UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION



TRANSCRIPT

PUBLIC HEARING NOVEMBER 18, 1986

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	7	TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1986 2:00 O'CLOCK P.M.
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JUDGE WILKINS: We'll continue now with
the proceeding testimony. We are very
privileged to have as our first witness this
afternoon Mr. James T. Lassart.
Mr. Lassart, come around? He is a former
Assistant District Attorney of San Francisco,
California. Also, in the U. S. Attorney's
Office and while there, as Chief of the Drug
Task Force team. He is now in private practice
with the law firm of Roper and Majeski, here in
San Francisco.
Delighted to see you.
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SPEAKER JAMES A. LASSART, ESQ. LAW FIRM OF ROPER & MAJESKI
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
MR. LASSART: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, public, commissioner. I had an
opportunity to hear some of the testimony this

morning and being that I am the first person after lunch I know that rule and I'll be brief.

I'd like to make some general remarks.

First of all with the change of the Federal sentencing rule that are long needed and long overdue, very welcome event, the need for a truth in sentencing system is so far long overdue and so difficult to explain and takes so long to get here that I can tell you that when put into effect it will be something that we can all discuss in our community and keep our heads high.

Right now, it's so difficult to tell someone out there who we live with in our neighborhood when the Judge says fifteen he means really five and then try to come up with an adequate explanation of why it is that way and then in the middle of your explanation decide you don't want to join that troop because it really don't make any sense.

Now, I was a prosecutor with the San
Francisco District Attorney's Office for about
12 years and during that time I specialized
quite a bit in the Homicide area and it was
during that period of time that California

switched from the indeterminate sentencing rules to the determinate sentencing.

And considering what I observed in that period of time, I would suggest to you that you learn from California but you surely don't adopt them as a model. Their idea is very good but the performance because of the various district negotiations, created a system that still has something in it that I will inform you of and ask you not to fall into.

When they say "a year" in California it still doesn't mean a year. That's one of the problems. It's really nine months. California has a thing that some of us have discussed and some, myself being a critic, have called it the "cheaper by the dozen rule".

California now has a system of -- a series of offenses that are committed -- the first offense is given the full accord of the term. The next offenses thereafter are only sentenced to the third base term.

so, if you commit three robberies it's cheaper as you commit those offenses. Those offenses don't have to be in the same transaction. So, thus far, as you put through

the guidelines we've avoided that and I suggest that you continue to avoid that because that is very difficult to explain.

And when we step outside these programs in things like all the rest of you people out there who become victims of these offenses, I think it's important for the integrity of this system that we be able to hold our heads high and say that, when we sentence somebody to the three years it means three years. They do it with two people it means six or at least we consider the possibility of giving them six.

Now, I'm sure the attorneys have informed you that these guidelines will create senseless hearings, and a backlog that will destroy the calendar system. These are old arguments and they're not borne out in the test of time.

Well-structured sentencing limitations in serious felonies, which in many cases even mandate incarceration, won't by definition create a backlog. The defendants and their counsel have always been realists. I think that's important for us to understand.

They operate within the perameters of raised and lower expectations and it's in the

defendant's interest, in his interest, to operate within that particular narrow range, whatever it may be. After all, we're dealing with sentencing, we're not there discussing guilt. That's all we can determine.

Once the expectations are set forth, defendants will be just and they'll adjust to the realm of possibility. If we decide the penalty should be higher, they're going to have to play the game and maybe that's really what we're talking about when we are changing these particular rules. We're talking about sentences on an overall nationwide basis. It is perhaps a little difficult to explain.

Now, there are two specific areas I'd like to address within the guidelines. They are the area of plea agreement and the area of cooperation and credit.

In the past I've heard some comment that the plea agreement situation is now out of control and Rule 11 may not apply. That is, you didn't hear that here but that's the kind of the discussion that you hear outside.

As I re-read these guidelines, Rule ll means "still remains in tact". The new

sentencing act just formed is the body of law written, within which the Court must now exercises its discretion. Rule 11 must now begin forming -- or plea agreements of Rule 11 must now begin to conform to the rules and guidelines. The Court always had and still has the power to reject any pro-offer of sentencing disposition.

However, I think that the area which has the greatest problem within the area of plea agreements is the concept of the integrity of the stipulation of counsel offered to the court regarding factors of adjustment and factors of characteristics. I feel that that particular area is one in which the guidelines is somewhat devoid of direction.

It is extremely important that the Court must order and accept that stipulation as to those factors of adjustment and factors of characteristics and the Court must examine those factors and the Court is in a perfect position to examine those factors because according to what it had before the presentencing report and then must make a determination whether or not if the Court feels those factors are for the

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purposes of gaining a plea or for the purpose of the fact that they are there and that rules are the facts.

If the Court is dissatisfied with those factors and that stipulation, then there are a couple of other avenues the Court can take. It can reject the plea -- the factors. They can accept them if they agree with them or the Court can look back at those two attorneys who happen to put together that stipulation and say:

"You got together on the stipulation, now let's understand the underpinings, the basis of this stipulation. Satisfy this Court that those are correct required sentences".

I think that is a part of the sentencing system that must be strongly enforced. It will maintain its integrety and extreme requirement for the Judge plays that important part, because basically, you're the fact finder in that one regard in this area and that's the one place that you're afraid of losing discretion and that's the one place the Court's afraid of

losing discretion, that's the one place they must exercise to maintain its integrety.

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Now, with regard to cooperation here:
The fact that Part 331 and 322, and 333 is in
existence is a very powerful statement.

These guidelines signal a statutory regulation that cooperation is not only acceptable but it deserves merit. That philosphy hasn't necessarily been pervasive in the justice system for a long time.

The system of justice will truly benefit by it. The recognized policy of cooperation is the accepted conduct and will assure more, rather than less cooperation, especially on the part of the organized defendants. And will place their counsel in a position where they're going to be required to talk to the prosecution and you're going to be get a lot more communication between both sides, because then they'll have a duty to communicate offers because those offers now mean something.

In the past, justice wasn't properly served and they really weren't encouraged. They were told "if you help us out we'll tell the Court and maybe the Court will do something.

Maybe the Court won't do something".

That's not necessarily a very comfortable position to be if you're charged with a serious matter.

Now, the Court has to take into consideration efforts of cooperation and weigh those and measure those and the United States Attorney has to serve by it. And that's very important because that kind of cooperation helps to remove the criminal defendant and the element and organization from this society, No. 1.

No. 2. It adds some integrety to the negotiations with the defense side because you can say the Court has to take into consideration -- the Court will consider it and it encourages people to distort their profits, to distort their information. We're all benefactors of that.

Now, there's one small point I'd like to make. Coming from the Drug Task Force Service the reports indicating the drug portion of the guidelines that concerns me, it doesn't appear that there is a consideration of the strength of the drugs being involved in the determination of penalty. There are pros and cons on that issue

and I happen to be one of the people that believes that the factors of strength of the particular narcotic controlled substance is very credible in determining whether or not an additional sentence or additional facts -- should be additional fact that does add impact to the sentence.

The reason being that the greater the purity close to the top. Rather simplistic explanation of things but also the people on the defense side -- by that I mean the criminal defense, understand that because that's how the price of the value starts. The higher the purity the higher the profit. The weaker the purity the lower the value down the chain.

I think that the closer to the purity merits a higher factor or at least higher factors in aggragation. I think to disregard that loses us an opportunity to place these persons in a position -- places people in a higher position to cooperate and you don't have to go as far with someone who's cooperating with maybe penalty from drugs of a higher purity.

Now, I said I would be short and reasonably short. Are there any questions?

Anything I might be able to add to it?

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JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much, Mr.

Lassart. I think we all agree with you on the issue of purity. We're now struggling with how it should be factored into the guidelines without making it an unnecessary mathematical application and if you would give some thought to that we would greatly appreciate it. It's not something that we have just glossed over in the past. We value your opinion very much.

In addition to that, wish you would give some thought to what worth you would write in the area of drugs to capture that situation where the individuals are arrested with the seizure of the amount of drugs involved does not actively relect the seriousness of the level of involvement of that type of activity.

And you can, I'm sure, from your experience and number of the examples where significant drug dealers were arrested but not the drugs seized for one reason or another, did not reflect they're criminal activity now.

How do we capture that situation in guideline form so that the sentence, on these sentences, would be on a proportion to the

small-time drug dealer who got captured and arrested with a small amount of drugs. I'm not necessarily seeking answers today because it is very difficult to deal with past experience in this field.

Would you give some thought to it?

MR. LASSART: I would do that. I have as a result of passing activity given thought in this area and I agree with the premise that because you happen to be arrested with eight pounds doesn't mean that you're necessarily an eight pound person. And by the same token, I guess the circumstances surrounding the events of the arrest dictates your probability of cooperation. I will give extra thought to that and be more than happy to communicate.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much.

Any questions to my right? Any questions to my
left?

JUDGE BREYER: The point that you brought up in talking to judges who sentence seems to me whether ut;s the top sentence, lenient sentencing, they all tend to think that you just don't add up the harm to these victims.

I mean, I can give you a lot of examples,

but a person that hits somebody in the nose and it hurts him seriously that may be worth six months in prison. If he gets into a barroom brawl and breaks 20 noses, he gets more of a sentence but he doesn't get ten years.

And similarly, if I get drunk and drop
the -- drive into another car which goes off the
edge of a cliff and seriously hurts the driver
maybe I deserve three years. If it's a bus and
you kill 20 or 30, say I deserve more of a
sentence but not ten times the sentence.

And that's seems to be a principle that exists in sentencing across the board regardless of the sentencing philosophy. It tends to be reflected in the fact that judges sometimes give concurrent sentences and sometimes give consecutive sentence. And it doesn't have to do with the fact that the tenth victim is hurt any worse or isn't as serious. It's just as serious and is hurt as worse or as badly and it has something to do with deterents and it may have something to do with notions of culpability.

When you lump a lot of crimes together they're culpable. Just as culpable, ten times as culpable. You don't punish them quite as

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much, at least 10 times as much.

And if you take seriously your report
we're going to say when the guy who's gets
drunk, bumps into the bus he goes to jail for
the rest of his life. If he bumps into a car
he's in jail for a year. A person in a barroom
brawl is going to jail the rest of his life. A
person who hits one person will go to jail for
six months or a year. Now that contrary to
people's ordinary persons wishes. That's what's
given us the problem how to reflect that.

MR. LASSART: Your Honor, it's a matter of where you stand when you make that decision.

JUDGE BREYER: You want to say you will just add it up.

MR. LASSART: I think you look at it two ways with the split of the hypothetical. First of all, you described a single transaction.

That has a good deal of merit to the fact that you don't add things up. How would you stand on the other side of those that are hurt.

JUDGE BREYER: That's true.

