not exceed 59.99 kilograms of marihuana.

Ketamine

1 unit of ketamine = 1 gm of marihuana

Schedule IV Substances (except flunitrazepam)****

1 unit of a Schedule IV Substance
(except Flunitrazepam)= 0.0625 gm of marihuana

****Provided, that the combined equivalent weight of all Schedule IV (except flunitrazepam) and V substances shall not exceed 4.99 kilograms of marihuana.

Schedule V Substances*****

1 unit of a Schedule V Substance = 0.00625 gm of marihuana

*****Provided, that the combined equivalent weight of Schedule V substances shall not exceed 999 grams of marihuana.

List I Chemicals (relating to the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine)******

1 gm of Ephedrine = 10 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Phenylpropanolamine = 10 kg of marihuana
1 gm of Pseudoephedrine = 10 kg of marihuana

******Provided, that in a case involving ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine tablets, use the weight of the ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine contained in the tablets, not the weight of the entire tablets, in calculating the base offense level.

Date Rape Drugs (except flunitrazepam, GHB, or ketamine)

1 ml of 1,4-butanediol = 8.8 gm marihuana
1 ml of gamma butyrolactone = 8.8 gm marihuana

To facilitate conversions to drug equivalencies, the following table is provided:

**MEASUREMENT CONVERSION TABLE**

1 oz = 28.35 gm  
1 lb = 453.6 gm  
1 lb = 0.4536 kg  
1 gal = 3.785 liters  
1 qt = 0.946 liters  
1 gm = 1 ml (liquid)  
1 liter = 1,000 ml  
1 kg = 1,000 gm  
1 gm = 1,000 mg  
1 grain = 64.8 mg.

11. If the number of doses, pills, or capsules but not the weight of the controlled substance is known, multiply the number of doses, pills, or capsules by the typical weight per dose in the table below to estimate the total weight of the controlled substance (e.g., 100 doses of Mescaline at 500 mg per dose = 50 gms of mescaline). The Typical Weight Per Unit Table, prepared from information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration, displays the typical weight per dose, pill, or capsule for certain controlled substances. Do not use this table if any more reliable estimate of the total weight is available from case-specific information.

**TYPICAL WEIGHT PER UNIT (DOSE, PILL, OR CAPSULE) TABLE**

**Hallucinogens**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Weight (mg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMA</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mescaline</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peyote (dry)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peyote (wet)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psilocin*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psilocybe mushrooms (dry)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psilocybe mushrooms (wet)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psilocybin*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,5-Dimethoxy-4-methylamphetamine (STP, DOM)*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Marihuana**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Weight (gm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 marihuana cigarette</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stimulants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Weight (mg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methamphetamine*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenmetrazine (Preludin)*</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*For controlled substances marked with an asterisk, the weight per unit shown is the weight of the actual controlled substance, and not generally the weight of the mixture or substance containing the controlled substance. Therefore, use of this table provides a very conservative estimate of the total weight.

12. Types and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the offense level. See §1B1.3(a)(2) (Relevant Conduct). Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. In making this determination, the court may consider, for example, the price generally obtained for the controlled substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory involved.

If the offense involved both a substantive drug offense and an attempt or conspiracy (e.g., sale of five grams of heroin and an attempt to sell an additional ten grams of heroin), the total quantity involved shall be aggregated to determine the scale of the offense.

In an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to determine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. For example, a defendant agrees to sell 500 grams of cocaine, the transaction is completed by the delivery of the controlled substance - actually 480 grams of cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. In this example, the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense. In contrast, in a reverse sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance would more accurately reflect the scale of the offense because the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the defendant. If, however, the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase, or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing.

13. Certain pharmaceutical preparations are classified as Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substances by the Drug Enforcement Administration under 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13-15 even though they contain a small amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance. For example, Tylenol 3 is classified as a Schedule III controlled substance even though it contains a small amount of codeine, a Schedule II opiate. For the purposes of the guidelines, the classification of the controlled substance under 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13-15 is the appropriate classification.

14. If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance, thereby leading to the defendant’s purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted.

15. LSD on a blotter paper carrier medium typically is marked so that the number of doses ("hits") per sheet readily can be determined. When this is not the case, it is to be presumed that each 1/4 inch by 1/4 inch section of the blotter paper is equal to one dose.

In the case of liquid LSD (LSD that has not been placed onto a carrier medium), using the weight
of the LSD alone to calculate the offense level may not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense. In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted.

16. In an extraordinary case, an upward departure above offense level 38 on the basis of drug quantity may be warranted. For example, an upward departure may be warranted where the quantity is at least ten times the minimum quantity required for level 38. Similarly, in the case of a controlled substance for which the maximum offense level is less than level 38, an upward departure may be warranted if the drug quantity substantially exceeds the quantity for the highest offense level established for that particular controlled substance.

17. For purposes of the guidelines, a "plant" is an organism having leaves and a readily observable root formation (e.g., a marihuana cutting having roots, a rootball, or root hairs is a marihuana plant).

18. If the offense involved importation of amphetamine or methamphetamine, and an adjustment from subsection (b)(2) applies, do not apply subsection (b)(4).

19. Hazardous or Toxic Substances.—Subsection (b)(10)(A) applies if the conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) involved any discharge, emission, release, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal violation covered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b); or 49 U.S.C. § 5124 (relating to violations of laws and regulations enforced by the Department of Transportation with respect to the transportation of hazardous material). In some cases, the enhancement under subsection (b)(10)(A) may not account adequately for the seriousness of the environmental harm or other threat to public health or safety (including the health or safety of law enforcement and cleanup personnel). In such cases, an upward departure may be warranted. Additionally, in determining the amount of restitution under §5E1.1 (Restitution) and in fashioning appropriate conditions of probation and supervision under §§5B1.3 (Conditions of Probation) and 5D1.3 (Conditions of Supervised Release), respectively, any costs of environmental cleanup and harm to individuals or property shall be considered by the court in cases involving the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine and should be considered by the court in cases involving the manufacture of a controlled substance other than amphetamine or methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(q) (mandatory restitution for cleanup costs relating to the manufacture of amphetamine and methamphetamine).

20. Substantial Risk of Harm Associated with the Manufacture of Amphetamine and Methamphetamine.—

(A) Factors to Consider.—In determining, for purposes of subsection (b)(10)(C)(ii) or (D), whether the offense created a substantial risk of harm to human life or the environment, the court shall include consideration of the following factors:

(i) The quantity of any chemicals or hazardous or toxic substances found at the laboratory, and the manner in which the chemicals or substances were stored.

(ii) The manner in which hazardous or toxic substances were disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment of hazardous or toxic substances.

(iii) The duration of the offense, and the extent of the manufacturing operation.

(iv) The location of the laboratory (e.g., whether the laboratory is located in a...
residential neighborhood or a remote area), and the number of human lives placed at substantial risk of harm.

(B) Definitions.—For purposes of subsection (b)(10)(D):

"Incompetent" means an individual who is incapable of taking care of the individual’s self or property because of a mental or physical illness or disability, mental retardation, or senility.

"Minor" has the meaning given that term in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §2A3.1 (Criminal Sexual Abuse).

21. Applicability of Subsection (b)(11).—The applicability of subsection (b)(11) shall be determined without regard to whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that subjects the defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Section §5C1.2(b), which provides a minimum offense level of level 17, is not pertinent to the determination of whether subsection (b)(11) applies.

22. Imposition of Consecutive Sentence for 21 U.S.C. § 860a or § 865.—Sections 860a and 865 of title 21, United States Code, require the imposition of a mandatory consecutive term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years and 15 years, respectively. In order to comply with the relevant statute, the court should determine the appropriate "total punishment" and divide the sentence on the judgment form between the sentence attributable to the underlying drug offense and the sentence attributable to 21 U.S.C. § 860a or § 865, specifying the number of months to be served consecutively for the conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 860a or § 865. For example, if the applicable adjusted guideline range is 151-188 months and the court determines a "total punishment" of 151 months is appropriate, a sentence of 130 months for the underlying offense plus 21 months for the conduct covered by 21 U.S.C. § 860a or § 865 would achieve the "total punishment" in a manner that satisfies the statutory requirement of a consecutive sentence.

23. Application of Subsection (b)(6).—For purposes of subsection (b)(6), "mass-marketing by means of an interactive computer service" means the solicitation, by means of an interactive computer service, of a large number of persons to induce those persons to purchase a controlled substance. For example, subsection (b)(6) would apply to a defendant who operated a web site to promote the sale of Gamma-hydroxybutyric Acid (GHB) but would not apply to coconspirators who use an interactive computer service only to communicate with one another in furtherance of the offense. "Interactive computer service", for purposes of subsection (b)(6) and this note, has the meaning given that term in section 230(e)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)).

24. Application of Subsection (e)(1).—

(A) Definition.—For purposes of this guideline, "sexual offense" means a "sexual act" or "sexual contact" as those terms are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) and (3), respectively.

(B) Upward Departure Provision.—If the defendant committed a sexual offense against more than one individual, an upward departure would be warranted.

25. Application of Subsection (b)(7).—For purposes of subsection (b)(7), "masking agent" means a substance that, when taken before, after, or in conjunction with an anabolic steroid, prevents the detection of the anabolic steroid in an individual’s body.

26. Application of Subsection (b)(8).—For purposes of subsection (b)(8), "athlete" means an
individual who participates in an athletic activity conducted by (i) an intercollegiate athletic association or interscholastic athletic association; (ii) a professional athletic association; or (iii) an amateur athletic organization.

Background: Offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 receive identical punishment based upon the quantity of the controlled substance involved, the defendant’s criminal history, and whether death or serious bodily injury resulted from the offense.

The base offense levels in §2D1.1 are either provided directly by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 or are proportional to the levels established by statute, and apply to all unlawful trafficking. Levels 32 and 26 in the Drug Quantity Table are the distinctions provided by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act; however, further refinement of drug amounts is essential to provide a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses. To determine these finer distinctions, the Commission consulted numerous experts and practitioners, including authorities at the Drug Enforcement Administration, chemists, attorneys, probation officers, and members of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, who also advocate the necessity of these distinctions. Where necessary, this scheme has been modified in response to specific congressional directives to the Commission.

The base offense levels at levels 26 and 32 establish guideline ranges with a lower limit as close to the statutory minimum as possible; e.g., level 32 ranges from 121 to 151 months, where the statutory minimum is ten years or 120 months.

For marihuana plants, the Commission has adopted an equivalency of 100 grams per plant, or the actual weight of the usable marihuana, whichever is greater. The decision to treat each plant as equal to 100 grams is premised on the fact that the average yield from a mature marihuana plant equals 100 grams of marihuana. In controlled substance offenses, an attempt is assigned the same offense level as the object of the attempt. Consequently, the Commission adopted the policy that each plant is to be treated as the equivalent of an attempt to produce 100 grams of marihuana, except where the actual weight of the usable marihuana is greater.

Specific Offense Characteristic (b)(2) is derived from Section 6453 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

Frequently, a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment is required by statute for offenses covered by this guideline. Guidelines for the imposition, duration, and conditions of supervised release are set forth in Chapter Five, Part D (Supervised Release).

Because the weights of LSD carrier media vary widely and typically far exceed the weight of the controlled substance itself, the Commission has determined that basing offense levels on the entire weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but different carrier weights), as well as sentences disproportionate to those for other, more dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP. Consequently, in cases involving LSD contained in a carrier medium, the Commission has established a weight per dose of 0.4 milligram for purposes of determining the base offense level.

The dosage weight of LSD selected exceeds the Drug Enforcement Administration’s standard dosage unit for LSD of 0.05 milligram (i.e., the quantity of actual LSD per dose) in order to assign some weight to the carrier medium. Because LSD typically is marketed and consumed orally on a carrier medium, the inclusion of some weight attributable to the carrier medium recognizes (A) that offense levels for most other controlled substances are based upon the weight of the mixture containing the controlled substance without regard to purity, and (B) the decision in Chapman v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1919 (1991) (holding that the term "mixture or substance" in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) includes the carrier medium in which LSD is absorbed). At the same time, the weight per dose selected is less than
the weight per dose that would equate the offense level for LSD on a carrier medium with that for the same number of doses of PCP, a controlled substance that comparative assessments indicate is more likely to induce violent acts and ancillary crime than is LSD. (Treating LSD on a carrier medium as weighing 0.5 milligram per dose would produce offense levels equivalent to those for PCP.) Thus, the approach decided upon by the Commission will harmonize offense levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled substances and avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the applicable offense level. Nonetheless, this approach does not override the applicability of "mixture or substance" for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; §5G1.1(b)).

Subsection (b)(10)(A) implements the instruction to the Commission in section 303 of Public Law 103–237.

Subsections (b)(10)(C)(ii) and (D) implement, in a broader form, the instruction to the Commission in section 102 of Public Law 106–310.
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment expands the listing in §1B1.10(c) to include Amendment 715 as an amendment that may be considered for retroactive application.

§1B1.10. Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)

(a) Authority.—

(1) In General.—In a case in which a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c) below, the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), any such reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment shall be consistent with this policy statement.

(2) Exclusions.—A reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if—

(A) none of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant; or

(B) an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.

(3) Limitation.—Consistent with subsection (b), proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.

(b) Determination of Reduction in Term of Imprisonment.—

(1) In General.—In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement is warranted, the court shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced. In making such determination, the court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.

(2) Limitations and Prohibition on Extent of Reduction.—

(A) In General.—Except as provided in subdivision (B), the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.
determined under subdivision (1) of this subsection.

(B) Exception.—If the original term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this subsection may be appropriate. However, if the original term of imprisonment constituted a non-guideline sentence determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a further reduction generally would not be appropriate.

(C) Prohibition.—In no event may the reduced term of imprisonment be less than the term of imprisonment the defendant has already served.

c) Covered Amendments.—Amendments covered by this policy statement are listed in Appendix C as follows: 126, 130, 156, 176, 269, 329, 341, 371, 379, 380, 433, 454, 461, 484, 488, 490, 499, 505, 506, 516, 591, 599, 606, 657, 702, and 706 as amended by 711, and 715.

