United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020). Assault with intent to rob a postal employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. A2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2. A “controlled substance” means any substance controlled by the jurisdiction of conviction, not substances controlled by federal law.
United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020). Attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The “substantial step” needed to establish attempted Hobbs Act robbery “need not be violent.”
United States v. Runyon, 983 F.3d 716 (4th Cir. 2020). Carjacking in violation of 18 USC § 2119, and conspiracy to commit murder for hire where death results in violation of 18 USC § 1958(a), are crimes of violence under 18 USC § 924(c).
United States v. Al-Muwwakkil, 983 F.3d 748 (4th Cir. 2020). Virginia attempted rape and Virginia burglary are not violent felonies under the ACCA.
In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2021). Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), which found § 924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague, applies retroactively on collateral review.
United States v. Croft , 987 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2021). South Carolina carjacking, which prohibits taking or attempting to take a motor vehicle “by force and violence or by intimidation while [a] person is operating the vehicle or while the person is in the vehicle,” is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. South Carolina courts have “given every indication” that intimidation “require[s] the use, attempted use or threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle.”