MR. LASSART: Now, the other concern I have is that you don't do what California did in that limiting to multiple acts in multiple

transactions are given the value of -- or devalue -- in other words, if you have a person who goes out and hits the bus on consecutive weeks then I think that that person ought to suffer the advantages of the penalty of each one of those events.

JUDGE BREYER: I thought so. Judge Green (sic) was saying in his experience -- he thought a lot about sentencing. -- he finds even that unrelated cases Judges just don't add it up. I don't know what your experience -- you've had quite a lot of it. What you do you think haven'ts in fact ought to be.

MR. LASSART: If I took the crime that you used, battery, and switched that to an armed robbery, the other two who I particularly like in the manner in which they handle these matters, do give consecutive sentences. And it's not as if the penalty is totally determinate on the fact of whether or not you can give consecutive time.

In other words, you can set up with a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences with various penalty factors added in.

So, I guess to answer your question,

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sure, you have to look at the circumstances, you never lump in multiple transactions into one sentence. Always separate those and then within those particular transactional activities then I believe you're right, you could use consecutive sentence to concurrent sentencing to lessen the penalty would be an overreaching sentence.

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JUDGE BREYER: Have you thought something out about this in terms of specific rules? I'd be awfully interested in because I found the single most difficult conceptual problem.

MR. LASSART: The example I would follow is California's law, under 654 of the Penal Code. The other one is their multiple sentencing activities laws.

In other words, they have haven't amended that in the last few years. In sex crime, where you can have actually -- a single transaction, be sentenced consecutively for rape, forceable oral copulation and a few other sex crimes.

Appropriately so.

They haven't done that necessarily in the multiple transaction robbery situation. And I know that they use the third base term on that and there's some good question and I'm not

really up to date on the California Supreme
Court last time around on this, but there's some
concern whether or not that's a multiple
sentence as multiple transactions.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Don't you think in those cases where you have multiple offenses if you added them all up it would be twenty years beyond life in prison. In those cases you look at the prisons and you say: "Well, too much is too much".

And I remember having a boy in the Navy, came into me on proposition one day and I took a look at his record and he had the most horrible record I'd ever seen in the Navy. And I said: "You don't need any time in the brig you need something to change you around here".

And that is about where you get with your ordinary sentence. Isn't it, when you're multiplying these tremendous things? If you're going to impose for a mail fraud, time for every single solitary event you're going to run out of time. You're not going to have enough time for any person to serve during this century. And those are considerations that a judge really looks at.

He looks at it and says: "Ten years or 15 years for this man would be the maximum of any benefit that any person in society could ever get from"

And he says: "That's my limit. That's what I think is the limit".

Is that about the way they add those things up?

MR. LASSART: That's the way I think they do.

JUDGE MACKINNON: On the strength of -- I was interested in your "strength" argument and I had another slant to it.

Would you think this would have a different sentence for drugs depending upon their potency? For instance, Marijuana isn't as serious a drug -- I don't think, although I think it's serious -- as Heroin. And grouping them together isn't exactly a fair proposition. Is it?

MR. LASSART: The way I look at the guidelines, the opiates, cocaine, heroin and in terms of importance, how I see it. Now, within those particular groups that's where the strength is. In other words, once you broken

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out the categories of penalty for each type of drug then the strength of that particular drug is important.

Quite frankly the strength of Marijuana,

I don't think that becomes a big factor in

determining value. When we're talking about

strength we're really talking more than anything
else you're talking heroin and cocaine.

JUDGE MACKINNON: And PCP.

MR. LASSART: And PCP.

JUDGE MACKINNON: And they ought to be in a different category you would think, than Marijuana.

MR. LASSART: As far as strength goes, I don't think there is any necessity for 80 or 90 percent.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you.

PROFESSOR NAGEL: In some of the hearings in the past we have been urged to consider jurisdictional differences in sentencing for drug offenses. Given your own experience, what would your response be given the drugs perceived to be a national problem? Would that be something that you would advocate?

MR. LASSART: Not at all. I've asked --

we have that now. That's here. The penalties for same amounts of the same posture throughout the little counties are very different from district to district.

If I were to get caught with a kilo of cocaine in Idaho within a thousand feet of a school and get caught for that same amount say in Florida a thousand feet from the school I can guarantee you there would be a different penalty. That doesn't help the problem. The penalties ought to be uniform and people shouldn't be able to shop jurisdictions because the last time someone cracked down on money in this country they were from California.

So, you don't want people to be able to shop based on penalty. It's a better place to do business. Frankly, I agree these arguments are a major problem. You probably -- longer than I -- know sophisticates could do that -- shop the market.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you again. We appreciate not only your testimony but the work you have given the commission. Thank you.

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JUDGE WILKINS: Our next witness is Mary Woods. Miss Woods is from Victim Advocate of Los Angeles. Miss Woods, we're delighted to have you with us.

MISS WOODS: Thank you.

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SPEAKER MARY WOODS, VICTIM ADVOCATE, LOS ANGELES

MISS WOODS: Good afternoon. I'm pleased to be part of this fine and necessary effort to create a consistent and enforceable guideline for the sentencing laws.

In looking over the agenda for today's hearing I realize I'm probably the only participant who does not speak legalize.

My knowledge of the subject is something I have learned from my heart and from my soul and from the hearts and souls of other crime victims of which I have come into contact.

Four years ago I woke up at 3:00 o'clock

in the morning to see a man standing in my bedroom. He proceeded to rob and rape me in my home. He returned a month later with a friend, a young man recently out of the Marines who was training in the arts of rape and pillage, and let the friend into the apartment.

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When he found out I was no longer there he went in the next room and attempted to rape my former roomate. She later testified how lucky she was after he ran away he left behind several pieces of solid evidence. Real smart guy he thought his sock wouln't leave fingerprints. We saw that his name was stenciled on it and in fact an important medium for his later conviction.

Both men were apprehended the night after the second attack in which there was another rape and robbery. Both my former roommate and I participated in conviction of the two men. I also made an impact statement at the time of sentencing. Both men received maximum penalty on all counts. The man who attacked me received 15 years and 4 months. The second man got nine years and ten months.

I'm here to address the impact of

psychological injury on the victim as it applies to sentencing. I was speaking primarily of offenses against the person but from what I understand, offenses involving property also reflect similar emotional response from the victim.

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Following my victimization I felt -- if you'll indulge me an analogy -- at the time somebody had taken me by arm and leg and flung me into the deep dark gravity pit. Felt that I had no choice but to lie down and make a nice little bed for myself at the bottom of that pit or I could start to climb, slowly fingernail by fingernail up until I could see the light again.

Every line up or hearing or a thoughtless remark by a coworker or a cruel joke heard in public or every noise I heard outside my door, I slipped back a little bit into the darkness again.

But as time continued and with the help of Crisis Intervention, psychological counseling and support of a few support friends and family members, I finally was able to climb out of that pit, stand in the open and let my face absorb the sunlight. It was a year and a half

following my attack that I woke up in one morning and realized that I was on the other side of that experience.

During that period I went to work, I performed the necessary tasks for survival including going through trial and all it's attendant activities. But I felt bad inside. I felt that my soul had been taken along with my jewelry and my wallet and it took a lot of hard work to get it back.

The problem is, as it's difficult to understand unless you've been there that being a victim of crime is a lifelong sentence. No matter how sane and happy I am today I work very hard to be. This is something I have to live with every day of my life. I didn't ask for it. It's not my fault. Now that I got it I really know what to do with it.

Many people today live in a constant state of fear and paranoia, baracade themselves in their own homes. They don't go out at night. I have lived through what they are afraid of. I have felt death at my neck and yet still I have to walk around my work, and interact in an increasingly violent society. I have seen the

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world as a violent place and I can never go back to the way I was before. My feelings are not unique.

As a member of the Board of Directors of Victims for Victims I have spoken to victims who expressed the same sentiment. This is victims of assaults, armed robbery, rape, kidnap, hijacking, loss of a loved one through homicide. They talk of fears which can take years out of them, how their relationships are affected. How many marriages are broken up. How jobs are lost.

The power over one's own life and death is an issue that has been taken away by the criminal. It is a long and arduous struggle to gain back that control.

The problem is: How do you apply numerical offense values to these long ranging and deep-seated effects? I don't think you have a number that could go high enough to reflect a just punishment in the eyes of the victim who has to live with the consequences for the rest of his or her life.

I'd like to ask specifically to a couple of things I've heard hear today as well as the

proposals outlined in your sentencing guidelines. You talk about the issue of disparity. I'd like you to consider that issue of disparity, the impact on the victim whose assailant receives a light sentence or even probation for their crimes.

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I think there's a general feeling in the public, they know that the chances of receiving fairness from something called criminal justice system is rather slim. You have the opportunity there to prove them wrong.

In the guidelines, I'd like to ask that you re-evaluate the offense value of twelve units added for victim whose vulnerable because age or mental or physical condition. The psychological impact of a violent crime on a defenseless and/or dependent person is extreme. The criminal should have to truly answer to such an act of brutal cowardness.

Secondly, I support and applaud the same base offense value applicable in attempted sexual assault cases as well as if the act had been completed. Certainly, the intent of the criminal is clear and the impact on the victim is comparable.

Thirdly, your guidelines acknowledge -this is where I have the problem -- acknowledge
the assumption that in crimes of violence at
least the minimal level of psychological injury
occurs and it states that and I quote here:

"The offense value for the lowest level of such injury has therefore been factored into the base offense value for an offene involving a person and in this instance in which psychological injury has been significant or extreme and appropriate increase in the penalty will result".

End quote. What is the offense value for the lowest level of psychological injury? What are the numbers? Is that enough? Who is to determine when extreme or significant psychological injury has occured and who will give the expert testimony, as is indicated?

With each victim of a violent crime be thoroughly examined by a psychiatrist trained in victimology. I must tell you in my experience I have never seen a victim of a violent crime

whose level of psychological injury was not significant or extreme.

In my view, a significant level of psychological injury should be assumption. A minimum level the exception. At any rate these classifications and determinations must be clarified. I implore you, learn to look beneath the physical scars and see the emotional and psychological wounds which never heal. Reflect this acknowledgement not only in your sentences but in your demeanor. Treat the victim who comes before your court with respect and compassion due a person performing such a brave task.

Understand that each victim that you see stands for a hundred more who are unable to come forward or whose assailants are never captured. The length of time time it takes for a case to come to sentencing guarantees that most of the psychological and physical signs of trauma will be gone but the brutality of our society with the daily onslaught of violent crimes continues to rip open the clinicial wounds endured by the victim. The responsibility is enormous. Tough, consistent,

and certain sentencings provide a deterrent as well as just punishment and more importantly as a legal application. Show the people as well as the perpetrators that violence no longer will be tolerated in our society

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you.

MISS WOODS: I'd be glad to answer any questions.

THE COURT: Thank you, very much, Miss Woods. On behalf of the commission, wish to express our appreciation to come to this hearing and provide this important imformation to us. I think re-enforces what we have felt, what we need to do with the psychological injury.