Commentary

Application Notes:

1. Application of Subsection (a).—

(A) Eligibility.—Eligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an amendment listed in subsection (c) that lowers the applicable guideline range. Accordingly, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with this policy statement if: (i) none of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant; or (ii) an amendment listed in subsection (c) is applicable to the defendant but the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).

(B) Factors for Consideration.—

(i) In General.—Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the court shall consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining: (I) whether a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted; and (II) the extent of such reduction, but only within the limits described in subsection (b).

(ii) Public Safety Consideration.—The court shall consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment in determining: (I) whether such a reduction is warranted; and (II) the extent of such reduction, but only within the limits described in subsection (b).
(iii) Post-Sentencing Conduct.—The court may consider post-sentencing conduct of the defendant that occurred after imposition of the original term of imprisonment in determining: (I) whether a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted; and (II) the extent of such reduction, but only within the limits described in subsection (b).

2. Application of Subsection (b)(1).—In determining the amended guideline range under subsection (b)(1), the court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced. All other guideline application decisions remain unaffected.

3. Application of Subsection (b)(2).—Under subsection (b)(2), the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) and the term of imprisonment already served by the defendant limit the extent to which the court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement. Specifically, if the original term of imprisonment imposed was within the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing, the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment to a term that is less than the minimum term of imprisonment provided by the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1). For example, in a case in which: (A) the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing was 41 to 51 months; (B) the original term of imprisonment imposed was 41 months; and (C) the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) is 30 to 37 months, the court shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment to a term less than 30 months.

If the original term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) may be appropriate. For example, in a case in which: (A) the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing was 70 to 87 months; (B) the defendant’s original term of imprisonment imposed was 56 months (representing a downward departure of 20 percent below the minimum term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing); and (C) the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) is 57 to 71 months, a reduction to a term of imprisonment of 46 months (representing a reduction of approximately 20 percent below the minimum term of imprisonment provided by the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1)) would amount to a comparable reduction and may be appropriate.

In no case, however, shall the term of imprisonment be reduced below time served. Subject to these limitations, the sentencing court has the discretion to determine whether, and to what extent, to reduce a term of imprisonment under this section.

4. Supervised Release.—

(A) Exclusion Relating to Revocation.—Only a term of imprisonment imposed as part of the original sentence is authorized to be reduced under this section. This section does not authorize a reduction in the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release.

(B) Modification Relating to Early Termination.—If the prohibition in subsection (b)(2)(C) relating to time already served precludes a reduction in the term of imprisonment to the extent the court determines otherwise would have been appropriate as a result of the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1), the court may consider any such reduction that it was unable to grant in connection with any motion for early
termination of a term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). However, the fact that a defendant may have served a longer term of imprisonment than the court determines would have been appropriate in view of the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1) shall not, without more, provide a basis for early termination of supervised release. Rather, the court should take into account the totality of circumstances relevant to a decision to terminate supervised release, including the term of supervised release that would have been appropriate in connection with a sentence under the amended guideline range determined under subsection (b)(1).

Background: Section 3582(c)(2) of Title 18, United States Code, provides: "[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."

This policy statement provides guidance and limitations for a court when considering a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and implements 28 U.S.C. § 994(u), which provides: "If the Commission reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced."

Among the factors considered by the Commission in selecting the amendments included in subsection (c) were the purpose of the amendment, the magnitude of the change in the guideline range made by the amendment, and the difficulty of applying the amendment retroactively to determine an amended guideline range under subsection (b)(1).

The listing of an amendment in subsection (c) reflects policy determinations by the Commission that a reduced guideline range is sufficient to achieve the purposes of sentencing and that, in the sound discretion of the court, a reduction in the term of imprisonment may be appropriate for previously sentenced, qualified defendants. The authorization of such a discretionary reduction does not otherwise affect the lawfulness of a previously imposed sentence, does not authorize a reduction in any other component of the sentence, and does not entitle a defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment as a matter of right.

The Commission has not included in this policy statement amendments that generally reduce the maximum of the guideline range by less than six months. This criterion is in accord with the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (formerly § 994(t)), which states: "It should be noted that the Committee does not expect that the Commission will recommend adjusting existing sentences under the provision when guidelines are simply refined in a way that might cause isolated instances of existing sentences falling above the old guidelines or when there is only a minor downward adjustment in the guidelines. The Committee does not believe the courts should be burdened with adjustments in these cases." S. Rep. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1983).
EXHIBIT C

Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment makes technical corrections to various guidelines.

First, the proposed amendment modifies §2B1.1(b)(11) to correct a clerical error.

Second, the proposed amendment addresses section 121 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–177, (the "USA PATRIOT Act"). The USA PATRIOT Act changed the definition of "contraband cigarette" in subsection (2) of 18 U.S.C. § 2341 to include the failure to pay local cigarette taxes. Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the definition covered only the failure to pay state cigarette taxes. Section 121 of the PATRIOT Act also reduced the number of contraband cigarettes necessary to violate the substantive offenses set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2342 (Unlawful acts) and 2344 (Penalties) from 60,000 to 10,000.

Violations involving contraband cigarettes are referenced to §2E4.1 (Unlawful Conduct Relating to Contraband Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco) in Appendix A (Statutory Index). The Commission amended the background commentary at §2E4.1 to reflect the change in the number of contraband cigarettes and expanded the headings of Chapter Two, Part E, Subpart 4 and §2E4.1 to include smokeless tobacco. See Amendment 700, USSG App. C. However, the amendment to §2E4.1 did not reflect the statutory inclusion of failure to pay local cigarette taxes in 18 U.S.C. § 2341.

The proposed amendment amends §2E4.1 to incorporate the statutory language regarding failure to pay local cigarette taxes. Currently, Application Note 1 at §2E4.1 provides that the "tax evaded" refers to state excise tax. The proposed amendment expands the meaning of "tax evaded" at Application Note 1 to include local excise taxes. The proposed amendment also amends the background commentary at §2E4.1 to include local excise taxes.

Third, the proposed amendment implements the technical corrections made by Pub. L. 110–161 regarding offenses referenced to §2X7.1 (Border Tunnels and Subterranean Passages).

Fourth, the proposed amendment corrects a statutory reference included in §3C1.4 (False Registration of Domain Name), which provides a two-level adjustment for a case in which a particular statutory enhancement applies. At the time of promulgation of this guideline, the referenced statutory enhancement was at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(1). See Amendment 689, USSG App. C. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the "Adam Walsh Act"), Pub. L. 109–248, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3559 by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g) and inserting a new subsection (f). This proposed amendment changes the statutory reference in §3C1.4 to reflect the redesignation of subsection (f) to subsection (g) of section 3339.

Fifth, the proposed amendment addresses statutory changes to 18 U.S.C. § 1512. In 2002, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) and (b) (Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant) as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (the "Act"), Pub. L. 107–273. Section 3001 of the Act moved the elements of "physical force" and "threat of physical force" from 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) into subsection (a). Thus, section 1512(b) now punishes only intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion, misleading conduct, and attempts. The Act also added at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(3)(C) a ten-year statutory maximum penalty in the case of "the threat of physical force against any person". In order to reflect the statutory changes, the proposed amendment modifies the statutory index by deleting the references in Appendix A to §§2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder) and 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault) for 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), and adding those guidelines as references for 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a). The proposed amendment also adds a reference to §2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice) for 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) to reflect the broad range of obstructive conduct now covered in that section, including the threat of
physical force against a witness.

Sixth, the proposed amendment refers offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (Genocide) to §2H1.1 (Offenses Involving Individual Rights) in Appendix A. Appendix A currently refers offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1091 to §2H1.3 (Use of Force or Threat of Force to Deny Benefits or Rights in Furtherance of Discrimination; Damage to Religious Real Property), but this guideline no longer exists. Amendment 521, which became effective November 1, 1995, consolidated §§2H1.2 (Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights), 2H1.3, 2H1.4 (Interference with Civil Rights Under Color of Law) and 2H1.5 (Other Deprivations of Rights or Benefits in Furtherance of Discrimination) into §2H1.1. This proposed amendment would make a conforming change to Appendix A.

Proposed Amendment

§2B1.1. **Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States**

* * *

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics

* * *

(11) If the offense involved an organized scheme to steal or to receive stolen (A) vehicles or vehicle parts; or (B) goods or chattels that are part of a cargo shipment, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 14, increase to level 14.

* * *

§2E4.1. **Unlawful Conduct Relating to Contraband Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco**

* * *

Commentary

* * *

Application Note:

1. "Tax evaded" refers to state and local excise taxes.

Background: The conduct covered by this section generally involves evasion of state and local excise taxes. At least 10,000 cigarettes must be involved. Because this offense is basically a tax matter, it is graded by use of the tax table in §2T4.1.

§2X7.1. **Border Tunnels and Subterranean Passages**

(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 5545(c), 4 plus the
offense level applicable to the underlying smuggling offense. If the resulting offense level is less than level 16, increase to level 16.

(2) 16, if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 5545(a); or

(3) 8, if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 5545(b).

Commentary


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Appendix A (Statutory Index)

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18 U.S.C. § 554
(Smuggling goods from the United States)

18 U.S.C. § 5545
(Border tunnels and passages)

§3C1.4. False Registration of Domain Name

If a statutory enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(fg)(1) applies, increase by 2 levels.

* * *

Appendix A (Statutory Index)

* * *

18 U.S.C. § 1511 2E3.1, 2J1.2
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) 2A1.1, 2A1.2, 2A1.3, 2A2.1, 2A2.2, 2A2.3, 2J1.2
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) 2A1.2, 2A2.2, 2J1.2
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)
18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)

Appendix A (Statutory Index)

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18 U.S.C. § 1091 2H1.32H1.1

* * *
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment implements the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–81 (the "Act"). The Act creates a new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 227 (Wrongfully influencing a private entity’s employment decisions by a member of Congress), which provides: "Whoever, being a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress or an employee of either House of Congress, with the intent to influence, solely on the basis of partisan political affiliation, an employment decision or employment practice of any private entity – (1) takes or withholds, or offers or threatens to take or withhold, an official act, or (2) influences, or offers or threatens to influence, the official act of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States".

The proposed amendment amends Appendix A to reference offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 227 to §2C1.1 (Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions).

§2C1.1. **Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions**

* * *

Commentary

Statutory Provisions: 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1), (2), 226, 227, 371 (if conspiracy to defraud by interference with governmental functions), 872, 1341 (if the scheme or artifice to defraud was to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services of a public official), 1342 (if the scheme or artifice to defraud was to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services of a public official), 1343 (if the scheme or artifice to defraud was to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services of a public official), 1951. For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

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APPENDIX A - STATUTORY INDEX

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18 U.S.C. § 226 2C1.1
18 U.S.C. § 227 2C1.1
18 U.S.C. § 228 2J1.1
EXHIBIT E

Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment implements the Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–22 (the "Act"). The Act amends the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156, to increase penalties for existing offenses and to create a new offense. Specifically, the Act increases penalties for criminal violations of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 from a maximum term of one year of imprisonment to a maximum term of not more than three years of imprisonment. The penalties are now set forth in section 49 of title 18, United States Code. In addition, the Act created a new offense at 7 U.S.C. § 2156(e) which makes it unlawful to "sell, buy, transport, or deliver in interstate or foreign commerce a knife, a gaff, or any other sharp instrument attached, or designed or intended to be attached, to the leg of a bird for use in an animal fighting venture." The term "animal fighting venture", an element of each criminal offense in 7 U.S.C. § 2156, is defined at subsection (g) as "... any event which involves a fight between at least two animals and is conducted for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment . . .".

The proposed amendment deletes the reference of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 to §2X5.2 (Class A Misdemeanors) in Appendix A and deletes the listing of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 from the statutory provision listed in the commentary to §2X5.2 because violations of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 are now felony offenses. The proposed amendment references offenses under 7 U.S.C. § 2156 to §2E3.1 (Gambling Offenses).

The proposed amendment also creates a new alternative base offense level at §2E3.1(b)(2) that provides a base offense level of 10 if the offense involved an "animal fighting venture", which is defined in proposed Application Note 1 as having the meaning given that term in 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g). Additionally, the proposed amendment adds an instruction to apply the greatest applicable base offense level at §2E3.1(a) because an offense involving an animal fighting venture may also involve conduct covered by subsection (a)(1).

The proposed amendment also provides an upward departure provision if an offense involves extraordinary cruelty, e.g. maiming or death, to an animal.

Finally, the proposed amendment expands the title of §2E3.1 to include animal fighting offenses.

§2E3.1. Gambling Offenses; Animal Fighting Offenses

(a) Base Offense Level: (Apply the greatest)

(1) 12, if the offense was (A) engaging in a gambling business; (B) transmission of wagering information; or (C) committed as part of, or to facilitate, a commercial gambling operation; or

(2) 10, if the offense involved an animal fighting venture; or

(23) 6, otherwise.

Commentary


Application Notes:
1. "Animal fighting venture" has the meaning given that term in 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g).

2. If the offense involved extraordinary cruelty to an animal that resulted in, for example, maiming or death to an animal, an upward departure may be warranted.

§2X5.2. Class A Misdemeanors (Not Covered by Another Specific Offense Guideline)

(a) Base Offense Level: 6

Commentary


* * *

Appendix A - Statutory Index

7 U.S.C. § 2156  2X5.2E3.1
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment implements the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110—177 (the "Act"). Among other things, the Act at sections 201 and 202, respectively creates two new offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1521 (Retaliating against a Federal judge or Federal law enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title), and 18 U.S.C. § 119 (Protection of individuals performing certain official duties).

