United States v. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2020). A supervised release condition requiring sex offender treatment, which allowed probation to select the treatment provider and treatment schedule, was not an impermissible delegation. And, neither the challenge to the condition requiring verification testing (arguing that it unlawfully permitted the use of the unreliable computerized voice stress analyzer) nor the challenge to the standard risk condition (arguing impermissible delegation) were ripe.
United States v. Villafane-Lozada, 973 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2020). A supervised release condition requiring truth verification testing, which permitted probation to select the testing method, was not an impermissible delegation.
United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020). The court erred when it imposed a condition of supervised released prohibiting the defendant from “communicating or interacting with someone . . . who has been convicted of a felony.” Although the standard condition usually requires no explanation, as applied to Bryant, the condition implicated his liberty interest in communicating with a close family member. Therefore, a specific justification was required.
United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020). When classifying a violation under §7B1.1(a), a court may consider a state recidivism enhancement to determine whether the violation conduct constituted an offense punishable by more than twenty years’ imprisonment.
United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020). A court may consider the seriousness of a defendant’s violation conduct when revoking supervised release, but it may do so only to a limited degree. The court did not violate this principle here: “the impact of the defendant’s actions on her victims is no doubt a legitimate component of [the severity of the violation conduct],” and the court articulated “a host of supporting reasons [for its sentence], many of which did not concern the severity of the violation.”