On the other hand, you see, there is nothing in the law anywhere that says a judge should -- psychological injury although we know most responsible judges do that. So, you're groping for words that provide for the imposition of a summons that reflect the psychological as well as the other injuries in terms of the victim and it's been very helpful I think this idea of presumption of psychological injury in the crimes of violence may go a long way to accomplishing that. I think that's an

excellent idea.

Any questions to my right?

JUDGE MACKINNON: I was wondering, you had to go to Court whether you had to testify or what?

MISS WOODS: Yes. I testified at three preliminary hearings and then finally at the Superior Court trial.

JUDGE MACKINNON: What would you say that added to your psychological --

THE WITNESS: Well, it's a two-edge sword. Facing my assailant in court was singly the most difficult thing that I had to do in that whole process and I had to do it four times. Being as far away as I am from you from the man who attacked me so brutally was an indescribable horrow. Things that I had to testify about were as well horrific.

However, I think this really came with my impact statement. I'd like to emphasize how much power that gave me to be able to do that and how that should be emphasized to other victims to take advantage of their rights as they have in California to make such a statement at the time of sentencing.

when I was able to make that impact statement, I wasn't under the gun, I wasn't under oath, I wasn't on the witness stand. I was standing behind the DA's desk saying my own words straight to the Judge, exactly what it felt like to be me in that situation at this time.

power. I remember when I came out of that courtroom after the men had received the maximum sentences I felt like the strongest woman in the world. I felt like I truly made a difference in that situation, that I prevented countless other victims from -- from going through what I had been through. The trial was extremely difficult and I do understand why victims balk at doing it, yet the impact statement gave me back everything

JUDGE MACKINNON: The statement that you made to the Judge in open court?

MISS WOODS: Yes.

JUDGE MACKINNON: At the time of sentencing?

MISS WOODS: At the time of sentencing. Which was covering four months after the

conviction.

JUDGE MACKINNON: That was what court?

MISS WOODS: Superior Court of Los

Angeles.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Is that their general practice to permit statements?

MISS WOODS: Well, it was unusual. I had received a piece of paper, which is a standard thing, telling me when my assailant was to be sentenced and at the bottom -- I just happened to read everything that came my way about the case because I was fairly active in it and cared a lot about each of the elements. And in little tiny letters along the bottom of it, said: "By the way, as a victim, you have a right to appear that day...."

So, I called the DA and said: "What is that?" And although she was a DA in the Sexual Assault Task Force, said: "Frankly, no one has ever taken advantage of that". "Well, you found someone who will".

so, I prepared a statement and not really knowing what to expect. And it was an unusual situation. The courtroom was packed with people because they understood that something unusual

was going to occur and in all of my speaking and work in Los Angeles I try to encourage other victims to take advantage of this and I would like to encourage people over the nation that they have a right to make such a statement to do so.

JUDGE MACKINNON: You're the only one in Los Angeles that you know of?

MISS WOODS: At that particular point —
this was four years ago. I have heard of other
cases since then where victims have made such a
statement. I fully intend when my assailant
comes up for parole to travel of course at my
own expense to Folsom to make a similar
statement at his parole hearing if I get the
opportunity to do so.

JUDGE MACKINNON: He was sentenced before the new law indeterminate? He can be paroled?

MISS WOODS: He can be paroled, I

JUDGE BREYER: When was he sentenced?

JUDGE BREYER: He'd have to serve seven years.

MISS WOODS: Yes.

MISS WOODS: '82.

believe, in '89.

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JUDGE MACKINNON: Fine. Thank you, very much.

We're delighted to have with us as our next witness, the Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon. Judge Alarcon is a member of the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.

Judge, we appreciate you taking your time to be with us today.

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HONORABLE ARTHUR L. ALARCON U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT

MacKinnon. I must say, everyone of your speaker seems to be very brief for reasons of having been here this morning and heard appearance and comments I'm going to be brief because I did not know I was on the program. And Judge Burns is the Chairman of our group, the Ninth Circuit and he will be following. I was going to be here to make sure that he did reflect the consensus of our group.

There are three things that I would like to comment on. One, Commissioner MacKenna just asked about the rights of the victims in

California to speak at sentencing. That is as a result of the Amendment to the California Constitution. It's called Proposition "P". Victims in criminal matters of the State of California must be given notice, have the right to be present and speak at sentence.

The three areas that I want to comment briefly on are as follows: First of all, from an Appellate standpoint, and I'll speak as one of the 28 Appellate Judges in the Ninth Circuit, I would appreciate if the Commission would consider finding if possible, more carefully, the modified real offense sentencing standard with reference to "other criminal conduct".

Judge Burns will be making our report to you and he will discuss with you two alternative suggestions that he will offer to you. I refer you to the concern the Commission has that elements can partly be bound up in conduct that constitutes a crime charged, should be considered.

As an Appellate Judge I worry about language like that. I see a fertile field -- properly so, from attorneys who would challenge concepts such as that.

Either of the alternatives offered by Mr.

Burns in his remarks that you limit the other

criminal conduct to conduct which is really

admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence,

Rule 404. Or, conduct which would form the

basis for a count and indictment joinable under

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8.

Would be something that all of us in the system

are familiar with and can deal with and might

toughen the possible elements.

The second thing I want to speak to you about is a concern I have, not as Appellate Judge because I think a lot of these things never get to us and that is the problem which may follow if, from what appears to be a recommendation for guidelines which will result in harsher or stiffer or stricter sentences. And what appears to be a down-playing of the use of probation by the District Judges.

I fear that while reducing disparity in sentencing by Judges, this may lead to a greater disparity in sentencing because of plea bargaining between lawyers, of charged reductions, and of fact-bargaining in order to prepare for the sentencing hearing.

Harsher sentences, if that is the result of the guidelines may precipitate more charged, more charged reduction to avoid greater punishment.

And I also encourage the overcharging to reduce the plea of guilt. I'm delighted that you apparently are concerned with the same things I am because that's one of the questions that I have heard this morning.

Finally, in the later matter and the second concern, is the need that you have pointed out in the evidentiary hearing to try to specific issues of the facts under the modified real offender sentencing concept. I cannot quarrel with your concerns that you are bringing out in the open and providing some kind of a process for things that, in the past, things that now appear only in presentencing reports and where there's less process in what you're suggesting.

What concerns me is that perhaps

Congress -- this is not your responsibility -
Congress has not given sufficient concern to the

judicial impact of what may be a greater load on

our District Courts in conducting the kind of

hearings that we're suggesting and that may be necessary for the guidelines.

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To avoid -- unless Congress takes that into consideration -- unless Congress provides the sufficient personnel in the probation officer's reports, investigations of that, in judges to try the cases where I believe there will be a greater need, we may see if we don't have that consistence, we may see prosecutors and defense lawyers taking care of the problem by stipulating to the facts as to the proper elements the Court should consider.

This in turn could lead to bargaining as to which facts will be presented and which facts may not be presented. If my concern is valid, the result will be disparity in sentencing no longer based on judicial discretion or where you are in the United States, who is the sentencer, but may well be based on the skill of negotiating lawyers and the facts exposed to the court?

The Rand Corporation in Los Angeles has done an excellent study on disparity in the sentence. One of the reports -- that turned out about 1977 -- one of the conclusions that they

reached is that plea bargaining charged reduction in bargaining has a tremendous impact even within one county, Los Angeles County, because we have about eight divisions of the Superior Court. They saw differences depending upon the policy of the DA charged that particular division in terms of charged reduction and in term of sentence work.

Delighted the commission is concerned about the impact of guidelines in the area of plea bargaining. I would hope that you come up with or recommend to Congress their consideration given to the impact of the statute and guidelines that you have to come up with on this problem.

I also hope that in the final report there will be more concern expressed in the report about the alternative probation. Judge Burns will speak more to that. This may be an unfair criticism. May be you are as concerned as we are about giving the Judge the continued option where the statute permits it to put people on probation.

However, of view of your proposed quidelines, seem to indicate to us that you

downplay the value of the importance of leaving it to the judges discretion to put people probation. That constitutes my remarks, Judge. Surprise to me until about 1:45 this afternoon.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Thank you, very much.

I wonder if you would consider this, perhaps by analogy, in the future. We provided a summary draft approach, in view of the sentencing hearing we set up a suggestion proceeding meeting with your approval. I wonder whether we have the power to do that?

JUDGE ALARCON: All right. I'd like to think about that.

JUDGE MACKINNON: I would appreciate
that. I just don't know whether we have as a
commission the authority in fact to do what
maybe the Legislature or Congress should be
doing and of course, that will determine greatly
the answer to that question in terms of the
sentencing?

JUDGE ALARCON: Sure.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Thank you, very much.

Any questions to my right? Anyone to my left have any question?

JUDGE BREYER: There seems to be in the

report there are persons are at fault who wrote this Page 17 "modified rules of sentencing".

Seems to be there's been some confusion about whether or not refers to. There is no standard such as the one you just described.

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What the modified rule of that section says and what it intended to say is that what that Judge does is he looks to the guideline and the guideline tells him what conduct to look at. Some guidelines will refer to "other conduct".

For example, the guideline for bank robbery refers to "physical harm". He never applies the standard that you mentioned. The standard that you mentioned dealt with permission to decide which specific cross references should be made.

In other words, we decided in the preliminary draft that a person who robs a bank, if he's charged with bank robbery and convicted and he happens to pistol-whip the teller, even though that crime of pistol-whipping the teller was not charged, the Judge, who chooses to sentence him for bank robbery, if the Judge finds that he pistol-whipped the teller, looks to the harm of physical injuries listed in Part

"A".

So, it's very specific what happens.

When a person is convicted for tax evasion, the guideline on tax evasion says that the Judge does not look at the personal harm. Even if, in the course of tax evasion, the tax evader happens to hit the IRS man on the head.

"go and look up physical harm when you rob a bank. But don't go and look up physical harm when you evade your income tax," is because by and large physical harm can be bound up with bank robbery. But it's a very unusual case in which physical harm is bound up with tax evasion.

In other words, that vague instruction that you read is not an instruction to you or me as Judges, it is an instruction to me as a commissioner so that I would then write a specific guideline which would then instruct the Judges.

Now, that's the way the Modified Rule of Sentencing is supposed to work and is supposed to be reflected in this particular document.

JUDGE ALARCON: It's reassuring to hear

that. I'm a little concerned however, about the specifity which sounds to a Judge like hands tied. Why shouldn't a judge consider that somebody reached over and hit the tax collector on the head with his pistol?

JUDGE BREYER: The reason for that is the following: If the Judge is going to consider these "other things", remember these "other things" were not charged and therefore, when the judge considers whether they happened he will consider them at a sentencing hearing after the trial and the standard will be perhaps a preponderence of the evidence and the Rules of Evidence if they do apply, if they will, will not apply with full force.