The new provision at 18 U.S.C. § 1521 prohibits the filing of, attempts, or conspiracies to file, any false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of officers or employees of the United States Government, on account of that individual’s performance of official duties. The offense is punishable by a maximum term of 10 years of imprisonment. The proposed amendment refers offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1521 to guideline 2A6.1 (Threatening or Harassing Communications; Hoaxes). The proposed amendment creates a new enhancement at subsection (b)(2) that provides a 2-level enhancement if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521 and the offense involved more than two false liens or encumbrances. An upward departure provision is added if the offense involved substantially more than two false liens or encumbrances.

In addition, the proposed amendment provides an upward departure provision to address substantial pecuniary harm.

The proposed amendment also adds a new Application Note 2 addressing the applicability of Chapter Three Adjustments, specifically providing that, if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, guideline 3A1.2 (Official Victim) applies.

The second new offense, 18 U.S.C. § 119, prohibits the public disclosure of restricted personal information about a federal officer or employee, witness, juror, or the immediate family member of such persons, with the intent to threaten or facilitate a crime of violence against such person. The offense is punishable by a maximum term of 5 years of imprisonment.

The proposed amendment refers offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 119 to guideline 2H3.1 (Interception of Communications; Eavesdropping; Disclosure of Certain Private or Protected Information). The proposed amendment creates a new enhancement at subsection (b)(2) that provides a 8-level enhancement if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 119, or a 10-level enhancement if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 119, and the offense involved the use of a computer or interactive computer service to make restricted personal information about a covered person publicly available. The proposed amendment also adds a new Application Note 3 addressing the inapplicability of guideline 3A1.2 (Official Victim) if the enhancement under subsection (b)(2) applies, and provides definitions of certain terms for purposes of subsection (b)(3).

§2A6.1. Threatening or Harassing Communications; Hoaxes; False Liens

(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) 12; or

(2) 6, if the defendant is convicted of an offense under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), (D), or (E) that did not involve a threat to injure a person or property.

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat, increase by 6 levels.

(2) If (A) the offense involved more than two threats; or (B) the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521 and the offense involved more than two false liens or encumbrances, increase by 2 levels.

(3) If the offense involved the violation of a court protection order, increase by 2 levels.

(4) If the offense resulted in (A) substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or services; or (B) a substantial expenditure of funds to clean up, decontaminate, or otherwise respond to the offense, increase by 4 levels.

(5) If (A) subsection (a)(2) and subdivisions (1), (2), (3), and (4) do not apply, and (B) the offense involved a single instance evidencing little or no deliberation, decrease by 4 levels.

(c) Cross Reference

(1) If the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to carry out a threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(B), (C), and (D), apply §2M6.1 (Weapons of Mass Destruction), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined under this guideline.

Commentary

Statutory Provisions: 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(c), 35(b), 871, 876, 877, 878(a), 879, 1038, 1521, 1992(a)(9), (a)(10), 2291(a)(8), 2291(e), 2292, 2332b(a)(2); 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C)-(E); 49 U.S.C. § 46507. For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1. Scope of Conduct to Be Considered.—In determining whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall consider both conduct that occurred prior to the offense and conduct that occurred during the offense; however, conduct that occurred prior to the offense must be substantially and directly connected to the offense, under the facts of the case taken as a whole. For example, if the defendant engaged in several acts of mailing threatening letters to the same victim over a period of years (including acts that occurred prior to the offense), then for purposes of determining whether subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) apply, the court shall consider only those prior acts of threatening the victim that have a substantial and direct connection to the offense.

2. Applicability of Chapter Three Adjustments.—If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1521, apply §3A1.2 (Official Victim).

23. Grouping.—For purposes of Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts), multiple counts involving making a threatening or harassing communication to the same victim are grouped together under §3D1.2 (Groups of Closely Related Counts). Multiple counts involving different victims are not to be grouped under §3D1.2.
34. Departure Provisions.—

(A) In General.—The Commission recognizes that offenses covered by this guideline may include a particularly wide range of conduct and that it is not possible to include all of the potentially relevant circumstances in the offense level. Factors not incorporated in the guideline may be considered by the court in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted. See Chapter Five, Part K (Departures).

(B) Multiple Threats or Victims.—If the offense involved substantially more than two threatening communications to the same victim or a prolonged period of making harassing communications to the same victim, or if the offense involved multiple victims, an upward departure may be warranted.

(B) Multiple Threats, False Liens or Encumbrances, or Victims; Pecuniary Harm.—If the offense involved (i) substantially more than two threatening communications to the same victim, (ii) a prolonged period of making harassing communications to the same victim, (iii) substantially more than two false liens or encumbrances against the real or personal property of the same victim, (iv) multiple victims, or (v) substantial pecuniary harm to the victim, an upward departure may be warranted.

Background: These statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends upon the defendant’s intent and the likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat. The specific offense characteristics are intended to distinguish such cases.

Appendix A Statutory Index

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18 U.S.C. § 1520  2E5.3
18 U.S.C. § 1521  2A6.1
§2H3.1. **Interception of Communications; Eavesdropping; Disclosure of Certain Private or Protected Information**

(a) **Base Offense Level (Apply the greater):**

(1) 9; or

(2) 6, if the offense of conviction has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less but more than six months.

(b) **Specific Offense Characteristics**

(1) If (A) the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(d) or (e); or (B) the purpose of the offense was to obtain direct or indirect commercial advantage or economic gain, increase by 3 levels.

(2) (Apply the greater) If—

(A) the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 119, increase by 8 levels; or

(B) the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 119, and the offense involved the use of a computer or interactive computer service to make restricted personal information about a covered person publicly available, increase by 10 levels.

(c) **Cross Reference**

(1) If the purpose of the offense was to facilitate another offense, apply the guideline applicable to an attempt to commit that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

**Commentary**


Application Notes:

1. **Satellite Cable Transmissions**—If the offense involved interception of satellite cable transmissions for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain (including avoiding payment of fees), apply §2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright) rather than this guideline.

2. **Imposition of Sentence for 18 U.S.C. § 1039(d) and (e)**—Subsections 1039(d) and (e) of title 18, United States Code, require a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years to be imposed in addition to any sentence imposed for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a), (b), or (c). In order to comply with the statute, the court should determine the appropriate "total punishment"
and divide the sentence on the judgment form between the sentence attributable to the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(d) or (e) and the sentence attributable to the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a), (b), or (c), specifying the number of months to be served for the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(d) or (e). For example, if the applicable adjusted guideline range is 15-21 months and the court determines a "total punishment" of 21 months is appropriate, a sentence of 9 months for conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a) plus 12 months for 18 U.S.C. § 1039(d) conduct would achieve the "total punishment" in a manner that satisfies the statutory requirement.

3. **Inapplicability of Chapter Three (Adjustments).—**If the enhancement under subsection (b)(2) applies, do not apply §3A1.2 (Official Victim).

4. **Definitions.**—For purposes of subsection (b)(2):

"Computer" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).

"Covered person" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 119(b).

"Interactive computer service" has the meaning given that term in section 230(e)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)).

"Restricted personal information" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 119(b).

35. **Upward Departure.**—There may be cases in which the offense level determined under this guideline substantially understates the seriousness of the offense. In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted. The following are examples of cases in which an upward departure may be warranted:

(i) The offense involved confidential phone records information or tax return information of a substantial number of individuals.

(ii) The offense caused or risked substantial non-monetary harm (e.g., physical harm, psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma, or resulted in a substantial invasion of privacy interest) to individuals whose private or protected information was obtained.

Appendix A Statutory Index

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18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4) 2A6.1
18 U.S.C. § 1521 2H3.1
EXHIBIT G


The proposed amendment, in Subpart 2, discusses the role of the guidelines, their evolution, and Supreme Court caselaw.

Amendment:

Chapter One is amended by striking the heading to the Chapter, Part A in its entirety, and the Editorial Note to Part A, and inserting the following:

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION, AUTHORITY, AND GENERAL APPLICATION PRINCIPLES

PART A - INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY

Introductory Commentary

Subparts 1 and 2 of this Part provide an introduction to the Guidelines Manual describing the historical development and evolution of the federal sentencing guidelines. Subpart 1 sets forth the original introduction to the Guidelines Manual as it first appeared in 1987, with the inclusion of amendments made occasionally thereto between 1987 and 2000. The original introduction, as so amended, explained a number of policy decisions made by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") when it promulgated the initial set of guidelines and therefore provides a useful reference for contextual and historical purposes. Subpart 2 further describes the evolution of the federal sentencing guidelines after the initial guidelines were promulgated.

Subpart 3 of this Part states the authority of the Commission to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and commentary.

1. ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION TO THE GUIDELINES MANUAL

The following provisions of this subpart set forth the original introduction to this manual, effective November 1, 1987, and as amended through November 1, 2000:

1. Authority

The United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") is an independent agency in the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members. Its principal purpose is to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.
The guidelines and policy statements promulgated by the Commission are issued pursuant to Section 994(a) of Title 28, United States Code.

2. **The Statutory Mission**

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal sentencing process.

The Act contains detailed instructions as to how this determination should be made, the most important of which directs the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics. An offense behavior category might consist, for example, of "bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken." An offender characteristic category might be "offender with one prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment." The Commission is required to prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories with the offender characteristic categories. Where the guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be narrow: the maximum of the range cannot exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25 percent or six months. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).

Pursuant to the Act, the sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed range. In that case, the court must specify reasons for departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). If the court sentences within the guideline range, an appellate court may review the sentence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly applied. If the court departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may review the reasonableness of the departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The Act also abolishes parole, and substantially reduces and restructures good behavior adjustments.

The Commission’s initial guidelines were submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987. After the prescribed period of Congressional review, the guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date. The Commission has the authority to submit guideline amendments each year to Congress between the beginning of a regular Congressional session and May 1. Such amendments automatically take effect 180 days after submission unless a law is enacted to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).

The initial sentencing guidelines and policy statements were developed after extensive hearings, deliberation, and consideration of substantial public comment. The Commission emphasizes, however, that it views the guideline-writing process as evolutionary. It expects, and the governing statute anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions to the guidelines through submission of amendments to Congress. To this end, the Commission is established as a permanent agency to monitor sentencing practices in the federal courts.

3. **The Basic Approach (Policy Statement)**

To understand the guidelines and their underlying rationale, it is important to focus on the three objectives that Congress sought to achieve in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Act’s basic objective was to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system. To achieve this end, Congress first sought honesty in sentencing. It sought to avoid the confusion and implicit
deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system which required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would serve in prison. This practice usually resulted in a substantial reduction in the effective length of the sentence imposed, with defendants often serving only about one-third of the sentence imposed by the court.

Second, Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. Third, Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.

Honesty is easy to achieve: the abolition of parole makes the sentence imposed by the court the sentence the offender will serve, less approximately fifteen percent for good behavior. There is a tension, however, between the mandate of uniformity and the mandate of proportionality. Simple uniformity -- sentencing every offender to five years -- destroys proportionality. Having only a few simple categories of crimes would make the guidelines uniform and easy to administer, but might lump together offenses that are different in important respects. For example, a single category for robbery that included armed and unarmed robberies, robberies with and without injuries, robberies of a few dollars and robberies of millions, would be far too broad.

A sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case would quickly become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent effect. For example: a bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept hidden (or brandished), might have frightened (or merely warned), injured seriously (or less seriously), tied up (or simply pushed) a guard, teller, or customer, at night (or at noon), in an effort to obtain money for other crimes (or for other purposes), in the company of a few (or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) time.

The list of potentially relevant features of criminal behavior is long; the fact that they can occur in multiple combinations means that the list of possible permutations of factors is virtually endless. The appropriate relationships among these different factors are exceedingly difficult to establish, for they are often context specific. Sentencing courts do not treat the occurrence of a simple bruise identically in all cases, irrespective of whether that bruise occurred in the context of a bank robbery or in the context of a breach of peace. This is so, in part, because the risk that such a harm will occur differs depending on the underlying offense with which it is connected; and also because, in part, the relationship between punishment and multiple harms is not simply additive. The relation varies depending on how much other harm has occurred. Thus, it would not be proper to assign points for each kind of harm and simply add them up, irrespective of context and total amounts.

The larger the number of subcategories of offense and offender characteristics included in the guidelines, the greater the complexity and the less workable the system. Moreover, complex combinations of offense and offender characteristics would apply and interact in unforeseen ways to unforeseen situations, thus failing to cure the unfairness of a simple, broad category system. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, probation officers and courts, in applying a complex system having numerous subcategories, would be required to make a host of decisions regarding whether the underlying facts were sufficient to bring the case within a particular subcategory. The greater the number of decisions required and the greater their complexity, the greater the risk that different courts would apply the guidelines differently to situations that, in fact, are similar, thereby reintroducing the very disparity that the guidelines were designed to reduce.
In view of the arguments, it would have been tempting to retreat to the simple, broad category approach and to grant courts the discretion to select the proper point along a broad sentencing range. Granting such broad discretion, however, would have risked correspondingly broad disparity in sentencing, for different courts may exercise their discretionary powers in different ways. Such an approach would have risked a return to the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission to reduce and would have been contrary to the Commission’s mandate set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

In the end, there was no completely satisfying solution to this problem. The Commission had to balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed, complex subcategorization, and within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the discretionary powers of the sentencing court. Any system will, to a degree, enjoy the benefits and suffer from the drawbacks of each approach.

A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment. Most observers of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is the control of crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus seems to break down. Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of "just deserts." Under this principle, punishment should be scaled to the offender’s culpability and the resulting harms. Others argue that punishment should be imposed primarily on the basis of practical "crime control" considerations. This theory calls for sentences that most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime, either by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.

Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to choose between them and accord one primacy over the other. As a practical matter, however, this choice was unnecessary because in most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will produce the same or similar results.

In its initial set of guidelines, the Commission sought to solve both the practical and philosophical problems of developing a coherent sentencing system by taking an empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating pre-guidelines sentencing practice. It analyzed data drawn from 10,000 presentence investigations, the differing elements of various crimes as distinguished in substantive criminal statutes, the United States Parole Commission’s guidelines and statistics, and data from other relevant sources in order to determine which distinctions were important in pre-guidelines practice. After consideration, the Commission accepted, modified, or rationalized these distinctions.

