United States v. Harris, 950 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2020). Arkansas committing a terroristic act is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2. It does not have as an element use of force against a person because it can be committed with intent to injure property.
United States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa and Illinois delivery of a controlled substance are controlled substance offenses under §4B1.2. The guideline’s definition of “distribution” includes delivery and is not limited to commercial drug trafficking crimes. The definition encompasses inchoate offenses through Application Note 1, which “is a reasonable interpretation of the career offender guidelines.”
United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa manufacture, delivery, and possession of counterfeit substances, simulated controlled substances, and imitation controlled substances is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).
United States v. Vanoy, 957 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance, is divisible by the type of substance. Here, applying the modified categorical approach, the defendant’s drug convictions were serious drug offenses under § 924(e).
McCoy v. United States, 960 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2020). Voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
United States v. Ross, 969 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2020). Kidnapping resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), and carjacking (with or without a death) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, are crimes of violence under § 924(c). Under these circumstances, a mandatory life sentence for a kidnapping resulting in death did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and insofar as the consecutive life sentences under § 924(c) had any practical effect, those sentences also did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
United States v. Bennett, 972 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa going armed with intent is not a violent felony under the ACCA. To be convicted, a defendant must have the specific intent to use a dangerous weapon against another and must, while armed, move from one place to another. Because the movement need not be in furtherance of the intent to harm another person, the completed crime does not involve the attempted use of force against the person of another.
United States v. Witherspoon, 974 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant had been convicted of Missouri first-degree robbery. Although the charging document was unavailable, the defendant did not object to the PSR’s recitation of that conviction. Missouri first-degree robbery is a violent felony under ACCA.
United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). Wisconsin possessing with intent to distribute cocaine is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).
United States v. Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2020). Attempting to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b). Application Note 1, which includes attempt and other inchoate crimes, is a valid exercise of the Sentencing Commission’s authority.
United States v. Coleman, 977 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2020). Tennessee possession of cocaine for resale is a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court determined that the defendant was convicted of possession “with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell” a controlled substance. Missouri delivery or manufacture of an imitation controlled substance is not a serious drug offense because it is punishable by a maximum of four years’ imprisonment, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) requires that an offense be punishable by ten years or more in prison.
United States v. Howard, 977 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2020). The court did not err when it used Shepard documents to determine that the defendant was convicted of Wisconsin armed robbery, which is a violent felony under the ACCA. Additionally, following the holding in Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), North Dakota conspiracy to deliver ecstasy is a serious drug offense under the ACCA because “conspiracy to delivery ecstasy in violation of North Dakota law involves conduct of distributing a controlled substance.”
United States v. Doran, 978 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 2020). California threatening to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury is a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(1).
United States v. Doran, 978 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 2020). Retroactive reclassification of a prior offense from a felony to a misdemeanor satisfies §4B1.2’s definition of a felony. If the failure to account for retroactive reclassification results in an overstated criminal history, the Guidelines permit a departure under Application Note 4 to §4B1.1.
United States v. Yackel, 990 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 2021). Minnesota aiding and abetting second-degree assault is a crime of violence under §4B1.2. Mere presence can support liability under Minnesota law but only where the “defendant’s presence is intended to, and does, aid the primary actors.”
United States v. Lyman, 991 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2021). The court’s decision to treat the defendant’s three prior convictions for Missouri drug trafficking as serious drug offenses under ACCA was not plain error. The law is unclear whether the definition of serious drug offense has a mens rea component.