And therefore, although that's an enormous procedural improvement over the present, where there are no protections to the defense, none the less he is less protected than if the crime's charged secondly and therefore, the IRS agent who is hurt, if the government wants to punish the person on the basis of the tax evader having hit the IRS man on the head, the government can't do it. The government simply charges that offense. And then since

that person has been convicted of having committed that offense he gets some support.

And then you say: "Well, why not do the same with the bank robbery?" And the answer predominantly is for not doing the same thing with the bank robbery is that if we do that same thing with the bank robbery we were worried about putting too much discretion in the hands of the prosecutor where the prosecutor can then control the sentence by deciding whether or not to charge that extra element.

You see? Under those considerations, some of which cut for and some of which cut against charged offense sentencing. Some of which cut for, some of which cut against, real offense sentencing, our balance on Pages 15 through 17, when we tried to spell them all out and explain how we reached the great compromise.

The compromise being substantive of what

I described this modified rule of that
sentencing, and being procedurally a sentencing
process that provides more protection for the
defendant than at present, but still somewhat
less procedural protection than if in fact, it
were a full-fledged trial. I mean that's the --

JUDGE ALARCON: I appreciate that.

JUDGE WILKINS: Just a note -- I'm sure Judge Breyer intends -- my understanding of the preliminary draft is not a requested compromise that this commission has reached, but is rather one view of the public reaction --

JUDGE BREYER: -- public reaction.

JUDGE WILKINS: And in fact, there are many people on this Commission who might have a slightly different viewpoint than Judge Breyer does. Some of us have a very different view.

JUDGE BREYER: I didn't mean it as a compromise on the Commission. Because I have a theory as a compromise of consideration.

JUDGE ALARCON: In your estimation -maybe this is because I've been a Judge too
long, I could read the brief on the appellate in
the bank case saying "why am I not being treated
the way a person in tax cases"?

JUDGE BREYER: You would not have the power to appeal, have anything to say about that.

JUDGE ALARCON: -- challenge the statute.

THE COURT: Yes. Yes. They could

challenge the statute.

JUDGE ALARCON: Will be equal treatment.

JUDGE BREYER: The reason I was addressing myself to the problem you were concerned with is that I do have a definite standard. I think the standard is tairly definite. I think the standard is served very well by that. I don't know why this is put out for comment. That is a standard which is a theory which I think represents a compromise of considerations. Is put out for comment because the question in my mind as it's put forward for comment, is it the correct approach?

California, we have learned, has much more of a charged offense based system.

The Department of Justice at one point proposed to us a system that was far more real. So, I'm not saying it's the right system, but I'd be happy to look through it again and see why that system is put forward.

JUDGE MACKINNON: I presume Judge Burns is going to discuss the other criminal conduct in greater detail?

JUDGE ALARCON: Yes. He's the real show. I'm just here to -- you.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, again.

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JUDGE WILKINS: We have with us now another representative from the Ninth Circuit. The Honorable James M. Burns, United States District Judge from Portland, Oregon. His reputation precedes this Commission for long before I met him. He was known as "James the Just, from Portland, Oregon". Delighted to have you with us, Judge Burns.

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HONORABLE JAMES M. BURNS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, PORTLAND, OREGON

JUDGE BURNS: Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. Appreciate very much the kindness to listen to me again and to begin with I want to assure you that I am not going to quote the scriptures.

In the first place, I have been handed a a controlled exercise agreement of three judges by virtue of the First Amendment and stipulation that I'm not entitled to quote the scriptures.

Secondly, considering the effects it had
I would prefer to open with a quote from
Aristotle which is: "Absolute equality is
absolute inequality." And that, in a way,
capsulizes I guess really, what my view is of
the statute itself as suggested for a method by
which we will eliminate sentencing disparity.

Also, I want to quote a sign which is over a store in Vermont as to the material that I have put together in a hurry and didn't really have much time to give sufficient thought to the detail and comments. But, the sign over the store in Vermont says: "Our best is none too good."

And I reel that way about the quality of today's presentation. I don't intend to go over it. I just want to get a couple, three points and then I'll answer any questions.

First, I have a cartoon that I generally show, it shows the Judge on the bench and it says: "Now, I have arrived at the job of

sentencing, the fun part of being a Judge."

And then, I have another cartoon which I show ususally in conjunction with that and it shows the Judge banging his gavel. Says: "99 years, justice triumphs again".

Be that as it may, NROS is a baffling problem you have sketched beautifully in view of the commentary and I'm frank to say I'm sorry, but I have to nit-pick or criticize the formulation that you end up with which is set forth in the text.

We have offered rather tentatively a couple of alternative formulations. We don't claim very much for either one of them though the first one, we claim at least familiarity by the practioneers by formulating the standards wherein more than charged with conviction would be looked at.

The other one, the alternative the defendants, I think is less injury. There is perhaps a third area and I simply am not aware of enough of the details of it, but I rather think the U. S. Attorney's Manual Service by the Department of Justice and various offices, but some of the standards that they employ with

respect to where the prosecutor is to charge or not, as the case may be. Where for example, if the file charges as opposed to diversion and so on. Those various prosecutorial judgment calls that must be made, probably take into account a variety of conduct associated with the punitive defendant and what the criminal episodal affects on he or she may be involved in. That might be another place to locate the standard.

But I don't have anything more specific than that. And I don't really claim that the alternative we are proposing in the written material are necessarily that helpful. They do have some problems. I do think they're worthy at least of some study by you folks and by your staff.

Secondly, and this was referred to somewhat earlier today by some of the other questions and some of the other people -- an in-house decision is one that on the present number -- and we appreciate that the present number simply says "number", they're not cast in stone but that's what we're reacting to as if that is what they're going to be, you understand, intellectually and emotionally and

among other things. But on those numbers what you have done is to eliminate a vast share of offenses in which I would at least consider probation.

And as I read the Statute, I am not entitled to grant probation on "A" or "B" felony and you rolks are probably not entitled to allow probation on serious or violent felonies because the Statute says be sure the guidelines reached have had to reach the maximum.

But, I'm not aware of anything that the Statute forbids consideration of probation except "A" and "B". And there are cases where I have put a bank robber on probation and I did not do so -- not very many, but there are rare cases, almost universally done, it has been one in which there's probation plus, perhaps the split, perhaps specified period of time in a residential alcohol treatment program and the like. But I have felt that those were proper cases.

Now, I agree that under the Statute I won't be able to do that anymore so long as the charge itself is 2113A or 2113B. But, for other reasons the charges -- I think it's an in-house

decision and broad in nearly the 14. -- as you know. And, third is the problem I see of warning a pleading defendant who comes to you without knowing all the facts which would add up to the sanction units imposed in the sentence and there is some other material in there that you might well want to consider.

Maybe the answer really is: So long as I tell him the maximum is 20 or the maximum is 25, that that's all I need tell him. I am not so sure. I'm not sure that the present requirement of Rule 11 have to tell him the maximum sentence, have to tell him the other direction.

I'm not so sure that isn't a reflection of a constitutional requirement or requirement that has constitutional undertones.

Needless to say, personally, I would feel very uncomfortable telling the defendant in a -- let us say, an unarmed bank robbery -- telling him only the maximum is 20, when I know perfectly well, given the various defense values that would add up to, let us say, a range of 15 to 18 years. And I know he's going to serve 85 percent of it unless he saves a woman's life, seems like you can aggragate one year, he's

going to serve 85 percent of whatever I say.

I would feel personally very
uncomfortable, because I think it's personally
wrong. It's his right. I think the defendants
are human beings just like judges are human
beings. I know victims are. So are police. So
are prosecutors. So are defendants and so is
everybody in the system.

And it's either their strength or their weakness, I'm not sure which. And where I think the Statute ultimately becomes a problem in administration to the extent our statement is critical, we're not critical of you folks.

We're critical, if at all, really of the Statute and our job is to try as best we know to help you make a workable set of guidelines, because I think that's required on the whole just as much as we are here.

But, there are four great purposes in that sentence, even though they don't really call it "rehabilitation" in the Statute we know that's the intent and there's a fifth great purpose, "preparing". But, Congress has not and so far as I see it, these guidelines do not always and everywhere identify the specified

time or specified criminal that the predominant 1 2 purpose is deterrent or response or diversion or is rehabilitation. And so long as that remains 3 I think there will be uncertainty. One or two rather technical items. Your definition of 5 psychological injury is very troubling to me. I 6 don't have a better method to word it. 7 know is that it engenders endless controversy in 8 9 almost every bank robbery case that I have ever 10 had because it would generate the argument of 11 the psychiatrist. And if you have ever had as 12 many psychiatrists as I've had in 20 years of 13 sentencing you don't want to hear anymore and 14 that's all they're doing come November a year 15 I hope to add some wording, send it from now. 16 to you that I think would be helpful. And then this problem of the role in the 17

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And then this problem of the role in the offense or relative culpability is a tough, tough, tough problem. One that we wrestle with all the time and I think most of you nave wrestled with. Three large-scale methamphetamine conspiracy cases with a total of 9 defendants, 11 defendants or 12 defendants.

And trying to sort them out in terms of the relative culpability. And it is a tough

proposition. I don't think the present wording of your role in the defense is as tight and precise and tidy as it could be. I'd like to offer some suggestions to you. It can never be, never be, as good as it should be in my judgment. Those are areas where I think, to the extent you think you can under the Statute you must allow me some discretion and you must tolerate therefore the disparity that would stem from my exercise which is different than any other way that judges trom the Central District of California view it.

Thank you, very much. Sorry to trespass on your time. I was interested in Judge Breyer's remark about the great compromise because it struck me on studying this, I anticipated reading Bolan's record of the meeting in Philadelphia which is very interesting.

And I saw this as I was coming on the plane here, the comparability here of the role that you folks play and the role that the ten weeks the residents of Philadelphia played in the way -- this is not as grandiose and doesn't affect the whole civil government, but it's a

tremendous important development and I hope you have the time between now and January or April, whenever it is you must -- I hope you have the time for the nine of you to sit behind doors by yourselves for an extended period and thrash it out and thrash it out the way they did in Philadelphia.

I'm satisfied of the quality of the folks have here consistent by the comments that you have from the others that you will in fact produce a darn good document. I hope so and I'm going to do everything I can to see that you attain that goal.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much,

Judge Burns. Not only is your testimony today a
submission for what you have given the

Commission in the past, we look forward to
receiving the submission that you talked about.

We agree you hit it right on the head.

We, in the Commission don't want examples of the area of psychological harm to turn the sentencing hearing into a battle of the testimony of psychiatrists.

JUDGE BURNS: We absolutely don't want that.

JUDGE MACKINNON: On the other hand, we want psychological harm to be a tactor in the appropriate cases. How do you find that balance? That's what we keep searching for in this and all the other issues.