This empirical approach helped the Commission resolve its practical problem by defining a list of relevant distinctions that, although of considerable length, was short enough to create a manageable set of guidelines. Existing categories are relatively broad and omit distinctions that some may believe important, yet they include most of the major distinctions that statutes and data suggest made a significant difference in sentencing decisions. Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably will occur rarely and sentencing courts may take such unusual cases into account by departing from the guidelines.

The Commission’s empirical approach also helped resolve its philosophical dilemma. Those who adhere to a just deserts philosophy may concede that the lack of consensus might make it difficult to say exactly what punishment is deserved for a particular crime. Likewise, those who subscribe to a philosophy of crime control may acknowledge that the lack of sufficient data might make it difficult to determine exactly the punishment that will best prevent that crime. Both groups might therefore recognize the wisdom of looking to those
distinctions that judges and legislators have, in fact, made over the course of time. These established distinctions are ones that the community believes, or has found over time, to be important from either a just deserts or crime control perspective.

The Commission did not simply copy estimates of pre-guidelines practice as revealed by the data, even though establishing offense values on this basis would help eliminate disparity because the data represent averages. Rather, it departed from the data at different points for various important reasons. Congressional statutes, for example, suggested or required departure, as in the case of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that imposed increased and mandatory minimum sentences. In addition, the data revealed inconsistencies in treatment, such as punishing economic crime less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior.

Despite these policy-oriented departures from pre-guidelines practice, the guidelines represent an approach that begins with, and builds upon, empirical data. The guidelines will not please those who wish the Commission to adopt a single philosophical theory and then work deductively to establish a simple and perfect set of categorizations and distinctions. The guidelines may prove acceptable, however, to those who seek more modest, incremental improvements in the status quo, who believe the best is often the enemy of the good, and who recognize that these guidelines are, as the Act contemplates, but the first step in an evolutionary process. After spending considerable time and resources exploring alternative approaches, the Commission developed these guidelines as a practical effort toward the achievement of a more honest, uniform, equitable, proportional, and therefore effective sentencing system.

4. The Guidelines’ Resolution of Major Issues (Policy Statement)

The guideline-drafting process required the Commission to resolve a host of important policy questions typically involving rather evenly balanced sets of competing considerations. As an aid to understanding the guidelines, this introduction briefly discusses several of those issues; commentary in the guidelines explains others.

(a) Real Offense vs. Charge Offense Sentencing.

One of the most important questions for the Commission to decide was whether to base sentences upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted ("real offense" sentencing), or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted ("charge offense" sentencing). A bank robber, for example, might have used a gun, frightened bystanders, taken $50,000, injured a teller, refused to stop when ordered, and raced away damaging property during his escape. A pure real offense system would sentence on the basis of all identifiable conduct. A pure charge offense system would overlook some of the harms that did not constitute statutory elements of the offenses of which the defendant was convicted.

The Commission initially sought to develop a pure real offense system. After all, the pre-guidelines sentencing system was, in a sense, this type of system. The sentencing court and the parole commission took account of the conduct in which the defendant actually engaged, as determined in a presentence report, at the sentencing hearing, or before a parole commission hearing officer. The Commission’s initial efforts in this direction, carried out in the spring and early summer of 1986, proved unproductive, mostly for practical reasons. To make such a system work, even to formalize and rationalize the status quo, would have required the Commission to decide precisely which harms to take into account, how to add
them up, and what kinds of procedures the courts should use to determine the presence or absence of disputed factual elements. The Commission found no practical way to combine and account for the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances; nor did it find a practical way to reconcile the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure with the need for a speedy sentencing process given the potential existence of hosts of adjudicated "real harm" facts in many typical cases. The effort proposed as a solution to these problems required the use of, for example, quadratic roots and other mathematical operations that the Commission considered too complex to be workable. In the Commission’s view, such a system risked return to wide disparity in sentencing practice.

In its initial set of guidelines submitted to Congress in April 1987, the Commission moved closer to a charge offense system. This system, however, does contain a significant number of real offense elements. For one thing, the hundreds of overlapping and duplicative statutory provisions that make up the federal criminal law forced the Commission to write guidelines that are descriptive of generic conduct rather than guidelines that track purely statutory language. For another, the guidelines take account of a number of important, commonly occurring real offense elements such as role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken, through alternative base offense levels, specific offense characteristics, cross references, and adjustments.

The Commission recognized that a charge offense system has drawbacks of its own. One of the most important is the potential it affords prosecutors to influence sentences by increasing or decreasing the number of counts in an indictment. Of course, the defendant’s actual conduct (that which the prosecutor can prove in court) imposes a natural limit upon the prosecutor’s ability to increase a defendant’s sentence. Moreover, the Commission has written its rules for the treatment of multicount convictions with an eye toward eliminating unfair treatment that might flow from count manipulation. For example, the guidelines treat a three-count indictment, each count of which charges sale of 100 grams of heroin or theft of $10,000, the same as a single-count indictment charging sale of 300 grams of heroin or theft of $30,000. Furthermore, a sentencing court may control any inappropriate manipulation of the indictment through use of its departure power. Finally, the Commission will closely monitor charging and plea agreement practices and will make appropriate adjustments should they become necessary.

(b) Departures.

The sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline-specified sentence only when it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. Section 5H1.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status), §5H1.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circumstances), the third sentence of §5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse), the last sentence of §5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress), and §5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative Efforts) list several factors that the court cannot take into account as grounds for departure. With those specific exceptions, however, the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.
The Commission has adopted this departure policy for two reasons. First, it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision. The Commission also recognizes that the initial set of guidelines need not do so. The Commission is a permanent body, empowered by law to write and rewrite guidelines, with progressive changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.

Second, the Commission believes that despite the courts’ legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often. This is because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors that the Commission’s data indicate made a significant difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice. Thus, for example, where the presence of physical injury made an important difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice (as in the case of robbery or assault), the guidelines specifically include this factor to enhance the sentence. Where the guidelines do not specify an augmentation or diminution, this is generally because the sentencing data did not permit the Commission to conclude that the factor was empirically important in relation to the particular offense. Of course, an important factor (e.g., physical injury) may infrequently occur in connection with a particular crime (e.g., fraud). Such rare occurrences are precisely the type of events that the courts’ departure powers were designed to cover -- unusual cases outside the range of the more typical offenses for which the guidelines were designed.

It is important to note that the guidelines refer to two different kinds of departure. The first involves instances in which the guidelines provide specific guidance for departure by analogy or by other numerical or non-numerical suggestions. The Commission intends such suggestions as policy guidance for the courts. The Commission expects that most departures will reflect the suggestions and that the courts of appeals may prove more likely to find departures "unreasonable" where they fall outside suggested levels.

A second type of departure will remain unguided. It may rest upon grounds referred to in Chapter Five, Part K (Departures) or on grounds not mentioned in the guidelines. While Chapter Five, Part K lists factors that the Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure, the list is not exhaustive. The Commission recognizes that there may be other grounds for departure that are not mentioned; it also believes there may be cases in which a departure outside suggested levels is warranted. In its view, however, such cases will be highly infrequent.

(c) Plea Agreements.

Nearly ninety percent of all federal criminal cases involve guilty pleas and many of these cases involve some form of plea agreement. Some commentators on early Commission guideline drafts urged the Commission not to attempt any major reforms of the plea agreement process on the grounds that any set of guidelines that threatened to change pre-guidelines practice radically also threatened to make the federal system unmanageable. Others argued that guidelines that failed to control and limit plea agreements would leave untouched a "loophole" large enough to undo the good that sentencing guidelines would bring.

The Commission decided not to make major changes in plea agreement practices in the initial guidelines, but rather to provide guidance by issuing general policy statements concerning the acceptance of plea agreements in Chapter Six, Part B (Plea Agreements).
rules set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) govern the acceptance or rejection of such agreements. The Commission will collect data on the courts’ plea practices and will analyze this information to determine when and why the courts accept or reject plea agreements and whether plea agreement practices are undermining the intent of the Sentencing Reform Act. In light of this information and analysis, the Commission will seek to further regulate the plea agreement process as appropriate. Importantly, if the policy statements relating to plea agreements are followed, circumvention of the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines should not occur.

The Commission expects the guidelines to have a positive, rationalizing impact upon plea agreements for two reasons. First, the guidelines create a clear, definite expectation in respect to the sentence that a court will impose if a trial takes place. In the event a prosecutor and defense attorney explore the possibility of a negotiated plea, they will no longer work in the dark. This fact alone should help to reduce irrationality in respect to actual sentencing outcomes. Second, the guidelines create a norm to which courts will likely refer when they decide whether, under Rule 11(e), to accept or to reject a plea agreement or recommendation.

(d) Probation and Split Sentences.

The statute provides that the guidelines are to "reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). Under pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sentenced to probation an inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes, such as theft, tax evasion, antitrust offenses, insider trading, fraud, and embezzlement, that in the Commission’s view are "serious."

The Commission’s solution to this problem has been to write guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for which probation previously was frequently given and provide for at least a short period of imprisonment in such cases. The Commission concluded that the definite prospect of prison, even though the term may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent, particularly when compared with pre-guidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the norm.

More specifically, the guidelines work as follows in respect to a first offender. For offense levels one through eight, the sentencing court may elect to sentence the offender to probation (with or without confinement conditions) or to a prison term. For offense levels nine and ten, the court may substitute probation for a prison term, but the probation must include confinement conditions (community confinement, intermittent confinement, or home detention). For offense levels eleven and twelve, the court must impose at least one-half the minimum confinement sentence in the form of prison confinement, the remainder to be served on supervised release with a condition of community confinement or home detention. The Commission, of course, has not dealt with the single acts of aberrant behavior that still may justify probation at higher offense levels through departures.*

*Note: Although the Commission had not addressed "single acts of aberrant behavior" at the time the Introduction to the Guidelines Manual originally was written, it subsequently addressed the issue in Amendment 603, effective November 1, 2000. (See Supplement to Appendix C, amendment 603.)

(e) Multi-Count Convictions.

The Commission, like several state sentencing commissions, has found it particularly...
difficult to develop guidelines for sentencing defendants convicted of multiple violations of law, each of which makes up a separate count in an indictment. The difficulty is that when a defendant engages in conduct that causes several harms, each additional harm, even if it increases the extent to which punishment is warranted, does not necessarily warrant a proportionate increase in punishment. A defendant who assaults others during a fight, for example, may warrant more punishment if he injures ten people than if he injures one, but his conduct does not necessarily warrant ten times the punishment. If it did, many of the simplest offenses, for reasons that are often fortuitous, would lead to sentences of life imprisonment -- sentences that neither just deserts nor crime control theories of punishment would justify.

Several individual guidelines provide special instructions for increasing punishment when the conduct that is the subject of that count involves multiple occurrences or has caused several harms. The guidelines also provide general rules for aggravating punishment in light of multiple harms charged separately in separate counts. These rules may produce occasional anomalies, but normally they will permit an appropriate degree of aggravation of punishment for multiple offenses that are the subjects of separate counts.

These rules are set out in Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts). They essentially provide: (1) when the conduct involves fungible items (e.g., separate drug transactions or thefts of money), the amounts are added and the guidelines apply to the total amount; (2) when nonfungible harms are involved, the offense level for the most serious count is increased (according to a diminishing scale) to reflect the existence of other counts of conviction. The guidelines have been written in order to minimize the possibility that an arbitrary casting of a single transaction into several counts will produce a longer sentence. In addition, the sentencing court will have adequate power to prevent such a result through departures.

(f) Regulatory Offenses.

Regulatory statutes, though primarily civil in nature, sometimes contain criminal provisions in respect to particularly harmful activity. Such criminal provisions often describe not only substantive offenses, but also more technical, administratively-related offenses such as failure to keep accurate records or to provide requested information. These statutes pose two problems: first, which criminal regulatory provisions should the Commission initially consider, and second, how should it treat technical or administratively-related criminal violations?

In respect to the first problem, the Commission found that it could not comprehensively treat all regulatory violations in the initial set of guidelines. There are hundreds of such provisions scattered throughout the United States Code. To find all potential violations would involve examination of each individual federal regulation. Because of this practical difficulty, the Commission sought to determine, with the assistance of the Department of Justice and several regulatory agencies, which criminal regulatory offenses were particularly important in light of the need for enforcement of the general regulatory scheme. The Commission addressed these offenses in the initial guidelines.

In respect to the second problem, the Commission has developed a system for treating technical recordkeeping and reporting offenses that divides them into four categories. First, in the simplest of cases, the offender may have failed to fill out a form intentionally, but without knowledge or intent that substantive harm would likely follow. He might fail, for example, to keep an accurate record of toxic substance transport, but that failure may not lead, nor be likely to lead, to the release or improper handling of any toxic substance.
Second, the same failure may be accompanied by a significant likelihood that substantive harm will occur; it may make a release of a toxic substance more likely. Third, the same failure may have led to substantive harm. Fourth, the failure may represent an effort to conceal a substantive harm that has occurred.

The structure of a typical guideline for a regulatory offense provides a low base offense level (e.g., 6) aimed at the first type of recordkeeping or reporting offense. Specific offense characteristics designed to reflect substantive harms that do occur in respect to some regulatory offenses, or that are likely to occur, increase the offense level. A specific offense characteristic also provides that a recordkeeping or reporting offense that conceals a substantive offense will have the same offense level as the substantive offense.

(g) Sentencing Ranges.

In determining the appropriate sentencing ranges for each offense, the Commission estimated the average sentences served within each category under the pre-guidelines sentencing system. It also examined the sentences specified in federal statutes, in the parole guidelines, and in other relevant, analogous sources. The Commission’s Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines (1987) contains a comparison between estimates of pre-guidelines sentencing practice and sentences under the guidelines.

