CHAPTER SIX - SENTENCING PROCEDURES AND PLEA AGREEMENTS
PART A - SENTENCING PROCEDURES
Introductory Commentary
This Part addresses sentencing procedures that are applicable in
all cases, including those in which guilty or nolo contendere
pleas are entered with or without a plea agreement between the
parties, and convictions based upon judicial findings or
verdicts. It sets forth the procedures for establishing the
facts upon which the sentence will be based. Reliable fact-finding is essential to procedural due process and to the
accuracy and uniformity of sentencing.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.
§6A1.1. Presentence Report (Policy
Statement)
(a) The probation officer must conduct a presentence
investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes
sentence unless—
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) or another statute requires otherwise; or
(2) the court finds that the information in the record enables it
to meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553, and the court explains its finding on the record.
Rule 32(c)(1)(A), Fed. R. Crim. P.
(b) The defendant may not waive preparation of the presentence
report.
Commentary
A thorough presentence investigation ordinarily is essential in
determining the facts relevant to sentencing. Rule 32(c)(1)(A)
permits the judge to dispense with a presentence report in
certain limited circumstances, as when a specific statute
requires or when the court finds sufficient information in the
record to enable it to exercise its statutory sentencing
authority meaningfully and explains its finding on the record.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
June 15, 1988 (see Appendix C, amendment 58); November 1, 1989
(see Appendix C, amendment 293); November 1, 1997 (see Appendix
C, amendment 574); November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment
674).
§6A1.2. Disclosure of Presentence Report; Issues in Dispute
(Policy Statement)
(a) The probation officer must give the presentence report to the
defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and an attorney for the
government at least 35 days before sentencing unless the
defendant waives this minimum period. Rule 32(e)(2), Fed. R.
Crim. P.
(b) Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the
parties must state in writing any objections, including
objections to material information, sentencing guideline ranges,
and policy statements contained in or omitted from the report.
An objecting party must provide a copy of its objections to the
opposing party and to the probation officer. After receiving
objections, the probation officer may meet with the parties to
discuss the objections. The probation officer may then
investigate further and revise the presentence report
accordingly. Rule 32(f), Fed. R. Crim. P.
(c) At least 7 days before sentencing, the probation officer must
submit to the court and to the parties the presentence report and
an addendum containing any unresolved objections, the grounds for
those objections, and the probation officer’s comments on them.
Rule 32(g), Fed. R. Crim. P.
Background: In order to focus the issues prior to sentencing,
the parties are required to respond in writing to the presentence
report and to identify any issues in dispute. See Rule 32(f),
Fed. R. Crim. P.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
June 15, 1988 (see Appendix C, amendment 59); November 1, 1991
(see Appendix C, amendment 425); November 1, 1997 (see Appendix
C, amendment 574); November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment
674).
§6A1.3. Resolution of Disputed Factors (Policy Statement)
(a) When any factor important to the sentencing determination is
reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate
opportunity to present information to the court regarding that
factor. In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important
to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant
information without regard to its admissibility under the rules
of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information
has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy.
(b) The court shall resolve disputed sentencing factors at a
sentencing hearing in accordance with Rule 32(i), Fed. R. Crim.
P.
Commentary
Although lengthy sentencing hearings seldom should be necessary,
disputes about sentencing factors must be resolved with care.
When a dispute exists about any factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court must ensure that the parties
have an adequate opportunity to present relevant information.
Written statements of counsel or affidavits of witnesses may be
adequate under many circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1991). An evidentiary hearing may
sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues.
See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez Martinez, 83 F.3d 488, 494-95
(1st Cir. 1996) (finding error in district court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for evidentiary hearing given questionable
reliability of affidavit on which the district court relied at
sentencing); United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 521(10th Cir.
1993) (remanding because district court did not hold evidentiary
hearing to address defendants’ objections to drug quantity
determination or make requisite findings of fact regarding drug
quantity); see also, United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057
n.9 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). The
sentencing court must determine the appropriate procedure in
light of the nature of the dispute, its relevance to the
sentencing determination, and applicable case law.
In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not
restricted to information that would be admissible at trial. See
18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,
154 (1997) (holding that lower evidentiary standard at sentencing
permits sentencing court’s consideration of acquitted conduct);
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1995) (noting that
sentencing courts have traditionally considered wide range of
information without the procedural protections of a criminal
trial, including information concerning criminal conduct that may
be the subject of a subsequent prosecution); Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747-48 (1994) (noting that district courts
have traditionally considered defendant’s prior criminal conduct
even when the conduct did not result in a conviction). Any
information may be considered, so long as it has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. Watts,
519 U.S. at 157; Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748; United States v.
Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 927 (1991); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990). Reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d
1365 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994); United
States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 997 (1989). Out-of-court declarations by an unidentified
informant may be considered where there is good cause for the
non-disclosure of the informant’s identity and there is
sufficient corroboration by other means. United States v.