JUDGE BURNS: Just about two weeks ago, three weeks ago I sentenced a bank robber which was in fact an armed robbery in which the defendant was armed in which the weapon was discharged and the teller and the manager and others were absolutely terrified out of their skins.

The government, unfortunately, or otherwise, has stipulated that the weapon when fired had been accidentally discharged, discharged from a robbery of -- went like this (indicating) with his arm to assist the lady customer who just came in the bank to get on the floor as he had instructed her to do and his arm went up and the gun discharged.

In any event, the teller in the bank wrote a letter. I asked them to come in for the hearing and so I asked them to testify or testify rather than make statements and conducted a rather lengthy inquiry of them and

asked them how long I should sentence him for and I asked them now long they wanted me to sentence -- this was a 39 year old man with an absolutely clear record, no priors of any kind. And a lot of other mitigating factors; chronic confession and restoration of procedures and all kinds of others.

Be that as it may, neither one could tell me how long they thought he ought to stay in, actually stay in behind bars. And so I finally said to them: "Well, gee whiz, I shouldn't ask you to do my job." And I should thank them for participating. Both of them obviously suffering from the events of the episode.

I think it most important that we have the benefit of comments from the victims wherever they feel comfortable in coming in and appearing, otherwise the comments they -- they don't care to come in and comment to us and we take them with what we have.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much. Any questions to my right. To my left?

JUDGE MACKINNON: You suggested some possible consideration be given the guidelines that might be put out by the United States

Attorneys. They are definite. They apply.

"The attorneys for the government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he believes that the person's conduct constitutes a tederal offense and that the admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain conviction unless in his judgment prosecution should be declined because of no substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution, the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction or there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution..."

That's the present standard and which there are some more refinements beyond that.

But that's the present standard. I don't know how the Court standard is being applied.

You know, I read the statement of the Ninth Circuit on what they were talking about on: "Other criminal conduct". And I thought you were going to dwell on that more and what you propose to do is limit the Judge in the

imposition of a sentence to other criminal conduct to evidence that was rather minimal.

Yes. It's Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. And -- well, the elements of Rule 404 are limited rather and "other crimes is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted with conformity therewith".

"It may however, be admissible for other purposes".

That was one of the things that dealt relatively with character evidence. Now, in contrast to that nowever -- and that was your suggestion -- that the criminal -- Title 183577 provides:

"No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a Court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence".

So, the two are sort of at loggerheads.

And I just make a comment on that, what would be your particular observation on that? In other words, as far as the Ninth Circuit's recommendation was concerned?

JUDGE BURNS: Judge MacKinnon, I guess we didn't make ourselves too clear. Our problem with NROS (sic) was bottomed on the change of venue proceeding. If I rob five banks a week apart, standard stuff, bank robberies are apparently unrelated, they're a week apart and different parts of town. Now, under NROS as it is presently phrased, I could consider the other report. They're not inferred in some and they don't result from it.

Now, one way of getting that is, if he agreed to be tried on Bank Robbery No. 1 and the government could bring in evidence on Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 under 404-B then I could consider as part of the grieving offense alternatively if those bank robberies were separately indicted and if you joined in the Rule 8 as a matter of "joined-in-the-trial". Then, when he pleads guilty to one I can look at it and know about it

and act upon the other four.

JUDGE MACKINNON: You think they have to be charged?

JUDGE BURNS: I don't think they have to be charged, Judge MacKinnon. But, unless they are inferred or result from under the present standards you have, I would have to ignore those other four and I shouldn't have to.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Well, I agree with that because I think it's <u>Greyson and Roberts</u> that say that even though they were charged and dismissed you could still take them into consideration on the sentencing.

JUDGE BURNS: Not as I read NROS.

JUDGE MACKINNON: You say, our --

JUDGE BURNS: The present formulation.

The present formulation. I will read -- I will read the commentary on the formulation of NROS to aim for that kind of result, but this is real life and this is what we get and we struggle on this stuff because of the way these --

JUDGE MACKINNON: You want to have available the right that the Supreme Court gives you in those cases to consider those other offenses.

JUDGE BURNS: You can't have truth in sentencing without truth in the charging of it. If the prosecutor and defendant don't tell me those then I can't evoke the truth at the time of imposing sentence.

JUDGE MACKINNON: As I said earlier here today and I happen to be on that part of the assignment, I think it's going to be possible to assure that you get all the facts and if you don't somebody is going to be guilty of a crime.

The lawyers, the United States Attorney.

And that's very easy to do. And, I think you're entitled to it in sentencing. And you don't have to come up where somebody, as they say, "swallowed the gun" and you don't know anything about a gun and it's a bank robbery and they're going to have to show it.

JUDGE BURNS: Thank you, very much.

JUDGE WILKINS: Judge --

JUDGE BURNS: Running over my time.

JUDGE WILKINS: We, I think, all agree with what you're saying. The problem, I haven't been able to figure out, Judge, when you say you want to consider the other bank robberies in sentencing today. You do that.

JUDGE BURNS: You bet.

You see, you don't have to say how much you consider today, but under our guideline system we're going to have say how much because some of these numerical scores, maybe as you think about it for us to say those multiple crimes that you would sentence for the crime and conviction.

And as far as the others are concerned we would specifically say: I got it, Judge. This is a good example and we encourage that part to encompass these other things."

JUDGE BURNS: Part of the problem comes from the fact that the example that you have used in developing the commentary in NROS tends to be less realistic than many of what we, in the trenches think of as regular recurring episodes.

So, that's why we have struggled to accomplish this. I was hoping you wouldn't ask me questions that Judge Breyer has asked me earlier about concurrent and consecutive sentences. I don't have an answer on that.

JUDGE BREYER: The box that I put your problem in sometimes half-baked brain, the box I

put it in, the one about the bank in that concurrent/consecutive sentence because the -- and see why I put it there, because, see what good the bank tellers are toward banks and that happens all the time. In other words, you repeat the same conduct four or fives times. How do we punish him for that and you come up with an interesting idea.

JUDGE BURNS: Our committee isn't through yet. We intend to continue working and develop any material in the way of alternative suggestions. We intended to get them to you by the 3rd or 4th of December.

JUDGE BREYER: See, your 404 point. 404 point, you say "Gee, that's arbitrary". Because 404 point turns on relevance and relevance is important to the facts of the individual case. I mean, sometimes those three banks really tend to show a common scheme in which case in our Circuit decision will say --

JUDGE BURNS: Sure --

JUDGE BREYER: Whether or not they shown the common scheme is relevent to the facts of the individual case.

JUDGE BURNS: If you had the advantages

of the Appellate Court and I would like to think I had here, but I know better than that. And if the Court would say that the fact that the robbery's one because he's hooked on heroin and each was sufficient enough "relatedness" to include them under the form, that's fine. I don't see this Circuit doing that. I don't see most of the Circuits doing that under your policy.

I do promise, Judge Breyer, that if at all possible our group can help you with concurrent, consecutive problems which you've already discussed here, we're going to help you. We're going to try are best to help you.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, Judge Burns.

Appreciate your work and support and all of your assistance.

JUDGE BURNS: I ran over -- my rate, Judge Wilkins, is at \$5 a minute.

JUDGE WILKINS: Sorry about that. Send us a pill. Our next witness is Professor Curtin from the University of Southern California Law School, Los Angeles. Professor Curtin, we're delighted to have you with us.

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PROFESSOR DENNIS CURTIN UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW SCHOOL LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

PROFESSOR CURTIS: Thank you. I have been for the last 16 years running a criminal program here, either at Yale or USC where I now am and my students have represented federal prisoners in all sorts of problems that they've

had and we have had a lot of experience with sentencing and parole.

And so, I have some knowledge about that area and you can say I have a worm's eye view of the system because I see it through the eyes of my clients who are already in prison.

I think I probably should tell you at the beginning a little bit about my biases. I am probably more process-oriented than I am worried about abstract notions of justice.

I think also from contacts with the prisoners and my contacts with people who guard the prisoners, the staff at the institutions that I've been involved in, I think they tell me -- and I think they're probably right, that we nave lots of incarceration now in the Federal system. Enough incarceration now in the Federal system, maybe even too much incarceration now in the Federal system.

And I worry when I read these guidelines that perhaps the guidelines either advertantly or inadvertantly are going to raise the level or incarceration guite significantly.

Seems to me the burden ought to be on those who plan to increase the incarceration to

show how increased incarceration is going to be more just than the system we have right now.

I have -- I mean more just in the aggragate. I'm not talking about -- I understand that one of your purposes is to reduce disparities in the system and I have absolutely no quarrel with that. Seems to me we see them everyday, I have clients who have gotten one year, six years and 50 years for kidnapping, for example, the same crime and somewhat the same circumstances.

I have two reservations that I basically want to talk to you about today from my reading of the guidelines. One of them is, what I perceive to be a tremendous decrease in the amount of probation that is going to happen under the new guidelines and;

Second, of course, is the increase in the quantum of punishment that's going to be meted out under the guidelines as currently written and neither increase in revenue has been justified.

I think what I would urge that you do is to develop more flexible guidelines on probation, first. And second, take into

consideration as part of your deliberations about guidelines the capacity in the Federal system.

I have heard that you have decided that it's -- that you will develop your system first and then try to figure out what the impact of the system will be on the Federal -- on the system. Now, I'm not sure that's a correct understanding on my part, I'd be happy to find out that that's not true.

But nevertheless, I think that's in your analysis of what is just, what we have been doing in the past is certainly relevant to your considerations.

Sixty percent, I think, of the sentences that are now handed out are probationary sentences. It seems to me that any departure from that -- I might be wrong. Say it's fifty percent, say it's 40 percent, say it's 35 percent. But whatever percent it is, seems to me it would be unwise to depart immediately from roughly the same percentage of probation.

Probation is described in your draft as rehabilitation oriented. From my perspective, it isn't rehabilitation oriented. It's

punishment. Probation is punishment just like -- it's not just like incarceration is punishment, but it is punishment. It's punishment of a different sort and it comes after a lot of punishment for -- or a lot of pain for being convicted of things that have already happened.

I think that there should be a way to give probation in almost any sentence except the ones that you are forbidden to give probation.

Judge Alarcon said he had given or he had seen a case where the bank robber got probation and another bank robber got 25 years. Judge Burns was just talking about giving the bank robber probation.

It seems to me that under the guidelines as now promulgated -- not promulgated, as drafted -- that it would be extremely difficult to see instances like those and I think there will always be instances like those that I think you should provide for.

You should find a way to get zero time as well as to give 20 years time even in cases in which have laid out the high number of points.

One way that you might do that -- I might

say I'm extremely defident, I've been involved in the system for so long that I'm extremely defident about talking to you because I know that you've been thinking really hard about it and it's an extreme, extreme, difficult subject to deal with. And I know that you've been working very hard at it and thinking about it a lot longer than I have and so I have a lot of respect for the solutions that you come up with.