While the Commission has not considered itself bound by pre-guidelines sentencing practice, it has not attempted to develop an entirely new system of sentencing on the basis of theory alone. Guideline sentences, in many instances, will approximate average pre-guidelines practice and adherence to the guidelines will help to eliminate wide disparity. For example, where a high percentage of persons received probation under pre-guidelines practice, a guideline may include one or more specific offense characteristics in an effort to distinguish those types of defendants who received probation from those who received more severe sentences. In some instances, short sentences of incarceration for all offenders in a category have been substituted for a pre-guidelines sentencing practice of very wide variability in which some defendants received probation while others received several years in prison for the same offense. Moreover, inasmuch as those who pleaded guilty under pre-guidelines practice often received lesser sentences, the guidelines permit the court to impose lesser sentences on those defendants who accept responsibility for their misconduct. For defendants who provide substantial assistance to the government in the investigation or prosecution of others, a downward departure may be warranted.

The Commission has also examined its sentencing ranges in light of their likely impact upon prison population. Specific legislation, such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the career offender provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (28 U.S.C. § 994(h)), required the Commission to promulgate guidelines that will lead to substantial prison population increases. These increases will occur irrespective of the guidelines. The guidelines themselves, insofar as they reflect policy decisions made by the Commission (rather than legislated mandatory minimum or career offender sentences), are projected to lead to an increase in prison population that computer models, produced by the Commission and the Bureau of Prisons in 1987, estimated at approximately 10 percent over a period of ten years.

(h) The Sentencing Table.

The Commission has established a sentencing table that for technical and practical reasons contains 43 levels. Each level in the table prescribes ranges that overlap with the ranges in the preceding and succeeding levels. By overlapping the ranges, the table should
discourage unnecessary litigation. Both prosecution and defense will realize that the difference between one level and another will not necessarily make a difference in the sentence that the court imposes. Thus, little purpose will be served in protracted litigation trying to determine, for example, whether $10,000 or $11,000 was obtained as a result of a fraud. At the same time, the levels work to increase a sentence proportionately. A change of six levels roughly doubles the sentence irrespective of the level at which one starts. The guidelines, in keeping with the statutory requirement that the maximum of any range cannot exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25 percent or six months (28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)), permit courts to exercise the greatest permissible range of sentencing discretion. The table overlaps offense levels meaningfully, works proportionately, and at the same time preserves the maximum degree of allowable discretion for the court within each level.

Similarly, many of the individual guidelines refer to tables that correlate amounts of money with offense levels. These tables often have many rather than a few levels. Again, the reason is to minimize the likelihood of unnecessary litigation. If a money table were to make only a few distinctions, each distinction would become more important and litigation over which category an offender fell within would become more likely. Where a table has many small monetary distinctions, it minimizes the likelihood of litigation because the precise amount of money involved is of considerably less importance.

5. A Concluding Note

The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial guidelines with considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal statutes in the United States Code. It began with those that were the basis for a significant number of prosecutions and sought to place them in a rational order. It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of these provisions and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied upon pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports, the parole guidelines, and policy judgments.

The Commission recognizes that some will criticize this approach as overly cautious, as representing too little a departure from pre-guidelines sentencing practice. Yet, it will cure wide disparity. The Commission is a permanent body that can amend the guidelines each year. Although the data available to it, like all data, are imperfect, experience with the guidelines will lead to additional information and provide a firm empirical basis for consideration of revisions.

Finally, the guidelines will apply to more than 90 percent of all felony and Class A misdemeanor cases in the federal courts. Because of time constraints and the nonexistence of statistical information, some offenses that occur infrequently are not considered in the guidelines. Their exclusion does not reflect any judgment regarding their seriousness and they will be addressed as the Commission refines the guidelines over time.

2. CONTINUING EVOLUTION AND ROLE OF THE GUIDELINES

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 changed the course of federal sentencing. Among other things, the Act created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent agency in the Judicial Branch, and directed it to develop guidelines and policy statements for sentencing courts to use when sentencing offenders convicted of federal crimes. Moreover, it empowered the Commission with ongoing responsibilities to monitor the guidelines, submit to Congress appropriate modifications of the guidelines and recommended changes in criminal statutes, and establish
education and research programs. The mandate rested on congressional awareness that sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body to revise sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new criminal statutes are enacted, and as more is learned about what motivates and controls criminal behavior.

This statement finds resonance in a line of Supreme Court cases that, taken together, echo two themes. The first theme is that the guidelines are the product of a deliberative process that seeks to embody the purposes of sentencing set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act, and as such they continue to play an important role in the sentencing court’s determination of an appropriate sentence in a particular case. The Supreme Court alluded to this in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld the constitutionality of both the federal sentencing guidelines and the Commission against nondelegation and separation of powers challenges. Therein the Court stated:

Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate. Although Congress has delegated significant discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analysis of existing sentencing practice and alternative sentencing models, . . . [w]e have no doubt that in the hands of the Commission the criteria which Congress has supplied are wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose of the Act. Id. at 379 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

The continuing importance of the guidelines in federal sentencing was further acknowledged by the Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), even as that case rendered the guidelines advisory in nature. In Booker, the Court held that the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court reasoned that an advisory guideline system, while lacking the mandatory features that Congress enacted, retains other features that help to further congressional objectives, including providing certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted. The Court concluded that an advisory guideline system would "continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary." Id. at 264-65. An advisory guideline system continues to assure transparency by requiring that sentences be based on articulated reasons stated in open court that are subject to appellate review. An advisory guideline system also continues to promote certainty and predictability in sentencing, thereby enabling the parties to better anticipate the likely sentence based on the individualized facts of the case.

The continuing importance of the guidelines in the sentencing determination is predicated in large part on the Sentencing Reform Act’s intent that, in promulgating guidelines, the Commission must take into account the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(f), 991(b)(1). The Supreme Court reinforced this view in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), which held that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence imposed by a district court within a properly calculated guideline range without violating the Sixth Amendment. In Rita, the Court relied heavily on the complementary roles of the Commission and the sentencing court in federal sentencing, stating:

[T]he presumption reflects the nature of the Guidelines-writing task that Congress set for the Commission and the manner in which the Commission carried out that task. In instructing both the sentencing judge and the Commission what to do, Congress referred to the basic sentencing objectives that the statute sets forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . The provision also tells the sentencing judge to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with" the basic aims of sentencing as set out above. . . . Congressional statutes then tell the Commission to write Guidelines that will carry out these same § 3553(a) objectives . . . Id. at 2463 (emphasis in original).

The Court concluded that "[t]he upshot is that the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale," id., and that the Commission’s process for promulgating guidelines results in "a set of Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice." Id. at 2464.

Consequently, district courts are required to properly calculate and consider the guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (a)(5); Booker, 543 U.S. 264 ("[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account when sentencing"), Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007) ("[a]s a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark."). The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence in a particular case, therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy statements, and then the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465. The appellate court engages in a two-step process upon review. The appellate court "first ensure[s] that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range. . . [and] then consider[s] the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range." Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

The second and related theme resonant in this line of Supreme Court cases is that, as contemplated by the Sentencing Reform Act, the guidelines are evolutionary in nature. They are the product of the Commission’s fulfillment of its statutory duties to monitor federal sentencing law and practices, to seek public input on the operation of the guidelines, and to revise the guidelines accordingly. As the Court acknowledged in Rita:

The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and the Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process. The sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases may depart (either pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines sentence). The judges will set forth their reasons. The Courts of Appeals will determine the reasonableness of the resulting sentence. The Commission will collect and examine the results. In doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others. And it can revise the Guidelines accordingly. Id. at 2464.

See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 ("the Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research, and revising the Guidelines accordingly"); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 ("even though the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, they are, as we pointed out in Rita, the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.").

Provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act promote and facilitate this evolutionary process. For example, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(x), the Commission publishes guideline amendment proposals in the Federal Register and conducts hearings to solicit input on those proposals from experts and other members of the public. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), the Commission
periodically reviews and revises the guidelines in consideration of comments it receives from members of the federal criminal justice system, including the courts, probation officers, the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Prisons, defense attorneys, and the federal public defenders, and in consideration of data it receives from sentencing courts and other sources. Statutory mechanisms such as these bolster the Commission’s ability to take into account fully the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) in its promulgation of the guidelines.

Congress retains authority to require certain sentencing practices and may exercise its authority through specific directives to the Commission with respect to the guidelines. As the Supreme Court noted in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 571 (2007), "Congress knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms. For example, Congress has specifically required the Sentencing Commission to set Guideline sentences for serious recidivist offenders ‘at or near’ the statutory maximum." See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).

As envisioned by Congress, implemented by the Commission, and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, the guidelines are the product of a deliberative and dynamic process that seeks to embody within federal sentencing policy the purposes of sentencing set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act. As such, the guidelines continue to be a key component of federal sentencing and to play an important role in the sentencing court’s determination of an appropriate sentence in any particular case.

3. AUTHORITY

§1A3.1 Authority

The guidelines, policy statements, and commentary set forth in this Guidelines Manual, including amendments thereto, are promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to: (1) section 994(a) of title 28, United States Code; and (2) with respect to guidelines, policy statements, and commentary promulgated or amended pursuant to specific congressional directive, pursuant to the authority contained in that directive in addition to the authority under section 994(a) of title 28, United States Code.
EXHIBIT H

Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment repromulgates the temporary emergency amendment, effective February 6, 2008, that responded to the directive in section 5 of the "Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007," Pub. L. 110–179 (the "Act"). The directive, which required the Commission to promulgate an amendment under emergency amendment authority by February 6, 2008, provides that the Commission forthwith shall—

promulgate sentencing guidelines or amend existing sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for persons convicted of fraud or theft offenses in connection with a major disaster declaration under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5170) or an emergency declaration under section 501 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5191); and

submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives an explanation of actions taken by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) and any additional policy recommendations the Commission may have for combating offenses described in that paragraph . . . .

Section 5(b) of the Act further requires the Commission to—

(1) ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements reflect the serious nature of the offenses described in subsection (a) and the need for aggressive and appropriate law enforcement action to prevent such offenses;
(2) assure reasonable consistency with other relevant directives and with other guidelines;
(3) account for any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that might justify exceptions, including circumstances for which the sentencing guidelines currently provide sentencing enhancements;
(4) make any necessary conforming changes to the sentencing guidelines; and
(5) assure that the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.

The emergency amendment created a new two-level enhancement in §2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States) if the offense involved fraud or theft involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with a declaration of a major disaster or an emergency, and added a corresponding application note.

The emergency amendment added a new subdivision (IV) to Application Note 3(A)(v) of §2B1.1 providing that in disaster fraud cases, "reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the administrative costs to any federal, state, or local government entity or any commercial or not-for-profit entity of recovering the benefit from any recipient thereof who obtained the benefit through fraud or was otherwise ineligible for the benefit that were reasonably foreseeable."

The emergency amendment also provided a reference to §2B1.1 in Appendix A (Statutory Index) for the new offense at 18 U.S.C. § 1040, which criminalizes the commission of a fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits, and is punishable by a maximum
term of imprisonment of thirty years.

The proposed amendment repromulgates the emergency amendment as a permanent amendment to §2B1.1 with the following changes.

First, the proposed amendment expands the scope of subsection (b)(16) to include all conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040. The effect would be to expand the scope of the enhancement to include frauds or thefts involving procurement of property or services as a contractor, subcontractor or supplier, rather than limiting it to the conduct described in the emergency directive from Congress.

Second, the proposed amendment deletes subdivision (IV) to Application Note 3(A)(v) of §2B1.1 added by the temporary amendment. This subdivision provides that in disaster fraud cases, "reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the administrative costs to any federal, state, or local government entity of recovering the benefit from any recipient thereof who obtained the benefit through fraud or was otherwise ineligible for the benefit that were reasonably foreseeable." The proposed amendment deletes this provision to address concerns that administrative costs might be difficult to determine or in some instances could overrepresent the harm caused by the offense.

Third, the proposed amendment modifies subsection (b)(16) to include a minimum offense level of 12. The Commission frequently adopts a minimum offense level in circumstances where, as in these cases loss, as calculated by the guidelines, is difficult to compute or does not adequately account for the harm caused by the offense.

Finally, the proposed amendment includes a downward departure provision that may apply in a case in which the minimum offense level under subsection (b)(16) applies, the defendant is a victim of a major disaster or emergency, and the benefits received illegally were only an extension or overpayment of benefits received legitimately.

§2B1.1. Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States

(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) 7, if (A) the defendant was convicted of an offense referenced to this guideline; and (B) that offense of conviction has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years or more; or

(2) 6, otherwise.

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics

(1) If the loss exceeded $5,000, increase the offense level as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loss (Apply the Greatest)</th>
<th>Increase in Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) $5,000 or less</td>
<td>no increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) More than $5,000</td>
<td>add 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(C) More than $10,000 add 4
(D) More than $30,000 add 6
(E) More than $70,000 add 8
(F) More than $120,000 add 10
(G) More than $200,000 add 12
(H) More than $400,000 add 14
(I) More than $1,000,000 add 16
(J) More than $2,500,000 add 18
(K) More than $7,000,000 add 20
(L) More than $20,000,000 add 22
(M) More than $50,000,000 add 24
(N) More than $100,000,000 add 26
(O) More than $200,000,000 add 28
(P) More than $400,000,000 add 30.

(2) (Apply the greatest) If the offense—

(A) (i) involved 10 or more victims; or (ii) was committed through mass-marketing, increase by 2 levels;

(B) involved 50 or more victims, increase by 4 levels; or

(C) involved 250 or more victims, increase by 6 levels.

(3) If the offense involved a theft from the person of another, increase by 2 levels.

(4) If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property, increase by 2 levels.

(5) If the offense involved misappropriation of a trade secret and the defendant knew or intended that the offense would benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, increase by 2 levels.

(6) If the offense involved theft of, damage to, or destruction of, property from a national cemetery or veterans’ memorial, increase by 2 levels.

