United States v. Baez-Martinez, 950 F.3d 119 (1st Cir. 2020). Puerto Rico second-degree murder is a violent felony under the ACCA because it requires malice aforethought rather than ordinary recklessness. Puerto Rico attempted murder conviction is also a violent felony because it requires the use of violent force.
United States v. Colon-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). Neither aggravated abuse nor attempted abuse under Puerto Rico law are categorically crimes of violence that constitute Grade A violations under §7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i) because the abuse statute includes psychological abuse that causes emotional harm.
United States v. Garica-Cartagena, 953 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2020). A hybrid approach is used to classify the grade of a violation under §7B1.1(a). The first step involves classifying the grade of a violation using the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense.” The second step involves using a conduct-based approach to determine if the defendant committed the offense. In the second step, the court can look beyond Shepard documents to any other reliable evidence.
United States v. Lewis, 963 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2020). Application Note 1 to §4B1.2 includes conspiracies and other inchoate crimes in the definitions for a crime of violence and a controlled substance offense, and this application note is valid. Prior First Circuit panels have held so, and “the case for finding that the prior panels would have reached a different result today is not so obviously correct” to allow overruling those decisions. On plain error review, the First Circuit declined to address whether a § 846 conspiracy is categorical mismatch with the generic definition.
United States v. Capelton, 966 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020). Massachusetts possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a class B substance is a controlled substance offense under the career offender guideline at §4B1.2. The statute was not overbroad because the defendant did not show there was “a realistic probability” that Massachusetts would have applied the statute to conduct that fell outside the generic definition of aiding and abetting.