Rogers, 1 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Young, 981 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980
(1993); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). Unreliable
allegations shall not be considered. United States v. Ortiz, 993
F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements
and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application
of the guidelines to the facts of a case.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 294); November 1,
1991 (see Appendix C, amendment 387); November 1, 1997 (see
Appendix C, amendment 574); November 1, 1998 (see Appendix C,
amendment 586); November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment 674).
§6A1.4. Notice of Possible Departure (Policy Statement)
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing
guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either
in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission,
the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is
contemplating such a departure. The notice must specify any
ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. Rule
32(h), Fed. R. Crim. P.
Commentary
Background: The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
amended, effective December 1, 2002, to incorporate into Rule
32(h) the holding in Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39
(1991). This policy statement parallels Rule 32(h), Fed. R.
Crim. P.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C,
amendment 674).
PART B - PLEA AGREEMENTS
Introductory Commentary
Policy statements governing the acceptance of plea agreements
under Rule 11(c), Fed. R. Crim. P., are intended to ensure that
plea negotiation practices: (1) promote the statutory purposes
of sentencing prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (2) do not
perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparity.
These policy statements make clear that sentencing is a judicial
function and that the appropriate sentence in a guilty plea case
is to be determined by the judge. The policy statements also
ensure that the basis for any judicial decision to depart from
the guidelines will be explained on the record.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment 674).
§6B1.1. Plea Agreement Procedure (Policy
Statement)
(a) The parties must disclose the plea agreement in open court
when the plea is offered, unless the court for good cause allows
the parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera. Rule
11(c)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P.
(b) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in
Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the
defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not
follow the recommendation or request. Rule 11(c)(3)(B), Fed. R.
Crim. P.
(c) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the agreement,
reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the
presentence report. Rule 11(c)(3)(A), Fed. R. Crim. P.
Commentary
This provision parallels the procedural requirements of Rule
11(c), Fed. R. Crim. P. Plea agreements must be fully disclosed
and a defendant whose plea agreement includes a nonbinding
recommendation must be advised that the court’s refusal to accept
the sentencing recommendation will not entitle the defendant to
withdraw the plea.
Section 6B1.1(c) deals with the timing of the court’s decision
regarding whether to accept or reject the plea agreement. Rule
11(c)(3)(A) gives the court discretion to accept or reject the
plea agreement immediately or defer a decision pending
consideration of the presentence report. Given that a
presentence report normally will be prepared, the Commission
recommends that the court defer acceptance of the plea agreement
until the court has reviewed the presentence report.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment 674).
§6B1.2. Standards for Acceptance
of Plea Agreements (Policy
Statement)
(a) In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal
of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges
(Rule 11(c)(1)(A)), the court may accept the agreement if the
court determines, for reasons stated on the record, that the
remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the
actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not
undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing
guidelines.
However, a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge
or a plea agreement not to pursue a potential charge shall not
preclude the conduct underlying such charge from being considered
under the provisions of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection
with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted.
(b) In the case of a plea agreement that includes a nonbinding
recommendation (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)), the court may accept the
recommendation if the court is satisfied either that:
(1) the recommended sentence is within the applicable guideline
range; or
(2) (A) the recommended sentence departs from the applicable
guideline range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons
are specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons
or judgment and commitment order.
(c) In the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific
sentence (Rule 11(c)(1)(C)), the court may accept the agreement
if the court is satisfied either that:
(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range;
or
(2) (A) the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline
range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons are
specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons or
judgment and commitment order.
Commentary
The court may accept an agreement calling for dismissal of
charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges if the
remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the actual offense
behavior. This requirement does not authorize judges to intrude
upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor. If the
government’s motion to dismiss charges or statement that
potential charges will not be pursued is not contingent on the
disposition of the remaining charges, the judge should defer to
the government’s position except under extraordinary
circumstances. Rule 48(a), Fed. R. Crim. P. However, when the
dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges
is contingent on acceptance of a plea agreement, the court’s
authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is implicated,
and the court is to determine whether or not dismissal of charges
will undermine the sentencing guidelines.