(7) If (A) the defendant was convicted of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1037; and (B) the offense involved obtaining electronic mail addresses through improper means, increase by 2 levels.

(8) If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization, or a government agency; (B) a misrepresentation or other fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding; (C) a violation of any prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines; or (D) a misrepresentation to a consumer in connection with obtaining, providing, or furnishing financial assistance for an institution of higher education, increase by 2 levels.
If the resulting offense level is less than level 10, increase to level 10.

(9) If (A) the defendant relocated, or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials; (B) a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States; or (C) the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level 12.

(10) If the offense involved (A) the possession or use of any (i) device-making equipment, or (ii) authentication feature; (B) the production or trafficking of any (i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device, or (ii) authentication feature; or (C)(i) the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, or (ii) the possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level 12.

(11) If the offense involved an organized scheme to steal or to receive stolen (A) vehicles or vehicle parts; or (B) goods or chattels that are part of a cargo shipment, increase by 2 levels. If the offense level is less than level 14, increase to level 14.

(12) If the offense involved (A) the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury; or (B) possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the offense, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 14, increase to level 14.

(13) (Apply the greater) If—

(A) the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of the offense, increase by 2 levels; or

(B) the offense (i) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution; (ii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of an organization that, at any time during the offense, (I) was a publicly traded company; or (II) had 1,000 or more employees; or (iii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims, increase by 4 levels.

(C) The cumulative adjustments from application of both subsections (b)(2) and (b)(13)(B) shall not exceed 8 levels, except as provided in subdivision (D).

(D) If the resulting offense level determined under subdivision (A) or (B) is less than level 24, increase to level 24.
(14)  (A)  (Apply the greatest) If the defendant was convicted of an offense under:

(i) 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and the offense involved (I) a computer system used to maintain or operate a critical infrastructure, or used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; or (II) an intent to obtain personal information, increase by 2 levels.


(iii) 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and the offense caused a substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure, increase by 6 levels.

(B) If subdivision (A)(iii) applies, and the offense level is less than level 24, increase to level 24.

(15) If the offense involved—

(A) a violation of securities law and, at the time of the offense, the defendant was (i) an officer or a director of a publicly traded company; (ii) a registered broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or dealer; or (iii) an investment adviser, or a person associated with an investment adviser; or

(B) a violation of commodities law and, at the time of the offense, the defendant was (i) an officer or a director of a futures commission merchant or an introducing broker; (ii) a commodities trading advisor; or (iii) a commodity pool operator,

increase by 4 levels.

(16) If the offense involved fraud or theft involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with a declaration of a major disaster or an emergency, increase by 2 levels.

(16) If the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to 12.

(c) Cross References

(1) If (A) a firearm, destructive device, explosive material, or controlled substance was taken, or the taking of any such item was an object of the offense; or (B) the stolen property received, transported, transferred, transmitted, or possessed was a firearm, destructive device, explosive material, or controlled substance, apply §2D1.1
(Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy), §2D2.1 (Unlawful Possession; Attempt or Conspiracy), §2K1.3 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Explosive Materials; Prohibited Transactions Involving Explosive Materials), or §2K2.1 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition), as appropriate.

(2) If the offense involved arson, or property damage by use of explosives, apply §2K1.4 (Arson; Property Damage by Use of Explosives), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

(3) If (A) neither subdivision (1) nor (2) of this subsection applies; (B) the defendant was convicted under a statute proscribing false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations generally (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001, § 1341, § 1342, or § 1343); and (C) the conduct set forth in the count of conviction establishes an offense specifically covered by another guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct), apply that other guideline.

(4) If the offense involved a cultural heritage resource, apply §2B1.5 (Theft of, Damage to, or Destruction of, Cultural Heritage Resources; Unlawful Sale, Purchase, Exchange, Transportation, or Receipt of Cultural Heritage Resources), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

Commentary


Application Notes:

1. Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:

"Cultural heritage resource" has the meaning given that term in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §2B1.5 (Theft of, Damage to, or Destruction of, Cultural Heritage Resources; Unlawful Sale, Purchase, Exchange, Transportation, or Receipt of Cultural Heritage Resources).

"Equity securities" has the meaning given that term in section 3(a)(11) of the Securities
"Financial institution" includes any institution described in 18 U.S.C. § 20, § 656, § 657, § 1005, § 1006, § 1007, or § 1014; any state or foreign bank, trust company, credit union, insurance company, investment company, mutual fund, savings (building and loan) association, union or employee pension fund; any health, medical, or hospital insurance association; brokers and dealers registered, or required to be registered, with the Securities and Exchange Commission; futures commodity merchants and commodity pool operators registered, or required to be registered, with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and any similar entity, whether or not insured by the federal government. "Union or employee pension fund" and "any health, medical, or hospital insurance association," primarily include large pension funds that serve many persons (e.g., pension funds of large national and international organizations, unions, and corporations doing substantial interstate business), and associations that undertake to provide pension, disability, or other benefits (e.g., medical or hospitalization insurance) to large numbers of persons.

"Firearm" and "destructive device" have the meaning given those terms in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).

"Foreign instrumentality" and "foreign agent" have the meaning given those terms in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1) and (2), respectively.

"National cemetery" means a cemetery (A) established under section 2400 of title 38, United States Code; or (B) under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, or the Secretary of the Interior.

"Publicly traded company" means an issuer (A) with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78l); or (B) that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)). "Issuer" has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c).

"Theft from the person of another" means theft, without the use of force, of property that was being held by another person or was within arms’ reach. Examples include pick-pocketing and non-forcible purse-snatching, such as the theft of a purse from a shopping cart.

"Trade secret" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).

"Veterans’ memorial" means any structure, plaque, statue, or other monument described in 18 U.S.C. § 1369(a).

"Victim" means (A) any person who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under subsection (b)(1); or (B) any individual who sustained bodily injury as a result of the offense.

"Person" includes individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies.

2. Application of Subsection (a)(1).—

(A) "Referenced to this Guideline"—For purposes of subsection (a)(1), an offense is "referenced to this guideline" if (i) this guideline is the applicable Chapter Two guideline determined under the provisions of §1B1.2 (Applicable Guidelines) for the offense of conviction; or (ii) in the case of a conviction for conspiracy, solicitation,
or attempt to which §2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) applies, this
guideline is the appropriate guideline for the offense the defendant was convicted of
conspiring, soliciting, or attempting to commit.

(B) Definition of "Statutory Maximum Term of Imprisonment".—For purposes of this
guideline, "statutory maximum term of imprisonment" means the maximum term of
imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction, including any increase in that
maximum term under a statutory enhancement provision.

(C) Base Offense Level Determination for Cases Involving Multiple Counts.—In a case
involving multiple counts sentenced under this guideline, the applicable base offense
level is determined by the count of conviction that provides the highest statutory
maximum term of imprisonment.

3. Loss Under Subsection (b)(1).—This application note applies to the determination of loss
under subsection (b)(1).

(A) General Rule.—Subject to the exclusions in subdivision (D), loss is the greater of
actual loss or intended loss.

(i) Actual Loss.—"Actual loss" means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm that resulted from the offense.

(ii) Intended Loss.—"Intended loss" (I) means the pecuniary harm that was
intended to result from the offense; and (II) includes intended pecuniary
harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a
government sting operation, or an insurance fraud in which the claim
exceeded the insured value).

(iii) Pecuniary Harm.—"Pecuniary harm" means harm that is monetary or that
otherwise is readily measurable in money. Accordingly, pecuniary harm
does not include emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-
economic harm.

(iv) Reasonably Foreseeable Pecuniary Harm.—For purposes of this guideline,
"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" means pecuniary harm that the
defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known,
was a potential result of the offense.

(v) Rules of Construction in Certain Cases.—In the cases described in
subdivisions (I) through (III), reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm shall
be considered to include the pecuniary harm specified for those cases as
follows:

(I) Product Substitution Cases.—In the case of a product substitution
offense, the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the
reasonably foreseeable costs of making substitute transactions and
handling or disposing of the product delivered, or of retrofitting the
product so that it can be used for its intended purpose, and the
reasonably foreseeable costs of rectifying the actual or potential
disruption to the victim’s business operations caused by the product
substitution.
(II) **Procurement Fraud Cases.**—In the case of a procurement fraud, such as a fraud affecting a defense contract award, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the reasonably foreseeable administrative costs to the government and other participants of repeating or correcting the procurement action affected, plus any increased costs to procure the product or service involved that was reasonably foreseeable.

(III) **Offenses Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030.**—In the case of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, actual loss includes the following pecuniary harm, regardless of whether such pecuniary harm was reasonably foreseeable: any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of service.

(IV) **Disaster Fraud Cases.**—In a case in which subsection (b)(16) applies, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the administrative costs to any federal, state, or local government entity or any commercial or not-for-profit entity of recovering the benefit from any recipient thereof who obtained the benefit through fraud or was otherwise ineligible for the benefit that were reasonably foreseeable.

(B) **Gain.**—The court shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.

(C) **Estimation of Loss.**—The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence. For this reason, the court’s loss determination is entitled to appropriate deference. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) and (f).

The estimate of the loss shall be based on available information, taking into account, as appropriate and practicable under the circumstances, factors such as the following:

(i) The fair market value of the property unlawfully taken or destroyed; or, if the fair market value is impracticable to determine or inadequately measures the harm, the cost to the victim of replacing that property.

(ii) The cost of repairs to damaged property.

(iii) The approximate number of victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim.

(iv) The reduction that resulted from the offense in the value of equity securities or other corporate assets.

(v) More general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense and revenues generated by similar operations.

(D) **Exclusions from Loss.**—Loss shall not include the following:
(E) **Credits Against Loss.**—Loss shall be reduced by the following:

(i) The money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected. The time of detection of the offense is the earlier of (I) the time the offense was discovered by a victim or government agency; or (II) the time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the offense was detected or about to be detected by a victim or government agency.

(ii) In a case involving collateral pledged or otherwise provided by the defendant, the amount the victim has recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral, or if the collateral has not been disposed of by that time, the fair market value of the collateral at the time of sentencing.

(F) **Special Rules.**—Notwithstanding subdivision (A), the following special rules shall be used to assist in determining loss in the cases indicated:

(i) **Stolen or Counterfeit Credit Cards and Access Devices; Purloined Numbers and Codes.**—In a case involving any counterfeit access device or unauthorized access device, loss includes any unauthorized charges made with the counterfeit access device or unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access device. However, if the unauthorized access device is a means of telecommunications access that identifies a specific telecommunications instrument or telecommunications account (including an electronic serial number/mobile identification number (ESN/MIN) pair), and that means was only possessed, and not used, during the commission of the offense, loss shall be not less than $100 per unused means. For purposes of this subdivision, "counterfeit access device" and "unauthorized access device" have the meaning given those terms in Application Note 7(A).

(ii) **Government Benefits.**—In a case involving government benefits (e.g., grants, loans, entitlement program payments), loss shall be considered to be not less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to unintended uses, as the case may be. For example, if the defendant was the intended recipient of food stamps having a value of $100 but fraudulently received food stamps having a value of $150, loss is $50.

(iii) **Davis-Bacon Act Violations.**—In a case involving a Davis-Bacon Act violation (i.e., a violation of 40 U.S.C. § 276a, criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001), the value of the benefits shall be considered to be not less than the difference between the legally required wages and actual wages paid.

(iv) **Ponzi and Other Fraudulent Investment Schemes.**—In a case involving a fraudulent investment scheme, such as a Ponzi scheme, loss shall not be...
reduced by the money or the value of the property transferred to any individual investor in the scheme in excess of that investor's principal investment (i.e., the gain to an individual investor in the scheme shall not be used to offset the loss to another individual investor in the scheme).

(v) Certain Other Unlawful Misrepresentation Schemes.—In a case involving a scheme in which (I) services were fraudulently rendered to the victim by persons falsely posing as licensed professionals; (II) goods were falsely represented as approved by a governmental regulatory agency; or (III) goods for which regulatory approval by a government agency was required but not obtained, or was obtained by fraud, loss shall include the amount paid for the property, services or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented, with no credit provided for the value of those items or services.

(vi) Value of Controlled Substances.—In a case involving controlled substances, loss is the estimated street value of the controlled substances.

(vii) Value of Cultural Heritage Resources.—In a case involving a cultural heritage resource, loss attributable to that cultural heritage resource shall be determined in accordance with the rules for determining the "value of the cultural heritage resource" set forth in Application Note 2 of the Commentary to §2B1.5.

4. Application of Subsection (b)(2)—

(A) Definition.—For purposes of subsection (b)(2), "mass-marketing" means a plan, program, promotion, or campaign that is conducted through solicitation by telephone, mail, the Internet, or other means to induce a large number of persons to (i) purchase goods or services; (ii) participate in a contest or sweepstakes; or (iii) invest for financial profit. "Mass-marketing" includes, for example, a telemarketing campaign that solicits a large number of individuals to purchase fraudulent life insurance policies.

(B) Applicability to Transmission of Multiple Commercial Electronic Mail Messages.—For purposes of subsection (b)(2), an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1037, or any other offense involving conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1037, shall be considered to have been committed through mass-marketing. Accordingly, the defendant shall receive at least a two-level enhancement under subsection (b)(2) and may, depending on the facts of the case, receive a greater enhancement under such subsection, if the defendant was convicted under, or the offense involved conduct described in, 18 U.S.C. § 1037.

(C) Undelivered United States Mail.—

(i) In General.—In a case in which undelivered United States mail was taken, or the taking of such item was an object of the offense, or in a case in which the stolen property received, transported, transferred, transmitted, or possessed was undelivered United States mail, "victim" means (I) any victim as defined in Application Note 1; or (II) any person who was the intended recipient, or addressee, of the undelivered United States mail.

(ii) Special Rule.—A case described in subdivision (C)(i) of this note that
involved—

(I) a United States Postal Service relay box, collection box, delivery vehicle, satchel, or cart, shall be considered to have involved at least 50 victims.

