Sixth Circuit - Categorical Approach

Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2019). Ohio felonious assault does not have as an element the use of force and is not a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.

United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Tennessee selling or delivering cocaine is not a controlled substance offense under §2K2.1(a)(4). The statute includes attempted transfer, but the plain language of §4B1.2(b) does not include attempt crimes.

United States v. Mayes, 928 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2019). Defendant’s convictions for Kentucky cocaine trafficking were serious drug offenses under the ACCA, even though the Kentucky legislature subsequently reduced the maximum 10-year sentence for three of the offenses to five years. The applicable maximum term is the term in effect at the time of the defendant’s state conviction for that offense.

United States v. Johnson, 933 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2019). Ohio robbery and complicity to commit aggravated robbery are crimes of violence under §4B1.2 because both statutes have as an element the use of force.

Knight v. United States, 936 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2019). Assault and robbery of a postal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

Greer v. United States, 938 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2019). Ohio aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA’s enumerated offense clause.

United States v. Parrish, 942 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2019). North Carolina indecent liberties with children is a conviction related to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor” under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). The categorical approach in this context does not require as close a match to a crime’s generic definition because the conviction only has to “relate to” abusive sexual contact.

United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2020). Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2020). Texas possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is not a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. The statute prohibits “offers to sell,” which constitute an attempt to commit a controlled substance offense. Inchoate offenses cannot qualify as predicate offenses because the guidelines commentary that includes them “impermissibly ‘add[s] to’ the Guidelines.”

United States v. Armes, 953 F.3d 875 (6th Cir. 2020). In determining the elements of a prior conviction, courts may consider the relevant part of an undisputed PSR that characterizes the contents of an underlying Shepard-approved state court record, such as an indictment or plea agreement.

United States v. Brown, 957 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under § 924(e).

United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020). Ohio preparing for shipment, shipping, transporting, deliver, preparing for distribution, or distribution of a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale to another person is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Garth, 965 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2020). Tennessee possession of marijuana with intent to deliver is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b) because it criminalizes the same conduct as the federal offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.

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