Eighth Circuit - Categorical Approach

United States v. Stovall, 920 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2019). Arkansas robbery is a crime of violence under U.S.S.C §4B1.2(a) because the offense has the same elements as that of generic robbery—“misappropriation of property under circumstances involving danger to another person.”

Jones v. United States, 922 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2019). Missouri first degree robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA. “Putting a victim in fear of immediate injury” satisfies the force clause.

United States v. McDaniel, 925 F.3d 381 (8th Cir. 2019). Shepard documents established that three prior Missouri convictions for selling cocaine listed in one indictment were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as required for the ACCA’s mandatory minimum penalty to apply.

Faulkner v. United States, 926 F.3d 475 (8th Cir. 2019). Indiana burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA even though the statute defines “structure” to include “outdoor, fenced-in” areas.

Taylor v. United States, 926 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2019). Minnesota simple robbery is a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA.

United States v. Williams, 926 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2019). A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a controlled substance offense under §2K2.1(a).

United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2019). Arkansas aggravated robbery is a crime of violence under both the force and enumerated clauses of §4B1.2. The statute requires force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance.

Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2019). Missouri second-degree burglary is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the statute is not divisible and includes burglary of a boat or railroad car.

Kidd v. United States, 929 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2019). Aiding and abetting armed robbery of controlled substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§21188(a) and (c), is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 USC § 924(c).

United States v. Davis, 932 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2019). The Court did not clearly err when it determined that the defendant’s prior Iowa burglary conviction was a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 because the court announced an alternative rationale for the sentence, noting the defendant’s criminal history, likelihood of recidivism, and prior gang membership.

United States v. Gamell, 932 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2019). Minnesota aggravated robbery is a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA. Minnesota aiding and abetting second-degree burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA. Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but rather one way to prove the defendant guilty of the substantive offense.

United States v. Hataway, 933 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2019). Arkansas aggravated assault is a violent felony under the ACCA purposes. While the statute is divisible and lists non-violent ways to commit the offense, the charging document established that the defendant’s offense necessarily involved force. South Carolina pointing a firearm at another person is a crime of violence under the guidelines and a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA.

United States v. Merritt, 934 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2019). It was not plain error to decline to apply the categorical approach to determine whether drug conspiracy in violation of 21 USC § 846 is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2.

United States v. Jones, 934 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2019). Missouri sale of a controlled substance is a serious drug offense under the ACCA. An offer to sell is an offense “involving” the distribution of a controlled substance.

United States v. Clark, 934 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2019). Missouri second-degree robbery is a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA.

United States v. Block, 935 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2019). Arkansas second-degree battery is a violent felony under the force clause of the ACCA. Texas delivery of a controlled substance, which includes offers to sell, is a serious drug offense under the ACCA.

United States v. Quigley, 943 F.3d 390 (8th Cir. 2019). Iowa assault with intent to inflict serious injury is a crime of violence under the force clause of the career offender enhancement at USSG §4B1.2.

United States v. Silva, 944 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2019). The court appropriately looked to the state court judgment, indictment, and notice of criminal disposition to decide whether the defendant’s prior conviction for Mississippi burglary was a crime of violence under USSG §4B1.2. Though the records were not explicit enough to meet Taylor’s “demand for certainty,” they were sufficient for the factual inquiry into the statutory basis of the conviction at issue.

United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 2019). Arkansas aiding and abetting distribution of methamphetamine is a “controlled substance offense” because the commentary to §4B1.2 includes aiding and abetting offenses. Arkansas’ battery statute is divisible and one form of it is a crime of violence because it has as an element causing serious physical injury to another person.

United States v. Harris, 950 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2020) Arkansas committing a terroristic act is not a crime of violence under §4B1.2. It does not have as an element use of force against a person because it can be committed with intent to injure property.

United States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa and Illinois delivery of a controlled substance are controlled substance offenses under §4B1.2. The guideline’s definition of “distribution” includes delivery and is not limited to commercial drug trafficking crimes. The definition encompasses inchoate offenses through Application Note 1, which “is a reasonable interpretation of the career offender guidelines.”

United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2020). Iowa manufacture, delivery, and possession of counterfeit substances, simulated controlled substances, and imitation controlled substances is a controlled substance offense under §4B1.2(b).

United States v. Vanoy, 957 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2020). Virginia manufacturing, selling, giving, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance, is divisible by the type of substance. Here, applying the modified categorical approach, the defendant’s drug convictions were serious drug offenses under § 924(e).

McCoy v. United States, 960 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2020). Voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 is a crime of violence under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

United States v. Ross, 969 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2020). Kidnapping resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), and carjacking (with or without a death) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, are crimes of violence under § 924(c). Under these circumstances, a mandatory life sentence for a kidnapping resulting in death did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and insofar as the consecutive life sentences under § 924(c) had any practical effect, those sentences also did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

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