(II) a housing unit cluster box or any similar receptacle that contains multiple mailboxes, whether such receptacle is owned by the United States Postal Service or otherwise owned, shall, unless proven otherwise, be presumed to have involved the number of victims corresponding to the number of mailboxes in each cluster box or similar receptacle.

(iii) Definition.—"Undelivered United States mail" means mail that has not actually been received by the addressee or his agent (e.g., mail taken from the addressee's mail box).

(D) Vulnerable Victims.—If subsection (b)(2)(B) or (C) applies, an enhancement under §3A1.1(b)(2) shall not apply.

5. Enhancement for Business of Receiving and Selling Stolen Property under Subsection (b)(4).—For purposes of subsection (b)(4), the court shall consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether the defendant was in the business of receiving and selling stolen property:

(A) The regularity and sophistication of the defendant’s activities.

(B) The value and size of the inventory of stolen property maintained by the defendant.

(C) The extent to which the defendant’s activities encouraged or facilitated other crimes.

(D) The defendant’s past activities involving stolen property.

6. Application of Subsection (b)(7).—For purposes of subsection (b)(7), "improper means" includes the unauthorized harvesting of electronic mail addresses of users of a website, proprietary service, or other online public forum.

7. Application of Subsection (b)(8).—

(A) In General.—The adjustments in subsection (b)(8) are alternative rather than cumulative. If, in a particular case, however, more than one of the enumerated factors applied, an upward departure may be warranted.

(B) Misrepresentations Regarding Charitable and Other Institutions.—Subsection (b)(8)(A) applies in any case in which the defendant represented that the defendant was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious, or political organization, or a government agency (regardless of whether the defendant actually was associated with the organization or government agency) when, in fact, the defendant intended to divert all or part of that benefit (e.g., for the defendant’s personal gain). Subsection (b)(8)(A) applies, for example, to the following:

(i) A defendant who solicited contributions for a non-existent famine relief organization.
(ii) A defendant who solicited donations from church members by falsely claiming to be a fundraiser for a religiously affiliated school.

(iii) A defendant, chief of a local fire department, who conducted a public fundraiser representing that the purpose of the fundraiser was to procure sufficient funds for a new fire engine when, in fact, the defendant intended to divert some of the funds for the defendant's personal benefit.

(C) Fraud in Contravention of Prior Judicial Order.—Subsection (b)(8)(C) provides an enhancement if the defendant commits a fraud in contravention of a prior, official judicial or administrative warning, in the form of an order, injunction, decree, or process, to take or not to take a specified action. A defendant who does not comply with such a prior, official judicial or administrative warning demonstrates aggravated criminal intent and deserves additional punishment. If it is established that an entity the defendant controlled was a party to the prior proceeding that resulted in the official judicial or administrative action, and the defendant had knowledge of that prior decree or order, this enhancement applies even if the defendant was not a specifically named party in that prior case. For example, a defendant whose business previously was enjoined from selling a dangerous product, but who nonetheless engaged in fraudulent conduct to sell the product, is subject to this enhancement. This enhancement does not apply if the same conduct resulted in an enhancement pursuant to a provision found elsewhere in the guidelines (e.g., a violation of a condition of release addressed in §3C1.3 (Commission of Offense While on Release) or a violation of probation addressed in §4A1.1 (Criminal History Category)).

(D) College Scholarship Fraud.—For purposes of subsection (b)(8)(D):

"Financial assistance" means any scholarship, grant, loan, tuition, discount, award, or other financial assistance for the purpose of financing an education.

"Institution of higher education" has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1954 (20 U.S.C. § 1001).

(E) Non-Applicability of Enhancements.—

(i) Subsection (b)(8)(A).—If the conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(8)(A) is the only conduct that forms the basis for an adjustment under §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill), do not apply that adjustment under §3B1.3.

(ii) Subsection (b)(8)(B) and (C).—If the conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(8)(B) or (C) is the only conduct that forms the basis for an adjustment under §3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice), do not apply that adjustment under §3C1.1.

8. Sophisticated Means Enhancement under Subsection (b)(9) —

(A) Definition of United States.—For purposes of subsection (b)(9)(B). "United States" means each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.
Sophisticated Means Enhancement.—For purposes of subsection (b)(9)(C), "sophisticated means" means especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense. For example, in a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means. Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.

Non-Applicability of Enhancement.—If the conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(9) is the only conduct that forms the basis for an adjustment under §3C1.1, do not apply that adjustment under §3C1.1.

Application of Subsection (b)(10).—

Authentication Features and Identification Documents.—Offenses involving authentication features, identification documents, false identification documents, and means of identification, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028, also are covered by this guideline. If the primary purpose of the offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 1028, was to violate, or assist another to violate, the law pertaining to naturalization, citizenship, or legal resident status, apply §2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization) or §2L2.2 (Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to Naturalization), as appropriate, rather than this guideline.
(C) **Application of Subsection (b)(10)(C)(i).**—

(i) *In General.*—Subsection (b)(10)(C)(i) applies in a case in which a means of identification of an individual other than the defendant (or a person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)) is used without that individual's authorization unlawfully to produce or obtain another means of identification.

(ii) *Examples.*—Examples of conduct to which subsection (b)(10)(C)(i) applies are as follows:

(I) A defendant obtains an individual's name and social security number from a source (e.g., from a piece of mail taken from the individual's mailbox) and obtains a bank loan in that individual's name. In this example, the account number of the bank loan is the other means of identification that has been obtained unlawfully.

(II) A defendant obtains an individual's name and address from a source (e.g., from a driver's license in a stolen wallet) and applies for, obtains, and subsequently uses a credit card in that individual's name. In this example, the credit card is the other means of identification that has been obtained unlawfully.

(iii) *Nonapplicability of Subsection (b)(10)(C)(i).*—Examples of conduct to which subsection (b)(10)(C)(i) does not apply are as follows:

(I) A defendant uses a credit card from a stolen wallet only to make a purchase. In such a case, the defendant has not used the stolen credit card to obtain another means of identification.

(II) A defendant forges another individual's signature to cash a stolen check. Forging another individual's signature is not producing another means of identification.

(D) **Application of Subsection (b)(10)(C)(ii).**—Subsection (b)(10)(C)(ii) applies in any case in which the offense involved the possession of 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced or obtained, regardless of the number of individuals in whose name (or other identifying information) the means of identification were so produced or so obtained.

10. **Application of Subsection (b)(11).**—Subsection (b)(11) provides a minimum offense level in the case of an ongoing, sophisticated operation (e.g., an auto theft ring or "chop shop") to steal or to receive stolen (A) vehicles or vehicle parts; or (B) goods or chattels that are part of a cargo shipment. For purposes of this subsection, "vehicle" means motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. A "cargo shipment" includes cargo transported on a railroad car, bus, steamboat, vessel, or airplane.

11. **Gross Receipts Enhancement under Subsection (b)(13)(A).**—

(A) *In General.*—For purposes of subsection (b)(13)(A), the defendant shall be
considered to have derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts if the gross receipts to the defendant individually, rather than to all participants, exceeded $1,000,000.

(B) **Definition.**—"Gross receipts from the offense" includes all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4).

12. **Application of Subsection (b)(13)(B).**—

(A) **Application of Subsection (b)(13)(B)(i).**—The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court shall consider in determining whether, as a result of the offense, the safety and soundness of a financial institution was substantially jeopardized:

(i) The financial institution became insolvent.

(ii) The financial institution substantially reduced benefits to pensioners or insureds.

(iii) The financial institution was unable on demand to refund fully any deposit, payment, or investment.

(iv) The financial institution was so depleted of its assets as to be forced to merge with another institution in order to continue active operations.

(B) **Application of Subsection (b)(13)(B)(ii).**—

(i) **Definition.**—For purposes of this subsection, "organization" has the meaning given that term in Application Note 1 of §8A1.1 (Applicability of Chapter Eight).

(ii) **In General.**—The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court shall consider in determining whether, as a result of the offense, the solvency or financial security of an organization that was a publicly traded company or that had more than 1,000 employees was substantially endangered:

(I) The organization became insolvent or suffered a substantial reduction in the value of its assets.

(II) The organization filed for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (title 11, United States Code).

(III) The organization suffered a substantial reduction in the value of its equity securities or the value of its employee retirement accounts.

(IV) The organization substantially reduced its workforce.

(V) The organization substantially reduced its employee pension benefits.

(VI) The liquidity of the equity securities of a publicly traded company was substantially endangered. For example, the company was delisted from its primary listing exchange, or trading of the
company’s securities was halted for more than one full trading day.

13. **Application of Subsection (b)(14).**—

   (A) **Definitions.**—For purposes of subsection (b)(14):

   "Critical infrastructure" means systems and assets vital to national defense, national security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. A critical infrastructure may be publicly or privately owned. Examples of critical infrastructures include gas and oil production, storage, and delivery systems, water supply systems, telecommunications networks, electrical power delivery systems, financing and banking systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue services), transportation systems and services (including highways, mass transit, airlines, and airports), and government operations that provide essential services to the public.

   "Government entity" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(9).

   "Personal information" means sensitive or private information (including such information in the possession of a third party), including (i) medical records; (ii) wills; (iii) diaries; (iv) private correspondence, including e-mail; (v) financial records; (vi) photographs of a sensitive or private nature; or (vii) similar information.

   (B) **Subsection (b)(14)(iii).**—If the same conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(14)(iii) is the only conduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under subsection (b)(13)(B), do not apply the enhancement under subsection (b)(13)(B).

14. **Application of Subsection (b)(15).**—

   (A) **Definitions.**—For purposes of this subsection:

   "Commodities law" means (i) the Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.); and (ii) includes the rules, regulations, and orders issued by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.

   "Commodity pool operator" has the meaning given that term in section 1a(4) of the Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)).

   "Commodity trading advisor" has the meaning given that term in section 1a(5) of the Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1a(5)).

   "Futures commission merchant" has the meaning given that term in section 1a(20) of the Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1a(20)).

   "Introducing broker" has the meaning given that term in section 1a(23) of the Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 1a(23)).

   "Investment adviser" has the meaning given that term in section 202 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)).

   "Person associated with a broker or dealer" has the meaning given that term in

"Person associated with an investment adviser" has the meaning given that term in section 202 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(17)).

"Registered broker or dealer" has the meaning given that term in section 3(a)(48) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(48)).


(B) In General.—A conviction under a securities law or commodities law is not required in order for subsection (b)(15) to apply. This subsection would apply in the case of a defendant convicted under a general fraud statute if the defendant's conduct violated a securities law or commodities law. For example, this subsection would apply if an officer of a publicly traded company violated regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission by fraudulently influencing an independent audit of the company's financial statements for the purposes of rendering such financial statements materially misleading, even if the officer is convicted only of wire fraud.

(C) Nonapplicability of §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).—If subsection (b)(15) applies, do not apply §3B1.3.

15. Application of Subsection (b)(16).

Definitions.—For purposes of this subsection:

"Emergency" has the meaning given that term in 42 U.S.C. § 5122.

"Major disaster" has the meaning given that term in 42 U.S.C. § 5122.

165. Cross Reference in Subsection (c)(3).—Subsection (c)(3) provides a cross reference to another guideline in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) in cases in which the defendant is convicted of a general fraud statute, and the count of conviction establishes an offense involving fraudulent conduct that is more aptly covered by another guideline. Sometimes, offenses involving fraudulent statements are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, or a similarly general statute, although the offense involves fraudulent conduct that is also covered by a more specific statute. Examples include false entries regarding currency transactions, for which §2S1.3 (Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements) likely would be more apt, and false statements to a customs officer, for which §2T3.1 (Evading Import Duties or Restrictions (Smuggling); Receiving or Trafficking in Smuggled Property) likely would be more apt. In certain other cases, the mail or wire fraud statutes, or other relatively broad statutes, are used primarily as jurisdictional bases for the prosecution of other offenses. For example, a state employee who improperly influenced the award of a contract and used the mails to commit the offense may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for fraud involving the deprivation of the intangible right of honest services. Such a case would be more aptly sentenced pursuant to §2C1.1 (Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right; Fraud involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions).
176. Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise.—If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 225 (relating to a continuing financial crimes enterprise), the offense level is that applicable to the underlying series of offenses comprising the "continuing financial crimes enterprise".

187. Partially Completed Offenses.—In the case of a partially completed offense (e.g., an offense involving a completed theft or fraud that is part of a larger, attempted theft or fraud), the offense level is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of §2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) whether the conviction is for the substantive offense, the inchoate offense (attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy), or both. See Application Note 4 of the Commentary to §2X1.1.

198. Multiple-Count Indictments.—Some fraudulent schemes may result in multiple-count indictments, depending on the technical elements of the offense. The cumulative loss produced by a common scheme or course of conduct should be used in determining the offense level, regardless of the number of counts of conviction. See Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts).

2019. Departure Considerations.—

(A) Upward Departure Considerations.—There may be cases in which the offense level determined under this guideline substantially understates the seriousness of the offense. In such cases, an upward departure may be warranted. The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may consider in determining whether an upward departure is warranted:

(i) A primary objective of the offense was an aggravating, non-monetary objective. For example, a primary objective of the offense was to inflict emotional harm.

(ii) The offense caused or risked substantial non-monetary harm. For example, the offense caused physical harm, psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma, or resulted in a substantial invasion of a privacy interest (through, for example, the theft of personal information such as medical, educational, or financial records). An upward departure would be warranted, for example, in an 18 U.S.C. § 1030 offense involving damage to a protected computer, if, as a result of that offense, death resulted. An upward departure also would be warranted, for example, in a case involving animal enterprise terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 43, if, in the course of the offense, serious bodily injury or death resulted, or substantial scientific research or information were destroyed.

(iii) The offense involved a substantial amount of interest of any kind, finance charges, late fees, penalties, amounts based on an agreed-upon return or rate of return, or other similar costs, not included in the determination of loss for purposes of subsection (b)(1).