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On the other hand I think that along the way we've gone wrong in two important respects.

One way to put it, one way to simply take care of the probationary problem is to say "alright, whatever, say 35 percent of the people get probation now, say, okay, whatever 35 percent of the grades fall under the numbers fall under, that is presumptively a probationary sentence and that's what we're going to do. Or, at least we'll consider probation first and if that's not the case then we consider if there's some aggravating factor".

Of course, as now structured you have a heck of a time doing that because there's lots of narms that you would not encompass by incarceration.

On the other hand, you wouldn't be true to the system that we now have, you would not be increasing the prison population or you would not be increasing punishment in the aggragate.

The other thing that I really -- the other way to do it is simply give Judges more authority if they need reasons to decrease the numbers.

You have, and I think it's on Pages 314 on Page 123 of your guidelines, the Judges need a little more participation in certain crimes to enable to multiply the number by .5 to .7

In my view, you might be able to give a little bit more discretion than that, remember you're going to have to give reasons for every multiplication factor. You might think of saying: "All right, you can have from .1 to .7 or, if you can justify it, No. 1 or you might say can think of more reasons than simply lesser participation in the crime such as some moral reasons for going below the guidelines than simply lesser participation of the crime than they have.

And there, I think some sort of mental state, departure from the guidelines, claim of

right. Chairman Breyer can fill you in on those better than I can.

But, basically, I would try to give the Judges a lot more flexibility in their dealing with the probationary sentences because I think it's extremely important both for the system of justice and not to increase the aggrate of punishment that we have now.

The other thing is, I think that you overtly should take the capacity of the system into account in setting up your guidelines. I see a nod from Judge Breyer. So, maybe I better not say anymore.

But it seems to me you can't -- what I would hate to see is some tieing up of harms. Some adding up of harms which I see as I was going through your guidelines and attempting to kind of replicate the job that you must have done. And everytime I saw harms I could always think of three or tour harms to consider even as I sit in my room, can think of more harms than you thought of, because you have them down on paper and that's a very seductive thing. And I think a very dangerous path because at the end of that you have to put numbers on those harms

and you have to say: "All right. How much does somebody deserve?"

What I'm really afraid of when you do that you cast loose all of your wards (sic). (inaudible) You're not bound to anything. You're just sitting in your room: "What do you think this crime deserves?".

Of course, you're seven people who are who are expressly -- supposed to be, on the other hand, I would feel much more comfortable and I think the American people would feel much more comfortable if you said: "All right, what have you done in the past?" What's the medium of the sentences that have been handed out in the past? What is the average? How do they break down?

Why should we go outside of what we have done before? Should we increase it anymore and for what reason? Maybe we should go under. At least you're starting with some number that has some basis and practice in your history and acceptance not from everybody, at least from some portion of the room -- of the public.

So, I think in addition to the fact that Congress has told you to take into account --

told you, suggested to you, also suggested in the sentencing Judge's interim period, take the capacity into account. Should be a very significant part of it. I think that's the problem.

If you get away from some sort of capacity system what's going to happen? You're going to have the system itself avoiding your guidelines.

I can tell you when you talked today about several ways to do that, one of them is fact bargaining which goes on. I don't myself, and Judge MacKinnon I think, sometimes it's not as pad as you think it might pe. There are reasons to do it.

That the charge bargaining that's going on in some cases, I think might be transferred to State prosecution. That's happening all over the country now with cross reference of U.S. Attorneys, State District Attorneys.

You find cases being tried back and forth to Federal Courts and State Courts and easy way to avoid the guidelines is to simply shuttle something over to State Court when you want to make a deal that would give the prosecutors a

lot of power that they don't now have.

I think there are other advantages (sic) that says that it might be put into effect, not to mention, which could grow into the guidelines' system. So, basically, what I'm worried about is losing control. You're losing control of the process if the process is getting out of your hands and getting into the people before you or after you in the criminal justice system and if that happens then you'll have more discrepancies. Then we can even trim off -- or maybe we'll nave the same discrepancies that we have now in the system that we're trying to correct.

I think it would be terrible in my judgment if we ended up with unnecessary punishment as a result of your efforts.

I'd be glad to answer questions you might have.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you. Let me assure you that we share your concern about handling the detailed analysis. We do not have that in detail and will have it in the next few months.

It is more that we understand what the current practice is, although, as you probably

know it is not easy to find out exactly what the current practice is. You can't go to any agency and detail what we need to do.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: The kind of research that you actually need to have done because it's been gone over decades. It's a very difficult thing to do. Any numbers that mean anything especially in the Federal system, some States are far more easy to get it in, in the U.S.--not the Federal system. I hope to do that.

JUDGE WILKINS: It's not completed.
Would have to be completed before we submit anything. Any questions to my right?

JUDGE MACKINNON: I find one of your suggestions interesting but perplexing. The question of keeping the same percentage of probation. You make that suggestion. Following the suggestion or at least the enforcment of a higher reduction in disparity. Do you see any contradiction in that?

PROFESSOR CURTIN: You do it without -well, if you assume that every probationary
sentence is a disparity sentence then you short
out different points.

JUDGE MACKINNON: I'm not saying that.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: What I would like to try to do, I think for any client is -- absolutely all I could do is, you base a lot of things that you're not going to be able to do but keep the same percentage if possible of probation that you have now.

JUDGE MACKINNON Keep the same average which means the only thing I can do for disparity?

PROFESSOR CURTIN: One way you can do it is to say: "We are going to have a system in which certain people down at the lower end of our guideline range get probation."

And that cuts you off - going to be in the 35 percent mark. So that you can surely predict with the guidelines that you have now, how many points somebody's going to be where the 65 percentile -- 35 percentile is going to fall on the point system. If you say everyone, presumptive basis, you won't do anything, the fact that you raise --

JUDGE MACKINNON: I'm still perplexed.

If you leave the same percentage at zero in terms of probation, keep the average the same and you wanted to eliminate disparity there's

only one place you can get it from, are those who are apparently in prison.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: No. Maybe I'm not making myself clear. I guess I'm not. If you have 65 -- say you have fifty percent. Let's take a number. Let's say you nave tifty percent of the people getting probation. Fifty percent going to prison. I suggest you keep that same percentage in your guidelines.

One way that you do that without reducing disparity in the system is to say that anybody who has a point score in the lower 50 percent gets probation. There's a lot of ranges where you obviously don't want to do that, if you do it any other way. On the other hand, reducing that from a disparity is better than not having any amount of probation. To that effect, I'm being consistent.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Disparity is coming upon the positive sentence. Keeping it to fifty. Taking your example, who gets probation, now, half of all those sentences have to still get probation. So, there's no disparity between giving fifty percent probation and fifty percent sentences. The only disparity is that those are

actually sentences in prison. I find that a strange notion of reducing disparity. Don't you? Disparity has nothing to do with the proportion of getting probation, only to do with the length of sentencing of those who are incarcerated.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: I think, if I add -if I presume -- suppose your factors go up from
zero --

JUDGE MACKINNON: I think I understand the technique.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: Everyone in the fifty perecent, presumptively get probation. Then you have, in essence, a similar system that you have right now. The only way you could so that the guy with the knife and the guy with the gun gets probation. So you have disparity there. If that's what you're saying. But we have a one --we had --worthy enough to be in prison (inaudible) and in that case there's nothing wrong with continuing. Only way to avoid it, it seems to me, is to give everyone except people who are almost innocent some --

JUDGE MACKINNON: No.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: Otherwise, if you want

to do away all you can have is people down at the very low end with 6 points or less getting probation.

COMMISSIONER HELEN G. CORROTHERS:

Professor Curtin, I think you indicated that our commentary reflected the idea that probation is not punishment. I was not aware of that and I only think we intend to say that probation is not punishment.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: Some were.

COMMISSIONER CORROTHERS: Is punishment simply a matter of discretion if we didn't do that?

PROFESSOR CURTIN: In my notes, I recall saying for the purpose of rehabilitation. I think that that's not true. I think there are probation lots of times imposed and under our system I think this is puinishment.

COMMISSIONER CORROTHERS: Yes, with that point.

JUDGE WILKINS: Any other questions.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Depends on the individual, hardened criminal, rather than spend an extra year in prison then three years on -PROFESSOR CURTIN: That's right. Some

people can't stand probation.

JUDGE MACKINNON: And others -- somebody like that is just a brief, as I indicate, what you're really advocating, in an action or except as we have a practice (inaudible). How are you going to -- we have a thousand judges throughout around America. Can't come up with any proceeding that you're going to guarantee that you have, just as many probation cases, prison cases that you had.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: You can come close,
Judge. The other thing is my point is really
this: I would say rather you say: "Look, this
is essentially what we have been doing in the
past. It has some validity because it is the
(inaudible) of a group of judges thinking hard
about crime and there's some solid reality to
it.

Now, the Judges are distant. They give distance sentences. But this bank robber gets five years in time. Seems to me it's telling us. That's all I'm saying, If you want to do ten years seems to me you ought to say we thought it ought to be ten years instead of five years." But that's a very difficult judgement

for me to make. That's my point.

The other point in the guidelines that you have in your possession and the tools that you have in your possession I think you can pretty well, you can pretty well design guidelines that are out there with your thousand Judges sitting out there, are going to be able to put eight thousand people in jail or ten thousand.

JUDGE MACKINNON: How do you think about probation for income tax offenders.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: You know, Judge it seems to me your better at that than I am. I don't want -- I don't want to dodge the question. If I where a Judge I would say I might be a little more conservative than members of this panel. I think that crimes of violence I would say incarceration is necessary. Income tax violations, I think are probably not, depending on what I know about risidivism. I don't know much about residivism in income tax cases.

Really insensitive there. In terms of giving time, as far as I think that for the first offense in an income tax case, I certainly

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would give probation. I hope you don't think the worst of me for that.

JUDGE MACKINNON: When I was a U. S.

Attorney I had an income tax investigator come in to see me after I'd been there about a year. He said: "You don't realize the kind of work we're getting. Some of the kinds of prosecution that you have been bringing in", he said, "they're coming in evading taxes in the hundreds".

It isn't that we see so many of the individuals, it's the continuance of the effect there and I think there's a wide -- I'm only speaking for myself, but certainly doing a lot of -- consideration going to be given to providing the income tax violations in reasonably, substantial amounts -- might get some time, not five years or two years but some time.

PROFESSOR CURTIN: Let me just say one thing: If you give somebody three months you're doing that person -- you're giving him a shot, certainly. On the other hand, you're making a heck of a lot of trouble for prison people just to process that guy in and out if you try to.

We're getting paid for that.

You're also making -- you're putting that person in a place he's going to take up for three months and it seems to me that when you try to cross all these things out you might end up, in our judgment, we think it's a -- (inaudible) to run these people through in lighter cycles.