Similarly, the court should accept a recommended sentence or a
plea agreement requiring imposition of a specific sentence only
if the court is satisfied either that such sentence is an
appropriate sentence within the applicable guideline range or, if
not, that the sentence departs from the applicable guideline
range for justifiable reasons (i.e., that such departure is
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)) and those reasons are
specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons or
the judgment and commitment order. As set forth in subsection
(d) of §5K2.0 (Grounds for Departure), however, the court may not
depart below the applicable guideline range merely because of the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a
plea agreement with respect to the offense.
A defendant who enters a plea of guilty in a timely manner will
enhance the likelihood of his receiving a reduction in offense
level under §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility). Further
reduction in offense level (or sentence) due to a plea agreement
will tend to undermine the sentencing guidelines.
The second paragraph of subsection (a) provides that a plea
agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge, or a plea
agreement not to pursue a potential charge, shall not prevent the
conduct underlying that charge from being considered under the
provisions of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection with the
count(s) of which the defendant is convicted. This paragraph
prevents a plea agreement from restricting consideration of
conduct that is within the scope of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in
respect to the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted; it
does not in any way expand or modify the scope of §1B1.3
(Relevant Conduct). Section 5K2.21 (Dismissed and Uncharged
Conduct) addresses the use, as a basis for upward departure, of
conduct underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement
in the case, or underlying a potential charge not pursued in the
case as part of a plea agreement.
The Commission encourages the prosecuting attorney prior to the
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to disclose to the defendant
the facts and circumstances of the offense and offender characteristics, then
known to the prosecuting attorney, that are relevant to the application of
the sentencing guidelines. This recommendation, however, shall not be construed
to confer upon the defendant any right not otherwise recognized in law.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 1989 (see Appendix C, amendment 295); November 1,
1992 (see Appendix C, amendment 467); November 1, 1993 (see
Appendix C, amendment 495); November 1, 2000 (see Appendix C,
amendment 604); October 27, 2003 (see Appendix C, amendment 651).
§6B1.3. Procedure Upon Rejection
of a Plea Agreement (Policy
Statement)
If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of
the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do
the following on the record and in open court (or, for good
cause, in camera)—
(a) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;
(b) advise the defendant personally that the court is not
required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw the plea; and
(c) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not
withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably
toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.
Rule 11(c)(5), Fed. R. Crim. P.
Commentary
This provision implements the requirements of Rule 11(c)(5). It
assures the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea when
the court has rejected a plea agreement.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 2004 (see Appendix C, amendment 674).
§6B1.4. Stipulations (Policy Statement)
(a) A plea agreement may be accompanied by a written stipulation
of facts relevant to sentencing. Except to the extent that a
party may be privileged not to disclose certain information,
stipulations shall:
(1) set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual
offense conduct and offender characteristics;
(2) not contain misleading facts; and
(3) set forth with meaningful specificity the reasons why the
sentencing range resulting from the proposed agreement is
appropriate.
(b) To the extent that the parties disagree about any facts
relevant to sentencing, the stipulation shall identify the facts
that are in dispute.
(c) A district court may, by local rule, identify categories of
cases for which the parties are authorized to make the required
stipulation orally, on the record, at the time the plea agreement
is offered.
(d) The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may with the
aid of the presentence report, determine the facts relevant to
sentencing.
Commentary
This provision requires that when a plea agreement includes a
stipulation of fact, the stipulation must fully and accurately
disclose all factors relevant to the determination of sentence.
This provision does not obligate the parties to reach agreement
on issues that remain in dispute or to present the court with an
appearance of agreement in areas where agreement does not exist.
Rather, the overriding principle is full disclosure of the
circumstances of the actual offense and the agreement of the
parties. The stipulation should identify all areas of agreement,
disagreement and uncertainty that may be relevant to the
determination of sentence. Similarly, it is not appropriate for
the parties to stipulate to misleading or non-existent facts,
even when both parties are willing to assume the existence of
such "facts" for purposes of the litigation. Rather, the parties
should fully disclose the actual facts and then explain to the
court the reasons why the disposition of the case should differ
from that which such facts ordinarily would require under the
guidelines.
Because of the importance of the stipulations and the potential
complexity of the factors that can affect the determination of
sentences, stipulations ordinarily should be in writing.
However, exceptions to this practice may be allowed by local
rule. The Commission intends to pay particular attention to
this aspect of the plea agreement procedure as experience under
the guidelines develops. See Commentary to §6A1.2 (Disclosure of
Presentence Report; Issues in Dispute).
Section 6B1.4(d) makes clear that the court is not obliged to
accept the stipulation of the parties. Even though stipulations
are expected to be accurate and complete, the court cannot rely
exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the factors
relevant to the determination of sentence. Rather, in
determining the factual basis for the sentence, the court will
consider the stipulation, together with the results of the
presentence investigation, and any other relevant information.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987.