(iv) The offense created a risk of substantial loss beyond the loss determined for purposes of subsection (b)(1).

(v) In a case involving stolen information from a "protected computer", as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2), the defendant sought the stolen
information to further a broader criminal purpose.

(vi) In a case involving access devices or unlawfully produced or unlawfully obtained means of identification:

(I) The offense caused substantial harm to the victim’s reputation or credit record, or the victim suffered a substantial inconvenience related to repairing the victim’s reputation or a damaged credit record.

(II) An individual whose means of identification the defendant used to obtain unlawful means of identification is erroneously arrested or denied a job because an arrest record has been made in that individual’s name.

(III) The defendant produced or obtained numerous means of identification with respect to one individual and essentially assumed that individual’s identity.

(B) Upward Departure for Debilitating Impact on a Critical Infrastructure.—An upward departure would be warranted in a case in which subsection (b)(14)(iii) applies and the disruption to the critical infrastructure(s) is so substantial as to have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

(C) Downward Departure Consideration.—There may be cases in which the offense level determined under this guideline substantially overstates the seriousness of the offense. In such cases, a downward departure may be warranted.

(D) Downward Departure for Major Disaster or Emergency Victims.—If (i) the minimum offense level of 12 in subsection (b)(16) applies and (ii) the defendant sustained damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by a major disaster or an emergency as those terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 5122; and (iii) the benefits received illegally were only an extension or overpayment of benefits received legitimately, a downward departure may be warranted.

Background: This guideline covers offenses involving theft, stolen property, property damage or destruction, fraud, forgery, and counterfeiting (other than offenses involving altered or counterfeit bearer obligations of the United States).

Because federal fraud statutes often are broadly written, a single pattern of offense conduct usually can be prosecuted under several code sections, as a result of which the offense of conviction may be somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, most fraud statutes cover a broad range of conduct with extreme variation in severity. The specific offense characteristics and cross references contained in this guideline are designed with these considerations in mind.

The Commission has determined that, ordinarily, the sentences of defendants convicted of federal offenses should reflect the nature and magnitude of the loss caused or intended by their crimes. Accordingly, along with other relevant factors under the guidelines, loss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability and is a principal factor in determining the offense level under this guideline.

Theft from the person of another, such as pickpocketing or non-forcible purse-snatching.
receives an enhanced sentence because of the increased risk of physical injury. This guideline does not include an enhancement for thefts from the person by means of force or fear; such crimes are robberies and are covered under §2B3.1 (Robbery).

A minimum offense level of level 14 is provided for offenses involving an organized scheme to steal vehicles or vehicle parts. Typically, the scope of such activity is substantial, but the value of the property may be particularly difficult to ascertain in individual cases because the stolen property is rapidly resold or otherwise disposed of in the course of the offense. Therefore, the specific offense characteristic of "organized scheme" is used as an alternative to "loss" in setting a minimum offense level.

Use of false pretenses involving charitable causes and government agencies enhances the sentences of defendants who take advantage of victims’ trust in government or law enforcement agencies or the generosity and charitable motives of victims. Taking advantage of a victim’s self-interest does not mitigate the seriousness of fraudulent conduct; rather, defendants who exploit victims’ charitable impulses or trust in government create particular social harm. In a similar vein, a defendant who has been subject to civil or administrative proceedings for the same or similar fraudulent conduct demonstrates aggravated criminal intent and is deserving of additional punishment for not conforming with the requirements of judicial process or orders issued by federal, state, or local administrative agencies.

Offenses that involve the use of financial transactions or financial accounts outside the United States in an effort to conceal illicit profits and criminal conduct involve a particularly high level of sophistication and complexity. These offenses are difficult to detect and require costly investigations and prosecutions. Diplomatic processes often must be used to secure testimony and evidence beyond the jurisdiction of United States courts. Consequently, a minimum offense level of level 12 is provided for these offenses.

Subsection (b)(6) implements the instruction to the Commission in section 2 of Public Law 105–101.

Subsection (b)(8)(D) implements, in a broader form, the directive in section 3 of the College Scholarship Fraud Prevention Act of 2000, Public Law 106–420.

Subsection (b)(9) implements, in a broader form, the instruction to the Commission in section 6(c)(2) of Public Law 105–184.

Subsections (b)(10)(A)(i) and (B)(i) implement the instruction to the Commission in section 4 of the Wireless Telephone Protection Act, Public Law 105–172.

Subsection (b)(10)(C) implements the directive to the Commission in section 4 of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Public Law 105–318. This subsection focuses principally on an aggravated form of identity theft known as "affirmative identity theft" or "breeding", in which a defendant uses another individual’s name, social security number, or some other form of identification (the "means of identification") to "breed" (i.e., produce or obtain) new or additional forms of identification. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d) broadly defines "means of identification", the new or additional forms of identification can include items such as a driver’s license, a credit card, or a bank loan. This subsection provides a minimum offense level of level 12, in part because of the seriousness of the offense. The minimum offense level accounts for the fact that the means of identification that were "bred" (i.e., produced or obtained) often are within the defendant’s exclusive control, making it difficult for the individual victim to detect that the victim’s
identity has been "stolen." Generally, the victim does not become aware of the offense until certain harms have already occurred (e.g., a damaged credit rating or an inability to obtain a loan). The minimum offense level also accounts for the non-monetary harm associated with these types of offenses, much of which may be difficult or impossible to quantify (e.g., harm to the individual’s reputation or credit rating, inconvenience, and other difficulties resulting from the offense). The legislative history of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 indicates that Congress was especially concerned with providing increased punishment for this type of harm.

Subsection (b)(12)(B) implements, in a broader form, the instruction to the Commission in section 110512 of Public Law 103–322.

Subsection (b)(13)(A) implements, in a broader form, the instruction to the Commission in section 2507 of Public Law 101–647.

Subsection (b)(13)(B)(i) implements, in a broader form, the instruction to the Commission in section 961(m) of Public Law 101–73.

Subsection (b)(14) implements the directive in section 225(b) of Public Law 107–296. The minimum offense level of level 24 provided in subsection (b)(14)(B) for an offense that resulted in a substantial disruption of a critical infrastructure reflects the serious impact such an offense could have on national security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or a combination of any of these matters.

Subsection (b)(16) implements the directive in section 5 of Public Law 110–179.

APPENDIX A - STATUTORY INDEX

*   *   *

18 U.S.C. § 1039 2H3.1
18 U.S.C. § 1040 2B1.1
18 U.S.C. § 1071 2X3.1
## EXHIBIT I

### Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:

This proposed amendment addresses offenses involving violations of certain food and drug safety laws.

The proposed amendment addresses how violations of the 
(the “FDCA”) and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–293,
(the “PDMA”) are treated under §2N2.1 (Violations of Statutes and Regulations Dealing With Any Food, Drug, Biological Product, Device, Cosmetic, or Agricultural Product). Specifically, the proposed amendment adds a 4-level specific offense characteristic at §2N2.1 that applies if the defendant committed any part of the instant FDCA offense after sustaining a prior conviction of an offense under the FDCA. Because PDMA offenses at 21 U.S.C. §§ 353 and 381 are incorporated into the FDCA at 21 U.S.C. § 331, the proposed specific offense characteristic also is applicable to a second or subsequent violation of the PDMA. The proposed amendment also amends the commentary to §2N2.1 to include substantial risk of bodily harm or death as a basis for an upward departure.

### Proposed Amendment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§2N2.1.</th>
<th>Violations of Statutes and Regulations Dealing With Any Food, Drug, Biological Product, Device, Cosmetic, or Agricultural Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Base Offense Level: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Specific Offense Characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>If the defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 331 after sustaining a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 331, increase by 4 levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(c)</td>
<td>Cross References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>If the offense involved fraud, apply §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>If the offense was committed in furtherance of, or to conceal, an offense covered by another offense guideline, apply that other offense guideline if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.</td>
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### Commentary


**Application Notes:**

1. This guideline assumes a regulatory offense that involved knowing or reckless conduct. Where only negligence was involved, a downward departure may be warranted. See Chapter
Five, Part K (Departures).

2. The cross reference at subsection (bc)(1) addresses cases in which the offense involved fraud. The cross reference at subsection (bc)(2) addresses cases in which the offense was committed in furtherance of, or to conceal, an offense covered by another offense guideline (e.g., bribery).

3. Upward Departure Provisions.—The following are circumstances in which an upward departure may be warranted:

   (A) The offense created a substantial risk of bodily injury or death; death or bodily injury, death, extreme psychological injury, property damage, or monetary loss resulted from the offense. See Chapter Five, Part K (Departures).

   (B) The defendant was convicted under 7 U.S.C. § 7734.

4. The Commission has not promulgated a guideline for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (offenses involving human growth hormones). Offenses involving anabolic steroids are covered by Chapter Two, Part D (Offenses Involving Drugs and Narco-Terrorism). In the case of an offense involving a substance purported to be an anabolic steroid, but not containing any active ingredient, apply §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) with "loss" measured by the amount paid, or to be paid, by the victim for such substance.
EXHIBIT J

Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: The proposed amendment addresses discrete application issues related to §2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States) identified through comment to the Commission as well as through an analysis of applicable circuit case law. Specifically, the proposed amendment but modifies the applicable application notes to address issues related to the definitions of “crime of violence” and “drug trafficking offense.”

First, the proposed amendment modifies the definition of "forcible sex offenses" in Application Note I(B)(iii) to include offenses where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct was involuntary, incompetent, or coerced.

Second, the proposed amendment modifies the definition of “drug trafficking offense” in Application Note I(B)(iv) by adding the term “offer to sell” to the definition.

The proposed amendment also adds a departure provision that may apply in “a case in which the applicable offense level substantially overstates or understates the seriousness of a prior conviction,” and provides examples of cases in which a departure may be warranted.

§2L1.2. Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States

(a) Base Offense Level: 8

(b) Specific Offense Characteristic

(1) Apply the Greatest:

If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after—

(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense, increase by 16 levels;

(B) a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or less, increase by 12 levels;

(C) a conviction for an aggravated felony, increase by 8 levels;

(D) a conviction for any other felony, increase by 4 levels; or

(E) three or more convictions for misdemeanors that are crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses, increase by 4 levels.

Commentary
Application Notes:

1. **Application of Subsection (b)(1).—**

   **(A) In General.—** For purposes of subsection (b)(1):
   
   (i) A defendant shall be considered to be deported after a conviction if the defendant has been removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal was outstanding.

   (ii) A defendant shall be considered to be deported after a conviction if the deportation was subsequent to the conviction, regardless of whether the deportation was in response to the conviction.

   (iii) A defendant shall be considered to have unlawfully remained in the United States if the defendant remained in the United States following a removal order issued after a conviction, regardless of whether the removal order was in response to the conviction.

   (iv) Subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a conviction for an offense committed before the defendant was eighteen years of age unless such conviction is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted.

   **(B) Definitions.—** For purposes of subsection (b)(1):

   (i) "Alien smuggling offense" has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N)).

   (ii) "Child pornography offense" means (I) an offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, or 2260; or (II) an offense under state or local law consisting of conduct that would have been an offense under any such section if the offense had occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

   (iii) “Crime of violence” means any of the following offenses under federal, state, or local law: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary, incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.

   (iv) "Drug trafficking offense" means an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing, or offer to sell of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent...
(v) "Firearms offense" means any of the following:

(I) An offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the importation, distribution, transportation, or trafficking of a firearm described in 18 U.S.C. § 921, or of an explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

(II) An offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), or of an explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).


(IV) A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).


(VI) An offense under state or local law consisting of conduct that would have been an offense under subdivision (III), (IV), or (V) if the offense had occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

(vi) "Human trafficking offense" means (I) any offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 1581, § 1582, § 1583, § 1584, § 1585, § 1588, § 1589, § 1590, or § 1591; or (II) an offense under state or local law consisting of conduct that would have been an offense under any such section if the offense had occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

(vii) "Sentence imposed" has the meaning given the term "sentence of imprisonment" in Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of §4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History), without regard to the date of the conviction. The length of the sentence imposed includes any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release.

(viii) "Terrorism offense" means any offense involving, or intending to promote, a "Federal crime of terrorism", as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).

2. **Definition of "Felony"**.—For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(A), (B), and (D), "felony" means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

3. **Application of Subsection (b)(1)(C).**—

   (A) **Definitions.**—For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), "aggravated felony" has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), without regard to the date of conviction for the aggravated felony.

   (B) **In General.**—The offense level shall be increased under subsection (b)(1)(C) for any
aggravated felony (as defined in subdivision (A)), with respect to which the offense level is not increased under subsections (b)(1)(A) or (B).

4. **Application of Subsection (b)(1)(E).**—For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(E):

   (A) "Misdemeanor" means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less.

   (B) "Three or more convictions" means at least three convictions for offenses that are not counted as a single sentence pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of §4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History).

5. **Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracies, and Attempts.**—Prior convictions of offenses counted under subsection (b)(1) include the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting, to commit such offenses.

6. **Computation of Criminal History Points.**—A conviction taken into account under subsection (b)(1) is not excluded from consideration of whether that conviction receives criminal history points pursuant to Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History).

7. **Departure Considerations.**—

   (A) In a case in which subsection (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B) does not apply and the defendant has a prior conviction for possessing or transporting a quantity of a controlled substance that exceeds a quantity consistent with personal use, an upward departure may be warranted.

7. **Departure Consideration.**—There may be cases in which the applicable offense level substantially overstates or understates the seriousness of a prior conviction. In such a case, a departure may be warranted. Examples: (A) In a case in which subsection (b)(1)(A) or (b)(1)(B) does not apply and the defendant has a prior conviction for possessing or transporting a quantity of a controlled substance that exceeds a quantity consistent with personal use, an upward departure may be warranted. (B) In a case in which subsection (b)(1)(A) applies, and the prior conviction does not meet the definition of aggravated felony at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), a downward departure may be warranted.