On the other hand, you certainly might -not because you fit it in. We have six -- six bank robbers waiting for a place in this prison. We have got 250 million people in the United States. When you factor out the juveniles, you got 150 million filing income tax returns and if they see that they've got to file an honest tax return the number of cases that you're going to prosecute in the future, if they don't or if they file an honest tax return as a result of the imposition of some time for a few offenses in the next couple of years, I wouldn't be discouraged, Judge, that you couldn't look upon prison as a source of resourse -- not a resourse that we can spend with complete impunity and if it turns out that income tax people are very important to put in jail, remember they're

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occupying scarce space.

JUDGE MACKINNON: They're depriving the government of millions of dollars and they're just the tip of the iceberg. And the fact that they get off as easily as they do a lot of them feel it's just a business proposition or a business risk that they continue to underpay their taxes.

Now, I don't know whether you nav eever prosecuted any tax evaders, but the general way that the ordinary tax evader is discovered he goes down and talks to the Internal Revenue and a lot of this is pure avoidance of the law.

A lot of people feel something has to be brought nome to those people and they are most repentant, they are not repeaters. Once you get a person for income tax evasion he's generally not going to repeat it. But somebody else is going to repeat it because he got off easy.

I think that some person along the line -- I don't know about my colleagues might bear, something that might bear a little time,, I'm not saying going to make a career criminal out of him but again, he ought to get some time, maybe.

The other thing you talked about was specifying standards. Did you ever realize if you specify standards for probation you are in effect limiting the flexibility and discretion of the sentencing judge?

PROFESSOR CURTIN: Sure.

JUDGE MACKINNON: That you're doing that and consequently, he has to fit him into it in order to get it and if he goes beyond it --

PROFESSOR CURTIN: I understand. I think it's worth it in situations on that basis to in fact, have discussions. That's all I have.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much,
Professor. Appreciate very much your testimony
in keeping with the policy of the Commission.

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JUDGE WILKINS: Anyone who has any testimony to offer to the commission either today orally or in writing, we would prefer that anyone who has any testimony to come forward and remember that we request that testimony be submitted at a later date in writing. I was informed that you were here, John.

MR. COOK: My name is Michael Cook. I'm with the Federal Offenders.

JUDGE WILKINS: Have a seat, Mr. Cook.

MICHAEL COOK

FEDERAL JUDGES OFFICES

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MR. COOK: All right. I'm with the Federal Judges Offices, Northern District of California. I sat through this hearing all today. I appreciate the opportunity to be a member of the public, also to have the input in listening to what's happening today and the comments I heard.

There were a couple of thoughts I had.

First, it was interesting to see the clearcut contrast between prosecutors who seem very satisfied with the number at least in terms of

sanctions and what that equates to in terms of length of sentence in the preliminary draft and the defense seems very concerned about the lack of rlexibility from the lower-end sentence where there's a lot of limiting factors, we should all agree upon, doesn't seem to be included in the potential draft before us now.

I think it's very important to have the flexibility before the lower end. I practice in front of three Judges in San Jose. I don't consider them to be soft nor do I consider them hardened sentencers to me when I get -- because there's some people that maybe the case is different than the recent bank robbery cases that we have to deal with. And so my concern really is to allow the present system we have now full discretion. The Commission seems to deal rairly effectively with the high end sentence outside the normal -- what we would expect. I appreciate the Commission's concern about how you can hurt those mitigating factors.

There's one thought I nad, was one of the areas that you left quite wide open is how does one convert non-custodial type of sentence, be it probation, house arrest, fines, into

equivilents that are inconsistent to be used.

It seems to me if the concern really is for the low end sentence and that seems to be certainly the public concern, though in my experience in representing clients who are people who I don't want to see treated as though this is an appeal, this is an average in terms of time.

So, I have to present that it's important that that flexibility be there and if the concern is whether one includes that within the guidelines or takes it outside of the guidelines, if your concern is some control over that process, I guess it ends up within the guidelines and ends up with some sort of procedure of conversion factor of one year of probation, would be the equivilent to six months in custody.

Whatever it is, it seems to me that's the Commission's concern and Congress' concern is limiting discretion. That's one way of doing it, still allowing flexibility for those mitigating factors. I think we all realize it's important.

I'm very concerned also about the

question of the standard of proof. Whether, to what extent the Rules of Evidence apply. Seems to me, if you deal with a standard of proof we ought to be applying or tormalizing particular rules. Be it Rules of Evidence if you're talking about a clear and convincing evidence standard. Maybe there is more justification for applying a resser standard.

Seems to me there's some flexibilities there in terms of the applicability, in terms of Rules of Evidence and the standard of proof that's going to be required ultimately when we have appeals. That will happen, certainly.

I think there will be a tremendous number of appeals. Certainly, the defense or the government who may be disputing the application for what they contend to be wrongful application in the rirst place, sense it's going to be a factor-down type of determination by the sentencing judge.

And I can invision a lot of sentencing judges are going to be having the Appellate Courts reviewing, mostly clearly eroneous standards which is an extremely sentencing Judge which to me is all the more reason why there

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should be the higher quantum of proof, higher degree of evidence in our determining the exact factors that the Judge must produce, must consider in imposing sentence.

So specifically, our comment of Rule 32, which is going to be modified, fits correctly the portion that will now require the Probation Department to disclose as part of the pre-sentence in terms of what they believe the guidelines the Judge should follow will be what they should apply.

However it, still leaves open the ultimate recommendation by the probation officer still has not been exposed to the defendant.

And I'm not clear whether that's intended for the probation officer making a recommendation below the guidelines or above the guidelines.

Even though they have made their computation, whether that's going to be a part of that confidential recommendation that I don't think he'll receive, whether it's going to apply to recommendations within, whatever the guidelines that the Judge may have, to impose sentence.

Doesn't seem to me that's clear what the change to Rule 32 is going to be.

That's certainly very important to, I think, any defense attorney. Quite frankly, there are some judges who disclose what those recommendations are, some are apparent and I think it's a good idea to have sentences as open as 1s contemplated by the Statute by this Commission's mandate.

If it's going to be I think those recommendations where the probation officer may indicate to the judge that the ractors should be below the guidelines or above, ought to be disclosed also to the prosecution or defense.

I'm really troubled about what's going to happen to all my clients I have represented in the past and who keep asking me "what's going to happen to me when the Commission is out of existence?" That certainly is not clear at this point nor do your guidelines seem to agree except in this one case.

I had one of these cases that my client was convicted of First Degree Murder whose appeal is pending and as I read the commentary of your guidelines on Homicide you propose to convert the sentence which is now eligible for a parole, ten years mandatory release, 30 years

with life without possibility of parole.

I have some great problems with that and really concerned that I don't think the Commission has dealt with those. How you propose to deal with converting sentencings ultimately.

Another problem I see with Rule 32, every sentencing Judge are mandated to consider all of the factors that can be set out effectively. Eliminate that section of Rule 32, will not consider disputed factual information for purposes of sentencing. If that happens are going to be lot of sentencing. What is practically happening now. Most Judges have decided not to consider that disputed factual matters in the pre-sentence report.

What happens? Judges no longer have that discretion. He's going to have a lot more sentences and ultimately my reading of these guidelines, they get enacted in a fashion similar to, they don't have included the mechanism to deal with mitigating factors.

Lot of my clients are going to say to me, "what happens if I plead guilty?"

(inaudible) Must have very definite idea as I do

not. I have a lot of uncertainty in that. If I end up telling them "it really makes no difference what mitigating factors are available because the judge wouldn't be able to take into consideration..." as it will actually affect upon me of getting to trial.

Quite frankly, I don't see another rational thing I can say if you're going to be treated as a certain individual charged with a certain offense if important factors such as background and drug abuse and other relative factors of my client are not going to be available as mitigating factors.

I don't see what, if any motivation there is for a client not to take his chances and go to trial. I'd like to thank the Commission for the opportunity for allowing me to be heard. We ask for compassion for our work you now consider for purposes of the system today. (inaudible)

JUDGE WILKINS: I was a little surprised to read complaints about the studies suggesting ways of protecting your client's rights. Just as I'm not going to consider -- I don't know whether you consider that or not, so you have to

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give a reason.

MR. COOK: I understand that. And I guess my response in part to that is the way the system is presently structured now, the parole commission with its guidelines roughly cleans out that process. Whatever standard in the Parole Commission instead of by statute is by preponderance of the evidence.

JUDGE WILKINS: Review proceedings.

MR. COOK: -- just came out. Isn't clear, enough discretion. Their calculations of guidelines, nor is it a violation of the expo facto law to apply through guidelines to deal with previously sentenced under older guidelines.

JUDGE WILKINS: Any questions to my left?

JUDGE BREYER: You make it to accommodate sentencing in terms of proceedings. Then you can slow down the system to the point where you might as well say: "Charging -- that's the charged offense sentence, get rid of it." But then the power goes to the prosecutor.

I think you're absolutely right on the right track, trying to figure out some kind of negotiable criteria to work with.

From that point, would you think the same thing -- I think you neard Professor Zimring (sic) and Commissioner Baer say it was a technical point. You're bringing that out. You're trying to suggest what we should do in order to make it easier for a Judge to give probation. Easier than in the --

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MR. COOK: That's true. It becomes a function of to what extent you want to bring in discretion and to what extent to do that.

JUDGE BREYER: You're making some conversion of guidelines. This is what I'd like to think about. All the suggestions come down to three. For the first time each has a fault and one of them -- I think -- one thing you can do, you can raise the floor to 14, 16, 18.

You're floor is too low. It's 14 points now.

Now, the floor in raising is that we have the statute that ties the ceiling to six months. You know what I'm talking about?

MR. COOK: Yes.

JUDGE BREYER: So, if we raise it to 18 or 20 that means that whatever category the Judge has the right to give probation whatever that category of offenders. If the Judge can't

give more than six months in prison to that person in that category who he would like to send to prison, that's a flaw. That doesn't say you should do it. Each method has a tlaw.

The second method is the one, kept proposing all day, the threshhold. Decide whether to look at probation or not. If you do that as a threshhold, the category of guys like bank robbers, bad guys for the most part in that category — wasn't so very bad, but what you're asking the Judge is, you either give him probation or 25 years. There's no in between, and that's sort of weird.

MR. COOK: There, the Judge could still say there's some factors not really covered adequately.

JUDGE BREYER: If you say only that you produce that weird result. If you say that --

MR. COOK: Ultimately, the sentencing Judge doesn't consider anything literally.

JUDGE BREYER: The third one is, you say judging outside the guidelines, that's what you're saying right now, if you think he needs probation go outside of the guidelines. The flaw in that these are not key flaws. I'm just

saying that too often people tell us "you got to use quidelines".

And now, you suggested a rourth, which I'd like you to think about, which is there some way of increasing the encouragement to go outside the guidelines when the sentencing of prison that otherwise would be relevant is low but less encouragement when it's high.

In other words, if the sentence of imprisonment for people in this category were normally a year, the Judge would somehow be inclined to look more closely at the possibility of no sentence at all. In a sense, in this category is 20 years.

You say, not -- if you're going to depart, not send him to prison at all, that's better than if your flaws are few and far between for very, very, good reasons.

MR. COOK: Seems to me, too and it's surprising the limitations, you handle five years maximum probation imposed, seems to me the possibility if one is concerned about the lack of rlexibility that most longer periods of probation is an alternative to assert. All of the traditional prison sentences, the types of

probation in bank robbery cases, I think everyone is concerned from the defense point of view, that there needs to be some flexibility in the system to accomplish that other than what I see now, which is the Judges can do it, but the onness is putting all to the --

JUDGE BREYER: I can think of two things to be nelpful. One is both the technical problem, trying it as a technical problem. How to do it on probation, not as an average policy problem. Technically, what there is (inaudible) and secondly, as you pointed out in Murder, Section 1111, that's a problem. What happens is that that Statute U.S.C-1111 imposes a penalty. It says: "Penalty is life." And that didn't mean life prior to this new law but this new law parole, appeals, bank robberies.

MR. COOK: Bank robbery is five years for people who are going to be getting dates before they allow disposition.

JUDGE BREYER: You're pointing out something of policy. I'm not talking about policy. I'm talking about something that the law says if I agree in terms of policy I still have to pay this statute which for technical

reasons says whoever is guilty of Murder in the First Degree shall be sentenced to prison for life.

MR. COOK: We have that problem of the statute and there I think it would be useful for people like yourself who see these analogies to make a point to call it to the attention of Congress.

JUDGE BREYER: I'm glad that you call it to our attention but we are operating under the status, as rar as I know, there's no way out that. You see the statute says "life" and the provision which allows the parole authorities to grant parole is gone.

MR. COOK: That's true for the armed bank robber. 15 years. Your guidelines don't tell somebody. Seems to be intimating is the --

JUDGE BREYER: Statute says that it will be a minimum number of tive years. That's the maximum number.

MR. COOK: No, it doesn't -- that's right.

JUDGE BREYER: We can't say less. Any statute that has a minimum. We can't go beyond any statute that has a maximum number. We don't

go above the maximum. The Murder statute does not provide minimum or maximum.

MR. COOK: Based on -- it is truely the way it's written, a discretionary life sentence --

JUDGE BREYER: That's base --

MR. COOK: Unfortunately, it's not published?

JUDGE BREYER: You ought to get it published.

MR. COOK: Asked him to write an opinion, unfortunately, he didn't.

JUDGE BREYER: It calls for decision by the jury too. Doesn't it? And the Department of Justice -- have to go to the jury. Let me ask you this: You realize the contents in which these sentences are going to be imposed. Now, they're going to specify the exact reasons and that the exact reasons ennumerated in open court are going to be the sentence. Have you focused on that?

MR. COOK: I think that's an improvement.

JUDGE BREYER: They have to support the sentence either aggravaton or mitigation.

MR. COOK: Seems to be still steeped

(sic) with the standards the Appellate used also. The ract that the process of determining is this factor proved by the preponderance of the evidence or isn't it. I think we're going to have a great deal of lengthy review of that. I think we're going to have clearly erronerous -
JUDGE BREYER: I agree with you entirely.

MR. COOK: I think it is a much better process of opening all -- that's why I think it's important the process or whatever the probation officer's recommendations are either within the guidelines or outside which appears in every way, Rule 32 is going to read 1976 as part of the process of open --

JUDGE BREYER: Let me ask you now you feel on it tax evasion cases?

MR. COOK: Public Defender's Office rarely defend people. But they do as a favor -- I have represented some people in tax evasion cases. Quite frankly, I can think of a case specifically where the fellow was convicted -- imposed probation with a condition that returns of the past be filed at a certain time and all returns are filed within a limited probationary

period, timely fashion and that's the fraud, late tiling, of fines to be paid in a timely fashion.

And those I think are genuinely fair sentences. The problem is, most of the case that get prosecuted for tax evasion fail to file tax returns and quite frankly, that's deterring the rest of the world out there related the defendants I don't think it really happens.

There's a tremendous amount of penalty for people that I represent who are indigent by definition of the crime that justifies acts the penalties of administrations imposed the IRS.. Themselves are very open be 4TER 1 just.

Of I'm,

JUDGE BREYER: I'm not talking about
Substantial tax evader. Not your protest a
number of them might stand trial. Many of them
plead guilty. You think they ought to get time
or some small amount of time or.

MR. COOK: Your largest --

JUDGE BREYER: All right. I'm talking about evasion cases.

MR. COOK: I guess my answer to you is one you find that satisfactory in the sense it

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depends on the circumstances. To me what is important in representing that person would be the individuals mitigating factors.

JUDGE BREYER: Like what you got three years for instance the average case, three years tax evasion. Substantial. With mitigation. It depends. Got two wives. His business was going down the tubes. Maybe he had really financial Pressures. His motivation to do it, other than shear greed. For example, See, he do sentence from the other end of it I have an individual who I aidn't represent being in tront of those three same Judges in San Jose who make the same in every case, look to the person I present and was it that got them to the position where they're at. We got a lot in terms of sentence not only trying to deal, what happened with that but also trying to convince the judge of some of the things we have done. So that Judge wills ay I wouldn't be coming back in the system. I can't say that every one of those people should get jail time. No.

JUDGE BREYER: Would you think that they did not all of them but most of them that it might reduce tax evasion substantial it tax

evasion.

MR. COOK: Quite frankly in my experience it is the rare case that I have had my client who actually has fought in terms of the deterrants rational that a plea across the board in simply a part of the process that they have gone through. It is now, but there'll be additional factors if somebody begins to get time. In my experience most people, even bank robbers that really hasn't been part of the calculation.

JUDGE BREYER: At least I know the bank robber --

MR. COOK: People who know they were going to get caught never thought about the process. "If I get caught what will happen to me?"

JUDGE WILKINS. Neither of us will be able to decide today. Will the guidelines make a difference? We'll nave to find out through the next few years. We appreciate not only your input but all the public defenders. Most helpful in this Commission's proceedings. Great assistance to us during the past six or eight months.

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JUDGE WILKINS: Anyone else wish to speak? I'm informed that Mr. John Conrad is in the audience. Mr. Conrad--we're delighted to have you -- among other things has spent a number of years with the California Department of Corrections, Director of Research of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Thank you for coming.

MR. JOHN CONRAD
DIRECT OF RESEARCH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISON
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

MR. CONRAD: Thank you. Had a long day. Hope not to detain you unduly. I want to focus

entirely upon guidelines. The way in which they might affect the correctional system of the United States Government.

Any major change in the system of sanctions cannot fail to affect on the correctional system that are affected by it. So that I will give you some idea, by me, California -- in 1977, adopted -- changed the entire system of sanctions from indeterminate sentence to a determinate sentence.

The result has been a drastic -- drastic increase in the population of California prisons which are grossly overcrowded now. Millions of dollars invested will be necessitated and the extension of the budget program, budget forseeable in the future exceed a billion dollars a year which the Department of Corrections worked many years ago -- total budget was less than hundred thousand a year.

Similar situation occurred in the State of Ohio. Indeterminate sentence was adopted. Pretty complicated. Had some very unfortunate side features which resulted in an increase in the populcation of Ohio from around nine thousand in the late 70's to over 20 thousand.

Over time, there was a substantial increase of available space. This is a very serious situation from the standpoint of the safety of the inmates, also safety of the staff. It's important that in my view, that any change in the system, that the government should take into account the probably impact on both the system, of changes upon the Bureau of Corrections, and the probation system.

The system of guidelines is a well buffer between the legislature and the judiciary. The system of guidelines can insure that the legislature is not increasing the delay. Any increase in the sanctions between the present situation -- I'd note the guidelines are only as good as their capability for modification in the light of experience.

The pest example of the successful use of guidelines is the State of Minnesota which has managed to maintain a little prison population in the last eight or nine years during which the guidelines were in use.

The guidelines of Minnesota are regularly reviewed by the sentencing commission for that State and the Minnesota Statute requires the

Sentencing Commission to be impacted of any changes in the guidelines.

For a prison population this has been a very successful arrangement and I recommend that some of the provisions be arranged for the program that you adopt.

I have four recommendations to make to you. First: I think that it is merely practical and very desirable -- for guidelines -- to make a preliminary analysis of the impact of the guidelines which you adopt on the prison population. This is a personally practical thing to do and shouldn't take you much more time to do it.

Following that, there should be an annual review by the Sentencing Commission of the impact of the guidelines on the prison population, the population on probation.

And I remind you of the severe stress on an over-populated probation system which is worse then no probation at all in my view and I think I snould remind you that it's essential that if probation is to make any sense at all it does require a staff which is capable of maintaining regular and future contact with the

probationee.

population.

The second -- third recommendation I make to you has to with the question of intensive probation. A number of your witnesses this afternoon referred to the desirability of strengthening the probation system -- at least maintaining a stronger emphasis on probation and guidelines, prison draft seems to apply. I would like to add that it would be very desirable to consider a system of intensive probation such as that now in the State of Georgia. And I would want more relief of prison

And the tourth recommendation, in dealing with the guidelines program, there should be some explicit provision for the allowance of good time in long term -- good time is a judicial way of regaining some time for the purpose of behavior and that is the secondary purpose of making possible some reduction including the prison population.

Good time has unjustly, historically been abused by prisoners and by those in authority.

Often, the good time, when extended to anybody who has not had similar favor, unless the system

of good time is very carefully administered and supervised by the sentencing commission itself abuses occur and those are my four recommendation.

Preliminary review of the impact of the present proposed guidelines system upon the present prison population followed by annual review of the impact on the prison population and various other impacts that might apply.

The incorporation of intensive probation -- probation, that is for those programs and finally probation for a program of good time. Thank you, Commissioners.

JUDGE WILKINS: Thank you, very much, Mr. Conrad, for the suggestions that you make. Any questions to my left?

PROFESSOR NAGEL: Mr. Conrad, I would just like to assure you on your four recommendations, your first one, the accomplishing, we have been directed by the Congress to do an impact analysis.

Your second recommendation, also been assigned the mission, the monitory mission by the Congress subject to the development and promulgation of the guidelines.

The third: Intensive probation, I wouldn't be surprised if you'd see that.

And the fourth: We are limited by the Congress concerning the good times provisions in that 54 days per year is all that is committed.

MR. CONRAD: I only say 54 days a year or whatever is allowable by law be very carefully administered and supervised, so is not automatically guaranteed to anybody and prisoners earn good time.

JUDGE MACKINNON: Clear that you go to one year, get that good time, that from that point on that's personally done. Feel that's a good idea. That's the law.

JUDGE WILKINS: Any questions to my left. Thank you, very much much. Anyone else wish to appear and testify? None coming. We thank all of you for attending today. We stand in recess

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